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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks a better understanding of the determinants of 
public policy. An approach is proposed which recognises that society 
is an interconnected whole, and which therefore seeks to explain policy 
in terms of the overall context in which it takes place. Several broad 
propositions derived from such an approach are suggested which the 
thesis seeks to verify.
Part One, based on the literature, defines an inclusive framework 
of categories of policy-influential variables, and examines the 
influence on public policy of each of these categories. It concludes 
by summarising a pattern of influential variables which, it is argued, 
is broadly similar in Western industrial countries, and plays a major 
part in explaining the nature and continuity of such societies and the 
characteristic policies which they pursue.
Part Two, using the framework defined in Part One, tests and 
refines the preceding analysis by examining some cases of environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) and public policy in Australia. The Common­
wealth government's overall implementation of its EIA legislation is 
reviewed, followed by case studies of policy determinants in relation 
to the planning and EIA of the formerly proposed new urban development 
of Monarto in South Australia, and Australia's uranium mining and 
export policy and the Ranger Inquiry.
The final chapter draws on both Parts One and Two to examine the 
propositions advanced in Part One. In terms of these propositions it 
is concluded that an understanding of the effects of the factors often 
described as forming the environment of policymaking, although some­
times neglected in favour of more proximate policy influences, is 
essential in explaining public policy, and that such factors do not 
merely set broad limits on policy, but have more immediate and specific 
effects on particular policies.
The wide range of variables which affect public policy and their 
highly interrelated nature is demonstrated, and it is therefore conclu­
ded that in explaining the determinants of public policy partial or 
monodisciplinary analysis should be avoided, and an approach should be
adopted of the kind used in this thesis, which seeks explanation among 
the patterns of interaction between many variables.
It is shown that a predominant pattern of relationships between 
major policy-influential variables exists which is important in 
determining the character of Australian society and its policies. The 
components of this pattern are described, and they are shown to have 
mutually reinforcing tendencies which lead to strong resistance to 
change which runs counter to their prevailing characteristics. These 
conclusions are applied to explain the course of EIA policy in Australia.
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PR Fi FACH
This thesis arose from the author's involvement in carrying out 
EIA, and encountering the resistance to the EIA requirement among 
government and private sector organisations. Such resistance seemed 
disproportionately strong, given the reasonableness of the idea 
underlying EIA, that the environmental consequences of proposals 
should be fully taken into account in decisionmaking. Existing 
attempts to explain the extent of such resistance and the poor 
implementation of EIA (for example in terms of deficiencies in the 
relevant legislation) appeared to be insufficient, or to point to 
further, underlying causes. It became apparent that a very wide 
range of contributing factors was involved, so that in order to 
explain the determinants of EIA, or any other policy, it is first 
necessary to understand the broader pattern of variables and 
relationships which shape society and its policies. Much academic 
work is directed towards refining the understanding of the role of 
specific variables in economic, political or social processes.
This thesis seeks to illustrate the need for a wider framework and 
perspective for explaining the determinants of public policy.
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PART I: TUT DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC POLICY
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
... no causal theories of suicide which ignore social 
organisation and cultural patterns can account for its 
essential factors ... The essence of his theory 
consists in regarding the total character of the 
respective society and culture as the cause of suicide. 
(Sorokin, 1974, p. 89).
These comments on Dürkheim's classic study of the causes of 
suicide are strikingly applicable to the approach adopted in this 
thesis to the task of explaining the influences which shape public 
policy. Such explanation, it will be argued, requires examination of 
all the factors which are likely to have influenced the process of 
formulating and implementing policy, from broad cultural ideas and 
values and socio-economic aggregates and relationships, through 
interest groups, institutions and organisations to the immediate 
decisionmakers and their interactions.
Expressed in this way, the need for a comprehensive approach to 
explaining the determinants of public policy may seem obvious; yet, as 
will emerge in later chapters, the policy literature is studded with 
examples where writers have neglected the broader context in narrowly 
focussing on proximate policy actors, or have advanced largely mono- 
causal explanations which tend to reflect their own disciplinary 
backgrounds.
In similarly advocating a 'holistic' approach (in relation to 
policy impact studies) Dolbeare (1974, p. 113) notes the frequent 
problem of
... failure to characterise pre-policy social circumstances 
and to combine policy-effects analysis with analysis of the 
effects of ongoing changes in social conditions and the 
impact of various other public and private policies.
He concludes (p. 119):
Without understanding of what conditions were like before a 
policy intervention, what forces were at work, creating 
what changes in social relationships, how these forces shape 
the lives of people, and related questions, analysts cannot 
hope to understand the effects of policies.
2.
A difficulty of such a broad perspective, however, is that in 
dealing with the effects of background variables such as prevailing 
ideas or socio-economic factors, explanation can only be indicative 
and interpretive in character. Causality between variables and 
policy cannot be rigorously demonstrated. To demonstrate strict 
empirical linkage would require exclusion of as many variables as 
possible, a narrow definition of the policy and concern with only 
its immediate and measurable effects. In doing so the danger is 
that important explanatory factors or outcomes, or vital aspects of 
the policy itself, are excluded - one is no longer explaining policy 
and its causes, but a distorted and partial image of them. To 
quote Dolbeare (1974, p. 21) once more:
To meet established standards of empirical demonstrabi1ity, 
we must adopt limiting premises, narrow the focus, and 
exclude as many factors from the analysis as possible.
But doing so means that we are obliged to build in 
inescapable flaws and biases. And it assures that we 
shall not ... accomplish wholistic (sic) analysis ...
Further, when studying a once-only phenomenon such as a 
particular policy process, it is not possible to isolate a specific 
independent variable and determine its influence on the dependent 
variable by repeated experiment. It is necessary to identify such 
relationships amidst the change and complexity of social events and 
interactions. In considering the various influences on policy it is 
tempting to think of policymaking as a sequential process narrowing 
down from the broad limits set by biogeophysical and socio-economic 
conditions, through electoral and interest group pressures to 
individual policymakers, in what Simeon (1976, p. 556) calls 'a funnel 
of causality'. But the relationships between influential variables 
and policy are usually more complex than this model suggests. In 
explaining policy it is necessary to look not only at the influence 
of each type of variable on policy, but at the interactions between 
variables and their consequences for policy. Such interactions 
consist of not only cause and effect relationships between pairs of 
variables, but also synergistic relationships which may involve many 
variables. Nor is the influence of each variable confined to a 
particular stage of the decisionmaking process, as the 'funnel of 
causality' would suggest. The many linkages between policy- 
influential variables are such that changes in one react on others
3 .
in a complex pattern. The problem therefore is not only that at any 
given time a number of variables is influencing any dependent variable, 
but that at the same time these variables are acting upon each other. 
Further, over time, the 'dependent1 variable may begin to show a degree 
of independence and feedback to the 'independent' variables.
In other words when one is seeking to explain a social 
phenomenon which is influenced by a large number of interdependent 
variables, a more reliable estimate of the influence of any single 
variable can be made if such an estimate is based on some understanding 
of the influence of all other significant variables on the dependent 
variable and on each other. Without such an understanding, to make 
inferences about the relationships of two variables under such 
conditions could be quite misleading, for example because an apparent 
causal relationship may in fact be due to the effect on both of other 
variables. Again these are simple points, but inclined to be 
overlooked in practice.
In short, because society and its environment are an inter­
connected whole, it is desirable in explaining the determinants of 
policy to begin with a review of the components of the whole, 
considering not just the proximate political or economic factors, 
but the broader framework of economic and biogeophysical conditions, 
institutions, ideas and values, technology, social structures and 
relations, and the important interactions between all these factors.
In order to implement such an approach, subsequent chapters will 
introduce a simple but inclusive framework of categories of policy- 
influential variables and examine the ways in which such variables 
and their interactions are likely to influence policy.
This is not an approach which says that everything is relevant.
It proposes that an overview is necessary to see what is relevant, 
and that a wider range of factors can be significant in explaining 
public policy than is often recognised. And it emphasises the 
importance of the pattern of interrelationships between policy- 
influential variables in explaining public policy. This does not mean 
that the proposed mode of analysis assumes multicausality or rejects 
beforehand the more monocausal explanations such as class-based 
conflict theory. But in seeking to examine the determinants of
4public policy, it does reject the methodology of carrying out an 
empirical study within an analytical framework based on one of the 
all-embracing theories of society, such as those often subsumed under 
the headings of 'order' or 'conflict' theories. Once the framework 
appropriate to a given theory has been adopted, then within its own 
framework the theory cannot be tested against other theories, but 
only with respect to its apparent explanatory power or otherwise in 
the case being examined. And in view of the complexity of social 
causation, it is all too easy to find data which appear to validate a 
selected model. In some studies it is far from clear whether the 
theoretical framework is being assumed as a priori correct in order to 
provide an explanation for particular phenomena, or whether the 
phenomena are being investigated in order to test the validity of the 
theoretical structure. Similarly, the theoretical framework of any 
single academic discipline is inappropriate in seeking to explain the 
determinants of public policy, because by their nature such disciplines 
tend to focus their attention on certain types of variables and 
relationships, and neglect others.
The preceding discussion suggests both an approach to explaining 
the determinants of public policy and a number of ideas concerning the 
nature of such determinants. The essence of the argument is that the 
path to such explanation does not lie in the pursuit of monocausal 
or monodisciplinary explanations, but rather in seeking a better 
understanding of the predominant pattern of relationships between the 
full range of variables which shape society and its policies. There­
fore rather than adopting an analytical framework based on some over­
riding theory of society or on any single academic discipline, it is 
proposed to start at a more fundamental level in Part One of this 
thesis by defining an inclusive framework of categories of policy- 
influential variables and, based on a review of the literature, 
examining the influence of each of these categories and their interac­
tions on public policy. Part Two will test and refine the conclusions 
of Part One by examining some cases of environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) and public policy in Australia. The advantages of EIA as the 
principal policy area examined in Part Two and the reasons for the 
choice of the particular case studies examined will be reviewed later 
in this chapter.
5A number of writers have proposed lists of policy-influential 
variables (e.g. Dye, 1972; Dearlove, 1973; lleclo, 1974; Simeon, 1976; 
Hawker et al. 1979) but such lists often omit important variables, as 
shown in Chapter Three. And analyses of the determinants of specific 
policies tend to be undertaken in a narrower and less systematic way. 
However, the intention here is to do more than provide a typology of 
policy determinants. Nor is it sufficient simply to consider the 
policy influence of each of the various classes of variables. The 
study stresses the importance of the relationships between such 
variables in shaping the overall character of society and its policies, 
and the way in which such relationships may reinforce one another to 
assist or resist various forms of change.
Given the complexity and variety of such interactions, it is 
suggested that many of the competing paradigms which purport to explain 
the determinants of public policy are not sufficient explanations, 
but reflect different aspects of reality (for example see the discussions 
of models of the decisionmaking process in Chapters Six and Eight).
The thesis therefore seeks where possible to reconcile and synthesise 
such explanations as components of a broader explanatory framework. 
Centrally, a pattern of important variables and relationships between 
them is identified which it is argued is a major factor in shaping 
society and its policies; a pattern which is outlined at the end of 
Part One and expressed in more detail in the Australian context in 
Chapter Eight, where it is also applied to explain the Australian 
experience with EIA policy.
Some general propositions
The ideas concerning the determinants of public policy embodied 
in the preceding discussion can be developed and expressed as a number 
of propositions, the validity of which will be examined in Parts One 
and Two.
They are first, that factors which form the environment of policy­
making - technology, prevailing ideas and values, biogeophysical 
factors, broad socio-economic conditions, the institutional framework - 
are likely to be of considerable weight in determining the character of 
any public policy. The policy influence of such factors is at times 
insufficiently recognised in explanations which focus on the proximate
6policy actors and events. Second, that because of the nature of 
society and its environment as an interrelated whole, changes in one 
area are likely to have extensive repercussions elsewhere. It is 
therefore important in explaining the determinants of public policy to 
examine the policy effects of such ramifications and interactions.
Third, that within the complex interweaving of policy influences 
a significant pattern of important variables and linkages between them 
can be discerned, and that the nature of this pattern of forces is 
a major factor in determining and explaining the character and direction 
of society and its policies. The divisions between the academic 
disciplines tend to detract from the study of the overall pattern of 
relationships between the different classes of policy-influential 
variables.
Fourth, that the extensive interactions and often mutually rein­
forcing relationships between policy-influential variables, and certain 
characteristics of these variables, embody a degree of momentum and 
inertia, so that a great deal of resistance is encountered by some 
vectors for social change. Plans for the implementation of new 
policies, and attempted explanations of difficulties in policy implemen­
tation, often fail to recognise the variety and strength of* such 
sources of resistance to change.
Fifth, and following from the preceding point, that proposed 
policies such as EIA which run counter to the dominant forces and trends 
in society will meet with great resistance, and are likely to be weak 
in implementation and to achieve only marginal success. Sixth, and 
specifically, that the experience with EIA policy in Australia can 
only be fully understood with regard to the preceding propositions. 
Seventh, that the determinants of public policy can be more readily 
explained in the light of the preceding propositions.
An introductory outline
The following provides a preliminary outline of the subsequent 
chapters, indicating the way in which the proposed approach to 
explaining the determinants of public policy is to be implemented and 
the preceding propositions tested.
7The range of factors considered as determinants of public policy 
has sometimes been unrealistically restricted by defining public 
policy as an outcome of rational processes. Thus an inappropriate 
choice of definitions may adversely affect the subsequent analysis. 
Definitions in the field of public policy sometimes differ substantially, 
creating the potential for confusion. In order to reduce such 
problems, and to make subsequent reference easier, a number of 
definitions are discussed together at the outset, in Chapter Two.
Chapter Three carries out the task of defining a framework of 
policy-influential variables and, based on the literature, examining 
the nature and extent of the influence of each category on public 
policy, both directly and through its interactions with other variables. 
The introduction to the chapter sets out some reasons for carrying 
out such a review, rather than proceeding more directly to the case 
studies. These include the far broader base of evidence provided by 
the literature concerning the determinants of public policy than can 
be obtained from case studies alone, and the desirability of examining 
existing explanations and paradigms.
Chapter Three is necessarily an extensive one, given the 
considerable number of categories of policy-influential variables and 
the multiplicity of relationships between them, the extensive literature, 
across a number of academic disciplines, concerning their effects 
on public policy, and the variety of conflicting viewpoints in the 
literature which call for examination.
It is shown that while each class of variable examined contributes 
to the shaping of public policy, no one or few such variables are 
predominant in doing so, and that therefore approaches to explaining the 
determinants of public policy which are largely monocausal or mono- 
disciplinary in character can at best be only partial explanations.
Such conclusions support the view that explanation of the determinants 
of public policy requires cross-disciplinary analysis of the kind 
introduced in Chapter Three, which examines a wide range of variables 
and seeks to incorporate and synthesise existing, partial explanations.
The chapter provides general support for the propositions set out 
above; in particular it identifies many of the sources of resistance
8to change, and it concludes by outlining a pattern of important policy- 
influential variables and linkages which, it is suggested, has common 
features in many Western industrial societies.
Before outlining the individual chapters in Part Two, some general 
comments should be made concerning the selection and organisation of 
the material and its contribution to the overall purpose of explaining 
the determinants of public policy.
In examining such determinants, empirical evidence can be 
obtained in a number of ways. A single policy area can be analysed in 
detail; more than one policy area can be examined, but in less detail, 
or the discussion can draw on a wide range of examples. There is 
therefore usually a trade-off between the thoroughness of the analysis 
of each case and the breadth of the empirical base. In this thesis, 
however, through the use of EIA as the principal policy area examined, 
elements of each of the above approaches are combined.
This is possible largely because EIA policy has the unusual 
property of being concerned with modifying decisionmaking processes.
EIA is based on the idea that special provision needs to be made to 
ensure that the environmental consequences of decisions are not ignored 
or underestimated, and that this can be done by requiring that certain 
procedures, intended to ensure that environmental impacts are predicted 
and taken into account by decisionmakers, are to be followed as part 
of the decisionmaking process. Thus while most policies have only one 
sequence of implementation, and so provide only a limited base from 
which to draw conclusions about the determinants of policy, the EIA 
requirement is applied to a variety of decisions. In each case a 
different set of variables affects its implementation, providing the 
overall study of the determinants of EIA policy with a broad empirical 
base.
Further, there is necessarily considerable overlap between the 
variables which affect the implementation of EIA in each case, and the 
determinants of the particular proposal to which it is being applied. 
Therefore the study of the determinants of the implementation of EIA 
in any particular case can easily be extended to examine the determinants 
of the policy or proposal to which EIA is being applied. This is the 
course taken in Part Two. For example, Chapters Six and Seven examine 
the determinants of the implementation of EIA policy in specific cases 
of urban development and uranium mining and export respectively.
9But they also consider the determinants of the urban development and 
uranium policies themselves. They are therefore case studies at two 
levels, both of which contribute to the understanding of the 
determinants of public policy.
Thus Part Two is not intended to be a comprehensive description 
of the course of EIA policy in Australia. It is a selective review 
with the primary purpose of using EIA, and the other policy areas 
examined concurrently, to contribute to the understanding of the 
determinants of public policy, with particular reference to the general 
propositions set out above. At the same time, the review will make a 
specific contribution to the explanation of the determinants of EIA 
policy.
Each chapter in Part Two examines different, but complementary, 
aspects of EIA and the determinants of public policy. Chapter Four 
considers the influence of the environmental variables in the Australian 
setting on EIA policy and some of their implications for public policy 
more generally. Chapter Five reviews the role of governments and the 
bureaucracy in the overall implementation of Commonwealth EIA policy. 
Chapter Six focusses on the internal workings of a State statutory 
authority carrying out an EIA and the way in which these were affected 
by external and internal forces. By contrast, Chapter Seven examines a 
range of actors in the public arena together with influences external 
to Australia concerning a nationally controversial issue involving the 
public inquiry form of EIA.
The period covered by the studies in Part Two is for the most part 
from the early 1970's to the defeat of the Fraser Liberal-National 
Country Party (LNCP) Federal government in March 1983.
The following sets out the content and contribution of each 
chapter in more detail. Chapter Four reviews the setting for policy­
making in Australia, including the 'environmental' variables: technology,
socio-economic conditions, biophysical factors, institutions. It 
examines the characteristics of such variables and their important 
relationships with other policy-influential variables. It considers 
both their broad consequences for EIA policy, and some of the implica­
tions for public policy more generally.
The chapter therefore provides the necessary background for 
subsequent chapters. Its discussion of the institutional framework,
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and of changing economic conditions over the period, is particularly 
relevant to the review in Chapter Five of the Commonwealth government's 
overall implementation of the EIA legislation. Chapter Four, together 
with the more detailed analysis in subsequent chapters, helps to evalu­
ate, in the Australian context, many of the conclusions in Chapter 
Three concerning the influence of the environmental variables on policy.
Chapter Five focusses on governmental actors. It investigates the 
influence of governments and the bureaucracy on the character 
and implementation of the Commonwealth EIA legislation. The Commonwealth 
government's experience with EIA was chosen for detailed review largely 
because its EIA legislation - the Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974-75 ('the Act') - has been in operation longer than 
any State legislation, and its requirements are more comprehensive and 
detailed than those of the States. New South Wales has had a longer 
experience with EIA, but its procedures were not embodied in legislation 
until 1979. The Commonwealth experience also provides a better view of 
the important policy effects of the division of powers between Common­
wealth and States under the Constitution. However, the experience of 
each State with EIA is also summarised.
The chapter examines the Whitlam and Fraser governments' implementa­
tion of the EIA legislation, including their management of the 
Commonwealth department administering the Act. These activities are 
reviewed in the context of the institutional framework and changing 
economic conditions described in Chapter Four, and related to the 
respective ideologies and policy priorities of each government. The 
chapter also examines the response of the Commonwealth departments 
affected by the requirements of the Act, the relationships between these 
departments and the administering department, and the extent to which 
the latter has been able adequately to implement the Act. The EIA 
requirements and experience of the States, and State attitudes and 
Commonwealth/State relations concerning the Commonwealth Act are also 
discussed.
The conclusions of Chapter Five support those of Chapter Three in 
a number of ways: they illustrate the wide range of policy influences
which combined to reduce the implementation of the Act; the latitude of 
governments and bureaucracy to take action which has no clear public 
support; the strong independent influence of the bureaucracy on public 
policy; and the operation of a range of sources of resistance to change.
Chapter Six examines the implementation of EIA and environmental 
planning for the formerly proposed new urban development of Monarto, in 
South Australia. The case was chosen primarily because of the special 
knowledge of the internal workings of the Monarto Development Commission 
(MDC) available to the writer as the former Director of Environmental 
Planning at the MDC, with responsibilities which included that of carry­
ing out EIA. As discussed in more detail in the chapter, there is a 
scarcity of information on the internal workings of government in 
Australia, an area particularly important to understanding the implemen­
tation of EIA, since it is commonly carried out by organisations which 
are unsympathetic to its aims. The case also satisfied other criteria: 
the Monarto proposal was a large and multi-faceted one, involving a wide 
range of organisations, including both Commonwealth and State environmen­
tal authorities.
Although the case study centres on the internal workings of a 
specific government organisation, it is not restricted to examining 
internal influences on decisionmaking. It uses the full framework of 
variables developed in Chapter Three in order to demonstrate the way in 
which these variables took effect through the organisation's decision­
making processes. Because of its access to internal decisionmaking 
processes, the study is particularly suited to considering the applica­
bility of the various models of decisionmaking considered in Chapter 
Three, and to reviewing the discussion there concerning the effects of 
factors such as organisational and professional socialisation, aspects
of personality, and structural and procedural rigidities in leading to
*
resistance to change.
In order to consider the factors which affected the implementation 
of EIA for Monarto it is necessary to examine many of the influences on 
decisionmaking concerning the Monarto project more generally - for 
example those leading to the adoption of the proposal. These wider 
decisionmaking processes, as well as those specifically concerning EIA, 
are drawn upon to illustrate the determinants of policy.
Chapter Seven examines the determinants of Australia's uranium 
mining and export policy, with particular reference to the role of the 
Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry. The Chapter thus examines the 
determinants of public policy at two interrelated levels: the factors
which influenced Australia's uranium mining and export policy, and those 
which affected the implementation of EIA in the form of a public 
environmental inquiry.
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The issue of uranium mining and export was selected for study both 
because it was the subject of one of the only two inquiries to have been 
held under the Commonwealth EIA legislation, and because of its value 
as a case study of the determinants of public policy in action. The 
uranium issue involved a variety of important questions ranging from 
nuclear safeguards requirements to Aboriginal land rights. These 
generated a high level of public interest, and brought an unusually wide 
range of actors into the public arena.
The issue therefore provides the opportunity to examine the actions, 
policy stances, and policy influence of a variety of actors: trade
unions, the business sector, environmental interest groups, scientists, 
the media, Aborigines, and the general public, together with the 
influence of international energy markets and the policies of other 
countries concerning nuclear power development and safeguards. The 
chapter also examines a range of other relevant matters such as the 
effects on uranium policy of the divisions within the Labor Party and 
the union movement on the uranium issue, and of course the role of the 
Ranger Inquiry itself.
Where the Monarto case study concerns a subject which was of a much
/
more localised interest, and to a considerable extent deals with bureau­
cratic activities taking place away from public scrutiny, Chapter Seven 
emphasises the other side of the coin in examining a wide array of public 
actors concerned with a policy issue of national interest and importance.
The final chapter uses Parts One and Two of the thesis to draw con­
clusions about the determinants of public policy. Centrally, it 
addresses itself to proposition three concerning the 'pattern of 
important variables and linkages between them ... which is a major 
factor in determining' the character of public policy and which was 
outlined at the end of Chapter Three. It sets out the components of 
this pattern in the Australian case in the light of supporting evidence 
from earlier chapters, and shows how, in terms of proposition four, 
such variables tend to be mutually reinforcing in resisting change.
The chapter then applies these conclusions to explaining the difficul­
ties which have been encountered by EIA policy in Australia.
This thesis is primarily directed towards explanatory analysis, 
rather than normative or prescriptive conclusions. However, the thesis 
concludes with some normative comments on EIA policy in Australia in 
the light of the preceding analysis.
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EIA and public policy
It was noted earlier that the study of EIA policy has certain 
advantages for the purpose of explaining the determinants of public 
policy. Because EIA policy is concerned with modifying decision­
making processes, it applies to a variety of proposals. In each case a 
different set of determinants affects the implementation of EIA, thus 
broadening the empirical base. It was also pointed out that the study 
of the determinants of the implementation of EIA policy in a particular 
case can readily be extended to a review of determinants of the 
decision or proposal to which EIA is being applied, since both sets of 
determinants will overlap.
Another advantage arises because in seeking to modify decision­
making processes, EIA necessarily embodies certain prescriptive ideas 
about the desired nature of such changes, and these in turn are based 
on further concepts or assumptions about the character of the decision­
making process and the factors which influence it. This adds another 
dimension to the analysis of EIA policy, since implementation of EIA 
policy in effect provides a testing ground for such concepts, and 
the results throw light on various aspects of the determinants of 
public policy.
The following outlines some of the ideas embodied in EIA policy 
and their bearing on questions concerning the determinants of public 
policy.
EIA as a theory of environmental problems
The EIA requirement contains an implicit theory of the causes 
of environmental problems. The idea central to EIA of modifying 
decisionmaking procedures in order to reduce the adverse environmental 
consequences of decisions is often supported by the argument that such 
consequences arise because of failings related to the decisionmaking 
process itself. For instance, environmental costs are often disregarded 
by decisionmakers because they are external costs: costs not borne by 
the organisation creating them and therefore not included in the cost/ 
benefit calculations upon which the organisation bases its decisions. 
Further, because ecological relationships are complex and often poorly 
understood, and because environmental amenities are often public goods
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with no market price, environmental impacts are frequently difficult 
to predict and to express in money values and therefore tend to be 
neglected. It can therefore be argued that the appropriate solution 
is to overcome such deficiencies by modifying decisionmaking procedures 
by means such as EIA, to require the provision and consideration of 
information about the environmental consequences of proposals.
A less optimistic view is that such weaknesses in the decision­
making process do exist, but that these are largely a reflection of 
certain characteristics of society which are the underlying causes of 
environmental problems and that therefore changes in decisionmaking 
procedures alone are likely to be ineffective. Nevertheless it might 
still be considered that changes in decisionmaking procedures could 
reduce environmental problems, provided that such changes also 
indirectly modify the underlying causal factors. For example, the 
mandatory placing of information about environmental consequences 
before decisionmakers and the public might lead to a modification of 
values and attitudes towards the environment, and therefore to a 
greater weight being given to such considerations in decisions.
Thus in assuming that environmental problems are susceptible to 
changes in decisionmaking procedures, EIA policy raises the question of 
whether many environmental problems are largely due simply to 
deficiencies in the decisionmaking process, or whether such deficiencies 
are manifestations of underlying and less directly tractable economic, 
political and social forces. Because of the fundamental matters which 
this question raises, any review which seeks answers to it will clearly 
have a bearing on more general questions concerning the determinants of 
public policy, and should draw on both the EIA experience and the 
wider literature.
EIA as rational decisionmaking
EIA embodies the view that changes which attempt to introduce 
greater rationality into decisionmaking processes with respect to 
environmental factors will result in such consequences being given more 
adequate weight in decisions. The changes required by EIA are designed 
to move decisionmaking, at least in its environmental aspects, substan­
tially towards what has been called the rational-comprehensive model of 
decisionmaking (Lindblom, 1959). The essentials of the model are a
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systematic and objective approach to decisionmaking involving the 
identification and weighting of all relevant goals, values and resources 
prediction of the consequences of all feasible alternatives for achiev­
ing the goals based on comprehensive collection and analysis of 
information about such consequences, and selection of the alternative 
with the highest net expectation. EIA, with its characteristic 
requirements of identification of the objectives of proposals, review 
of social and environmental as well as economic costs and benefits, 
examination of all feasible alternatives including that of not proceed­
ing, and public review to reduce the possibility of important aspects 
being neglected or wrongly weighted, adds up to an application of the 
rational-comprehensive model. EIA policy thus assumes that decision­
making processes are susceptible to attempts to increase their 
rationality and that environmental outcomes will be improved as a result 
A review of the EIA experience to examine the validity of such assump­
tions will carry wider implications concerning the nature of the 
decisionmaking process.
EIA as public participation
The provision in most EIA procedures for the environmeptal impact 
statement (EIS) to be made available to the public for comment rests on 
certain ideas concerning the merits of public participation in decision­
making. Such ideas may range in strength from the notion that the 
public should be informed about proposals likely to affect it, to the 
view that the public should have a direct participatory role in 
decisions. Behind such ideas lies the notion that the conventional 
democratic mechanisms are too attenuated and imprecise to deal 
effectively with many matters of public concern, and that therefore a 
more direct link between the public and decisionmakers is necessary.
There are of course counter-arguments, for example to the effect 
that public participation works to the disadvantage of the less well- 
educated and articulate sections of society. Examination of the 
validity of such views in relation to EIA leads to a range of questions 
concerning the operation of parliamentary democracy: for instance,
whether the lengthy chain of communication between the electorate, 
parliament, the executive and the public service is effectively trans­
mitting the will of the people; to what extent cabinet or prime 
ministerial government has reduced the effective role of parliament;
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whether the bureaucracy takes too large a part in policymaking and 
decisionmaking; and whether greater judicial or other constraints on 
the discretionary powers of public servants and ministers are 
desirable. Once again, the ideas inherent in EIA policy raise 
questions concerning the forces which shape public policy generally.
EIA as organisational change
EIA policy embodies the idea that carrying out the EIA should be 
the responsibility of the proponent - the organisation responsible for 
the proposal in question. Under some requirements the proponent 
organisation must itself carry out the EIA; elsewhere, it can be done 
by outside consultants for the proponent. The processes entrained by 
the need to conform with EIA requirements can have quite traumatic 
effects within the proponent organisation. Personnel required to 
participate in the EIA process must cope with a subject in which they 
may have little or no expertise, and whose purpose and philosophy may 
conflict with their predispositions and training. Where new staff 
resources or additional responsibilities are created to deal with EIA 
requirements, new power relationships and potential conflicts are 
thereby created. Where public review is required, the rationale for 
decisions, formerly an internal matter, may be exposed to extensive 
public criticism and debate. Previously anonymous individuals may be 
required to justify their decisions in the public arena. Review by 
government agencies of EIA produced by other government agencies can 
lead to inter-departmental disputes and power struggles. The potential 
of EIA to threaten established interests and to bring external 
influences to bear on organisations can generate strong resistance, and 
the outcomes of EIA policy are in part a product of organisational 
struggles to adapt to or resist EIA requirements. EIA policy thus 
provides a testing ground for questions concerning the influence of 
organisations on the policy process.
EIA as social change
Finally, in this catalogue of ideas which EIA embodies or implies, 
are those which relate to EIA policy's potential as an agent of social 
change. EIA's deceptively simple objective of ensuring that the 
environmental consequences of proposals are fully considered carries
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with it implications which challenge some of the more fundamental 
orientations of Australian and similar societies. By suggesting the 
possibility that the environmental damage caused may outweigh the 
benefits of some proposals, it challenges the often unquestioning 
belief in the intrinsic merits of economic growth and development. As 
we have seen, EIA also calls in question the long-established but 
narrowly conceived objectives of development-oriented government 
agencies. It challenges the doctrine that the minimum interference 
with the pursuit of private gain will result in the greatest public 
good, by requiring organisations previously concerned with private 
ends to account publicly for the public consequences of certain 
actions.
In any society certain widely-held ideas and values exist.
Some of these, even though they exist simultaneously, may conflict.
The nature and importance of such values, myths or national self- 
images of course varies between countries, and may greatly affect the 
degree of success of a particular policy. EIA may be seen by 
implication to favour some values over others; environmental and social 
amenity as against material welfare; the appreciation of nature as 
opposed to conquering it; the need to consider others as agqinst the 
freedom of individual action; the virtues of co-operation as against 
those of aggression and competitiveness.
Because of its potentially wide implications and its challenge 
to existing values and institutions, EIA has the capacity to be a 
significant agent of social change. This potential was probably not 
fully understood by many of those involved in introducing EIA policy; 
nor has its potential for inducing social change been anywhere near 
fully utilised. Nevertheless, as an agent of social change, the 
course of EIA policy requires explanation not only in terms of its 
specific characteristics as an environmental policy, but also in terms 
of the forces which are encountered in some degree by any attempt to 
bring about social change; that is, the mainstream of influences which 
shape public policy.
As an agent of deliberate social change EIA falls into an 
important normative category. Problems associated with population 
growth, food and energy shortages, technological change, economic 
recession and pollution are increasing in scale, complexity and
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interdependence. Many such variables have a momentum of their own 
over which society as a whole appears to have little control. It is 
becoming an increasingly difficult and vital task for society to 
achieve greater control over its own destiny - to be able to determine 
the direction and nature of change. As an agent of deliberate social 
change, the EIA experience can provide useful information about the 
capacity to carry out such change, and about the processes and 
resistances which are activated by such attempts.
SUMMARY: AIMS AND CONTENT
This thesis seeks a better understanding of the determinants of 
public policy. It argues that this can be achieved by developing an 
approach which recognises the nature of society as an interrelated 
whole, and which therefore seeks to explain policy in terms of the 
overall context in which it takes place. It puts forward a number of 
propositions concerning the determinants of public policy which are 
derived from such an approach, and seeks to verify these.
To this end Part One develops from the literature a classifica­
tion of policy-influential variables, and examines the significance of
/
each of them for public policy. It concludes by summarising some of 
the major relationships between variables which, it is argued, are 
important in explaining the nature of Western industrial societies and 
the characteristic policies which they pursue.
The preceding analysis is then tested and refined in Part Two 
by examining the determinants of public policy in some studies of EIA 
and public policy in Australia. Successive chapters examine: some
aspects of the Australian setting for public policymaking; the 
Commonwealth government's overall implementation of its EIA legislation; 
the implementation of EIA for the formerly proposed new city of 
Monarto in South Australia; and Australia's uranium mining and export 
policy and the role of the Ranger Inquiry. Each of the case studies 
emphasises somewhat different aspects of the determinants of public 
policy. The final chapter draws on both the literature review and the 
case studies to describe, in the Australian case, a pattern of important 
policy-influential variables of the kind outlined in Part One.
It shows the significance of these variables and their interactions in 
shaping public policy in the cases examined, and applies these findings 
to the general propositions listed in Part One.
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CHAPTER TWO: SOME DEFINITIONS
Few exercises produce so quick and deep a glaze 
in the eyes of nonprofessional readers of 
scholarly literature as the hair splitting and 
logic chopping of conceptualisation. (Ranney, 1968, p.6)
There are some remarkable differences in the definitions of 
commonly used terms advanced by various writers in the policy field. 
To reduce the possibilities of misunderstanding it is necessary to 
carry out the preliminary task of explaining one's own terminology 
and relating it to that of others. Those who wish to avoid semantics 
should pass on and refer back to this Chapter where necessary.
There is no absolute right or wrong in such definitions. As 
Heclo (1974, p.85) notes: 'policy does not seem to be a self-defining 
phenomenon, the contents of which are noted by the analyst ... There 
is no unambiguous datum constituting policy and waiting to be discovered 
in the world.' But some definitions are more useful classifications of 
similarities amongst phenomena than others. Differences in definition 
arise not only because some definitions are 'better' than others, but 
because purposes, time frames, and scope of study differ. Ap author 
conducting a historical review is likely to have a broader definition 
of a term than one making a laboratory experiment.
Public policy
A frequently encountered definition (e.g. Dye, 1972, p.l) is 
that public policy is simply 'what government does'. This is a very 
broad definition, yet perhaps it should have been even broader.
Public policy is not only what government does. It can also be what 
government does not do. Governments may pursue a deliberate policy 
of inaction. Heclo (1974, p.4) aptly quotes Churchill's description 
of the British government's inaction on defence policy; 'decided only 
to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, all 
powerful for impotence.' But d l l the things that government does not 
do are not public policy. Only when government consciously refrains 
from doing something can inaction be called public policy. Inaction 
which arises from a fortuitous lack of awareness is not policy.
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The term ’public policy' is also used in a rather different sense, 
to mean a stated or perceived intention of government. As Easton (1965, 
p .358) writes, 'the term is also used in a second and broader sense to 
describe the more general intentions of the authorities of which any 
specific binding outputs might be a partial expression. As such the 
statements of policies are not binding ...'
So far, then, we have added to the original definition so that 
public policy is what government does, intends to do, or chooses not to 
do. What might one wish to subtract from this definition? Surely 
everything government does is not policy. According to Heclo (1972, p.83), 
the term 'is usually considered to apply to something "bigger" than 
decisions, but smaller than general social movements.' But the 
distinction between policies and decisions does not necessarily rest 
with bigness or smallness. Certainly, a policy can be made about 
decisions, but a decision can also be made about policy - a policy 
decision - without one being 'bigger' than the other; but they are still 
distinct. A decision is the choice of an action or course of action. 
Decisions are discrete, while policies have continuity over time. A 
policy is a course of action (or inaction) carried out or intended.
Some commentators would limit the term policy to the 'important' 
activities of government (e.g., Sharkansky, 1970a, p.3). A problem 
here is that importance is to a large extent in the eye of the beholder. 
What is a comparatively minor decision at one level of government may 
provide a central policy objective at a lower level. Sharkansky attempts 
to reduce this subjectivity by defining important activities as those of 
interest to many people or which use large amounts of resources. This 
view, however, deviates too far from common usage. 'Policy' is often 
used to refer to courses of action or decision rules which use few 
resources and affect comparatively few people; for example, a local 
government authority may have a policy on residential street closures, 
or on subsidised housing for single mothers.
Many writers believe that policy must have an objective or goal. 
Lasswell and Kaplan (1960, p.71), for instance, define policy as 'a 
projected programme of goal values and practices'. To Friedrich (1963, 
p.70), 'It is essential for the policy concept that there be a goal, 
objective, or purpose.' In a definition which has often been quoted,
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Ranney (1968, p.7) has taken this kind of approach even further. He 
suggests that the 'elements of any kind of policy, toward anything by 
any social actor' are as follows:
1. a particular object or set of objects;
2. a desired course of events;
3. a selected line of action;
4. a declaration of intent;
5. an implementation of intent.
Such restrictive definitions of policy have become less popular, probably 
because they have a strong flavour of the 'rational actor' paradigm of 
decisionmaking which has since been under considerable fire (see for 
example Lindblom (1959), Allison (1969) and for contrasting views Dror 
(1964) and Ball (1974)). Ranney's third element, for example, requires 
deliberate, rational choice, as he elaborates it: 'in other words not
merely whatever the society happens to be doing towards the set of 
objects at the moment, but a deliberate selection of one line of action 
from among several possible lines' (1968, p.7). By contrast, Allison 
and Halperin's (1971, p.43) characterisation of bureaucratic politics 
has now almost become cliche; 'players choose in terms of no consistent 
set of strategic objectives, but rather according to various conceptions 
of national security, organisational, domestic and personal interests. 
Players make governmental decisions not by a single rational choice, but 
by pulling and hauling.'
But it is not necessary to abandon the rational actor paradigm as 
a useful description of the policy process in many instances in order to 
accept that situations exist where government is pursuing a course of 
action which is recognised as government policy, but which cannot be 
said to have clear and agreed goals or to have been deliberately chosen 
from a range of possibilities. Certainly, many policies have stated or 
apparent goals. But the overt goals may camouflage a range of diverse 
and conflicting purposes. For example, EIA policy might have a stated 
objective of ensuring that environmental consequences are fully 
considered. But such an objective leaves room for conflicting views as 
to the extent to which the policy is to be implemented, what 'fully 
considered' means, or whether the primary objective of the policymakers 
might not have been to make a largely symbolic gesture to placate 
public opinion.
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Heclo (1972, p.85) suggests that 'policy should be identified, not 
by its goals, but by the actual behaviour attempting to effect the goals.' 
But such a statement must be questioned insofar as it implies that 
somewhere there is an agreed set of goals that is being implemented, 
or that the concept of goal implementation is inseparable from that of 
policy. As a result of bargaining, conflict and compromise, courses of 
action may arise which do not fully satisfy the interests of any of the 
participants. Discussion of goals and objectives is often bypassed, 
and the proposed course of action becomes the focus of interest, not 
only because actions, rather than objectives, have the greatest impact 
on the interests of participants, but also because it is often possible 
to reach agreement on courses of action among actors whose differing 
interests, allegiances and purposes would not allow them to agree on 
objectives. Many of the possible lines of action are simply not 
considered because of the constraints provided by institutions, 
organisational procedures, past policies and commitments, and limitations 
of time and resources. It is unrealistic to confine 'policy' to the 
results of goal-oriented reviews of possible courses of action. So 
much has been written about satisficing,incrementalism, partisan 
mutual adjustment and bureaucratic politics, that it should not be 
necessary to labour the point further here.
In relation to Ranney's fourth element, that a policy must have 
a declaration of intent 'whether broadcast to all who will listen or 
communicated secretly to a chosen few ...' (1968, p.7), it must be 
noted that there are many areas of government activity where the 
authorities do not have a conscious intention, and yet take actions 
which affect that area. Simeon (1976, p.557) points out that 'Canadian 
governments do not have a "policy" on income distribution, but they do 
many things which affect it; they may have a policy on poverty, but no 
doubt many activities with a consequence for poverty are not included 
in it.' He notes that Anthony King uses the term 'quasi-policy' to 
describe such situations, but agrees that policy study should encompass 
both policy and quasi-policy. Others, like Dearlove (1973, p.2), would 
include the latter as policy - 'a pattern of resources committed by 
government ...'
One must disagree also with Ranney's final point, that policy 
must have an implementation of intent. It is possible to have a policy
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about a possible future event which need not be implemented until the 
event occurs; and it is possible to have a policy about current events 
which has not yet been implemented. What Ranney may mean, although 
this is not clear, is that the test of whether a meaningful policy 
really exists is whether or not it is implemented when certain 
conditions occur. This point will be further discussed in relation to 
another attempt to define 'policy' in more detail. In an interesting 
paper, Kerr (1976) sets out to establish more rigorous criteria for the 
use of the term than have generally been applied elsewhere. She argues 
(p. 353) that a policy must have an agent (one who is to take some 
action), a conditional imperative (an action which the agent is always 
to take under particular conditions) and an intention (the agent must 
intend to act in accordance with the conditional imperative). In 
presenting each of her conditions the wording has been altered slightly, 
but not intentionally the sense.
Her first condition for policy to exist is therefore that:
1. An agent must intend to act in accordance with some 
conditional imperative.
The authorising agent and the implementing agent may not be the same, in
t
which case the condition would read:
1. An authorising agent directs some implementing agent to act 
in accordance with some conditional imperative.
But are these necessary conditions for policy? The concept of a 
conditional imperative contrasts with a meaning of the word 'policy' 
distinguished by Easton (1965, p. 358) and already noted above, that a 
policy may be a general statement of intention which is not binding. 
Accepting Easton's point, policy need not be binding in the sense of a 
conditional imperative, that an action will always be taken when 
certain conditions prevail.
Ranney's final element referred to above, that policy must have 
an implementation of intent, interpreted as meaning that a policy still 
exists only if it is implemented when certain conditions occur, is 
therefore also not valid in every case of non-implementation. In some 
cases (for example, a policy about a single event which is not 
implemented when the event occurs) the policy would be invalidated; 
in others, repeated non-implementation would be required before it
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would be correct to say that the policy had been invalidated. Even 
then, because policymakers and policy implementors are often different 
groups, there are cases where it would seem a valid use of ’policy* 
to say that 'x' is still policy; the repeated failures to carry it out 
successfully have been due to failures in implementation, not to any 
change of policy. Furthermore, there is a considerable literature 
concerning symbolic policies (e.g. Wade, 1972, p.14, or Mitchell, 1969, 
p.135-164), which by their nature may not involve an intention to 
implement anything. Implementation, then, is not a necessary condition 
of policy in the strict sense of Kerr's conditional imperative, nor in 
the less strict sense of repeated non-implementation. In the latter 
sense the point at which policy may become non-policy is a matter of 
interpretation of the particular circumstances under which non­
implementation has occurred.
In terms of Kerr's first condition, we are left with an agent and 
an intention or direction which may or may not be binding. To say, 
however, that an agent is a necessary condition of policy is not very 
helpful when applied to the task of separating policies from non-policies, 
since in many cases of what for other reasons we might want to classify 
as policy, an agent is implied, or must be assumed, rather than being 
explicitly designated. And just as symbolic policies may not involve 
an intention to implement, nor need they require an implementing agent.
Kerr (1976, p.354) proposed two further conditions:
2. The agent perceives as likely that the conditions under 
which it must act in accordance with the conditional 
imperative will occur more than once or a restricted 
number of times.
3. The agent may substitute one conditional imperative for 
another, without violating the original conditional 
imperative.
These conditions are intended to distinguish policies from promises; 
under the first condition on the grounds that promises may apply to 
one or more anticipated events but a policy must apply to more than 
one anticipated event. Again, this does not seem to be a necessary 
condition for policy. A government may have a policy on what it will 
do in the event of a nuclear attack, without supposing that the event 
is likely to occur more than once.
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Kerr's third condition arises from the observation that a promise 
cannot be changed without breaking it, whereas a policy can be revised.
This condition is not very useful operationally in distinguishing 
policies from promises, however, since not only can a policy contain a 
promise and a promise contain a policy, but one would usually need to 
know the intention of the policy/promise maker in order to distinguish 
which of the two is intended.
Kerr proposes another condition to distinguish pubtie policy from 
any other policy. This is simply that (p.358):
4. The policy must have a relevant public.
A relevant public is defined as those, other than the agent, whose actions 
can contribute to bringing about the conditions under which the agent will 
take particular actions; and all those persons other than the agent, who 
have an interest in, or are affected by, the agent's taking those actions. 
Under this definition, therefore, if I have a personal policy of running 
over elderly ladies crossing the road, this is a public policy, since the 
elderly ladies can contribute to bringing about the required conditions, 
and are likely to be affected by my actions, as are a number of other 
people including the authorities and the friends and relatives of the 
elderly ladies.
To define public policy in this way, however, strays much too far 
from both academic and common usage of the term to refer to policy which 
is carried out by the authorities or by government - what is done 
authoritatively in the name of the people. Since there are inevitably 
borderline cases which are not strictly government policy, but which 
would usually be regarded as public policy (for example, policies of semi­
government bodies such as statutory corporations, or possibly those of 
government-funded universities) a broader term such as 'the authorities' 
is a more appropriate term than 'government'.
To summarise, probably the best short definition is that a public 
policy is a course of action or inaction pursued by the authorities, where 
'pursued' is as evidenced by either intention or implementation, or both, 
provided that stated intention has not been conclusively negated by the 
actual course of action. Even this definition, however, fails to include 
comfortably all valid uses of the term, such as 'symbolic' policy.
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Policy may encompass goals, intentions, statements, actions and 
programmes. Rather than defining policy more narrowly, in this study 
we will retain the broad usage of the term and qualify it where 
necessary. The analysis will thereby be released from the unrealistic 
restrictions which would be imposed by a narrow, rationalistic view 
of the policy process.
Implementation
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p.16, footnote) note that some 
define policy to include implementation (as must those, for example, 
who define policy as what government does). Others, however, see policy 
as 'only a collection of words, a point of departure for implementors.' 
More recently, Majone and Wildavsky (1977, p.104) refer to the 'endless 
difficulties' of defining the subject matter of implementation.
It should first be established that implementation may include 
modification or elaboration of policy. In the process of putting 
policy into effect, implementors may need to add detail to the broad 
terms in which policy is initially stated, or they may need to change 
policy in order to make it workable. Implementation cannot be usefully 
conceived as the effectuation of an immutable policy commandment. The 
process of putting policy into effect may also change it. There is no 
border in time separating policy formulation and policy implementation. 
Policy formulation continues as part of implementation. We might 
define a point in time at which implementation begins, but even this 
will be difficult since most policies even in their formative stages 
contain elements of implementation. Policy and its implementation are 
conceptually separable but empirically most difficult to distinguish.
The conceptual difference is that implementation must have a policy to 
implement: even if policy and implementation were to be created and
carried out simultaneously, implementation must have a conceptually 
preceding policy on which to operate.
Most analysts of implementation place its commencement after the 
enactment of legislation and funding arrangements, and this may be 
accepted as a convenient approximation. Of course there are borderline 
cases. A public servant altering policy in order to implement it is 
engaged in implementation; a public servant altering policy because he 
dislikes it is not. But this is hairsplitting. The important point 
is that implementation may involve policy change. Therefore seeking to 
explain the determinants of public policy involves explaining the
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influences on implementation.
To say that public servants as well as elected representatives 
make policy is nothing new. The point in relation to the pursuit of 
definitions is that because policy at the commencement of the 
implementation process is very likely to be different from policy at a 
later time in that process, it is necessary to be clear as to which 
manifestation of policy is meant. For instance, those who see policy 
as 'only words' do not regard any actions taking during the implement­
ation process as policy. They see policy as merely the broad policy 
statements prior to implementation. Our approach, however, is to regard 
both initial statements and the course of action being pursued after 
implementing actions have modified or elaborated policy as manifestations 
of policy at different times. Thus in answer to the question - 'what is 
government policy on 'x'? - all relevant government actions and statements 
to date would be examined to discern a pattern of policy. In doing so, 
the most recent results do not necessarily outweigh earlier actions or 
statements as an indication of current policy. For instance, if a 
government announced a policy of achieving 'x', and in the event achieved 
'^x', this result may have been due to an implementation failure. A 
strictly behavioural approach, considering only actions, would perceive 
a policy change. A review such as the present study, which seeks to 
interpret statements and intentions as well as actions, finding 
intentions unchanged as a result of initial failings in implementation 
would conclude that policy was unchanged.
Outputs and outcomes
Easton's differentiation between the 'outputs' and 'outcomes' of 
political systems is a convenient starting point. He calls outputs 'a 
stream of activities flowing from the authorities in a system' (Easton, 
1965, p.349). Outputs include 'the binding decisions, their implementing 
actions, and ... certain associated kinds of behaviour'(p.351). Policies 
to Easton are particular kinds of output, either binding or 'associated' 
(p.358). Outcomes, however, are the consequences of outputs. Failure 
to make this distinction 'would lead us to consider the infinite chain 
of effects that might flow from an authoritative allocation (output) as 
part and parcel of that allocation' (p.351).
Dye, while adopting the general framework of Easton's systems model, 
fails to distinguish between policy and outcomes. He defines policy 
outcomes as expressing 'the value allocations of a society ... the chief
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output of the society’s political system' (Dye, 1970, p.21). Policy 
outcomes to Dye are a particular kind of output, using the latter in 
the Eastonian sense. By policy outcomes he does not mean the outcomes 
(consequences) of policy but policy itself - those outputs of the 
political system which are policy.
Sharkansky (1970b, p.63), notes that Dye's definition (not 
surprisingly) limits his ability to identify linkages between policy 
and outcomes. Sharkansky defines public policy as actions taken by 
government, policy outputs as the service levels affected by these 
actions, and policy impact as the effect which the service has on a 
population (p.63). He sees this terminology as 'bearing close 
resemblance (p.67) to Easton's concepts of conversion, output and 
feedback. This is not entirely correct, however, since as already 
noted, Easton regards policy as a type of output.
Simeon (1976, p.557) puts the view that 'the difficult distinction 
made by Ira Sharkansky and others between output and outcome ... is 
essentially a distinction between what is done and its consequences 
for society.' This, however, resembles Easton's distinction, rather 
than Sharkansky's. Simeon goes on to say that 'In practice, this 
distinction seems impossible to maintain; description of government 
action ... seems pointless without consideration of the meanings 
attached to it by those who decided, by those affected, or by outside 
observers.' He suggests that it is more useful to distinguish between 
'first order consequences which are intended or immediately perceived, 
and second order consequences, either benign or malign, which are not 
foreseen.' Heclo, on the other hand (1974, p.4), suggests that 'output' 
is already used for this very purpose to distinguish the intended policy 
result from unintended, often broader effects (outcomes).' Adding to 
the confusion, Robinson and Majak (1967, p.184), use 'output' to refer 
to the products of intermediate stages of the decisionmaking process, 
'outcome' to refer to the final product imposed on the environment, and 
'effects' to refer to the consequences of the final product for the 
environment. Many other examples of differing usage could be given.
In relation to Simeon's point that description of government 
action 'seems pointless without consideration of the meanings attached 
to it', it does not necessarily follow that distinguishing between
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outputs and outcomes implies failure to consider meanings. Simeon’s 
linking of first order with expected consequences, and second-order 
with unanticipated consequences unnecessarily confuses two different 
types of categorisation of outcomes. Some first-order consequences of 
policy may be unexpected, and some second-order consequences may be 
expected. His comment about distinctions which are impossible to 
maintain in practice seems to have some validity, however, when 
applied to Sharkansky's three variables; policy, output and impact. 
Sharkansky's definition of policy as actions taken by government seems 
to be equivalent to part of Easton's 'outputs' - binding decisions and 
implementing actions; and his 'impacts' - the effect of service levels 
on a population - at first sight appears to be equivalent to Easton's 
'outcomes' - the consequences of outputs. But Sharkansky (1970b, p.69) 
has an additional 'outputs' or 'levels of service' category. He explains 
this as necessary because there is no assurance that government actions 
such as increased expenditure 'will add to the outputs of a service­
providing agency'; for example, because different levels of policy may 
work at cross purposes with each other (p.65).
It seems reasonable to distinguish the variation in the level of 
service provided from actions taken which may or may not bring about 
such variation. But Sharkansky's presentation of the additional category 
is somewhat confusing. Service levels (outputs) he says (p.66), can be 
defined by:
the amount of benefits or services provided per client; 
the units of service in relation to the total populations 
of the jurisdiction; the incidence of beneficiaries among 
people who are potential clients; the rate at which a program 
is performed; or by the frequency with which a population 
chooses to use a program.
It is not clear from this whether he means the level of service provided, 
or the level of service actually used. The measures he uses to determine 
levels of service in his case study of education, however, are attendance, 
graduation and dropout (p.68), which indicate the level of service actually 
used. But such measures would more appropriately be classified as the 
primary outcomes (or in Sharkansky's terms, impacts) of policy on the 
population. If we disagree with Sharkansky and include such factors 
among impacts, we are still left with the useful suggestion that the
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level of service provided needs to be measured distinctly from other 
aspects of policy. Using his example of education policy, increased 
per pupil expenditures, improved teacher salaries and teacher:pupil 
ratios, do not necessarily mean that there will be any improvement in 
the level of service (the quality of teaching). What is not agreed 
here is that level of service, although measured separately, should be 
treated as a separate category from 'policy'. The level of service 
provided by a government agency is usually as much a part of policy as 
are expenditure, staffing, or plant and equipment. This point may be 
illustrated by reference to an example given by Sharkansky himself.
He notes that in relation to regulatory policy, "output" would 
represent the character of actions that the regulatory agency took 
against firms or citizens' (1970b, p.78, note 11). But in terms of 
Sharkansky's own definition of policy as the actions of government, 
'policy' not 'output', would seem to be the appropriate category for 
the actions of such an agency.
The term 'output' will rarely be used in this study, unless the 
terminology used by others is being specifically discussed; for example, 
its use in Easton's sense, to distinguish government policies, decisions 
and implementing actions (outputs) from their consequences. /Outcome' 
will be used in a very broad sense, to refer to any consequence of 
policy, whether occurring in society or within government, and whether 
direct or indirect, intended or unintended.
Environment and impact
The word 'environment' is used in somewhat different senses by 
policy analysts and conservationists. To the former it generally means 
the environment of politics or the policy process, the economic and 
social context within which policymaking takes place; those factors 
which influence politics but which are not in themselves political. To 
a conservationist, 'environment' usually has the ecological meaning of 
the totality of surroundings which influences, or is influenced by, an 
organism or group of organisms. When discussing the environment of man, 
some confine the term to the natural (biogeophysical) environment, 
although others would add the built environment and some would give 
equal emphasis to the social environment.
In this study we will define 'environment' in its widest sense, to
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include the built and social environment. The political and 
ecological uses of the term therefore converge; in both cases the 
environment is the totality of surroundings which influences or is 
influenced by a given subject; the difference lies in whether the 
subject is man or politics, not in the definition of 'environment* 
itself. Where the word 'environment' is used in this study without 
qualification, it will generally mean the environment of man. Where 
the word is used in other senses, either it will be qualified, e.g. 
the 'environment of politics', or the'biogeophysical environment' 
unless the meaning is clear from the context.
The term 'impact' is used in policy analysis to refer to 
consequences of policy, and in EIA to refer to consequences of human 
actions for the environment. In both cases there are differences in 
interpretation. In policy analysis impact may be used synonymously with 
policy 'outcomes', or interpreted more narrowly. Dolbeare (1974, p.94) 
suggests that some researchers have confined 'impact' to 'demonstrable 
behavioural or attitudinal response which can be causally linked to 
components of the policy in question.' He concludes that strict 
usage of 'impact'in the limited, direct sense 'would be unsatisfactory 
to all but the most dedicated laboratory experimentalist', and uses 
the term interchangeably with 'consequences'.
Views again differ as to the meaning of 'impact' when used in 
relation to EIA. According to Munn (1979, p.l) a man-induced change 
may be called an effect, while the harmful or beneficial consequences 
are called impacts; but sometimes 'impact' is reserved for the harmful 
effects; and elsewhere, effects and impacts are synonymous while 
deleterious effects are called 'damage'.
Differences in defining 'impact' as man-induced change, or as the 
value-judgements about such changes, often reflect differences on more 
fundamental matters such as the character of EIA itself and the respective 
roles of those preparing the EIA and of the political decisionmakers who 
review it. To review such matters fully here would require too extensive 
a detour into material more appropriately dealt with at a later stage. 
Briefly, however, if it is agreed that the main function of the agent 
preparing EIA should be to present information about the nature and 
magnitude of the changes which will be induced by the proposal in question
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and that of the political decisionmaker to evaluate such information 
in deciding whether the project should proceed, it follows that the 
primary purpose of the HIA should be to present information, not value- 
judgements. This is not to say that EIA should not contain value- 
judgements; these may assist the decisionmaker. But such judgements 
should be subordinate to, and as far as possible separated from, 
description of impacts themselves. The agents preparing the EIA may 
have special expertise in predicting man-induced changes but they have no 
such claim in weighing the degree of goodness or badness of such 
impacts.
To argue that most 'facts' have an element of value attached in 
one way or another (for example in their selection) does not mean that 
for practical purposes such as those served by EIA an acceptable attempt 
cannot be made to separate fact from value; nor does it mean that the 
main emphasis of EIA cannot be on the presentation of information about 
the potential environmental and social changes arising from a proposal. 
Examples of deliberate failure to make such a separation are those 
methodologies under which those preparing the EIA arrive by various 
means at a judgemental positive or negative numerical value for each 
impact, and sum these numbers to arrive at an overall positive or 
negative number for the project. To provide a politician with such a 
number is to provide him with a means of avoiding his legitimate function; 
that of making a decision based on a thorough understanding of the issues 
involved. Fortunately such approaches to EIA have declined in popularity.
Because it is considered that the main purpose of EIA is the 
provision of information, not value-judgements, the term 'impact' will 
be used to mean a man-induced change. The judgement as to how good or 
bad an impact is, is considered to be separate from the impact itself. 
Since an 'outcome' has been defined as any consequence of policy, and 
'impact' as a man-induced change, there is little conceptual difference 
between them. For convenience, however, we will tend to use 'outcomes' 
in relation to policy and 'impacts' in relation to EIA, except where 
discussing their usage by others.
Environmental impact assessment
Many of the properties of EIA were discussed in Chapter One and
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will be enlarged upon subsequently; consequently EIA will only be 
briefly discussed here. EIA in the simplest terms is an activity 
designed to predict and document the environmental consequences of 
proposals, with the objective of ensuring that such consequences are 
fully considered in decisionmaking. In the narrowest sense, 'EIA' 
refers to a set of methodologies and techniques for obtaining and 
presenting such information. But the term may also be used more broadly 
to encompass not only prediction and documentation, but also the 
totality of procedures by which EIA techniques are mobilised to achieve 
their objective. In other words 'EIA' in the latter sense refers to 
the whole of the EIA process from the initial screening of proposals 
to decide whether EIA is required, through preparation and review of 
the EIS document, to the decision as to whether or not the proposal 
should proceed. It includes such matters as the types of proposals for 
which EIA is required, the subjects which EIA must examine and the 
provisions for public review and comment. Used in this way, 'EIA' may 
mean either the formalised or legally sanctioned steps for requiring 
and reviewing EIA, or the actual practice of such steps as established 
by empirical inquiry, or both. Both these meanings are included in 
the use of the term to mean EIA policy - the course of action pursued 
by government in relation to EIA. The question ’what has been the 
experience with EIA in Australia' is likely to be using the term in 
its policy sense, and it is with EIA as policy that this study is 
centrally concerned.
Also encompassed by the term 'EIA' is the public environmental 
inquiry. Provisions for instituting such inquiries are commonly part 
of EIA legislation or procedures. The public environmental inquiry is 
a further means of obtaining and assessing information on potential 
environmental impact, and is therefore part of EIA policy.
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPLAINING THE DETERMINANTS
OF PUBLIC POLICY
As I got to know them better, I realised 
that in many ways they were highly - in 
our phrase - 'civilised'. But they never 
thought in terms of either-or. It began 
to seem to me very peculiar that I should 
do so myself, and that so many of my 
judgements were paired; good or evil, black 
and white, to be or not to be. (Mitchison, 
1976, pp. 26-7).
In the introductory chapter it was argued that a framework based 
on one or other of the more general theories of society should not be 
adopted for the present study. Rather, a more basic classification 
of policy-influential variables should be used as a starting point.
This chapter sets out such a classification, and discusses the 
relationships of each class of variable with public policy, based on a 
review of the relevant literature. It also proposes that within the 
totality of such relationships, a central structure of influences and 
interrelationships can be distinguished which is important in 
explaining public policy, and which tends to inhibit certain kinds 
of attempted social change. In subsequent chapters these ideas are 
reviewed in relation to the experience with EIA policy in Australia.
Therefore, as intimated previously, the present study is not one 
which is limited to the examination of a particular event, organisation, 
process or policy, with findings largely restricted to the immediate 
topic. But even given that a more general understanding of the 
determinants of policy is being sought, why carry out the lengthy 
exercise of developing an analytical framework and broad preliminary 
conclusions from the literature, rather than beginning with the detailed 
exposition of the case study and then drawing generalisations from it? 
There are several points to be made in answer to this question. First, 
social causation is so multi-faceted and complex that without some 
prior structure to limit the scope of inquiry one could keep bringing 
forward possibly relevant information almost indefinitely:
If anything characterises social science, it is 
the lack of agreement as to what variables are 
important for characterising an event or phenomenon.
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Hundreds of different variables are proposed and 
measured for investigating any particular event or 
entity; for example there are easily thousands of 
personality variables that have been proposed for 
describing individuals (Reynolds, 1976, p. 141).
Because of the sheer volume of potential information the researcher 
must have some means of selection and classification, whether explicit 
or otherwise. Moreover, any individual, whether recognising it or not, 
has a set of preconceptions about the world by which he or she is 
influenced when seeking information. The danger is that the researcher, 
while thinking that the facts are being allowed to speak for themselves, 
is unconsciously selecting them according to personal values and 
preconceptions. The advantage in making an analytical framework explicit 
is that in doing so the researcher should be more likely to recognise and 
amend any weaknesses and inconsistencies, and to become more aware of 
personal value biases. Likewise the reader will be in a better position 
to understand the basis on which information has been selected and 
organised.
Another weakness of the ’case study first' (or Baconian) approach 
is that it fails to recognise the literature sufficiently as^  a source 
of both empirical findings and theoretical constructs. In using the 
literature as such a source the researcher is building on the work of 
others by using their ideas and paradigms to contribute to his or her own 
conceptual framework and by using their data and findings to help verify 
conclusions. At the same time this is demonstrating the relationship of 
the researcher's work to the existing literature. Also, for many 
purposes (except for very specific or unresearched questions) the 
literature provides a far wider information base than a case study. The 
popular emphasis on carrying out case studies, however, can be such that 
the literature as a source of information is sometimes neglected.
The changing nature of policy and the conditions which influence 
it - over time, between policy areas, and between different nations - 
means that there can be no universal or wholly satisfactory explanations. 
Some writers on the policy process are inclined to write as though 
their conclusions were universally applicable. Here, while some of the 
discussion of certain variables, for example concerning aspects of the 
parliamentary system, is of limited applicability to other political 
systems, some of the discussion has a higher level of generality. One
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would need to assess its applicability with a knowledge of the country 
and policy area in question. To ensure as wide a base as possible, 
the present chapter draws largely on the literature from elsewhere with 
the intention of leaving the Australian material mainly to the chapters 
on EIA policy.
Until comparatively recently it was possible to say 'at least 
since 1945 most American political scientists have focussed their 
professional attention mainly on the processes by which public 
policies are made and have shown relatively little concern with their 
contents' (Ranney, 1968, p. 3). Since then, however, there has been a 
rapid expansion in the volume of the policy literature and the 
perspectives which it encompasses. Much of the literature is now 
concerned with studies which treat policy as an independent variable, 
and much of it concerns commissioned research carried out for policy­
makers. A number of writers have discussed the various types of policy 
research (e.g. Elkin, 1974; Simeon, 1976; Hawker et al., 1979), although 
their categories seem somewhat incomplete. Policy studies may be 
categorised along a number of dimensions; for example according to 
whether they are predominantly explanatory, descriptive or normative; 
whether commissioned for policy advice or undertaken for academic 
purposes; according to the stage of the policy-making process with which 
they are concerned, the type of policy being examined, and so on. 
However, it is not necessary to attempt a complete categorisation here, 
but rather to identify the extent to which various broad classes of 
policy studies might offer the most assistance towards explaining the 
determinants of policy.
Such studies may be divided into two groups: those which treat
policy as the dependent variable, which will include those studies 
which aim to explain policy; and those which treat policy as the 
independent variable, which will include those studies which explain 
outcomes. (This is of course a convenient oversimplification since 
in some studies policy at different points may act as a dependent or 
independent variable).
Studies which treat policy largely as the dependent variable may 
focus on describing and explaining the process by which policy is made; 
on the structure of policymaking institutions and its implications for
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policy; or on explaining variations in policy outputs (e.g. expenditure, 
level of service) as between different government jurisdictions.
Studies which treat policy as the independent variable include those 
which examine the process of implementation of policy and its 
consequences for policy outcomes; impact studies which seek to determine 
the effects of policy; and evaluation studies which assess policy 
performance against certain criteria.
Such categories can be broken down still further. T.B. Smith 
(1975) identifies five types of policy evaluation; Dolbeare (1974, p. 96) 
four categories of impact study. Looking first at studies taking policy 
as the independent variable, policy evaluation is usually concerned 
with measuring policy performance against certain goals (e.g. see 
Weiss, 1972, p. 4). Such an approach has limitations for present 
purposes, both because it is only secondarily concerned with explanation, 
and because it is largely restricted to considering only performance 
related to goal-achievement, where such goals are usually those set by 
policymakers or attributed to the policy by evaluators. The matters 
which an independent analyst might wish to explain could extend well 
beyond those nominated by policymakers for evaluation. For example, a
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policymaker or administrator is unlikely to include in the policy goals 
to be formally evaluated the effect of the policy on his own or his 
organisation's power, even though such considerations may have been 
to the forefront of his mind when promoting the policy. In other 
instances the goals of a policy may be unclear, and the analyst is 
compelled to formulate his own version of the goals, with consequent 
distortions to the analysis.
The literature of policy impact overlaps with that of policy 
evaluation, but it will be defined here as that literature which is 
concerned with identifying the effects of policy, without the strong 
focus on goal-performance characteristic of policy evaluation. Again 
one must distinguish between impact analysis commissioned to give 
policymakers information about certain effects of policy, and research 
undertaken with the purpose of understanding the diffusion of policy 
effects through society. Much impact research is of the former kind, 
and is limited in its usefulness here because it tends to consider 
only the proximate determinants of policy impact or those manipulable 
by policymakers. It is not 'holistic' research in the sense previously 
discussed as being desirable for our purposes.
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A limitation in the literature of policy implementation has been 
the tendency to treat implementation as a process quite distinct and 
subsequent in time to policy formulation, in which policy is a given, 
and in which many of the forces which have shaped policy are assumed 
to be no longer influential. In defining ’implementation’ earlier, 
however, it was argued that the process does involve further formulation 
and modification of policy. It can be further argued that the 
implementation process should not be conceived too narrowly, since many 
of the broad influences on policymakers are also at work on policy 
implementors, and in fact implementors and formulators are overlapping 
groups. The way in which a policy is put into effect may in some cases 
be crucial in explaining its outcomes, but generally such explanations 
would need to look beyond implementation to the character of the 
policy itself and the influences which played a part in its development.
The discussion will now turn to the literature in which policy is 
the dependent variable. A considerable debate in the policy literature 
has concerned the question of whether socio-economic or political 
variables are the main determinants of policy. Early findings of what 
has been called the 'demographic approach' based on statistical 
analysis of relationships between socio-economic indicators Xe.g. income, 
urbanisation, industrialisation, education), political variables (e.g. 
voter participation, party in control, level of party competition) and 
policy outputs (expenditure, levels of service), across U.S. States 
showed a marked statistical association between socio-economic variables 
and policy outputs, with little apparent intervening effect of political 
variables (e.g. Dye, 1972). Such findings were unwelcome to many 
political scientists, and considerable effort has gone into pointing out 
flaws in such work and re-establishing the importance of political 
variables. Consequently, for some time much of the policy literature 
was rather narrowly preoccupied with this debate. In attempting to pin 
a winner's medal on one major group of variables or another, other 
possibly more worthwhile questions have been bypassed; for example, 
questions about how processes inside organisations lead to their 
particular policy stance, or how interactions between policy-influential 
variables actually bring about a particular policy.
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Even if there were convincing evidence that one variable was 
statistically related to another, this would not mean that the processes 
by which this relationship occurred were understood. Further, as has 
been argued previously, the whole idea of identifying a 'winning 
variable' is misconceived, since policymaking is a complex process 
in which many variables have varying degrees of influence through 
differing channels at various stages. A number of writers have listed 
or otherwise indicated the main variables which have been put forward 
in the literature, or which they themselves consider as being significant 
influences on policy (e.g. Dye, 1972; Dearlove, 1973; Heclo, 1974; Simeon, 
1976; Hawker, et al. , 1979). A curious feature of such lists, however, 
is their variability and incompleteness. One can identify at least a 
dozen such major variables in the work of these authors taken together, 
yet Dearlove or Hawker et al. , for instance, each discuss only about 
half of these. Other variables which one might consider warrant a 
category of their own (e.g. technology), are barely mentioned. Possibly 
these authors have been influenced by the rather constricting terms of 
the 'winning variable' debate. They either enter the debate (like 
Dearlove, who argues that 'government' has been too frequently regarded 
as a 'weak variable') or at least use it as a starting point.'
Consequently they have been content to list the variables routinely 
considered in the debate, perhaps adding one or two of their own. It 
pays, however, not to be too cavalier in presenting such lists. They 
are, in effect, classifications of variables according to certain 
characteristics, abstracted from the complex stream of events which 
influence policy in order to make the task of analysis manageable. As 
well as acting as checklists to reduce the possibility of omitting 
significant influences on policy from consideration, the way in which 
such categories are constructed may illuminate or obscure important 
relationships, and incomplete or distorted categories may generate 
faulty conclusions. It seems desirable, therefore, to develop a more 
inclusive categorisation.
Policy emerges from a process of interaction among individual and 
collective actors which takes place within an environment providing 
opportunities and constraints. We thus have three groups of variables,
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actors, process and environment. The first group subdivides into a 
range of individual, group and organisational actors. The third group 
also can be subdivided into some important and disparate elements.
These are biogeophysical factors, the material surroundings which 
provide resources for, and limitations on, human activity; social and 
economic conditions, the state of human welfare, living conditions and 
the production, allocation and consumption of resources; ideas, the 
stock of mental images or constructs held by or available to individuals 
and groups; technology, the available methods of production; and 
institutions, the formal rules, laws, fundamental behaviour patterns 
and established organisations structuring human activities. It is 
also useful to distinguish a category of those influences external to a 
given nation.
As noted previously, some of the above categories are not always 
recognised in classifications of policy-influential variables in the 
mainstream literature of policy analysis. For instance, technology or 
biogeophysical factors are often ignored or, one supposes, subsumed 
under socio-economic factors. This is somewhat surprising, given their 
coverage elsewhere, for example in the environmental policy'1iterature. 
It will be contended that such factors merit separate categories. Their 
influence on policy can be less directly apparent and more difficult to 
demonstrate than that of proximate actors, but nevertheless may be 
essential to an adequate explanation of policy.
Since the eight categories proposed above can be broken down into 
numerous component variables, the number of possible interactions 
between and within categories is enormous. The following is a review 
of some of the implications of each category for policy. It does not 
attempt also to consider systematically the interactions between 
categories and their consequences for policy. Some of the relationships 
of one category (technology) to each of the others are briefly 
discussed, but to do so for each category would be too lengthy and 
inevitably repetitive a task. Nevertheless, many such relationships 
emerge from the discussion, and the chapter concludes by summarising 
what are considered to be some important relationships between policy- 
influential variables.
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IDEAS
’Ideas’ is used here as a form of shorthand for ideas, values, 
attitudes, theories, beliefs and norms. A good case can be made out 
for the view that ideas are the main determinants of policy. Ideas or 
ideology appear to be the driving force behind so many political or social 
movements. However, it does not necessarily follow that such movements are 
caused by ideas. Ideas may simply be an expression of a change which 
is already under way, or even a subsequent rationalisation for it.
Ideas reflect and interpret existing circumstances, as well as 
influencing them. Furthermore, an idea, no matter how meritorious, 
has no necessary effect on the world. It cannot effect events 
directly, but must be taken up by human agents under social conditions 
which permit its effectuation. Causality between ideas and events can 
work either way, or through other variables, or ideas and events may 
change concurrently. Ideas and social conditions can each reinforce 
the other in bringing about change or maintaining stability. The 
incompletely formed ideas inherent in a nascent social change may be 
given their first clear and powerful expression by an individual, 
thereby enhancing, reinforcing or even altering the nature of the 
change itself. Equally, the ideas which justify and legitimate an 
existing social order help to perpetuate it.
The range of ideas which might affect policy is infinite, but one 
can distinguish certain categories of ideas most likely to be 
influential. Ideas may affect the policy process at various levels, 
from values or ideology common to many nations down to norms affecting 
only small groups and beliefs peculiar to individuals. For example, 
at the broadest level, it has been argued that Western values and ethics 
such as materialism, the expectation of economic growth, and the belief 
in man’s dominion over nature, are root causes of policies which bring 
about environmental degradation. (For argument against such views, see 
Passmore (1974), in defence of them see Routley (1975)). At the national 
level, King (1973) has argued that differences in ideas account for 
differences in the scope of government in the U.S. and other 
industrialised countries. Similarly, differences in national attitudes 
to economic growth and the environment may account for differences in 
the nature and effectiveness of environmental policy. In other cases,
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it is not national differences but similarities, through the inter­
national transfer of ideas, which are important in determining policy. 
The spread of the idea of EIA is a case in point, and Heclo (1974, 
p.307) notes the diffusion of social policy innovations through a 
trans-national learning process.
At the organisational level, norms, unwritten rules and shared 
values can play important parts in influencing and perpetuating policy. 
Dearlove (1973), in his study of local government in the Royal Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea, demonstrates the importance of councillors' 
ideology and unwritten rules for maintaining existing policy. This 
'defence of commitment and control of disturbance' was accomplished 
by councillors in a number of ways; by means of unwritten rules for 
controlling the selection and behaviour of new recruits; by rules- 
of-thumb applied to categorise and exclude or accept interest groups 
and their claims according to how these related to the ideology of 
councillors; and by giving priority to some sources of information and 
avoiding others which did not reinforce councillors' existing beliefs.
In order to establish a relationship between ideas and policy, it 
must be demonstrated not only that an idea is current, but that those 
holding it have been influential in the policy process, and that the 
character of their influence is conditioned by the idea in question.
By their nature, ideas which account for broad orientations at 
national or regional level are likely to be more difficult to 
demonstrate as having a causal connection with policy than those 
associated with organisations or policymakers. While policymakers in 
general must be creatures of their time, exposed as much as others to 
prevailing ideas, they are also subject to a variety of more immediate 
organisational and personal ideas, values and pressures. Clearly in 
explaining policy it is particularly important to identify the 
sources and types of ideas most likely to influence policymakers.
In suggesting the importance of social learning in the develop­
ment of policy, Heclo (1974, p .316) identifies two kinds of learning: 
classic conditioning, where repeated occurrence of the same (or an 
apparently similar) situation engenders the same response; and 
instrumental conditioning, where reinforcement depends on the response 
produced. Heclo suggests that much policy continuity can be understood
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in terms of the former. That is, past policy and the ideas which 
it rests upon provide much of the explanation for present policy.
The idea of conditioning can be extended well beyond the effects of 
past policy, to what Kaufman (1971, p.15) has called 'programmed 
behaviour', the ways in which members of groups and societies are 
socialised by their groups into regularities of behaviour and shared 
values. This occurs in a variety of ways, through selective 
recruitment, example and imitation, and a variety of formal and 
informal rewards and sanctions for appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviour. Dearlove's work cited above illustrates some of these 
mechanisms at work and their consequences for policy.
Also important to policy development are the ideas current 
among policymakers about the nature of the policy process and the 
appropriate techniques for making decisions. Heclo notes that the 
Swedish approach to social policymaking, which he regards as more 
productive, has generally assumed that policymaking proceeds from 
information-gathering, analysis and consultation among interested 
parties, whereas the corresponding British assumption has been one of 
'divergent interests resolvable only through partisan conflict'
(Heclo, 1974, p.314). Allison and others have discussed the tendency 
of decisionmakers to conceptualise decisionmaking as a rational 
process of examining the alternative means of attaining certain 
objectives. When applied to predict the behaviour of organisations 
or nations, however, such a model may lead to quite misleading 
conclusions if, as Allison and Halperin argue, 'the actions of a 
nation result not from an agreed upon calculus of strategic interests, 
but rather from pulling and hauling among individuals with differing 
perceptions and stakes' (1971, p.57).
Among decisionmaking techniques, cost benefit analysis has 
played a dominant and for many years an almost unchallenged role in 
the assessment of public projects. Tribe et al. found that the 
analytic and legal tools available 'seemed inadequate to the task of 
explicitly addressing controverted issues of value at all. ' Cost 
benefit analysis, for example 'assumes that there is a general 
agreement on values ...' (1976, p.xi-xii). The result has been 
until comparatively recently the virtual exclusion of values from much
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decisionmaking other than that of economic efficiency.
That current economic theories are another source of influential 
ideas for policymakers should hardly need demonstration, but if it does 
one can point, like Hawker et at. (1979, p.12) to the influence of the 
current alternative Friedmanite and neo-Keynesian approaches on 
economic policies and thence on other policy areas. Heclo notes that 
there is 'not too much exaggeration' in saying that 'social policy has 
developed in the interstices allowed to it by "sound economic thinking" ' 
(1974, p.312). Past economic theory, too, may be influential. It is 
hard to resist quoting Keynes' well-worn but appropriate comment that 
'practical men, who believe themselves to be exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist.'
Ideas, of course, are not a one-way traffic imposed on the 
decisionmaker. In many situations opposing ideas, sentiments or 
national self-images co-exist, and politicians can activate or 
popularise one view or another in support of policy. In relation to 
foreign investment in Australia, for example, the Labor party is 
inclined to invoke nationalistic sentiments about 'selling off the 
farm' and fears of foreign control of Australian resources, while the 
Liberal-National Country Party coalition appeals to what Horne (1976) 
has called the Australian 'secular religion' of growth and develop­
ment .
Simeon (1976, p.573) suggests that ideas (using the word in a 
similar sense to its use here) 'tend to be general and thus to account 
for broad orientations rather than the specific details of policy.'
As well as providing broad orientations, however, ideas can bear consid­
erable responsibility for specific policy content. In the Dearlove study, 
what is being maintained by norms, rules and councillor ideology is 
not just 'broad orientations' but existing policy. In environmental 
disputes, a clash of values is usually the central issue, as Tribe 
et al. (1976) have pointed out. The outcome of such a value dispute 
can determine specifically whether or not a proposal will proceed, 
and if it proceeds, what are to be the detailed modifications to it. 
Certainly ideas alone do not determine such issues; the point is that 
they can play a major part in determining the specific thrust of 
policy as well as in limiting the range of policy alternatives considered.
4 5
TECHNOLOGY
Technology may be seen as largely autonomous and value-free, or 
the subject of social, political and economic forces. At the extremes 
of technological or social determinism, technology is seen respectively 
as the main determinant of the course of history or as the captive of 
society and ideology. These views require close examination since if 
either position is correct it would carry fundamental implications for 
the explanation of policy.
One version of social determinism is 'elite' or 'class' 
determinism: 'Technological change must be viewed as a political
process, reinforcing the interests of a dominant social class' (Dickson, 
1974, p. 95). In considering whether technology is determined by a 
class or elite, it is desirable to distinguish two senses in which 
'determined' and 'determinism' are used. In the first sense, technology 
follows inevitably from the nature of society; it is a necessary 
consequence, not a matter of choice. The second sense involves the 
notion of deliberate control: elites control technology in their own
interests. It implies authority over, and deliberate choice of 
technology. (Here the term 'elite' will be used, but similar 
arguments apply to 'class' determinism).
As Toffler (1970) and others have pointed out, much technology 
seems to be self-generating. Metcalf (1977, p. 104) gives the examples 
of the wide range of technological spin-offs from space research, and 
the multiple changes generated by the invention of the transistor, 
including advances in computer technology, which in turn led to further 
changes elsewhere. These and numerous similar instances appear to 
undermine the social determinist view. Of course, one might ask whether 
the original change in these examples was itself generated by social or 
technological factors, and so on; a chicken-and-egg argument which can 
be pursued back to the dawn of man. More fruitfully, however, a 
social determinist would argue that technology alone cannot produce 
new technology. Human agents must be involved, and it is their actions 
as influenced by society which will determine the character and 
application of new technology.
In order to examine the latter view more closely, it is useful to 
distinguish three stages in the development of technological change.
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The first is the generation of the idea for a new or improved 
technology; the second is the working out of how to apply the idea, 
and the third its actual application in production. It is difficult 
to see how a class or elite could entirely determine the first 
stage,the occurrence in individual minds of ideas for new technology. 
Certainly, the types of ideas generated will to a considerable extent 
reflect the nature of the society surrounding the individual. Equally, 
however, the ideas generated may reflect the surrounding technology, 
and we are back to the chicken-and-egg argument. It seems likely 
also that individuals vary sufficiently in their perceptions of, and 
attitudes to, society and technology for technological ideas to be 
conceived which do not conform to the mainstream.
If, however, elites control most of the funding and direction of 
research into new technology, those subject to such funding and 
direction will be constrained in the types of innovation they seek.
But a number of factors seem likely to render such control incomplete. 
Elites are not entirely uniform; differing interests may generate 
different research priorities. Pure research is less subject to 
control by commercial elites, yet it can generate radical changes in 
the possibilities for applied technology. The constraints of research 
funding cannot entirely put bounds on creative ideas, and technological 
innovations have a variety of possible uses.
In taking up the last point, Jevons (1976, p.34), attempting to 
refute the social determinists, in fact provides them with a fallback 
position:
The way in which we actually use the technology is 
of course determined by social preferences, but the 
range of capabilities that is inherent in the 
technology is not determined by them.
If society does not entirely determine the first stage, the 
generation of new technological ideas, it may determine the subsequent 
stages of development and implementation. If a class or elite can 
control the extent to which new technological possibilities are used, 
the end result will differ little from that of controlling the 
generation of such possibilities.
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It is apparent that society as a whole does not exercise such 
control. Information about proposed new technology and its likely 
consequences is rarely made public. In most countries there are no 
specific mechanisms for assessing the social and environmental 
benefits and costs of such technology. In general, predictions of 
the wider social consequences of technology, including its cumulative 
and synergistic effects and its likely stimulation of further 
technology, are not attempted. The narrow economic and technical 
criteria used reflect the reality that decisions concerning new 
technology are made largely on the basis of organisational self- 
interest .
Let us assume that the preceding statement applies to public as 
well as private sector organisations, and that those making such 
decisions can be characterised as an elite. It may then be 
considered that a situation of elite control or determination of 
technology exists. If this is so, however, it is an incomplete form 
of control. In the first place, elites are not monolithic. A new 
technology might benefit one sector of a society's elite and not 
another; or the elite of one nation and not another; or it mqy help 
in the downfall of an elite and the elevation of another.
Uncontrolled side effects (pollution) or cumulative effects (urban 
congestion) of technology can affect elites as well as society in 
general. More significantly, because corporate self-interest 
predominates, and the long-term and cumulative social consequences of 
technology are neglected, elite decisions must be made not only in 
ignorance of many of the consequences of specific innovations, but 
in ignorance of the transformations in society which new technology 
in aggregate will bring about. In changing technology, society is 
itself being changed in unforeseen and uncontrolled ways. If elites 
do not generally know what the wider and longer-term consequences of 
such decisions will be, they have no guarantee that the changes to 
society which their decisions will collectively bring about will 
not be inimical to their own longer-term interests. In other words, 
given that members of elites have a considerable degree of control 
over the development and use of specific increments of technology, 
this does not mean that elites control the overall consequences of 
technology for society and hence for themselves. This is a case
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similar to the fallacy of commons, where optimising individual short 
term decisions may not lead to an optimum collective result for the 
decisionmakers. In order to demonstrate elite control in the wider 
sense, one would have to demonstrate collective elite action or inaction 
based on a detailed understanding of the consequences of technological 
change for society and hence for elites. Certainly elites in corporations 
and in government carry out planning and forecasting activities related 
to their wider and longer-term interests, and achieve considerable 
cooperation and consensus. But the other side of the picture, of 
decisions based on short-term expediency or on inadequate information, 
of conflicts between elites and lack of planning in many areas, does 
not sustain a picture of detailed control and coordination by elites.
Nevertheless, this does not dispose of the arguments for elite 
determinism. It may be that elites do not need detailed cooperative 
planning in order to maintain their dominance. Elite values may come 
to be accepted by non-elites, institutions tend to develop which 
perpetuate elite power, and the pursuit by elite members of personal 
or corporate ends may still lead to a situation of overall economic 
dominance by elites. All these things could occur as a result of 
elite members largely following the dictates of self-interest, rather 
than from a conscious pursuit by individuals of collective elite goals, 
or from any conspiracy by elite members. This is not to deny that there 
can be simultaneously a degree of cooperation and a recognition of 
common interests. But it may be only in times of crisis for elites 
that elite members need to come together to protect their mutual 
interests.
Under the preceding scenario various degrees of dominance can be 
attributed to elites or ruling classes. But it would seem difficult 
to argue that without detailed planning, elites can totally determine the 
course of society. They may certainly maintain a climate which is 
biased in their favour, however, and perhaps this is all any pragmatic 
elite member might ask. In other words, elites must make concessions 
to other interests, there are events which they cannot control, their 
planning and cooperation is imperfect and variable, there may be 
competing elites or elite factions, and elite influence, particularly 
over longer-term consequences, is less than complete.
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It must be concluded that the a priori arguments for either 
technological or elite determinism are not so compelling that the 
conceptual framework implied by either one must be adopted as a starting 
point for analysis. Rather they are influences whose explanatory value 
must be considered along with that of other variables.
An alternative model to social, elite or technological determinism 
is suggested, one where neither technology nor society are determined by 
the other. Rather, their interactions with each other and with other 
variables create a degree of directional inertia for the whole socio­
economic and technological complex. Social and technological trends 
become institutionalised and are reflected in prevailing ideas and 
conventional wisdom, which in turn tend to maintain the course of 
technology. Society, technology and other variables have a mutually 
reinforcing momentum and any forces for change must overcome that 
momentum.
We will now turn to a brief consideration of some of the more 
immediate interactions between technology and other variables and their 
consequences for policy; that is, those instances where technology 
appears to be an important influence on another variable, leaving 
aside questions of the variables which may have conditioned technology.
In industrial society, technology affects almost all aspects of 
daily life, and is bound to permeate ideas and values and thereby 
affect policy. Two technology-related ideas are particularly 
important; the idea of rationality and the idea that technology is 
good in itself. Douglas (1971, p. 37) defines technology as the 
rational ordering of means to achieve definite ends. Rationality 
dominates not only factory production, but the structure of administration 
and, as noted earlier, our ideas about how decisionmaking should be 
conducted. A consequence of preoccupation with rationality of 
means is that values tend to be neglected; or, put differently, 
rationality of means becomes highly valued: the means becomes
the end. Similarly, technology, not just in its aspect of 
rationality, but also in its physical manifestation 'as objects 
selected or fabricated by man as a means of changing the state of 
his material environment' (Dickson, 1974, p. 17) has come to have 
positive values attached to it which have given it the qualities 
of an end as well as a means. Technology has been associated with
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the benefits of economic growth, and hence technological change has 
generally been regarded as highly beneficial. Of course, there has 
always been some concern with the social and environmental 
consequences of technology, particularly in recent years, but such 
views remain in a minority.
A consequence of the elevation of rationality and technological 
change to ends as well as means has been that policies become 
technologically dictated; technology must be used because it exists.
As Horne (1976, p.205) puts it: 'Policy consists in doing what
you know you can do ... It is the style of the soluble problem: if
you have the answer you have the question.' Even where problems 
arise independently, a technological society attempts to define them 
in technological terms and seek technological solutions. Politicians, 
too, as has often been observed, frequently prefer decisions to be 
seen to be taken on technological grounds, as this absolves them 
from having to make awkward choices between competing sets of values.
The relationships between technology and economic variables 
are, of course, often fundamentally important in explaining policy.
New technology allows existing products to be produced more* cheaply, 
and new or modified products to be produced which create additional 
demand. It allows more to be produced by the same or a lesser 
number of people, a loss of employment not necessarily counter­
balanced by new jobs created elsewhere. New technology can also be 
used to replace people with machines even where lower costs per unit 
of output are not expected; as Galbraith (1973, p.149) points out,
machines are usually more tractable than people and assure management 
of an increased degree of control.
New technology is beneficial when applied to the products of 
a given corporation because it assists corporate profit, growth and 
survival. Corporations therefore benefit from developing new 
technology and encouraging consumer acceptance of new products by 
advertising and merchandising. This in turn enhances public approval 
of technology, change, and newness. Pseudo-innovation, that is, 
trivial, cosmetic, or imaginary advances in product quality, can have 
the same beneficial consequences for sales as real technological 
advances if consumers can be persuaded to accept them as important
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and real. Since real innovations are not always available considerable 
effort goes into marketing such pseudo-innovations and their 
accompanying psychic benefits. At the same time, technological 
change and pseudo-innovation maintain a higher level of consumer 
demand than would otherwise obtain, because products become more 
rapidly obsolete. If the rate of innovation and pseudo-innovation 
were to fall, consumer demand would tend to fall also, reducing the 
level of economic activity. New technology and pseudo-innovation 
thus have a self-perpetuating aspect. To maintain a level of demand 
created by innovation, further innovation is needed. Because of the 
likely adverse consequences for the level of economic activity, 
governments are reluctant to pursue policies (technology assessment, 
controls on advertising) which might hinder innovation or pseudo­
innovation or the creation of demand for them. Where governments 
are also consumers (for example in the military area) innovation 
similarly hastens obsolescence and maintains demand.
Technology is maintained and assisted in influencing policy 
by becoming institutionalised. Government agencies are formed to 
carry out certain categories of development: construction of
highways or hydro-electric schemes. If such agencies survive and 
prosper, those employed by them will benefit. For this and other 
reasons to do with socialisation into organisations and professions, 
staff of such agencies are inclined to become single-minded 
advocates for the technology in which they are engaged. Frequently 
this attitude extends to the Ministers responsible for such 
agencies, since their power is related to that of their portfolio. 
Other government agencies, created to regulate certain industries 
and technologies, become captive of the interests they are supposed 
to control. Still other agencies are expressly created to foster 
various sectors of private industry and hence the technology they 
employ. In pursuit of their immediate objectives, public servants 
in such agencies tend to give insufficient weight to the wider 
public interest, or to acquire the belief that their objectives and 
the public interest coincide. Ties between government agencies 
and industry are strengthened because the main sources of 
policy advice concerning a particular technology are often people
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who have worked in the industry concerned. Staff of corporations 
and government agencies concerned with the same technology tend to 
share common backgrounds, training, and interests.
Large corporations are themselves institutions. Their financial 
and political power enables them to maintain the viability of the 
technologies in which they have invested, and to choose the new 
technologies which they wish to develop. The advantages of large 
corporations are in assembling large amounts of capital to undertake 
large scale, complex and centrally controlled activities. It is not 
surprising that such organisations tend to favour new technologies 
which are large scale, capital intensive, complex and centralised.
Technology, together with socio-economic and other forces, 
generates patterns of production and organisation which in turn bring 
about various occupational classes and groupings. In industrial 
sociecy, particularly, people are to a considerable extent defined by 
what they do. Their attitudes to policies, and their opportunities 
to influence them, will be affected by their occupation. Technology 
influences social structure and attitudes and hence policy. One such 
occupational grouping Galbraith (1973, p.82) identifies as the techno­
structure, the complex of engineers, marketing men, accountants, 
administrators and other specialists which collectively becomes the 
guiding intelligence of the business firm.
Overlapping with the technostructure, but extending into other 
areas is an occupational species closely related to technology, 
the expert. When policy issues become controversial, the role of 
experts in the policy process becomes more apparent as they become 
polarised by the dispute. From analysis of two such public disputes, 
Nelkin (1977, p.202) suggests several propositions about the part 
played by experts which may be generalisable to other such 
controversies:
First, developers seek expertise to legitimize 
their plans and they use their command of technical 
knowledge to justify their autonomy. They assume 
that special technical competence is a reason to preclude 
outside public (or 'democratic’) control.
Second, while expert advice can help to clarify 
technical constraints3 it also is likely to increase
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conflict, especially when expertise is available to 
those communities affected by a plan.
Third, the extent to which technical advice is 
accepted depends less on its validity and the competence 
of the expert, than on the extent to which it reinforces 
existing positions. Our two cases suggest that factors 
such as trust in authority, the economic or employment 
context in which a controversy takes place, and the 
intensity of local concern will matter more than the 
quality or character of technical advice.
Fourth, those opposing a decision need not muster 
equal evidence. It is sufficient to raise questions that 
will undermine the expertise of a developer whose power 
and legitimacy rests on his monopoly of knowledge or claims 
of special competence.
Fifth, conflict among experts reduces their political 
impact. The influence of experts is based on public 
trust in the infallibility of expertise. Ironically, 
the increasing participation of scientists in political 
life may reduce their effectiveness ...
Finally, the role of experts appears to be similar 
regardless of whether they are 'hard' or 'soft' scientists.
The two conflicts described here involved scientists, 
engineers, economists and lawyers as experts. The 
similarities suggest that the technical complexity of the 
controversial issues does not greatly influence the 
political nature of a dispute.
To summarise, if these propositions are correct then it appears 
that experts and their advice are not the most important influence 
in such debates, and the quality of their advice is less important 
than its usefulness to the other protagonists.
Perhaps of greater importance, however, is the role of experts 
in the many instances where decisions concerning new technology do 
not become controversial and are taken without public review. The 
consequences of such decisions may be highly significant for society, 
yet for a variety of reasons public debate is avoided. The adverse 
consequences of new technology may be deliberately withheld from the 
public, or in many cases such consequences are not understood or 
investigated. Governments and government agencies and private sector 
corporations both at times withhold information about new technology and its 
consequences from the public. In some cases the reasons for doing so 
are defensible (e.g., military secrecy); in other cases where secrecy 
is based on factors such as fears of public reaction, curtailment of
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agency programmes or loss of profit, agency or corporate interests are 
on the face of it being placed before those of the public.
Where the adverse consequences of technology are not known, 
this may occur because such consequences are simply not thought of, 
or because investigations into known possibilities are not pursued.
The latter may occur, in part, because scientists and technologists 
often regard their work as 'value-free' - their concern is to develop 
new knowledge and new technology, not to investigate the way it will 
be used and the effects it may have. Or it may be considered beyond 
corporate or government agency objectives or against their interests 
to investigate the wider social and environmental consequences of 
technological decisions.
Technology is applied to the biogeophysical environment in the 
course of satisfying human needs and wants. The effect of such 
application is, in one sense, basic to the explanation of policy, 
since (leaving aside the question of the factors which influence 
technology) the level of productivity which is made possible by the 
application of technology establishes the realms of possibility for 
policy. Further, the process and distribution of production are the 
subject matter for much of public policy.
The application of technology to the biogeophysical environment 
results in both benefits and costs. Some of the costs will take the 
form of adverse effects on the biogeophysical environment. The nature 
of such effects, and their consequences for human health and wellbeing, 
have been examined extensively in the environmental literature and 
need not be reviewed here. Commoner (1972) has argued that 
technological change has been the major cause of environmental 
degradation. The absolute increase in production has been less 
significant than changes in the methods of production and the nature 
of the end products, and new technology tends to have a more adverse 
environmental impact than the old.
Technology, of course, also has adverse as well as beneficial 
consequences for the social environment. Such consequences arise 
both from specific instances of the application of technology (e.g. 
the social disruption caused by a freeway bisecting a neighbourhood)
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and insofar as technology in general has shaped society and thereby helped 
to create its adverse as well as its beneficial aspects. Technology, for 
instance, has led to accelerated urbanisation with its attendant physical 
and mental stresses. It has meant, for many, a working life engaged in 
the tedious and repetitive tasks imposed by mass production. Again the 
list of such adverse consequences is long and need not be pursued further 
here.
Adverse consequences of technology for the social and
biogeophysical environment are not necessarily in themselves unacceptable.
Such consequences may be admissible in terms of the benefits which also
accrue from the circumstances or actions which cause them. The concern
is rather that the results of such actions may be non-optimal in some
sense; e.g. if in terms of the welfare of society marginal costs including
environmental costs exceed marginal benefits. As a corollary to the
explanation of public policy an important question is why policy often
brings about such non-optimal outcomes, both by pursuing actions which
lead to such outcomes, and by inaction or inadequate action to prevent
such consequences occurring. Such non-optimal outcomes, however, are not
simply attributable to the application of technology. They are a result
/
of all the factors which influence human actions, not just their 
technological component.
BIOGEOPHYSICAL FACTORS
In much of the policy literature the biogeophysical environment 
is ignored as an explanatory factor; the environmental policy literature 
is largely concerned with it as something affected by, rather than 
affecting, human actions. In sociology, Etzioni (1973, p. 6) states that 
'the environmental and biological theories have been so completely 
rejected that they are only of historical interest.1 But because a factor 
does not provide the predominant explanation of society or policy, this 
does not mean that it should be rejected as a partial explanation. Like 
other variables, biogeophysical factors both set some of the boundaries 
of possibility within which policy must operate, and may be decisive 
influences in determining particular policies.
The biogeophysical resources available to a nation help to 
determine the possibilities for its socio-economic development. The 
influence of biogeophysical factors, however, may be more subtle than
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that of their status as economic resources. Turner's work on the 
influence of the frontier on culture and ideas in the United States 
is an example; in Australia Blainey (1977) has shown the significance 
of problems of distance and communications in Australia's development.
The biogeophysical environment can influence the nature of institutions, 
for example where problems of distance lead to decentralised decision­
making and administration. It fundamentally influences technology, 
whose design is determined in part by the characteristics of the 
environment it is designed to modify, or within which it has to work, 
and by the materials available for manufacture from the environment.
It is also a mistake to regard the environment merely as a 
passive recipient for actions which change it; as a sink for waste 
products or a resource to be used. The idea that the natural 
environment embodies complex systems of interactions of living things 
with their environment and with each other is becoming more widely 
understood. Perhaps less well understood are the implications of the 
nature of such ecosystems for human affairs. The response of such 
systems to many forms of human intervention is not passive but 
reactive. Because of the interconnectedness of ecosystems such 
intervention can set off a chain of events - what has been called a 
’ripple effect' - which can lead to consequences other than those 
sought. In this respect, a more complex ecosystem is sometimes more 
stable than a simple one. For example, the clearing of land for cropping 
replaces a diversity of species with a single one. This provides 
favourable conditions for a buildup in numbers of insects which feed on 
the crop. The buildup may be followed by an increase in the pest's 
natural predators and renewed stability; or more probably, fluctuations 
in numbers of pests and predators may ensue, giving some low pest damage 
and some high pest damage seasons. If, as is likely, a broad spectrum 
insecticide is applied, both pests and predators will be largely 
destroyed, creating favourable conditions in the following season for 
another buildup of the pest species. Also, if the insecticide is 
repeatedly applied, there is a strong possibility of the pest species 
developing a resistance to it, rendering it increasingly less effective. 
Some adverse consequences may be quite distant in time or space 
from the source of change. Concentration of pesticides or heavy
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metals through the food chain may result in dangerous quantities being 
ingested by animals at the top of the chain, including humans.
The preceding are commonplace examples of human actions reacting 
adversely via ecological systems upon humans. Of course the effects of 
artificial changes in environment may be more direct: for example the
effect of asbestos dust in factories or mines on human lungs. Humans 
are adapted for an environment which does not contain significant 
quantities of such dust. This raises the question as to whether any 
wider principle can be adduced concerning the effects on humans of 
their changes to the environment. Humans are, like other animals, a 
part of the ecosystem. A significant difference, however, is the way 
humans have been able to expand their ecological niche by changing 
their environment, either locally or on a large scale, or by insulating 
themselves against it. Boyden (1980, p.629) notes that:
If the conditions of life of an animal population suddenly 
deviate from those of the natural habitat (to which the 
species has become adapted through natural selection) it 
is likely that the individual animals will be less well-suited 
to the changed conditions than to the original conditions, 
and consequently some signs of maladjustment - physical, 
behavioural or both - may be anticipated.
4
This 'principle of evodeviance' Boyden argues, applies to humans as 
much as other species. Further, the conditions to which humans are 
adapted by natural selection are those applying to the hunter-gatherer 
lifestyle, in which humanity has been engaged for almost all its exist­
ence. This point is not used by Boyden as an argument for a return to 
a hunter-gatherer lifestyle. What is being is asserted is that as 
humans create environmental conditions which deviate further from 
those to which they are adapted by evolution, the more obvious benefits 
of overcoming environmental constraints are likely to be offset to some 
degree by sometimes less obvious disbenefits. For example, the adverse 
effects on health of excessively refined food are becoming more widely 
understood. The argument can also be extended to psychosocial factors.
However, it is not necessary to accept arguments based on 
evodeviation in order to agree that humans are organisms to which 
some conditions are less favourable than others, and that policy 
formulation should try to comprehend all such significant consequences.
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Clearly the interactions between the biogeophysical environment and 
humans have important normative implications for many policies, 
including the explanation of some unanticipated or unwanted 
consequences of policies which involve environmental change. In 
relation to the explanation of policy the relevant question is often 
not how environmental considerations have influenced policy, but why 
they have not influenced it. Part of the answer is that ecological 
systems are often complex and poorly understood, and the adverse 
effects of human-induced environmental changes are often difficult to 
demonstrate conclusively and even harder to quantify and express in 
monetary terms. For a full explanation, however, it is necessary to 
look beyond the difficulties of predicting environmental outcomes to 
the range of influences on policy and the way in which these might 
introduce a bias against environmental values in the policy process.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Socio-economic variables have a distinguished record in the 
’winning variable' debate, from the Marxian emphasis on the relations 
of production as determinants of the social and political super-
4
structure, to the findings of the 'demographic approach' briefly 
discussed previously. The arguments concerning the demographic 
approach have been reviewed in detail in the literature (e.g. Dearlove, 
1973, pp. 61-70; Simeon, 1976, p. 552, footnote 17 for a list of 
references). The demographic approach generally showed strong 
statistical relationships between certain socio-economic variables 
and measures of policy outputs, and low correlations between certain 
attributes of political systems and policy outputs; the inference 
being drawn that socio-economic rather than political variables are 
important in determining policy. Criticisms of much of this work, 
however, point to the limited range of political, economic and policy 
output variables considered, and the selection of such variables for 
ease of measurement rather than importance. For example, policy 
outputs are usually measured as levels of expenditure (e.g. on 
education) but these may not measure real policy differences nor 
reflect variations in the levels of service provided.
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More fundamentally, it has been pointed out that demonstration 
of a statistical relationship does not explain the process whereby 
certain socio-economic variables work through the political process 
to generate certain policy outputs. Also, some of the more recent 
studies have re-established the importance of political variables 
(Simeon, 1976, p.567). The need is therefore to understand the way 
in which socio-economic variables enter and influence the policy 
process through the perceptual screens of policymakers (Dearlove,
1973, p.76). Policymakers are not passive recipients of environmental 
forces; to a degree, they select the inputs they want. The one-way 
arrow in Easton’s well-known systems diagram showing demands and 
support flowing from the environment of politics to the black box of 
political decisionmaking is in a sense reversed or at least made 
problematical; politicians seek some kinds of input and ignore others.
This selectivity of course applies to interest group and other 
environmental pressures as well as socio-economic factors; some of the 
ways in which such screening and selection takes place will be 
discussed in later sections.
Heclo takes a somewhat different approach to 'the grand choice 
between economic and political explanations.’ This, he says, 'turns 
out to be little more than a difference in analytic levels, a difference 
between the socioeconomic preconditions and the political creation and 
adjustment of concrete policies' (Heclo, 1974, p,288); a conclusion supported 
by Hawker et at. (1979, p.ll). While agreeing with Heclo that there is 
no grand choice of explanations, the matter cannot be so easily 
dismissed as a difference in analytic levels. Certainly, socio­
economic factors do set some of the preconditions, the dimensions of 
the stage for the players. But such factors should not be thought of 
solely in the sense of broad parameters within which political actors 
have plenty of room to manoeuvre. Socio-economic variables of a 
general kind may have a decisive influence on particular policies. A 
downturn in population growth can make nonsense of plans for satellite 
cities. Further, socio-economic factors are not simply those aggregates 
which can be analysed at national or regional levels, such as economic 
development, level of income or education. Socio-economic variables 
of a more policy-specific kind enter at a more detailed level of
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analysis. Those social and economic variables included in cost/ 
benefit analysis, for example, are an important factor in many 
decisions.
Governments consider both the political and economic 
consequences of decisions. For instance, government may recognise 
both political benefits and disadvantages in acquiescing to the wishes 
of a mining lobby, but in a disputed decision as to whether to proceed, 
the size of the expected economic return and other economic benefits 
are likely to be important considerations. Similarly, efforts to 
improve trade relations with another country may reflect the political 
influence of a producer group, but the success of such efforts will 
also be strongly related to the economic viability of the trade 
proposal. The policy decisions involved depend on a mixture of 
economic and political considerations as perceived by the policymakers; 
both from the policymakers' point of view and from that of the analyst 
explaining policy there is not necessarily a difference in analytic 
levels; both political and economic factors are part of a matrix of 
influences considered by the decisionmaker at a given time.
Whether on the macro-or micro-scale, policy influences under the 
heading of social and economic conditions encompass more than sets of 
aggregates which can be described statistically. Underlying such 
aggregates are structures and relationships of actors and institutions 
which are centred on economics but extend into the social and 
political spheres. Since such structures are likely to play an 
important part in explaining policy, it is desirable to sketch in a 
general view of them, together with some of their implications for 
policy.
A convenient starting point is the contrast, to which Galbraith 
drew attention, between 'private affluence and public squalor'; the 
high level of expenditure on material goods for private consumption as 
compared with the relative poverty of provision for many public goods 
and services. Hirsch (1977, p.108) believes that critics of 
Galbraith's views have 'for the most part, not seriously questioned 
the accuracy of the trends he has portrayed ... What the economists 
have questioned is Galbraith's interpretation of these phenomena.'
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This is somewhat inaccurate, however. While the high value given to 
the acquisition of material possessions is obvious, many economists 
would see no normative problems with this, nor would they concede 
failings in public expenditure. Rather, some would argue for 
reductions in the latter area.
Hirsch himself seeks to answer the question: ’Why has economic
advance become and remained so compelling a goal to all of us as 
individuals, even though it yields disappointing fruits when most, if 
not all of us, achieve it?' (Hirsch, 1977, p.l). Again, one might 
take issue with the view that economic advance yields disappointing 
fruits. Hirsch is assuming part of what he has to prove. Nevertheless, 
the first part of the question remains valid. It might therefore be 
reformulated thus: Why does Western society place such a high value
on private acquisition of goods and services, as compared with non­
material culture or public expenditure on shared goods? Perhaps the 
most obvious answer to the question put in this way, is that it is 
human nature to want these things; no further explanation embodying 
special influences on demand is necessary. People want more material 
possessions more than they want increased public goods and services, 
and Western industrial societies are the first which have bqen able to 
meet such wants for large numbers.
Galbraith, of course, sees matters otherwise. In essence, he has 
argued that the persuasive power of advertising, planned obsolescence, 
and the limited choice provided by the dominant large corporations all 
combine to distort patterns of demand. At the same time, the power 
of such corporations to influence government brings about a pattern of 
public expenditure which favours those areas which assist the 
corporations and starves of funds those which do not (Galbraith, 1973,
p.200).
Hirsch, however, suggests a different scenario. He argues that 
even if Galbraith were wrong about the influence of advertising, even 
if consumers make discerning choices and only the corporations which 
best meet these choices prosper, the outcome may still be consistent 
with a misallocation of resources (Hirsch, 1977, p.108). Hirsch sees 
this misallocation arising as a result of 'positional competition'. 
Positional competition is of two main types: status-seeking where
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satisfaction depends on relative position, for example that part of the 
satisfaction of owning a Rolls-Royce which arises from the envy and 
respect of others; what Arndt (1978, p.52) identifies as the psycho­
logical need for identity. The second type is the demand for 
commodities where satisfaction is ’independent of the satisfaction or 
position enjoyed by others and ... yet influenced by the consumption 
or activity of others’ (Hirsch, 1977, p.22). Here satisfaction is 
affected not by status but by crowding. Hirsch gives the examples of 
traffic congestion and competition for leadership positions. In the 
latter case, only a limited number of such positions are available, no 
matter how intense the competition for them.
In practice it is difficult to distinguish between the two sources 
of positional competition. Leadership positions, for instance, have a 
considerable element of status attached to them. Whether arising from 
status-seeking or congestion, however, Hirsch's central point is that 
’the satisfaction that individuals derive from goods and services 
depends in increasing measure not only on their own consumption but 
on consumption by others as well' (Hirsch, 1977, p.2). Individuals 
attain a certain level of consumption only to find that their satisfaction 
has decreased because others have reached the same level. Consequently, 
increasing levels of consumption see an increase in the intensity of 
positional competition. Hirsch thus provides an alternative explanation 
to Galbraith' s for the continuing heavy emphasis on individual material 
advancement in Western society.
There are other modes of explanation, however. Socialisation, 
the process whereby individuals accept or internalise the values 
encountered in their social environment, is relevant. Socialisation 
occurs through social learning, where behaviour is modified by reward 
and punishment, and by observation of models of behaviour. Where the 
learner encounters consequences of his behaviour which are more positive 
or negative than his expectations, he is likely to modify his 
subsequent behaviour accordingly. Socialisation by imitation and by 
observational learning differ in that 'when the imitator responds not 
merely by blindly matching his behaviour to that of a model, but by 
searching the environment to determine which cue conditions the model 
is responding to, independent learning may occur' (McDavid and Harari, 
1974, p.246).
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Through such processes, where people are exposed from childhood to 
a society in which high values are placed on material acquisition, they 
are likely to accept those values, and thus to perpetuate them. A 
high value may thereby continue to be placed on incremental material 
gains even where the functional utility of such increments is falling.
In Western society, and particularly in American society, 
imagination is stultified from infancy. The imaginative child 
is discouraged and upbraided. He is told that the process is 
mere dreaming, that it wastes time and leads nowhere. It is 
said to be 'impractical.' As the child grows and its imagina­
tion inevitably leads it to express unconventional ideas and 
to try new behaviour, it is chided and even viciously 
punished for such signs of unorthodoxy.
In America, the child is schooled, if a boy, toward fiscal 
endeavour. It is taught to want to be a 'good provider,' if 
not a millionaire. From babyhood it is pursued by advertise­
ments and commercials which give it the aggregate impres­
sion that the aim of life is to acquire funds wherewith to 
obtain all it hears recommended. The American media of 
communication hypnotize it into a set of special desires. A 
girl, of course, takes up the same doctrine. Her aim becomes 
to find a mate with money to act on every radio commercial 
or, at the very least, to set herself up in a career which will 
enable her so to act, independently.
Thus American imagination is directed - as if in the whole 
of life no other aims or satisfactions could be found than those 
of being a consumer, avid, constant and catholic (Wylie, 1974, p.61).
While the preceding quotation conveys the essence of the idea of 
socialisation, it is of course an exaggerated view. Society is not 
uniform; different sub-cultures and peers provide different forms of 
socialisation, and individuals react differently to socialisation 
pressures.
A rather different view is that many people do want more and better 
public goods such as clean air, natural areas and welfare services, but 
that they feel unable to influence such matters personally, and therefore 
opt for higher personal income and hence increased choice in those 
matters which they can influence through greater purchasing power. For 
instance, they may consider that increased taxation will be wastefully 
disposed of, and fail to bring about the changes that they want, and 
that they cannot significantly influence the process of government in 
these matters. For such reasons the individual's choice between 
government and personal spending does not necessarily reflect his 
priorities as between the end products of private or public commodities.
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The preceding explanations need not be regarded as conflicting 
alternatives, but rather as compatible and mutually reinforcing. The 
persuasive power of advertising and promotion, which Galbraith uses 
to explain the continuing preoccupation with the acquisition of 
consumer commodities, is only part of the wider process of socialization. 
Positional competition provides a further spur towards intensification 
of the commodity bias. Galbraith's first condition for the large 
corporations to have influence over the public and government - a 
profound public belief in the importance of what the corporations do 
(Galbraith, 1973, p.157) - is therefore amply met.
The resultant corporate influence on government, in Galbraith's 
view, brings about the inadequacies in public expenditure in sectors 
which do not assist the activities of the large corporations. Such 
inadequacies are augmented by Hirsch's 'commercialisation effect', the 
commercialisation of what were formerly shared public access facilities 
which arises from the pressure of positional competition (Hirsch, 1977, 
p.105). Commercialisation is inclined to be self-reinforcing; for 
example, the effect of increased car ownership and use in decreasing 
the level of public transport service in turn encourages increased car 
use.
Given the major features of commodity bias and large corporations 
with a strong influence on government, the rest of the outline of socio­
politico-economic relationships in the archetypal Western economy 
follows almost inevitably along largely Galbraithian lines. Corporate 
competition is largely by means of advertising and promotion which 
carry a high status-appeal component, and through real or imaginary 
product innovation. There is a minimum of price competition between 
the few large corporations in each market; by concerted action increased 
costs can be passed on to the consumer, making sweetheart agreements 
with unions feasible. Substantial control over margins largely 
assures stability and profit and attracts the cheapest capital and 
the best technical expertise, as against those sectors of the economy 
where price competition persists.
The influence of the large corporations over government, as well 
as deriving from their power to fund political campaigns and from the 
recognised importance of their activities, is furthered by the 'symbiotic
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relationship’ (Galbraith, 1973) which they maintain with the govern­
ment agencies charged with overseeing their interests. Both sides 
benefit from the relationship; personnel are exchanged between them; 
government assists with infrastructure, tax concessions or cheap 
energy supplies; government agencies benefit from the expanding 
departmental staff and budgets associated with a growing industry.
The influence of corporations is exerted through the bureaucracy as 
well as the elected government. Corporate power is also furthered by 
the pervasiveness through society and in influential positions of 
corporate personnel or their associates in related public and 
private organisations.
For a number of reasons, therefore, government policy is likely
to be largely compatible with the aims of the large corporations;
broadly, survival, growth and profit. Policies which run counter to
such aims are unlikely to find favour. Environmental policies are
likely to be weak and administered by weak departments. Technological
change will proceed with little concern for its adverse effects on
employment or pollution. Government agencies will not undertake
productive activity in areas which are potentially profitable for
private enterprise. Industry regulation, as in food, drug or
#
pesticide safety, is likely to be inadequate. Attempts at effective 
economic or land use planning and control will be avoided or undermined 
Control of inflation is given priority over maintenance of employment. 
Short-term resource exploitation will be favoured over longer-term 
resource conservation.
Where one must take issue with Galbraith is not in the structure 
he describes but in the centrality which he attributes to the large 
corporations - ’the planning system' - as a causal factor in this 
situation, stemming from their persuasive control of the consumer and 
their influence on government. This is, as Hirsch accepts, part of 
the truth; but positional competition exacerbates the commodity bias, 
and socialisation of the individual helps to perpetuate it. The 
explanation of the character of Western, or even U.S., society is 
wider and more varied than one centred on the influence of corporations 
The momentum of technology, the bias of institutions, and the 
pervasiveness of certain ideas all play a part. As Galbraith himself 
points out (1973, p.274), there is a strong association between
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the idea of private enterprise and the idea of freedom. We relate the 
freedoms of democracy to the freedom of enterprise and the achievement 
of material success, and thence create a climate favourable for 
corporate welfare. Governments and people, as well as corporations, 
exert influence; on the whole, their values are compatible with those 
of corporations, but not only because corporations have promoted such 
values. The phenomenon of Western society, and its policies, need to 
be understood in wider terms than those of corporate domination.
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTORS
In discussing individual and collective actors we come to the 
first of three groups: actors, institutions and decisionmaking
processes, which have been at the focus of interest of political 
scientists. In one way these three groups of variables are at the 
heart of the public policy process, since economic, technological and 
ideological forces, in order to affect public policy, must be 
expressed through political actors interacting in processes shaped by 
institutions. This is not to say, however, that such variables are 
necessarily more important than those others which have been discussed. 
Politicians are sometimes given excessive credit (or blame) 'for 
bringing about events for which more fundamental changes are largely 
responsible.
Because of the mutual interactions of the main classes of 
variables which influence policy, it is difficult to arrange a 
satisfactory order in which they should be reviewed. Discussing one 
group inevitably involves consideration of its relationship with others. 
Thus various political actors - elites, corporations, experts - have 
already entered the discussion without formal introduction. We will 
begin here by considering the influence of the public on policy, and 
work towards the proximate decisionmakers.
The public
Anyone beginning with the view that in a democracy the 
people have a considerable influence on public policy is likely to 
be quickly disillusioned by much of the academic writing on public policy 
analysis. Some writers, in listing the factors which shape policy, omit 
public opinion, or the electorate (as distinct from interest groups) 
altogether (e.g. Hawker et al., 1979, p. 10). Many studies appear to
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support such a conclusion. Dowse and Hughes mention work by Converse 
which showed that answers to the same questions about policy by the 
same sample of people in the U.S. in three interviews at two-yearly 
intervals were almost random: 'most people, in any meaningful sense,
did not have opinions' (Dowse and Hughes, 1975, p.276). They also 
(p.327) refer to a study by Jones which found no change between 
pre- and post-election policymaking behaviour by U.S. Congressmen, 
whether or not they had gained or lost support in the election.
Heclo, in his study of Sweden and Britain, concludes that 'elections 
appear to have had little direct impact on social policy and even 
the power indirectly asserted through policy makers' anticipations of 
popular reactions seems difficult to define and identify' (1974, p.293). 
Dye (1972, p.269) cites studies by Munger which showed little correlation 
between public opinion and certain public policies in U.S. States.
There are many arguments in favour of the view that the link 
between the general public and policy is a tenuous one. Public influence 
on policy may be exercised formally through elections or by less 
formal means such as contact with parliamentarians or via public opinion 
polls. However, members of the public may not have clear opinions on 
many policy areas; if they do, they may not trouble to express these 
views to policymakers, or the avenues for them to do so may'be limited. 
Politicians exercise some selectivity as to whom they listen and what 
they hear. Interest groups and elites are more likely to have influence 
on policymakers than the public at large because the former are 
organised to articulate their views and they may represent considerable 
aggregates of voting power or have other means of political or economic 
influence important to policymakers.
Further, elections do not provide for choices between specific 
policies; the choice is between the images and broad aggregations of 
policies presented by parties. Within these overall packages governments 
usually have plenty of room to manoeuvre in relation to specific 
policies, particularly when the next election is some way off; and it 
is not unusual for election promises to be dishonoured or new policies 
introduced which were not included in, or which conflict with, election 
platforms. The general public is removed several steps from the policy­
makers; policy is not made by the parliament, but by party machines, 
cabinet, and bureaucrats. Under the requirements of party solidarity 
parliament is often little more than a rubber stamp for policy decisions.
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Rather than passively putting into effect the wishes of the people, 
governments devise and sell policies to the public. Governments 
can have considerable control over which matters reach the public 
agenda and which policy alternatives, if any, are canvassed.
There are of course counter-arguments of various strengths to 
most of the preceding points. Governments wish to stay in office and 
must retain sufficient public approval to do so. To this end the 
public is not simply manipulable by government, but has been shown to 
be sometimes quite resistant to government efforts to influence it 
(Dowse and Hughes, 1972, p.272). Although the public may not initially 
hold clear opinions about desirable courses of action, it will exert 
pressure for action, and react positively or negatively to policies 
presented to it. Even though a high proportion of the population does 
not take an active interest in politics, given a pluralistic society 
(it may be argued) they may not feel the need to be active because 
their interests are already represented by pressure groups; or 
alternatively, if their interests are threatened, previously unorganised 
groups will be mobilised, and governments, being aware of this 
possibility, will bear such potential interests and pressures in mind 
when determining policy. t
The preceding arguments and counter-arguments carry different 
degrees of weight according to specific circumstances. It should be 
clear, nevertheless, that there is not usually a straightforward link 
between public opinion, expressed through elections or otherwise, and 
specific policies, and even less so concerning the details of policy.
The aggregations of policy represented by the choice between parties 
are too large for this. There are exceptions, however, when an 
election seems to turn largely on one or a few policy issues, or when a 
powerful groundswell of public opinion appears to precipitate policy 
change. Even then, it is moot as to what extent public opinions are 
the result of successful persuasion by opinion leaders or other means. 
Rather than the opinions held by members of the public causing their 
party allegiances, party allegiances may influence opinions. Even if 
policymakers think public opinion of policy is important, and are 
influenced by it, their reaction may not be to change policy, but 
rather to spend greater effort justifying it.
69
However, the public does affect policy in less direct ways.
Even if the public votes only on party image and overall programme, 
with little knowledge of specific policies, if the result is a change 
in the party in government or a marked reduction in its majority, this 
can in turn lead to major policy changes. In this sense the public 
has been, at one level, responsible for the change in policy, even 
though the matters which affected its vote had little or nothing 
to do with the specific policy in question. It may be, also, that 
without particular concern with any specific policy area, the majority 
of the public may have voted for a given party because it promised a 
change which would affect most policy areas, for example a promise to 
make major cuts in government spending. In this case the public are 
likely to have known that any given policy area is likely to receive 
expenditure cuts. Thus without detailed knowledge of, or concern with, 
a given policy area, the public, by voting on broader issues, can both 
wittingly and unwittingly bring about specific policy changes. The 
question is therefore not necessarily whether the people or elites 
or interest groups have power, but how these various forces interact 
at different stages of the policy process. Public opinion can bring 
about broad sea-changes in public policy orientations, with the 
proximate actors both influencing public opinion and making policy 
changes with considerable freedom within the broad and sometimes 
elastic and uncertain boundaries set by public opinion.
Elitism and pluralism
If the public often has no clear link with policy then perhaps 
elites or interest groups do. Heclo has suggested a reconciliation 
of the long-standing debate between elitist and pluralist inter­
pretations of politics. In his view the essential difference between 
elitist and pluralist interpretations may be in the time dimension.
At any given time, small groups working through institutions have been 
responsible for policy changes, but 'over the course of policy development, 
no particular group, party or administrative organ has finally captured 
a monopoly of influence on any policy ... All have played an important 
part at one time or another' (Heclo, 1974, p.319).
This 'longitudinal pluralism', however, would probably satisfy
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neither the pluralists nor the elitists. As Heclo says, this kind 
of pluralism 'is not necessarily that usually assumed by American 
observers, that is, a large number of semi-independent power units 
at a fairly narrow cross-section in time' (p.319). Nor does it accord 
with the ruling elite model of a dominant, cohesive group which 
maintains its hold on power over time.
Pluralists believe that power is widely distributed in the
community, so that interests have equal access to the political arena.
Pluralism implies a system of indirect public participation where people
are represented by competing groups. It thus relies on competing
elites, the leaders of interest groups. The classic criticism of the
pluralist approach was made by Bachrach and Baratz (1970), to the
effect that, in trying to identify the holders of power, it is not
sufficient to look only for those who are influential in concrete
decisions. It is also necessary to examine 'non-decisions' - the
ways in which some matters are excluded from the public agenda. If
a group can ensure that only the matters it wishes are subject to
public decisions, it is exercising a great deal of power. Non-decisions
may be brought about in many ways; for instance through the effect of
anticipated reactions, where certain proposals are not brought forward
/
because it is known that they will provoke strong opposition from the 
authoritative group.
Pluralism may be further criticised for looking too narrowly at 
the political dimension in seeking the sources of power. Economic 
power and social and professional contacts may be used to sway 
political decisions and non-decisions. Hegemonic theorists would 
argue that projection of elite or ruling class values onto the rest 
of society can limit the area of public debate. In such ways apparently 
pluralistic debate may be confined within the boundaries of a broad 
consensus on political and economic objectives favourable to elites, 
and decisionmaking may be consistently influenced in favour of one 
set of the competing interests. To point to the presence of competing 
interests in the political arena is not in itself sufficient evidence 
of a balanced democratic pluralism.
Nor can Heclo's longitudinal pluralism be accepted at face value. 
It would be necessary to establish not only that all groups 'played an 
important part at one time or another' but that interests coinciding
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w i t h  t h o s e  o f  any e l i t e  group d i d  no t  p l a y  an i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  more 
f r e q u e n t l y  t h a n  o t h e r s ;  t h a t  p o l i c i e s  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  u n f a v o u r a b l e  t o  
e l i t e s  were n o t  k e p t  o f f  t h e  agenda ;  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  a r e a s  i n  q u e s t i o n  
were o f  i m p o r ta n c e  t o  e l i t e s ,  and t h a t  a l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p o l i c i e s  
were p roduced  which were c l e a r l y  n o t  in  e l i t e  i n t e r e s t s .
Even i f  i t  were conc lude d  t h a t  such p o l i c i e s  were n o t  i n  e l i t e  
i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e r e  i s  a f u r t h e r  prob lem w i th  H e c l o ' s  a p p ro a c h .  An e l i t e  
may have d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  power and y e t  be f o r c e d  t o  d o l e  ou t  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e m e n t s  o f  w e l f a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  p o s i t i o n .  
H e c l o ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c s  as  a l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s ,  where 
governments  n o t  o n l y  ' p o w e r '  b u t  p u z z l e ,  and where improved  p o l i c y  i s  
b a s e d  on t h e  l e s s o n s  o f  t h e  o l d ,  i s  s t a t e d  in  r a t h e r  a c om placen t  way, 
r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  L in d b lo m 's  i n c r e m e n t a l i s m  and ' t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  o f  
democracy '  (L indblom, 1965) .
P o l i c y - m a k i n g  i s  a form o f  c o l l e c t i v e  p u z z le m e n t  on 
s o c i e t y ' s  b e h a l f ;  i t  e n t a i l s  bo th  d e c i d i n g  and knowing.
The p r o c e s s  o f  making p e n s i o n ,  unemployment  and s u p e r a n n u a t i o n  
p o l i c i e s  has  e x t e n d e d  beyond d e c i d i n g  what " w a n t s "  t o  
accommodate ,  t o  i n c l u d e  p rob lem s  o f  knowing who migh t  want  
som e th in g ,  what i s  w a n te d ,  what  s h o u ld  be w a n te d ,  and how t o  
t u r n  even t h e  most  s w e e t - t e m p e r e d  g e n e r a l  ag reem en t  i n t o  
c o n c r e t e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  T h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  p o l i t i c a l ,  no t  
b e c au s e  a l l  p o l i c y  i s  a b y - p r o d u c t  o f  power and c o n f l i c t  bu t  
b e c a u s e  some men have u n d e r t a k e n  t o  a c t  i n  t h e  name o f  o t h e r s .  
(Hec lo ,  1974, p .  3 05 ) .
I t  i s  u n d e n i a b l e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l a r g e  e le m en t  o f  l e a r n i n g  in  
p o l i c y m a k i n g ,  j u s t  a s  Heclo would n o t  deny t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l a r g e  e l e m en t  
o f  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  power .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  r a t h e r  what  i s  t h e  b a l a n c e  
be tw een  t h e  two,  and what  i s  t h e  n a t u r e  and adequacy  o f  t h e  l e a r n i n g  
t h a t  t a k e s  p l a c e .  Hec lo  h i m s e l f ,  as  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  i d e n t i f i e s  two 
k i n d s  o f  l e a r n i n g ,  c l a s s i c  c o n d i t i o n i n g  and i n s t r u m e n t a l  c o n d i t i o n i n g .
I f  l e a r n i n g  i s  l a r g e l y  o f  t h e  f i r s t ,  ' s a l i v a t e  a t  t h e  sound o f  t h e  
u s u a l  b e l l '  t y p e ,  p o l i c y m a k e r s  w i l l  have low a d a p t a b i l i t y  t o  c hang ing  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  The c o n d i t i o n e d  r e s p o n s e  c o n t i n u e s  long  a f t e r  t h e  r ew ard  
which p roduced  i t  i s  d i s c o n t i n u e d .  In o t h e r  words ,  w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  t h e  
P a v l o v i a n  a n a lo g y  t o o  l i t e r a l l y ,  a l e s s  k ind  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y ­
making th a n  H e c l o ' s  can  be made u s i n g  one o f  t h e  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s e s  
which he s u g g e s t s .  R a t h e r  t h a n  p o l i c y m a k in g  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a l e a r n i n g  
p r o c e s s  k e e p in g  a b r e a s t  o r  ahead  o f  c hang ing  c o n d i t i o n s ,  p o l i c y  
may be  d ragged  a lo n g  b e h i n d  them. P o l i c y  changes  may be  b e l a t e d
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and inadequate responses to changing demands and conditions, so that 
policy improvement is often achieved only after conditioned responses 
are changed by the repeated lesson of costly mistakes.
Even if this pessimistic picture of policymaking is overdrawn, 
there is still room for politics to be interpreted not ’as the 
agent of substantive policy adjustment at the hands of those with a 
commitment to knowledgeable action' (Heclo, 1974, p. 326), but as a 
process which, if not fully controlled by elites, can at least be 
substantially bent by them towards their own interests; and where 
improvements in social policy are often a reluctant concession rather 
than the product of the kind of benevolent elite paternalism which 
Heclo suggests.
Of course the ruling elite model also has its problems. Its 
proponents must demonstrate not only that a relatively small group 
holds disproportionate power, but that power in one area confers on 
its holders power in others, that powerholders are linked by a 
considerable degree of consensus, and that their power and influence 
give rise to decisions and circumstances which continue to favour 
elite interests.
4
It is also desirable to show the means by which elite power is 
maintained. Here some writers depend on the maintenance of a kind of 
hegemony under which the ideology of the elite becomes that of the mass 
of society. This situation need not occur, however, as the result of 
deliberate manipulation by elites. To advert to earlier discussion, it 
may be in part the outcome of a process of socialisation which brings 
about acceptance of the world as it is, and in part the self-perpetuating 
scarcity of positional goods which helps maintain the economic power 
of the large corporations and their links with political power.
There is no need to accept fully either the ruling elite or 
pluralist view of society; these may be regarded as ideal types, akin 
to the economists' perfect competition and monopoly, with real world 
situations occurring somewhere between the two.
Elites and classes
The ’elite’ and 'ruling class’ theories of the sources of 
societal power have engendered a long and tangled skein of debate, of
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which only the periphery can be skirted here. Marx defined class in 
relation to the means of production, and explained the dominance of the 
ruling class by its control of such means. The concept of a ruling elite 
arose in part as a result of some of the difficulties of Marx’s theory, 
particularly that of showing that a particular class, defined by its 
economic position, does in fact dominate politics and society (Bottomore, 
1974, p. 32). Pareto (1973, p. 26) defined elites as those who have the 
highest capability in their branch of human activity, and divided these 
into governing and non-governing elites. More recently Mills (1956, p. 4) 
defined the power elite as those who 'occupy the strategic command posts 
of the social structure', those who 'rule the big corporations ... run 
the machinery of state ... direct the military establishment.' Many 
writers have followed Mills in asserting a necessary connection between 
elites and organisations. Giddens (1974, p. 4) uses 'elite group' to 
designate 'those individuals who occupy formally defined positions of 
authority at the head of a social group or organisation.' Higley et at. 
(1979, p. 3) say 'The distinguishing feature of elites is their 
strategic decision-making locations in organisations. Elites are 
therefore persons with power to affect organisational outcomes 
individually, regularly and seriously.'
It should be recognised, however, that there are other'elites 
whose forte is not decisionmaking nor their distinguishing feature 
necessarily a strategic location in organisations. One might speak of 
a musical elite or an intellectual elite. Bottomore (1974, p. 14) defines 
the term in this wider sense as 'functional, mainly occupational groups 
which have a high status (for whatever reason) in a society.' Higley 
and Giddens' definitions refer more narrowly to a power or governing 
elite. Further, it is not always true, although probably largely so, that 
power to influence decisionmaking comes by virtue of organisational 
position. The influence of Marx or Keynes, for example, is not 
attributable to their positions with organisations. There is therefore a 
range of elites, whose interest in and power to influence policy varies. 
Nevertheless elite influence certainly overlaps, so that economic power, 
for instance, confers increased political influence.
Encel (1976, p. 39) recognises that social stratificiation is based 
on other than economic criteria, but at the same time he retains the 
Marxist definition of class. 'The description of the composition, role 
and function of elite groups' he writes 'requires the use of all three 
dimensions' of social inequality: class, status and power.' He refers to
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class as 'superior/inferior access to and control over the processes 
of production of material goods;' status as 'superior/inferior position 
in an accepted or established hierarchy of social roles and functions;' 
power as 'superior/inferior access to and control over the political, 
legal, and coercive mechanisms of influence and authority.'
Of course there are many kinds of power, but Encel is obliged to
define political and coercive power as 'power' because he has defined
economic power as 'class'. In order to maintain this definition, Encel
must argue (p.40) that distinctions such as differences in speech, which
people use to illustrate class differences, are really status
distinctions. To explain the difference between his definition of class
and the popular conception of the factors that go to make up class
differences, Encel contends that concepts like class, status and power
are logically different from 'actual social relationships' like
occupation, education, wealth, religion (p.37). His approach leads to
further difficulties. Encel speaks of 'the class system' as embracing
class, status and power (p.101), and says that to identify the components
of the upper class we should look for groups who occupy positions at the
top of each of the three axes of stratification (p.102). Class,
therefore, which he defines in economic terms, must at the same time be
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identified in terms of class, status and power.
Such problems are avoided if we define class in terms which 
reflect those used in society to place people in classes. Thus class 
will be defined by a number of factors which will vary somewhat in 
nature and emphasis between societies - factors such as income, property, 
education, occupation, kinship, residential neighbourhood, speech.
But many of these factors are also likely to be important in determining 
elite membership. How then, are elites to be differentiated from upper 
classes, or more generally, how are the factors which define elites 
differentiated from those which define classes? In the first place, 
although there may be a national elite, there are also many other kinds 
of elite in a given society. Elites divide vertically, for instance, by 
occupation, or by source of power. Class, however, is a society-wide 
phenomenon (although criteria used for placing people in classes may 
vary across a society). Further, although there may be a great deal of 
overlap, the kinds of factors which people see as defining class or 
elite membership respectively differ in composition and importance.
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Thus location in the upper class is likely to depend more on factors 
such as inherited wealth, lineage and social contacts, whereas for 
elites recognition is likely to be influenced more by achievement, 
power and strategic location within organisations, depending on the 
particular elite and society in question.
Class and elite theories of society are not necessarily opposed, 
except in their extreme forms. Provided that one does not start out 
with doctrinaire assumptions about the dominance of either classes or 
elites in explaining society, a number of questions can be asked 
whose answers will vary with the society concerned. These include the 
extent to which elites control political and economic power; whether 
elites are largely drawn from an upper class, and if so, whether their 
actions promote the interests of that class, so that it constitutes a 
ruling class; whether there is one cohesive elite or a plurality of 
elites, or a situation somewhere between the two.
Political Parties
Rose (1974, pp.380-383) proposes seven ’conditions that must be met 
if a political party is to direct the policies of government.’ Given that a 
party has gained power, by election or otherwise (Rose’s third 
condition) the remaining conditions boil down to four:
1) The party must have workable policies (Rose’s 
conditions 1 and 2).
2) Party nominees in government office must give high 
priority to carrying out party policies (Rose’s 
condition 7).
3) Nominees of the party must occupy a wide range of 
positions in government including the most important 
ones (Rose's conditions 4 and 5).
4) Party nominees in government must have control over 
the bureaucracy (Rose's conditions 6 and 8).
If a party lacks policies, or if these are unworkable, then 
clearly the party has no positive influence on government policy.
Party policies may be inadequate for many reasons. Policies and their 
means of implementation may not have been developed in detail for 
tactical reasons, for example because policies stated in very general 
terms are likely to be acceptable to a wider constituency. Factional 
disagreements within parties may result in vaguely worded policies or 
none at all in some areas. Limitations in party resources or
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organisation can prevent adequate preparation of policies. Party 
machines have many functions other than policy preparation. Some 
parties may place doctrinal considerations first, and gaining power 
second, a position likely to result in policies embodying 'grand 
intentions’, as Rose puts it, but which are difficult to implement 
because they require marked changes in the status quo.
Pre-election policy undertakings are quite often not adhered to 
in government. Rose shows that of fifteen selected policies, the 
1964-70 British Labour government had made no pre-election pledge on 
five of them, but nevertheless took action; of the ten on which it had 
made a pledge, it fulfilled five, took opposite action on three, and 
ambiguous action on the remaining two. The 1970-4 Conservative 
government showed a similar result (Rose, 1974, p.411).
There are two questions here: why parties' control over their
parliamentary leaders should be incomplete, and why parliamentary 
leaders' policies should differ from those of their parties. In some 
parties, parliamentary leaders (using the latter term in a collective 
sense to mean the prime minister and other ministers or their 
equivalents) are formally bound by the policies of their party; 
however, in practice there is more flexibility (see for example,
Hawker et at., 1979, p.36 - often the parliamentary caucus under the 
Whitlam Labor government was not given time to consider policies). On 
the other hand, it is argued in some party philosophies that the party 
has no right to bind elected members to party policies - their first 
duty is to represent the electorate which voted for them.
Parliamentary leaders are likely to see many matters from a 
different perspective to that of the party. As well as policy, leaders 
have a wide range of other concerns, including retaining power, 
furthering personal ambitions, and day to day administration. Once in 
office, leaders are subject to many new pressures in addition to 
those emanating from the party, such as public service advice which will 
point to difficulties in implementation and offer policy alternatives. 
Whereas party policy platforms are generally revised only at considerable 
intervals, parliamentary leaders are faced with a continually evolving 
situation where ideas, pressures, and circumstances change and policy 
must evolve also.
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The third point, concerning the need for party nominees to 
occupy a wide range of positions in government including the most 
important ones, draws attention to the difficulties which a government 
has in implementing policy if it is faced by a hostile upper house, or 
where a party has had to compromise on some of its policies in order 
to form a coalition to gain office. More contentiously (and this shades 
into the fourth point concerning government control of the bureaucracy) 
it may be considered that with the Minister as the only party 
representative at the head of government departments staffed by career 
public servants (as well as the range of independent or quasi- 
autonomous statutory bodies), the governing party's control over the 
activities of the bureaucracy is at best uncertain. As has often been 
pointed out, the skills which bring a politician to ministerial level 
are not necessarily those best suited to administering a government 
department. Hawker et at. (1979, p. 37) write of the 'essentially 
unequal relationship' between the minister and the permanent head of 
his department - the latter usually has the advantage of greater 
administrative expertise, far more experience in the policy area in 
question, and powerful allies elsewhere in the bureaucracy and often 
outside it. f
In his introduction to the Crossman diaries, Anthony Howard 
(1979, p. 9) defends Crossman against those who said he had prejudged 
the issue of civil service power before attaining ministerial rank: 'It
is impossible to mistake the genuine astonishment with which he 
gradually discovers the power of the civil service - a power, he 
eventually concludes, that rests on two time-honoured Whitehall 
customs ...' These customs were, first, the minuting of Cabinet 
discussions and decisions by the civil service, which Crossman saw as 
giving the cabinet secretariat great discretionary power; and second, 
the ease with which influential civil servants would combine to impose 
an official view which was pressed at both ministerial and cabinet 
level.
Surprisingly, given the views of Crossman, who was one of the 
ministers in question, Rose says that the doubts which the 1964 
British Labour government had about civil servants 'were soon 
dispelled, at least among ministers judged successful.' (Rose, 1974)
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In Australia the Whitlam Labor government had, at best, mixed feelings 
about the capacity of the public service to implement its policies 
(Wilenski, 1978, p.35). The Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration concluded that the public service is able 'to function 
to some degree as a self-contained elite group exercising significant 
power generally in the interests of the status quo but without being 
effectively accountable for its exercise' (RCAGA, 1976, p. 23).
Governments have some measures which they can take to counter 
bureaucratic influence, for example the appointment of commissions, 
ministerial advisers and task forces drawing on appointees from 
outside the public service, but such measures have problems of their 
own and are only a partial solution. It must be concluded that none of 
the four conditions necessary for parties to direct the policies of 
government are consistently met; the cumulative effect, therefore, is 
that the party as a whole, while it may be 'capable of setting or 
changing the political agenda' (Hawker et at., 1979, p. 39) is not 
usually the major determinant of government policy.
Parliament
It is commonplace now to say that parliament as a whole does not 
govern; that the power of government rests with the prime minister and 
his cabinet (e.g. Solomon, 1978, p.30). Cabinet, not the parliament, 
plans the business of the house and introduces almost all legislation. 
Policy is not decided in parliament; often it is not even debated there 
before being put into effect. Legislation must be passed by parliament, 
but its content is largely preordained by the government, and policies 
not requiring legislation need no parliamentary ratification. The 
considerable effort that goes into debates, questions and the planning 
of parliamentary tactics rarely has any direct influence on decisions. 
Given a majority government and strong party discipline, the opposition, 
however convincing its case, has virtually no hope of bringing about a 
parliamentary rejection of government policy. Members' votes will 
almost always reflect the numerical strength of government and opposition, 
rather than any differing views about a particular issue which individual 
members may have. And the forms and procedures of the parliament 
generally give the government considerable advantages in pursuing its 
course with the minimum of opposition harassment (see generally 
Solomon, 1978) .
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Of course there are circumstances where the parliament can 
directly affect policy. The strength of party discipline varies 
between parties and parliaments, there may be a possibility of 
coalition between opposition groups, or opposition control of the 
upper house, or independent members who may vote with the opposition 
to defeat the government. In such cases the opposition can set 
limits on what the governing party can do. Even without such 
favourable circumstances, the indirect effect on policy of an alert 
and articulate parliamentary opposition should not be ignored. Govern­
ment bills are occasionally withdrawn or amended, or policies modified, 
when the opposition finds flaws in them. More importantly, parliament 
provides a forum in which parliamentary leaders are individually and 
collectively tested, not by vote, but by performance. To quote 
Crossman:
'These two censure debates have made me realise that for 
the first time I really have been up against it, struggling 
for my political existence. And I recognise for the first 
time that if the pack gets me down and undermines my self- 
confidence it could be very difficult to regain that 
confidence and restore my position.' (Howard (ed.), 1979, p. 101)
By exposing weak ministers and unsound policies, the opposition 
can have an effect on government policy, but such an effect «is usually 
cumulative and indirect rather than immediate. In the short term, the 
government will be inclined to cling to its policies and attempt to 
discredit the opposition by other means. But because the parliament is 
widely reported, and because parliamentarians themselves place great 
emphasis on parliamentary performance, a government performing poorly 
in the house is likely to face both internal and external problems in 
pursuing its policies. Internally, government leaders in trouble in 
parliament are likely to find increased resistance to their policies 
within their own party, and their parliamentary difficulties can 
cause a drop in government morale which in turn must affect its policy 
performance. In 1975, when Whitlam was outperforming Snedden, the then 
Liberal-Country Party leader, in the House, 'For weeks Liberals 
wandered the parliamentary corridors discussing the weaknesses of 
Snedden's parliamentary performances with journalists, and each other.' 
(Solomon, 1978, p.47). Externally, the knowledge that the public is 
being made aware of government inadequacies must place closer limits 
on its policy activities.
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To regret that the hand of parliament as a whole is not stronger 
in influencing policy is not to say, as is sometimes suggested, that 
parliament is an empty charade. Parliament is one influence on policy 
among many, and its effect is indirect, variable and uncertain, 
yet often important. The limitations on how parliament can affect 
policy are set not only by the limitations of the institutions of 
parliament itself, but by the nature of the society which sustains it.
Prime minister and cabinet
Cabinet is the most important focal point of all the 
institutions of government; the point where political, 
legislative and administrative forces intersect 
(Hawker et al., 1979, p. 50).
These words aptly convey the essence of cabinet's central position 
in the policymaking process. They imply also that cabinet is not just 
a body which wields power, but one which is subject to a variety of 
forces which it must attempt to reconcile, accommodate or redirect. It 
is an object, as well as a source, of influence, and its powers are 
thereby limited.
It may also be argued that, rather than cabinet, the prime 
minister, or in a less formal sense he and his closer advisers and 
confidants, are the most important focus of government. In Australian 
political history, one can point to the central role of Chifley’s 
'official family' of ministerial and bureaucratic advisers, to Gorton's 
'cronies' or to the way in which Fraser has dominated his government. In 
the British case, Crossman (Howard (ed.), 1979, p. 96) saw Wilson's 
style as one of prime ministerial rather than cabinet government. At 
the same time, Crossman considered both prime minister and cabinet 
subject to undue civil service influence, the result being the erosion 
from two directions of traditional cabinet predominance in decision­
making.
Prime-ministerial pre-eminence in cabinet can be generated in a 
number of ways. Prime ministers usually control what goes onto 
cabinet agendas. As chairman of cabinet, and often of its most 
important sub-committees, they have considerable latitude to manoeuvre 
the course of discussion, to sum up 'the feeling of the meeting' in 
their own terms, and to arbitrate the final wording of cabinet decisions. 
Their power to select and dismiss ministers, or at least to allocate 
portfolios, gives them leverage over ministers' allegiances.
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There is also a tendency for the potential power of prime 
ministers to increase vis-a-vis the rest of cabinet. Cabinet is 
increasingly ’a victim of overloaded government' (Hawker et at. 3 1979, 
p.51). The growing demands and complexities of government restrict 
the capacity of cabinet members to become adequately informed on, and 
to debate fully, the many issues which come before them. The 
increasing size and role of prime ministers' departments, and often 
of their personal staff, provide alternative sources of advice which 
decrease prime ministers' dependence on line departments and their 
ministers.
However, the question is not simply one of the division of policy­
making power between prime minister and cabinet, but also one of the 
influence on policy of prime minister and cabinet taken together. The 
division of power here is not a zero-sum game. In other words the 
total policymaking capacity of prime minister and cabinet where the 
former thoroughly dominates the latter may or may not be as great as 
that where a less unequal and perhaps more cooperative relationship 
prevails.
In considering cabinet's policymaking capacity, Hawker et at. 
(1979, p.55) make the important point that it is appropriate to view 
cabinet, not in terms of the extent to which its performance conforms 
with the ideal of rational decisionmaking, but rather as an institution 
whose abilities depend 'both on the broad social context in which it 
operates - and the specific institutional arrangements which surround 
it.' This suggestion is akin to the view put earlier in this thesis, 
that policy must be explained in the context of the surrounding society. 
Cabinet power is limited and conditioned by a wide range of factors.
For example, Wilenski (1980, p.54) argues that the Whitlam Labor 
government failed to take adequate account of the effect of such 
limits on its powers to undertake political or social transformation. 
Again, his comments echo in part a central theme of this thesis 
concerning the strength of resistance to deliberate social change:
It [the Labor government] tended to see government, with 
the whole apparatus of the state behind it, as able (within 
the limits of the Constitution, and it was the Whitlam view 
that those limits had never been properly tested) to 
undertake whatever social or political transformation it 
wanted ... It failed to take sufficiently into account the
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position of the government as being only one of the sources 
of power in a capitalist society. After twenty-three 
years of conservative government, when the same interests 
had controlled not only parliamentary office but also most 
of the other power groupings in the community ... it was 
all too easy to regard the government as being the dominant 
influence over Australian society. While these different 
groups disagreed at times on particular and sometimes quite 
important issues, the broad thrust of where they wished to 
see Australian society going was much the same: they were
all moving in the same direction ... A Labor government 
which wished to sharply change direction would inevitably 
find itself ranged against other interests in the community 
which had, to that point, no reason to publicly exercise their 
potential power. The limits on the power of the state in a 
modern industrial society when it is in conflict with the 
collective interests of industrial and financial capital 
were never debated. (Wilenski, 1980, pp.54-5)
The powers of government are limited. The central decisionmakers - 
prime minister, cabinet, close advisers - located at a major confluence 
of forces, nevertheless have only limited control over these forces. 
There are many matters which they can affect only partially, 
indirectly, or not at all - natural forces, many external influences, 
some scientific discoveries or technological innovations. There are 
other areas where government could exert power, and may sometimes wish 
to (for example over certain private sector decisions or union actions) 
but is prevented or circumscribed by constitution, law, custom or 
prevailing ideology.
Even where government has a policy, however, such policy is by 
no means always attributable to the deliberate choice of the central 
decisionmakers. Some policies may be retained simply because decision­
makers have insufficient time or interest to review them. Others may 
be passively accepted or transmitted because they reflect the 
conventional wisdom or perpetuate the status quo: decisionmakers, like
others, are conditioned to some degree by the prevailing ideas and 
circumstances of their time. In other instances, policies may not 
accord with the views of the central decisionmakers, but are rather the 
result of acquiescence, in the interests of retaining power, to the 
views of parties, powerful interest groups, or the perceived wishes of 
the electorate. Again, policy may be the result of biased information: 
the central decisionmakers may have been presented with an incomplete 
review of possible policy options or an incorrect view of likely 
outcomes. Or the central decisionmakers may be bypassed or subverted:
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the bureaucracy or statutory authorities may create policy by their 
actions or modify it in implementation.
The policymaking efficacy of the central decisionmakers is also 
limited not only by external forces and constraints, but by the 
extent of their own capacity to formulate adequate policy. The 
central decisionmakers are under great time pressure. To their 
formal and informal meetings they bring differing personal ambitions, 
allegiances, ideas, interests, and priorities, and represent the 
different perspectives and requirements of their respective portfolios. 
At their various meetings they must deal with a wide range of 
issues other than policy, and the time for individual and collective 
policymaking must be found among the demands of electorates, 
administration and parliamentary attendance. Such pressures mean 
that some policies are less than adequately considered, that policy 
intervention in some areas is intermittent and confused, that 
incremental adjustments are more likely than thorough reviews, that 
information supplied to the central decisionmakers tends to be 
simplified and predigested, and that central coordination of the 
various policy areas is often poor. Where the central decisionmakers 
have failed to make or coordinate policy, the bureaucracy is left with 
considerable latitude to take up the slack. Furthermore, where 
participants enter the policymaking process with a wide variety of 
briefs and personal and departmental stakes, the policy which emerges 
from the resultant bargaining may be distinguished by its acceptability 
as a compromise rather than by its workability or capacity to meet 
substantive problems or achieve desirable ends. Alternatively, the 
difficulties of agreement and compromise may lead to avoidance and non­
resolution of the policy issue.
The central decisionmakers are in some ways more and in some 
ways less powerful than the conventional wisdom concerning 
the Westminster model would have us believe. Consider the three 
axioms into which Collins (1978, p.366) has reformulated Parker's (1978, 
pp.351-3) Westminster 'syndrome', to give the bare essentials of the 
Westminster principles:
1) that ministers are responsible to parliament for the 
conduct of their departments;
2) that in relations between ministers and officials, ministers 
have the last word;
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3) that officials are accountable to the public only- 
through the accountability of ministers and 
cabinet to parliament.
As discussed earlier, given party discipline and a government 
majority, cabinet is not effectively accountable to parliament. In 
fact the reverse is the case for government members - they are 
accountable to cabinet and the party for their parliamentary votes 
and public statements. Moreover, the area within which individual 
ministers are prepared to accept responsibility for the actions of 
their officials has also narrowed considerably (e.g. RCAGA, 1976, p.12). 
The supreme sacrifice of resignation is generally taken in consultation 
with or at the insistence of the prime minister and other central 
decisionmakers because a political scapegoat is needed, not as a 
result of the demands of parliament.
In such respects, the central decisionmakers have more power 
than the Westminster view would suggest. On the other hand, the 
central decisionmakers are limited in their exercise of power by 
institutions, prevailing ideas, social and economic conditions, past 
policies, and the influence of the bureaucracy. Ministers do not 
always have the last word, nor are officials always accountable to
4
them.
The bureaucracy
It should not be necessary to devote much space to demonstrating 
that bureaucrats have a strong hand in making, as well as administering, 
policy. Few now believe in the Westminster-derived homily that 
politicians make policy and public servants administer it. We have 
quoted Crossman concerning the way in which British civil servants 
combine to press an official view upon ministers and cabinet. If 
confirmation is needed, it can be found in Heclo and Wildavsky's (1977, 
p.130) comments concerning ministers’ limited involvement in the process 
of determining public expenditures in Britain. This is not only because 
of ministers’ limited time, but 'because civil servants prefer it this 
way.' This, Heclo and Wildavsky say, is not the result of any 
deliberate strategy on the part of civil servants, but rather the 
result of good intentions: ministers are often regarded 'as an
unreliable breed, long on haphazard arrangements and short on 
appreciation for the department's continuing needs.' Further, officials
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prefer cooperation to conflict, and try to resolve the latter and 
present an agreed view, both within and between dpeartments, rather 
than cause the minister trouble (an approach which often means that 
vital differences are glossed over).
In Australia also, we have noted the respective comments by the 
RCAGA and Hawker et oil. concerning the significant influence on policy 
of public servants. Given such influence, the important corollary 
question is, what implications does it have for public policy?
Bureaucrats, as the name implies, are generally long-term 
members of largely permanent organisations. This organisational 
situation has a major influence on their views and actions concerning 
the policies with which they deal. To understand the nature of such 
influence, it is helpful to look more closely at some aspects of the 
relationship between individuals and organisations or groups.
Organised groups develop their own standards of conduct or norms. 
Adherence to these by group members facilitates interaction by increasing 
the predictability and acceptability of behaviour. Individual members of 
such groups display stable patterns of behaviour or roles. There is 
disagreement (Mitchell, 1975, p. 148; McDavid and Harari, 1974, p. 280) 
as to whether ’role' should be used to mean the actual behaviour or the 
expected behaviour of such individuals. Here we will use the term 
'prescribed role' to refer to expected behaviour related to the norms 
of the group, as distinct from 'predicted role' where expectations of 
behaviour are based on probability rather than group norms. A 
prescribed role is thus a set of norms related to an individual in a 
particular position in a group or organisation. Norms may include the 
values, goals and beliefs which the individual is expected to hold.
Socialisation is the result of social learning experiences which 
bring about the integration of individuals into a group or society 
through adjustment to group values, norms and prescribed roles. Social 
learning is the modification of behaviour by the individual as the 
result of rewards or punishments received from the group or as a result 
of the individual's perception of expected behaviour by observing that 
of group members. Sanctions may be imposed externally, for instance by 
leader or group approval or rejection; or they may become internalised 
as an individual's own standards. One process by which internalisation
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occurs is that of identification: assuming the role of others who are
important to the individual. Conformity to norms and prescribed roles 
may be classified into normative conformity, where the conformative 
behaviour is an end in itself - the approval of the group is sought 
for its own sake - and informational conformity, where the individual 
conforms in order to further some other personal end.
Groups expend energy both on tasks directed to achieving group 
objectives and on maintenance of group organisation and harmony. For 
many individuals, group maintenance activities may be more satisfying 
than task-related activities; and to a degree the two types of activity 
are complementary.
The preceding concepts from social psychology (for further 
references see McDavid and Harari, 1974) are helpful for understanding 
the influence on public servants of their position within organisations 
(that is, within particular departments and within the public service as 
a whole), and the consequences of this for policy. Socialisation 
pressures mean that their organisation's norms and values will loom 
large in the perceptions of public servants. It may be that the 
individual's beliefs have come to coincide with those of the 
organisation, or that he simply recognises that his prospects depend 
on the judgements of his peers and superiors, and that such judgements 
will largely be made in terms of the organisation's prevailing values.
In either case, he will be greatly influenced by the internal workings 
of his organisation; by the requirements of organisational maintenance, 
conformity with norms, and cultivation of peer and superior approval. 
These will lead him to place what an outsider might see as a 
disproportionate emphasis on events, attitudes, processes and influences 
internal to the organisation, as compared with opinions and pressures 
from the outside world. This is not so much an insensitivity to 
external events and opinions as a question of relative weighting, and 
an inclination to perceive such matters selectively as they relate to 
organisational predispositions. Of course socialisation of the 
individual occurs not only in relation to the norms of the organisation 
as a whole but also in relation to those groups and sub-groups both 
within and outside it to which he belongs; and these may not be fully 
compatible with those of the organisation as a whole. However, in a 
cohesive and upwardly mobile organisation, where most members have 
similar social, educational and professional backgrounds, the development
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of groups with markedly different norms and goals from those of the 
organisation as a whole is less likely.
It follows that bureaucrats will formulate their policy views not 
only with reference to objective criteria as to the public good, but 
with a view to their compatibility with their organization's goals, 
activities and interests and with any current departmental view on 
that policy area.
Resistance on the part of public servants to attempts to change 
their policy views can be expected because what must be changed are the 
collective views of the organisation, not just the particular individual 
representing it. Even where the individual changes his own views, his 
need to conform may restrain him from expressing them. Where an 
organisation's own interests are threatened, changing its collective 
policy views will be difficult, even where the change is manifestly 
in the public interest. Even where the organisation's overall interests 
are not substantially at risk, change is still likely to be difficult 
because time and effort have been invested in reaching agreement on 
current policy, because some individuals will be disadvantaged by the 
change, and because the existing policy is now conventional wisdom: 
part of the established thought habits of the organisation's members.
Public servants are members of formal organisations at two levels. 
They are at once members of particular departments or agencies and of 
the wider public service. Their policy stances on some matters will 
therefore significantly depend on the relative strength of these two 
allegiances. Where departmental allegiances are strong, and those 
towards the public service as a whole relatively weak, one can expect 
policy coordination between departments to be poor and areas of policy 
overlap between departments to be sources of perennial difficulty in 
achieving agreement and executing effective policy.
The study by Heclo and Wildavsky (1977) of the British public 
expenditure review process illustrates many of the preceding points.
The authors begin by proposing that the civil service community can 
be understood in terms of kinship and culture, where kinship is the 
structure of relationships and obligations and culture the standards 
through which these relationships are regulated. Their use of these 
terms, similar in their meaning to role relations and norms, draws
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attention to the analogy of Whitehall life with that of a village.
They emphasise the relatively small numbers involved at the centre in 
formulating policy, the close knowledge those at the centre have of 
each other's capacities and attitudes, the high degree of cooperation 
that occurs, the emphasis on secrecy, and the 'self-centred interior 
perspective' which leads to greater concern 'for opinion within than 
for opinion without'. The latter is a theme to which the authors 
frequently return, and they conclude that left to its existing 
inclinations government will put community above policy, and that 'it 
is in the collective interest, as we see it, to shift the balance of 
emphasis from preserving community to improving policy, from the 
interests of political administrators to the interests of citizens'
(Heclo and Wildavsky, 1977, p.366).
Some of the characteristics of the Whitehall civil service 
community perceived by Heclo and Wildavsky are the emphasis on trust, 
paramount because it is necessary to deal with the same people year 
after year; on secrecy, because common kinship and culture separate 
the community from outsiders; on maintaining the esteem in which one 
is held within the community - since prospects for power depend on the 
judgements of colleagues, reputation is more important than any
4
particular issue; on cooperation and the tendency to arrive at a common 
civil service line, and the consequent lack of choice for politicians 
between well analysed rival positions.
Heclo and Wildavsky see the problem not as one of a civil service 
which is too strong, but of a parliament and opposition which are too 
weak. It is interesting that two of the solutions which they recommend, 
greater use of ministerial advisers drawn from outside the civil service, 
and the provision of a stronger departmental source of alternative 
advice for the prime minister, have already seen service in Australia: 
the influx of personal advisers with the Whitlam government, and the 
growth of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in recent years.
In the case of the Australian bureaucracy Smith and Weller, while 
seeing many of the same factors in operation as in the British case, 
stress the greater competitiveness, aggression and secretiveness 
towards each other of Australian departments (Hawker et al., 1979, 
pp.43,44). Painter and Carey, in a critique of inter-departmental 
committees based on findings of the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration, note that:
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... the two major characteristics of policy IDCs are, 
first, the tendency for departmental representatives 
to act as delegates and to see their role primarily in 
terms of defending departmental interests, territory, 
procedures and policies; and secondly the norm, and the 
practice, of IDCs of searching for a consensus outcome.
Take the two in combination and we have a recipe for 
ineffectiveness. Consensus outcomes stemming from 
narrow-minded and over-rigid departmental delegates will 
tend to emerge from a process in which agreement is 
reached by ignoring areas of disagreement and finding 
formulae for thinly disguising fundamental differences.
(Painter and Carey, 1979, p.61)
Wilenski (1978, p. 46), a former senior public servant under the 
Whitlam government, concludes that
... any Labor government of the future will again find 
in the senior public service a body of men (and perhaps by 
then some women) who, though willing to work hard to carry 
out Labor policies and anxious to rise to the challenge, 
will again be limited both by their personal backgrounds 
and outlooks and by the inflexibility and secrecy of public 
service procedures. Existing bureaucratic processes and 
personnel will set a limit to the pace and extent of reform.
The influence of the bureaucracy is likely to reflect a bias towards 
the status quo, a preoccupation with its own internal workings and 
attitudes, a slowness to respond to outside pressures, a high regard 
for secrecy, and a partisan support for departmental views and 
welfare. This is not to say that public servants are never responsive 
or innovative, or that they are not competent and hardworking.
Rather, their responses are both shaped and constrained by the nature 
of their organisational environment and the norms and regulations 
that structure it.
The media
The media form another group of variables which is sometimes 
neglected both in theoretical frameworks for policy explanation and 
in the explanations themselves. In Hawker et al. , Policy and Politics 
in Australia (1979), the word ’media' is not listed in the index, nor 
are the major newspapers. The proprietor of the Australian newspaper, 
Rupert Murdoch, is mentioned once, but not in a policy-influential 
context. Yet Hawker et al. are centrally concerned with the period 
during and subsequent to the rise and fall of the Whitlam government. 
Concerning the election of that government, one commentator has said
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'... the positive support of some parts of the media [in particular 
the Australian newspaper] must have assisted Labor. Quite possibly, 
without that support the Australian electorate, with its native 
conservatism, might still have returned the Coalition to power'
(Harding, 1979, p.4). The same newspaper later reversed its stance 
and took a strong anti-Labor line prior to and during the 1975 
election.
Hawker et at. might argue that they are concerned with the 
specific processes and proximate policymakers that shape policies, 
not the wider forces that shape policy by determining governments 
(although this is not clear from their text). Such an approach, however, 
whether deliberate or not, is open to criticism because it gives an 
overstated impression of the capacity of the proximate actors to make 
and vary policy, by neglecting the wider framework of constraints and 
opportunities which shapes and limits their actions. And even if 
one is considering only specific policies, the way these are taken up, 
editorialised, played down, promoted or ignored by the media may be 
quite significant in influencing the government's policy stance.
Media bias may be planned or unplanned. For example, it may 
be the result of a deliberate editorial policy, or simply that the 
slant of a programme unconsciously reflects the values of those 
involved in preparing it. Media bias may favour the status quo, the 
general interests of elites,specific interests or policies, or 
political parties. The initiators of bias may be governments, media 
owners, executives, journalists or advertisers. Bias, deliberate or 
otherwise, occurs in news and entertainment programmes as well as in 
advertising and comment or feature articles. Bias may be generally 
considered legitimate, as in editorials or election advertising, or 
illegitimate as in news presentation. News may be biased in what is 
chosen as news, the priority given to various items, and the way in 
which it is slanted. Entertainment programmes tend to be biased 
largely in favour of the status quo. Commercial media seek the largest 
possible audience for their advertisers. Their entertainment programmes 
compete for the middle ground, and those which achieve high ratings are 
likely to appeal to and reflect prevalent community attitudes and 
biases.
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Advertising is not just biased in favour of the particular goods 
and services in question. It promotes certain values: the importance
and desirability of possessions, of 'newness', of the wealth that 
enables the acquisition of goods and services, the frustrations that 
arise without them, and the satisfaction, improved social status and 
happiness that they bring. There is no equivalent weight of advocacy 
for those human activities and satisfactions which are not supplied 
commercially. Yet this rather obvious point concerning the imbalance 
of persuasion is ignored by many governments and is not allowed for in 
democratic theory. Representative democracy assumes the people's right 
of free choice between representatives, parties and their policies. 
Democracy of course does not require perfect knowledge or freedom from 
the influence of the prevailing customs and ideas of a given society and 
time. Freedom of choice cannot be absolute. But the wider the choices 
available, the more that is known about their likely consequences, and 
the greater the equality of their presentation to the voter, the higher 
the degree of freedom of choice, and the nearer to the democratic ideal. 
Conversely, if citizens are exposed to a great weight of advertising 
and other media pressures which favour certain values, then to the 
extent that their choice of governments and policies is influenced by 
such one-sided pressure, there is a retreat from meaningful free choice.
The causes of media bias are numerous. Where part of the media, 
like the Australian Broadcasting Commission, is a non-commercial 
government-funded operation, government can exercise control by appointing 
people of its own political colour to the Commission, by threatening or 
imposing budget and staff cuts, by instituting inquiries into the 
authority's operations, by changing the relevant legislation, or by 
exerting public and private pressure concerning alleged bias or 
inefficiency. Harding (1979) has shown how such tactics have been used 
in the case of the Australian Broadcasting Commission.
Governments are able to influence media coverage in another way, 
through various expedients to control the flow of information to the 
media. These include the promotion of secrecy, so that unfavourable 
information is suppressed, and other information released in a controlled 
way so that its timing or content is most favourable to government.
Hostile journalists can be punished, and others rewarded, by denying or 
granting interviews or by the selective provision of information or
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deliberate 'leaks' to favoured journalists. Of course the efficacy of 
such measures will be determined by the degree of secrecy obtaining 
within the public service, the lengths to which government is prepared 
to go to enforce secrecy, the compliance or otherwise of the press and 
the strength of any freedom of information legislation.
In the commercial sector, the media are often concentrated in a 
few hands, giving media owners great potential influence. By virtue of 
wealth and power, media owners are important members of the elite, with 
commercial interests in other areas as well as the media. Their 
attitudes are therefore likely to reflect those of the private business 
sector. It does not necessarily follow that these biases will be 
reflected in their media, or if they are, that this is solely due to the 
owner's influence. The latter is sometimes clearly evident, however, 
as in the case of Mr. Murdoch's acknowledgement of his personal 
involvement in the Australian's stance in the Federal elections of the 
1970's (for example, see Edgar, 1979, pp.26-7).
Bias, however, need not be deliberate, overt and specific, but 
rather, a general influence which permeates a media organisation. The 
way in which socialisation processes within such organisations work 
on journalists has been discussed by Baker (1980), who is himself a 
senior journalist. Novice journalists are not given conceptualised 
instruction on what is news and how to report it. In fact experienced 
journalists have difficulty defining 'news' (Baker, 1980, p.138). 
Learning is rather by trial and error and observation, by being sent 
out with more experienced journalists and observing how they handle 
stories, by seeing what changes are made to copy by editors and what 
priority various items are given. Baker also illustrates the 'gate­
keeper chain' where copy has to pass a number of editors before it is 
accepted. He argues that:
'the most significant factor which controls the way a 
gatekeeper along the message line decides to operate 
(open or shut) his/her gate in respect of a message 
passing along the line is not his/her individuality or 
subjectivity. Rather, that control factor is his/her 
understanding of the organisation's sense of priorities'
(Baker, 1980, p .157).
The wish to avoid giving offence to advertisers can be an 
important factor with the commercial media. Rosenbloom (1978,p.127), 
for instance, reports a case which later became the subject of a public 
inquiry, of the withholding by two television channels of news of a
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parliamentary report critical of household soaps and detergents.
Bias may occur partly for technological reasons - news and 
entertainment programmes are more widely and readily available from 
technologically advanced Western countries. Such technological 
factors, however, shade into cultural factors, where programmes from 
similar cultures are more acceptable to viewers, or where cultural 
prejudices are at work. When asked why he gave a certain (hypothetical) 
news story involving the deaths of twenty people a low ranking, one 
Australian television editor said 'so a bunch of Indians drive a bus 
over a cliff, there's nothing new about that' (Baker, 1980, p.154).
One of the items to which he and others gave a higher ranking concerned 
two elderly women being killed by a bomb blast in Northern Ireland .
Much media bias, of course, is of a more subtle kind and originates 
in a less obvious way. Langer (1980), like a number of other writers, 
argues that television news does not present a neutral image of reality, 
but by 'assigning problematic events and relations to explanatory 
contexts' is 'helping us not simply to know more about the world but to 
make sense of it' (Hall, 1977, p.341; quoted in Langer, 1980, p.13).
In doing so, 'rather than positioning audiences to evaluate old 
realities in new ways' interpretive conventions used by journalists tend 
to direct audiences to evaluate new realities in old ways (Chibnall,
1977, p.35; quoted in Langer, 1980, p .15).
Langer illustrates these points by an analysis of the conventions 
in the presentation of the 'other news', the less serious news concerning 
matters such as 'especially remarkable people', 'victims', and 'the 
forces of nature'. He shows that such stories are commonly structured 
in terms of the opposing concepts associated with mastery and the 
possession of control or non-mastery and the loss of control. The 
locus of action and control is presented 'in terms of either the 
personal attributes and deeds of individual actors or the impersonal 
unaccountable actions of forces operating externally on individuals ...' 
(Langer, 1980, p .41).
In an analysis which leads to somewhat similar conclusions, Mills 
(1980) sees the presentation of television news predominantly as drama 
based on the fear/security myth, in an extended version of the anxiety
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arousal/solution form of much television advertising. If the 
reassurance provided in the news itself, by the responses of the 
authorities or because it happened to somebody else, is not enough, 
further security is provided by the usually satisfactory endings of 
the dramatic entertainment programmes which follow the news.
There is an interesting parallel between the ideas of the two 
writers. The concept of a fear/security form for television news is 
close to that of non-mastery/mastery, where fear and non-mastery are 
caused by unpredictable and uncontrollable forces, and mastery and 
security are achieved by exceptional people and the guardian figures 
of society. Both writers agree that as a result of the nature of 
television news the social forces which contribute to events are 
ignored as explanatory factors or displaced by unpredictable forces or 
exceptional people, and that a climate of fatalism is encouraged which 
reinforces conservative values. Average individuals are not presented 
as masters of their fate, but subject to malevolent external forces.
They should be satisfied with their lot, because far worse could 
happen. The hierarchy of authorities who work to prevent or minimise 
disaster should be supported, and intervention in the world's affairs 
should be left to those exceptional persons who deserve reward and 
celebrity for having successfully taken the risks involved!
One need not accept every aspect of Langer's and Mills' analyses 
in order to agree that television news, while ostensibly presenting 
information rather than explanation, in fact in its selection of news 
items, in the form of their visual presentation, and in the nature of 
the accompanying commentary, does provide an explanatory context which 
tends to reinforce the status quo. Similar comments have often been 
made as to how newspaper journalism, with its concentration on the 
actions and clashes of personalities, implies explanations which 
exaggerate the impact of these personalities on events as against 
economic, institutional or social forces.
While they accept that the mass media largely reflect the 
conventional values of society, Aitken and Jinks (1980, p .115) go on 
to say that whether these values are those of a ruling class [or elite] 
is another question. But the question is not so much whether the values 
presented by the media are those of a ruling class or elite, as whether 
such values reinforce the position of a ruling class or elite. Since
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elites are in general favoured by existing conditions, to the extent 
that the media reflect and help to maintain these conditions, they 
are working in favour of elites.
INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
Institutions embody a crystallisation of past ideas and policies, 
which may or may not be valid in the present. Institutions, through 
the very nature of the rigidities created by their rules and structures, 
tend to hamper change. Yet, over time, institutions develop purposes 
and modus operandi of their own, which may bear only a superficial 
resemblance to the objectives envisaged in their establishment, or to 
the pursuit of the public interest. To the extent that the foregoing 
tendencies exist, they will be reflected in the influence which 
institutions have on policy.
Institutions are defined here to include not only recognised 
rules, customs and procedures, but the established organisations 
structured by such rules and procedures. (The point is made since 
some define institutions only in the former sense (e.g. Wells, 1970, 
p.7)). Institutions and organisations do not coincide, but they 
substantially overlap: there are unstructured or ephemeral
organisations which are not institutions, and institutions which are 
not organisations. Nor are the institutions relevant to policy only 
those which are centrally political. Many institutions, whether legal, 
economic, or otherwise, have a political influence or aspect.
The present discussion deals with institutions and individuals 
together for a number of reasons. Institutions alone do not make 
policies. People make them within an institutional framework. The 
interaction between human and institutional characteristics is central 
to the shaping of policy. It is in this sense that we refer to the 
effects of institutions on policy. In a similar sense Heclo suggests 
that institutions should be thought of as 'crannied hosts supporting 
individual agents of policy change' (1974, p.308). But equally, if 
perhaps more mundanely, individuals combine with institutional frame­
works to maintain policy continuity.
Miller (1962, p.105) suggests that institutions or 'government' 
are the means whereby conflicts of interest are 'registered, resolved, 
altered and maintained.' Institutions, however, are also a means of 
extension and implementation of power, whether this is the legitimate
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power of the majority or dictatorial power maintained by force. In 
either case, in order for the powerholders to maintain control, the 
powers, functions and rules of conduct of institutions must be carefully 
limited and delineated. Where proposed change conflicts with such 
rules and functions, they will provide obstacles to it.
Allison and Halperin (1971, p.54) point out that ’the existing 
configuration of large organisations, their established programs and 
standard operating procedures ... are especially important in 
determining': (1) the information available, (2) the options considered,
and (3) the details of what is done. Information will be available 
according to existing patterns of collection and processing. The 
alternatives considered by organisations are severely limited - those 
compatible with the configuration of existing organisations and their 
goals will be adequate but those which require coordination of several 
organisations or which fall in areas between organisations are likely to 
be inadequate. Similarly, implementation will be according to 
organisational routines which may lead to inadequate treatment of non­
standard issues. In such ways institutions tend to impart a 
conservative bias to policy by limiting the range of information and 
options considered and hence the possible range of decisions.
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This is not to say that institutions resist all change. Some 
kinds of change may be quite compatible with institutional objectives, 
structures and procedures. As well as structural and procedural 
rigidities, however, there are many other institutionally-related 
sources of resistance to change. These may be divided broadly into five 
categories: those which are inherent in the individual personality3
but which find opportunity for expression in an institutional setting; 
those which relate to the process of socialisation in organisations; 
those which might be called positional costs and b e n e f i t s where 
resistance to change is generated because individuals or groups fear 
the loss of benefits or the incurring of costs arising from their special 
position in relation to the institution contemplating the change; those 
which arise from the kinds of structural and procedural factors discussed 
above; and those which originate with institutional disposition3 the 
collective attitudes, purposes and dogma which an institution develops 
over time.
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Watson (1969) has summarised some of the aspects of personality 
which contribute to resistance to change. These include homeostasis, 
the tendency of an organism to return to a steady state, and its 
psychological equivalent, complacency; the repetition of accustomed 
response or habit, and the way in which repetition of such a response 
can become satisfying in itself and change is therefore resisted; 
primacy, the way in which the initially learned pattern of responses to 
a given situation continues to assert itself; and selective perception 
or retention, where the individual tends to seek out and accept 
information which is compatible with his established outlook, and ignore 
or misinterpret inputs to the contrary. Similar ideas underlie 
Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance: behaviour is
influenced by a tendency to try to achieve consistency in the 
organisation of cognitive experience. Dearlove (1973) drew upon such 
ideas in his explanation of councillor behaviour in the Royal Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea.
In an institutional situation, the preceding aspects of 
personality are likely to find a favourable climate and to link with 
each other and with institutional characteristics to provide resistance 
to change. The repetitive tasks and established procedures' of 
institutions provide the framework for the development of habitual 
responses; once learned, such responses tend to be perpetuated by the 
operation of primacy and selective perception.
Watson also offers some further personality-based sources of 
resistance to change which, while not so clearly reinforced by an 
institutional environment, nevertheless are likely to find expression 
in such an environment. In Freudian terms, the child internalises as 
the superego, not the rational conclusions of the parents based on their 
experience, but rather the heritage of taboos and moral standards which 
they in turn acquired from the past. Thus the superego is 'a powerful 
agent serving tradition* (Watson, 1969, p.492). As a consequence of 
the authority of the superego, self-distrust arises concerning impulses 
which conflict with established standards and institutions. Such 
insecurity leads to regression, the tendency to seek security in the 
past, which as Watson points out, is likely to occur just when change 
would be most constructive, at the time insecurity has been exacerbated 
because old ways are no longer so effective.
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The second category of sources of resistance to change, 
socialisation effects, has been discussed in an earlier section in 
relation to the bureaucracy. It was noted there that members of 
organisations develop norms, common beliefs and other regularities 
which facilitate interaction by making behaviour predictable.
Individuals are influenced to accept such standards and reflect them 
in their behaviour. A point worth repeating is that such conformity 
may be the result of calculated self-interest (informational conformity) 
as well as normative conformity or internalisation of norms. Norms are 
difficult to change because this involves changing them for a group or 
organisation, not just an individual. Further, behaviour learned through 
socialisation, since it relates to recurring situations, is subject to 
the perpetuating effects of the psychological traits of habit, primacy, 
and selective perception discussed above.
The third category of sources of resistance to change, positional 
costs and benefits, arises from those individuals or groups who by 
virtue of their position in relation to an institution anticipate loss 
of benefits or incurring of costs as a result of a proposed policy change. 
Such resistance may come from within the institution, or from persons or 
groups outside the institution who nevertheless have influence on it, and 
whose resistance is thereby transmitted by the institution itself. The 
benefits and costs involved are not, of course, just economic. Questions 
of loss of power, status, security, job satisfaction and a host of other 
factors may be involved. Policy changes are likely to have a range of 
institutional repercussions which inevitably have adverse consequences 
for some individuals and groups. For example, policy changes are likely 
to require changes in budgets and administrative arrangements, with 
related losses in power and span of responsibility for some and gains 
for others. Kaufman (1971, p.13) points to the psychic costs of change 
in terms of the additional personal effort and agony incurred by those 
who have to accommodate to new patterns. As a result of the requirements 
of a new policy, those with many years of expertise in a particular area 
may be faced with the need to deal with matters with which they have no 
familiarity. A civil engineer, for example, with lengthy but narrowly- 
focussed experience in construction, may be faced as a result of policy 
change with the need to produce a thorough assessment of the environmental 
consequences of his proposals, and have his work interfered with by 
strangers using unfamiliar knowledge and criteria. In such a situation, 
and with mutual reinforcement by like-minded colleagues, it is not
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surprising that his reaction is often one of sustained resistance.
In relation to the fourth category, structural and procedural 
factors, it has already been noted how these provide easy channels 
for some proposed policy changes and difficult passage for others, 
depending on how such policies conform to the existing configuration 
and routines of institutions. Sharkansky (1970c, pp.17,18) notes that 
'the appeal of all political routines for the decisionmaker is their 
capacity to simplify complex situations ... by identifying those 
criteria which should be valued highly in making the decision'. At the 
same time, however '... routines make a conservative contribution to 
the political system. Where individuals are accustomed to making their 
decisions according to explicit rules, they tend to resist contrary 
signs from the environment.'
A further point, made by Kaufman (1971, p.31), is that change
becomes difficult simply because institutions 'become enmeshed in
bodies of public law and regulation and adjudication and in their own
rules and decisions'. Any single change is thus inclined to have
extensive and difficult ramifications. Kaufman also points to resource
limitations and sunk costs as obstacles to change. Commitments to
/existing expenditure programs, or investment tied up in capital works or 
a given technology can prevent the mobilisation of resources for change.
Factors comprising the final category, institutional disposition, 
are those which make up the character which an institution has 
developed - the institutional view concerning such matters as its own 
role, the accepted attitude towards various policy questions, the proper 
boundaries between its responsibilities and those of other institutions - 
in short, its institutional wisdom, or what has been called, in relation 
to government agencies, the departmental view. Watson (1969, p.495) has 
noted that the greatest resistance to change within cultures generally 
concerns matters which are connected with the sacrosanct. Items of 
the conventional institutional wisdom can achieve a state of unreasoning 
acceptance within the institution which borders on the sacrosanct, and 
which thereby engenders an emotional resistance to proposed change rather 
than a rational assessment of it. A common example is the government 
agency which doggedly and narrowly pursues its stated objectives, rather 
than recognising that such objectives must be tempered by the wider 
public interest. Again, the process of socialisation is the key to the 
propagation of institutional dogma.
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The foregoing catalogue of the resistances to change generated by 
the interaction between institutions and individuals is not meant to 
indicate that such resistance is universal in institutions. Individuals 
have the tendency to seek new experience, as well as a tendency to 
complacency. Institutions actively pursue certain kinds of change 
which are consonant with their purposes, or, as Heclo suggests, provide 
the vehicle for individuals to bring about change. The point is rather 
that in overall terms there is likely to be a bias in institutions 
towards conservatism. Given the ubiquity and power of institutions in 
society, therefore, when examining the course of policy change or the 
prospects for such a change it is essential to examine the role which 
institutions have played or are likely to play, in forestalling, delaying, 
shaping, and less frequently in assisting and expediting policy change.
THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
Much of the discussion of policymaking and decisionmaking 
processes over the last two decades has centred on the relative merits 
of two major streams of thought which have usually been seen as 
presenting competing models of decisionmaking. On the one hand, the 
'rational1 model of decisionmaking emphasises the orderly search for 
the preferred means of meeting agreed ends by systematic review of the 
costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. On the other hand, 
there are those formulations which attack the unrealistic nature of the 
rational model, and emphasise the limitations on the time, knowledge and 
resources of decisionmakers and the political and bargaining aspects of 
decisionmaking. In the 1960's, the debate lay between Lindblom's (1959) 
'incrementalism' and the rational model defended by Dror (1964) and 
others. Lindblom stressed the limited time and resources available 
to decisionmakers and hence the limited range of options usually 
considered, the lack of clarity and agreement concerning goals and the 
consequent tendency to seek agreement on courses of action rather than 
goals, and the propensity to change policy by incremental steps rather 
than radical departures.
In the early 1970's the rational model once again came under 
attack, this time by Allison (1969) with his 'bureaucratic politics' and 
'organisational process' paradigms, later restated in conjunction with 
Halperin (1971). Once again the rational model was defended by writers 
such as Krasner (1972) and Ball (1974).
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As t h e  ground c o v e re d  by t h e  above a u t h o r s  in  t h i s  d e b a t e  has  
s i n c e  been t r o d d e n  by many o t h e r s ,  r e s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  
w i l l  no t  be u n d e r t a k e n  h e r e ,  w i th  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  a b r i e f  c r i t i q u e  
o f  t h e  i d e a s  p u t  fo rw a r d  by A l l i s o n .  F u r t h e r ,  s i n c e  t h e  d e b a t e  has  
sometimes shown a d e g r e e  o f  c o n f u s i o n  be tween  d e s c r i p t i o n  and 
p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  t a s k  s h o u ld  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from e f f o r t s  
t o  p u t  fo rw a r d  ’b e t t e r '  methods o f  d e c i s i o n m a k in g .  R a t h e r ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  
p u r p o s e  i s  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  w h i l e  a l l  t h e  above models e x p r e s s  f a c e t s  o f  
r e a l i t y ,  none i s  i n  i t s e l f  a s u f f i c i e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y ­
making and d e c i s i o n m a k in g  p r o c e s s e s .
A l l i s o n  (1969,  p .7 0 7 )  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  o f t e n  b e s t  
u n d e r s t o o d  as  t h e  outcome o f :
. . .  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s :  b a r g a i n i n g  a lo n g  r e g u l a r i z e d
c h a n n e l s  among p l a y e r s  p o s i t i o n e d  h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  w i t h i n  
t h e  governm ent .  . . .  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s  model s e e s  
no u n i t a r y  a c t o r  bu t  r a t h e r  many a c t o r s  as  p l a y e r s ,  who focus  
no t  on a s i n g l e  s t r a t e g i c  i s s u e  bu t  on many d i v e r s e  i n t r a ­
n a t i o n a l  p rob lem s  as w e l l ,  i n  t e rm s  o f  no c o n s i s t e n t  s e t  o f  
s t r a t e g i c  o b j e c t i v e s  b u t  r a t h e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  v a r i o u s  
c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  n a t i o n a l ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ,  and p e r s o n a l  g o a l s ,  
making government  d e c i s i o n s  n o t  by r a t i o n a l  c h o ic e  
bu t  by t h e  p u l l i n g  and h a u l i n g  t h a t  i s  p o l i t i c s .
/
In t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  p l a y e r ' s  s t a n c e  on a g iv e n  i s s u e  i s  a f f e c t e d  
by h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and h i s  p o s it io n  i n  a government:
P o s i t i o n s  d e f i n e  what  p l a y e r s  bo th  may and must  do. The 
a d v a n t a g e s  and h a n d i c a p s  w i th  which each p l a y e r  can e n t e r  and 
p l a y  i n  v a r i o u s  games s tem from h i s  p o s i t i o n .  So does a 
c l u s t e r  o f  o b l i g a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  pe r fo rm ance  o f  c e r t a i n  t a s k s  
( A l l i s o n ,  1969, p . 7 0 9 ) .
The p l a y e r ' s  i n d i v i d u a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  t o o ,  A l l i s o n  s e e s  as  r e l e v a n t  
l a r g e l y  as  t h e y  a f f e c t  h i s  p e r f o r m a n c e  as  a p l a y e r :
How each  man manages t o  s t a n d  t h e  h e a t  i n  h i s  k i t c h e n ,  
each  p l a y e r ' s  b a s i c  o p e r a t i n g  s t y l e ,  and t h e  c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y  
o r  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  among p e r s o n a l i t i e s  and s t y l e s  i n  t h e  i n n e r  
c i r c l e s  a r e  i r r e d u c i b l e  p i e c e s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  b l e n d  ( A l l i s o n ,
1969, p . 7 0 9 ) .
A l l i s o n ' s  view o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  which d e te r m in e  t h e  a c t i o n s  and 
i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  i s  t h u s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a r a t h e r  na r row one. He 
s t r e s s e s  t h o s e  f a c t o r s  which s tem from t h e  p l a y e r ' s  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
p o s i t i o n ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  t h o s e  p e r s o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which a f f e c t  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c a p a c i t y  t o  a c h i e v e ,  i n  t h e  game o f  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s ,  
ends l a r g e l y  d i c t a t e d  by h i s  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n .
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Similarly, the constraints to which Allison sees players being 
subjected are largely organisational ones, as expressed in his 
'organisational process' model:
At any given time, a government consists of existing 
organisations, each with a fixed set of standard operating 
procedures and programs. The behaviour of these organisations - 
and consequently of the government - relevant to an issue in 
any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily 
by routines established in these organisations prior to 
that instance (Allison, 1969, p.698).
Undoubtedly, bureaucratic politics and organisational processes 
play a significant and at times decisive part in decisionmaking. But 
there is also a host of other influential factors, which have been 
discussed in earlier sections. To see why a government has pursued 
a given policy it is also necessary to ask such questions as: what
ideas and values are prevalent in the society and how do these influence 
the decisionmakers? What is the history of that society and how has 
this influenced prevailing ideas? To quote Ball's critique of 
bureaucratic politics theory:
The ability of bureaucracies to independently establish 
policies, or of Congress to compel outcomes, is a function 
of Presidential attention. Presidential attention is a 
function of Presidential values. The Chief Executive involves 
himself in those areas which he determines to be important.
And this is ultimately a reflection of his mental baggage, 
of generational mind sets, of beliefs concerning what man 
and society ought to be. If United States policy is to be 
explained - or changed - the target is not the governmental 
structure but the values of American decision-makers (Ball,
1974, p .92).
Further, one must ask: what are the technological capabilities
and resource availabilities which define possibilities and limitations 
for action? How does the general economic climate, or specific 
economic costs and benefits, influence the acceptability of possible 
courses of action? What are the views of interest groups and elites, 
and how does their influence bear on decisionmakers? Allison's view 
of who the players are is too narrow. Elites and interest groups 
outside the immediate decisionmaking organisations, but with influence 
on them, are also players. So are parliamentary bodies.
To quote Ball once more, concerning the Cuban missile crisis:
Kennedy's initial decision that some sort of action was 
necessary was at least partly determined by his perception
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of the Congressional reaction. At the back of his mind 
always was the belief that if he 'hadn't acted ... I 
would have been impeached' (Ball, 1974, p.79).
There are many other factors that should be considered. What 
was the influence of the media? What were the boundaries to possible 
action set by the electorate? Such variables need to be examined not 
only for their immediate influence on the specific issue but as to 
their effects over time in creating the environment within which 
decisionmakers operate. Finally, as has been emphasised throughout 
this chapter, in explaining decisions and policies one must look at the 
pattern of interrelationships between all such major variables and the 
way in which these shape both society and the character of its policies. 
Seen in this wider context, the posturings, alarums and excursions of 
bureaucratic politics are often apparent as mere patches of colour in 
the pattern of events woven by more powerful forces.
Whereas the bureaucratic politics model emphasises differing 
interests, organisational allegiances and bargaining, the rational 
model stresses agreed goals, unitary decisionmaking and refined 
techniques for evaluating options. In its extreme form, the rational 
model requires the decisionmaker to clearly specify and rank the 
appropriate goals, to examine all the significant consequences of all 
the possible means of attaining such goals, and to make a value- 
maximising decision by comparing the costs and benefits of each possible 
course of action in terms of the predetermined goals.
Although some would argue that comprehensive rationality is an 
ideal towards which decisionmakers should strive, few would consider 
that decisionmakers generally operate in this way. Nevertheless, 
along with the incrementalist and bureaucratic-political aspects of 
decisionmaking, there exist, to a greater or lesser degree depending 
on the circumstances and the type of decision, elements of the rational 
approach to decisionmaking. Decisionmakers do not confine their 
concerns solely to obtaining outcomes which will be to their personal 
or organisational benefit. They also pursue what they see as the 
public interest, or the objectives which have been defined for their 
organisation or programme by government. The decisions which emerge 
are often a compromise between purely selfish individual and organis­
ational interests and the results of a disciplined attempt to think 
through a problem and choose a solution which best satisfies what are
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seen as the legitimate objectives of the organisation, government, or 
society, Governments, as Heclo (1974, p.305) says, 'not only "power" ... 
they also puzzle'. Rational decisionmaking and bureaucratic politics 
can both be present in varying degrees in decisionmaking processes. But 
both take place within a wider context of influences and constraints 
arising from the interplay of values, elites, institutions and socio­
economic conditions.
An important point to be made is that such extra-organisational 
factors shape not only the nature of the decision but also what it is 
that is being decided. The bureaucratic politics and rational models 
tend to take the subject of decision as a given. But the process by 
which a matter becomes a subject for public policy and the urgency 
attached to it are as prone to the influence of the range of variables 
which have been discussed as is the process of developing a policy 
itself. Dearlove (1973) and Bachrach and Baratz (1970) have shown how 
powerful groups can keep matters off the public agenda. Socio­
economic conditions, values, and the state of technology also help to 
decide what are seen as the types of matters with which government 
policy should concern itself.
4
March and Olsen (1976) add to the bureaucratic politics and 
rational models a third model, the 'garbage can' decision process: a
choice opportunity is 'a garbage can into which various problems and 
solutions are dumped by participants' (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1976, 
p.26). In a somewhat mixed metaphor, they suggest that in a 'garbage 
can' situation, 'a decision is an outcome or an interpretation of 
several relatively independent "streams" within an organisation'.
These include streams of problems, solutions, participants and choice 
opportunities. A solution, for example, need not be the result of 
attempting to meet a specific problem; it may be 'an answer actively 
looking for a question' (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1976, p.26). These 
streams are channelled by organisational and social structure, which 
affect the outcomes of a garbage can decision process ' (a) by affecting 
the time pattern of the arrival of problems, choices, solutions or 
decision makers, (b) by determining the allocation of energy by 
potential participants in the decision, and (c) by establishing linkages 
among the various streams (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1976, p.27).
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The essential feature of this model is that decisions are not 
primarily the outcome of individual purposes expressed through either 
rational decisions or bargaining. Rather, they are often the result of 
the 'somewhat fortuitous confluence' of the partly independent streams 
of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities.
The automatic and unconscious aspects ... are dominant.
The outcome is seen as an unintended product of certain 
processes having dynamics of their own. "Decision" in 
these models is a post factum construct, produced by 
participants or onlookers' (Olsen, 1976, p.83).
One might criticise the limited selection of 'streams' in the 
model. Streams of values, constraints, resources, purposes and 
ambitions also enter the decisionmaking arena. However, the main 
limitation of the model is one which its originators acknowledge: the
model is only a partial one in that it fails to account for the extra- 
organisational forces which influence the nature and flow of the 
streams of variables which enter the choice situation. Cohen, March 
and Olsen (1976, p.27) see the separate streams as being channelled by 
both organisational and social structure; they note that 'exogenous 
factors' may at times overwhelm internal organisational processes 
(March and Olsen, 1976, p.21); and they recognise that the influence 
of exogenous factors may be vital in determining the nature and timing 
of components of the various streams:
Although we have treated the four streams as exogenous 
for most of our discussion, it should be clear that we view 
the understanding of the lawful processes determining the 
flows of those streams as fundamental to understanding what 
is happening in organizational choice situations. The more 
complete social theory into which these ideas would be embedded 
would include ideas on how demographic, social, economic, and 
political processes affect the extent to which different groups 
are successful in formulating and diffusing problems and 
solutions, how the agenda (in terms of choice opportunities) 
of an organization emerge, and how the distribution of 
participation in one social institution is related to the 
distribution in another (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1976, p.36).
But to say that the flows of the streams of variables are determined 
by 'lawful processes' is to undermine a central attribute to the 
model as its authors present it: that decisions are often the result
of 'somewhat fortuitous' confluences of streams (Cohen, March and 
Olsen, 1976, p.27) and that 'automatic and unconscious' aspects (Olsen,
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1976, p.83)  a re  dominant .^ This  may well  be the  appearance o f  even ts  
seen from i n s i d e  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n ;  but  i f  the  ' l a w fu l  p r o c e s s e s '  which 
govern the  e f f e c t s  o f  exogenous f a c t o r s  on the  s treams a re  und e r s to o d ,  
then d e c i s i o n s  lo se  the  element o f  f o r t u i t o u s n e s s ,  s in c e  th e y  a re  now 
e x p l i c a b l e  in  terms o f  f o r c e s  e x t e r n a l  to  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n .
Thus while  th e  garbage can model makes s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  the  
e n t r a n c e  o f  e x t r a - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  i n t o  t h e  dec is ionmaking  
p r o c e s s ,  March and Olsen do n o t  develop an a n a l y s i s  o f  such f a c t o r s .
In o t h e r  words, a l l  the  q u e s t i o n s  conce rn ing  'exogenous f a c t o r s '  which 
i t  was sugges ted  above t h a t  the  b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s  model f a i l e d  to  
ask ,  a l s o  must be asked conce rn ing  the  garbage can model o f  o r g a n i s a t ­
i o n a l  ch o ice .  The garbage can or  n o n - d e c i s i o n  model i s  one p o s s i b l e  
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  how d e c i s i o n s  a re  'made'  w i th in  an o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
b u t ,  l i k e  the  o t h e r  models,  even where i t  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  i t  e x p l a i n s  
only a segment o f  the  t o t a l i t y  o f  f o r c e s  which lead  to  d e c i s i o n s  and 
p o l i c i e s .
Olsen (1976) compares t h r e e  types  o f  dec isionmaking  model which 
b ro a d ly  c o i n c id e  with  th o s e  we have d i s c u s s e d :  r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n
models;  ' c o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  ( c o a l i t i o n  b a r g a i n i n g ) '  models;  and 
' a r t i f a c t u a l  ( n o n - d e c i s i o n ) '  models o f  t h e  'ga rbage  can '  t y p e . .  He 
s u g g e s t s  some c o n d i t i o n s  under  which each model i s  l i k e l y  to  be most 
u s e f u l  in  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  e v e n t s :
The " r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n "  model - w i th  i t s  emphasis on 
the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a s p e c t s  o f  cho ice  - w i l l  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  a s i t u a t i o n  in  which r e l a t i v e l y  few 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  o f  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a r e  a c t i v a t e d  and where 
the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n  ( i . e . ,  which 
v a l u e s ,  b e l i e f s ,  and p rocedu res  a r e  r e l e v a n t )  i s  s t a b l e  
and no t  too  complex.
On th e  o t h e r  hand,  th e  c o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  model - with  
i t s  emphasis on th e  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  cho ice  - seems 
l i k e l y  t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  in  a s i t u a t i o n  where 
s e v e r a l  r e l a t i v e l y  p a r t - t i m e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a re  a c t i v a t e d ,  
where th e  group o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e ,  
where t h e r e  i s  agreement over  the  i s s u e s  in vo lved  in  t h e  
ch o ice ,  but  where t h e r e  i s  d is ag reem en t  over the  v a lu es  
t h a t  should  be used t o  r e s o lv e  th e  i s s u e s .
1 One wonders i f  th e  garbage  can model was developed in  much th e  same 
way as s o c i a l  Darwinism, as the  a d a p t a t i o n  o f  an id e a  from th e  n a t u r a l  
s c i e n c e s  t o  the s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  - th e  garbage can model shows an 
i n t e r e s t i n g  p a r a l l e l  with  th e  idea  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  embodied in  quantum 
th e o ry .
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F i n a l l y ,  t h e  a r t i f a c t u a l  model - w i th  i t s  emphasi s  on 
n o n - d e c i s i o n  a s p e c t s  o f  c h o ic e  seems l i k e l y  t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where bo th  a c t i v a t i o n  and 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a r e  cha n g in g ,  where s e v e r a l  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  a r e  a c t i v a t e d  ( i n  g e n e r a t i n g  s o l u t i o n s ,  t e s t i n g  
s o l u t i o n s ,  and r e a c t i n g ) ,  where t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  complex,  
i n v o l v i n g  many v a l u e s  and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  v a r i a b l e s ,  so t h a t  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a n a ly z e  and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
s e e  and compare t h e  conseque nc e s  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
(O lsen ,  1976, p . 8 5 ) .
O l s e n ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  p a r a l l e l s  t h a t  s u g g e s t e d  e a r l i e r :  t h a t  such models
a r e  n o t  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  ways o f  e x p l a i n i n g  d e c i s io n m a k in g  p r o c e s s e s  
' b u t  t h a t  each  model w i l l  p r o b a b l y  a p p ly  t o  any o r g a n i s a t i o n  u n d e r  
a p p r o p r i a t e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s '  (1976, p . 8 5 ) .  I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
t o  a v o id  a d o p t i n g  any o f  t h e s e  models  a p r i o r i ,  bu t  to  t a k e  a s t e p  
back and c o n s i d e r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  
d e c i s i o n m a k e r s  in  q u e s t i o n  t o  s e e  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  v a r i o u s  
e l e m e n t s  embodied i n  each o f  t h e  models  a r e  p r e s e n t .  F u r t h e r ,  i t  
i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  what needs  t o  be  added t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  p r o v i d e d  
by t h e  above models  i s  an a pp roach  which p l a c e s  them in  t h e  w id e r  
f ramework o f  t h e  e x t r a - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  f o r c e s  which b e a r  p o w e r f u l l y  in  
a v a r i e t y  o f  ways on t h e  p r o c e s s e s  which such models  r e p r e s e n t .
F i n a l l y ,  i t  s h o u ld  be n o t e d  t h a t  most o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  d i s c u s s e d  
i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  has  been  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h a t  o f  d e c i s i o n m a k in g ,  and i t  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which such  l i t e r a t u r e  
a p p l i e s  a l s o  t o  p o l i c y m a k i n g .  E a r l i e r ,  a pu b lic  p o l ic y  was d e f i n e d  as  
a c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  ( o r  i n a c t i o n )  p u r s u e d  by government ,  and a d ec is io n  
as  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  an a c t i o n  o r  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n .  A p o l i c y  may be 
a d o p te d  by means o f  one d e c i s i o n ,  o r  i t  may r e s u l t  from a s e r i e s  o f  
d e c i s i o n s  o v e r  t im e .  Here ,  c l e a r l y ,  what i s  s a i d  abou t  d e c i s i o n m a k in g  
i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  p o l i c y m a k i n g .  However,  p o l i c y  may a l s o  e v o lv e  and 
emerge in  a number o f  ways w i t h  no c l e a r  d e c i s i o n  p o i n t s  a t  a l l .  The 
aw areness  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  m a t t e r  as  a s u b j e c t  f o r  p o l i c y  can g r a d u a l l y  
de v e lo p  in  p a r a l l e l  w i th  a c o a l e s c i n g  o f  e l i t e ,  p u b l i c  and government  
a t t i t u d e s ,  so  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no d i s t i n c t  p o i n t  a t  which t h e  p o l i c y  i s  
a d o p te d ;  i t  a c q u i r e s  an o b v i o u s ,  t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d  a s p e c t  as  i f  i t  
has  been t h e r e  a l l  a l o n g .  Or ,  i n  a r e l a t e d  way, t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  
t e c h n o l o g y ,  s o c i e t y  and b e l i e f  sys tem s  may p l a c e  such c o n s t r a i n t s  on 
t h e  d e c i s i o n m a k e r  t h a t  i n  r e a l i t y  he has  l i t t l e  o r  no c h o ic e  as  t o  
t h e  p o l i c y  he a d o p t s .  Aga in ,  a p o l i c y  may e v o lv e  in  a d e c i s i o n l e s s  
way from t h e  s h a r e d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  d e v e lo p e d  by t h e  unend ing  s e r i e s  o f  
p o s i t i o n  p a p e r s ,  formal  and i n f o r m a l  m e e t i n g s ,  a l l e g i a n c e s ,  b a r g a i n s
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and tradeoffs which is the stuff of bureaucratic politics. In the latter 
case, what is said about policies and decisions again has a close affinity, 
since as we have seen, decisions, like policies, are not always made, but 
can be 'a post factum construct produced by participants or onlookers' 
(Olsen, 1976, p. 83).
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
So far we have discussed mainly the influences on policy which 
originate within a given nation. A number of explanations of policy which 
give centrality to particular variables have been rejected. It has been 
suggested that policy explanation should be approached within a framework 
which includes all of the potentially significant classes of policy- 
influential variables. Within that framework, explanation should be 
sought not in terms of one or a few predominant influential variables, 
but in the nature of the established pattern of important interactions 
between a range of variables. The question now is whether the influences 
on the policy of a given nation which originate externally to that nation 
should be approached in the same way; or whether, in the international 
sphere, some overriding paradigm which provides more compelling 
explanation can be adopted at the outset.
Frameworks for understanding international politics are often
/
divided into two broad groups: on the one hand the 'realist' or 'nation-
state' models; and on the othe^ the 'globalist' or 'interdependence' 
models (e.g. see Sullivan, 1978; Keohane and Nye, 1977, Michalak, 1979.
The question of whether or not the above is an adequate categorisation 
will be returned to later). According to Keohane and Nye, the central 
features of the realist model are that states as coherent actors are the 
dominant actors in world politics; that force is a usable and effective 
instrument of policy; and that there is a hierarchy of issues in world 
politics, headed by questions of military security (Keohane and Nye, 1977, 
pp. 22-3). By contrast, the 'complex interdependence' paradigm is 
characterised by multiple channels connecting societies - states do not 
always act coherently as a unit and non-governmental actors are 
important; by an agenda of inter-state relationships consisting of 
multiple issues not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy; and by 
the non-use of military force where complex interdependence prevails 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 24-5).
Sullivan (1978, pp. 93-4) presents the globalist model in a 
similar but more predictive way: the dominant issues in international
politics have changed away from that of military security; the role
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of the nation-state in world affairs will diminish; interdependence 
is increasing; war is no longer considered an option for most 
foreign policy decisionmakers.
Michalak (1979) correctly asserts that Keohane and Nye have 
presented an exaggerated view of the realist position; and the same 
might be said of Sullivan's presentation of the globalist view.
Keohane and Nye in a sense recognise this in suggesting that both 
paradigms 'can be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or 
ideal type.' (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.23). It is therefore necessary 
to consider on a case-by-case basis whether one or the other model is 
applicable or perhaps some combination of both. We therefore no 
longer have a unique paradigm but rather a choice or combination of 
models involving various national and transnational actors and both 
economic and security considerations.
Furthermore, Keohane and Nye go on to argue that the inter­
national regime - the rules, norms and procedures that affect 
international relationships - becomes important as an explanatory 
factor in situations of complex interdependence. Such regimes can be 
explained in four ways, one of which is the 'international organisation' 
model 'a term which is a broader category than regime, because it also 
includes patterns of elite networks and (if relevant) formal# 
institutions .... Even governments with superior capabilities ... will 
find it hard to work their will when it conflicts with established 
patterns of behaviour within existing networks and institutions.' 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.55). Further (p.57), '[the model's] 
focus on the political processes associated with international 
organisation implies that actor's strategies, and their cleverness in 
implementing them, can substantially affect the evolution of 
international regimes'. Thus under complex interdependence, 
institutions and processes become important.
Gourevitch (1978) considers the implications of various models of 
the international system for domestic politics. While acknowledging 
the importance of other factors including ideas, Gourevitch restricts 
himself to models which focus on either the international state system 
or the international economy. The first point to emerge is that while 
the realist and interdependence models represent two major streams of 
thought about international relations, there are many models which do 
not fit neatly into either category. The very variety of paradigms
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makes it less feasible to accept one of them as a starting point for 
analysis.
Nor is it necessary always to conceive of such models as 
competing explanations. Pettman (1975, p.8) makes the point that both 
the level of interdependence and of state preoccupation may have 
increased. Considerations of state security and economic interdependence 
may provide supplementary, rather than conflicting explanations for 
aspects of domestic politics. Given, then, the variety of paradigms 
and the possibility that these may be supplementary rather than 
mutually exclusive; given the importance in some circumstances of 
ideas, institutions and process as well as economic interdependence or 
state power in determining international influences on domestic 
politics, it is not acceptable in attempting to explain the nature of 
such influences, to adopt at the outset a paradigm in which one set of 
variables (e.g. capitalism, or state power) provides the predominant 
explanation. Rather, as with internal influences, one should ideally 
start from a more fundamental position by examining all the potentially 
significant external variables and their interactions for the important 
ways in which they influence domestic policy. Because we are not 
concerned with the question of external influences alone, however, it 
is not feasible to make such a full analysis here. The aim is the more 
limited one of illustrating four points: first, that domestic politics 
and policy can be significantly affected by a variety of external forces; 
second, that such forces, while enhancing the options of government in 
some ways, will greatly decrease them in many others; third, that 
external forces tend to lock nations, particularly the less powerful 
or developed ones, into certain courses within the wider pattern of 
international relationships; and fourth, that external forces often 
reinforce each other in bringing about such circumstances. Something 
has been said towards these points already; they can be further 
illustrated by borrowing from Gourevitch’s excellent review of the ways 
in which the various paradigms see international forces as affecting 
domestic politics.
It is noticeable how most of the paradigms agree on the preceding 
points, albeit for differing reasons. The dependencia, core-periphery 
and imperialism theorists, for instance, stress:
Ill
... the matrix set up by the advanced capitalist 
countries, a system of pressures which ... wholly 
determine the options available to developing 
countries. Since capital, organisation, technology, 
and military preponderance are in the hands of the 
core, the core countries are able to set the terms 
under which skill, capital and markets will be 
provided to the periphery .... The developing 
countries are unable to allocate resorces 
according to their internal needs, following some 
alternative vision of development. As a result 
they are locked into a structure where the benefits 
of growth accrue disproportionately to the core. 
(Gourevitch, 1978, pp.888-9).
The liberal development school, by contrast, suggests that both 
developed and developing countries benefit from the international 
economy, and that their interaction eventually leads to homogenisation. 
Hence the developing countries are locked in in a different way, since 
their development trajectories, according to this school of thought, 
will repeat those of the core countries (Gourevitch, 1978, p.891).
The transnational relations, modernisation and interdependence 
school sees interdependence as severely constraining the freedom of 
action of governments and even affecting their internal organisation 
(Gourevitch, 1978, p.892). There has been a shift of power from 
governments to transnational organisations and an increased ‘role for 
technology, trade, communications and culture vis-a-vis military 
security in shaping policy. The neomercantilists and the state-centred 
Marxists, on the other hand, assert the importance of the state in 
responding to international forces. In one neomercantilist 
formulation, that of Gilpin (1975):
If a hegemonic power exists, the international 
economy will be open; in a multipolar world, 
economic nationalism and protectionism are more 
likely to prevail. States are constrained by 
the international system if they are not the 
hegemonic power ... Nonetheless, for the 
neomercantilists, the system leaves some latitude 
of policy response. (Gourevitch, 1978, p.894).
Such latitude, however, applies more to the larger states. The 
less powerful are more thoroughly constrained by the international 
economic system. Marxists take a similar view of the leeway available 
to states, but see the state largely as the instrument of capitalism 
rather than asserting independent notions of national interest as in 
the neomercantilist formulation.
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Gourevitch does not deal so thoroughly with theories which 
emphasise the influence of the power relations of the international 
state system on domestic politics. One hardly needs to give examples, 
however, of military, subversive, or economic intervention by states 
in the internal politics of others undertaken for security reasons.
As well as causing intervention in the affairs of other states, of 
course, a state's military security concerns can fundamentally affect 
its own internal politics, for example through the potential of 
powerful armed services for a military coup. Like the international 
economic system, the international state system tends to limit 
governments' freedom of action and inhibit unilateral changes.
The overall impression given by the foregoing review is that 
different combinations of paradigms, or elements of them, best 
characterise the international position of different nations, depending 
on their size, strategic location, stage of economic development and 
other characteristics. Further, a combination of military security, 
economic and other ties are likely to supplement each other in 
limiting the individual state's freedom of action. Military alliance 
may be purchased at the cost of economic concessions; economic 
interests may> be protected by military presence; both may be maintained 
by overt or subversive political interference. Transnational's 
importation and use of superior technology can seriously retard the 
host country's own technological development (for example see Mytelka, 
1978) . The products and advertising of transnationals can alter 
consumption patterns and culture. The combined effect of military, 
economic, technological, cultural and institutional ties is to create 
a web of interrelationships in which an individual country's entangle­
ment restricts its capacity independently to change its course.
A SYNTHESIS
A problem with the written or spoken word is that perceptions of 
reality can only be communicated sequentially - one statement must 
follow another. This circumstance can create a spurious idea that 
causality is being attributed to the variables discussed first. This is 
a handicap when one is describing a network of relationships where 
causality can be multidirectional, since it is necessary to start 
somewhere, yet the variable one begins with may under some circumstances 
be dependent and sometimes independent, and sometimes both at once with 
respect to different variables in the network. Bearing this handicap
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in mind, the following is a summary of some of the major relationships 
between the categories of variables which have been discussed, one which 
is broadly similar in many Western or Westernised industrial countries. 
This pattern helps to explain the nature and continuity of such 
societies, and hence the characteristic policies which they pursue.
Technology influences ideas - the pervasiveness of technological 
change leads to the expectation of growth, change and improving 
material standards, faith in the ability of technology to overcome 
problems, and a preoccupation with the products of technology and their 
acquisition. Technology thus contributes to the commodity bias in 
consumer demands, at the same time providing corporations with a means 
of maintaining demand with new or updated products or reduced production 
costs, thereby furthering corporate ends of survival, growth and profit.
In this way technology assists the growth of corporations and development- 
oriented government agencies, which in turn foster the growth of the 
relevant technology and seek policies favourable to it. The type of 
technology developed therefore tends to be that most suited to the large- 
scale operations of corporations and government agencies. Within such 
institutions there develops an elite of engineers and administrators 
committed to the development and use of technology or the promotion and 
marketing of its products. At the same time technological development, 
while sometimes bringing about resource economies or reducing 
environmental damage, in general increases the capacity to alter and 
damage the biogeophysical environment and to consume scarce resources.
The general public has only an indirect and uncertain influence on 
policy. Rather, public opinion sets broad parameters within which 
policy may operate, and public attitudes are in any case influenced by 
media pressure, by processes of socialisation and by elite influence, 
towards acceptance of existing conditions and values. Except under 
unusual circumstances, parliament as a whole has little control over 
policymaking. The nexus of policymaking power lies between cabinet, 
prime minister, senior bureaucrats and those in a position to influence 
them, notably members of elite groups. Policymaking power, however, is 
limited by prevailing ideas and values, economic capacity, institutional 
constraints and external influences, and the weight of past policies.
Institutions tend to resist change. Laws, rules, routines, 
and institutional dogma limit options. The bureaucracy, working within 
institutions, is inclined to reflect the conservative bias of the 
institutional framework. As in the wider society, socialisation 
pressures help to induce acceptance of organisational objectives, 
norms and practices, which may be defended to the detriment of the 
public. Where conservative governments have been predominantly in 
power, public service hierarchies will reflect their views, and 
adherence to conservative policies is likely to persevere in the face of 
pressures for change.
Given the tenuous links between the public and public policy, 
elites have considerable latitude to influence policy through the exercise 
of power acquired through wealth, status or strategic location within 
political, economic or technological organisations. Where corporate 
elites have bonds of common interest with members of political and 
bureaucratic elites policy will be biased towards corporate ends.
To exercise power and influence, elites need not be closely-knit, 
or indulge in conspiracy. They may be 'a loose collection of elite 
groups linked together by ... a governing consensus' (Encel, 1976, p. 4), 
or there may be elites and counter elites, perhaps with the 'counter­
elite perennially less powerful. Where counter-elites concerned with 
social change seek political power, they are likely to have to modify 
their proposals in order to gain power, and to dilute them further in 
order to retain it. In this way non-conservative governments 
successful in retaining office tend to pursue policies not greatly 
different from those of their conservative predecessors, and introduce 
changes piecemeal and gradually.
Corporate elites control much of industry, commerce and the 
development and application of technology. Such control is used 
largely to further corporate and elite interests, with little regard 
for extra-market and longer term consequences for society as a whole. 
Corporate elites, by way of self-interest, corporate socialisation and 
genuine belief, are inclined to identify corporate economic welfare 
with the interests of society as a whole. Many corporations are trans­
national, and owe little or no allegiance to the specific societies 
within which they operate. Governments are easily convinced, given the 
importance attached to economic growth, that economic policies suited 
to the needs of corporate industry are in the public interest.
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Such policies are supported by values and beliefs inherited 
from the past and promoted by corporations and conservative governments 
in the present. For instance, the concept of freedom of the individual 
has been linked with that of freedom of enterprise, and thence with the 
doctrine that the minimum of interference with market forces will 
result in the maximum social benefit. Such a view provides the 
rationale for a low level of concern by corporations and governments 
with the wider social and environmental effects of corporate activities. 
Related beliefs and values include those of the inherent goodness of 
development and the centrality to individual wellbeing of consumption 
and ownership of material goods. Such values are promoted and sustained 
by heavy advertising pressure, often to differentiate virtually 
identical products, and by technological innovation or pseudo-innovation 
to boost product demand. The commodity bias thus produced is enhanced 
by positional competition generated by status-seeking and crowding, and 
the relative value of shared public goods is consequently downgraded.
The result is an intensified pressure on natural resources, with 
increasing demand for such resources to be used as inputs or sinks for 
manufacturing processes, coupled with a relatively lower demand for 
the retention of such resources in their natural state for use as 
shared public goods.
In promoting material values through advertising the media 
promote also the economic and social system which satisfies these values. 
Media ownership tends to become concentrated in the hands of a few 
members of the corporate elite, whose politics are in varying degrees 
reflected in the biases of their media. The media, as was argued, also 
support the status quo in a largely unintentional way by providing an 
explanatory context for news which dramatises personalities and plays 
down the underlying social and institutional circumstances.
The nature of decisionmaking processes is also such that they are 
likely to reinforce existing relationships and dampen attempted change. 
Policies are not made by comparing alternative ends and means on a 
clean slate. Past solutions are extended to deal with present problems, 
via conditioned reflexes and incrementalism. Policies are determined by 
organisations and individuals with an eye to organisational and 
personal benefits. Policies are as much the outcome of the tides and 
currents of power surging among the reefs and channels of institutional 
and economic constraints and opportunities, as of the rational pursuit 
of the public good. Further, once formulated, it cannot be assumed
that policies will be implemented in an optimum way by a neutral public 
service. Implementation is subject to similar forces of influence and 
inertia as is the formulation process. Intended change which has become 
policy may still be altered or emasculated during implementation.
External influences create a web of military, technological, 
economic, cultural and ideological relationships and obligations which 
bind nations to the international system and reach inside them by means 
of external control of industry and resources. Such influences reinforce 
those characteristics which are suited to each nation's place in that 
system, and reduce its capacity for unilateral change.
Certainly, the preceding picture is overgeneralised. Reality is 
infinitely more complex, and there are many exceptions and counter­
vailing tendencies to those described. Nevertheless, the broad 
pattern of relationships and influences outlined shows many common 
features in Western industrial societies, and in varying degrees in 
industrialising countries under Western influence. What emerges is a 
picture of powerful linkages and mutual reinforcement between 
influential variables. These not only define the character of society, 
but act as interlocking forces for the maintenance of existing trends 
and resistance to deliberate qualitative change. Change of course occurs 
but much of it is involuntary or quantitative change - an extension 
of existing tendencies. Deliberate, self-conscious major changes in the 
nature of society are rare. Where such change is brought about in a 
given set of variables, the interactions with other variables and the 
directional inertia of the whole are such as to dampen the change.
There is an analogy with the ecological proposition discussed 
previously, that the more complex an ecosystem, the more stable it tends 
to be. Programmes for change within an existing system are therefore 
unlikely to meet with swift success, but rather to proceed, if at all, 
only slowly and incrementally. The unpalatable alternative is 
revolutionary change which sweeps away existing structures.
In terms of the propositions listed in Chapter One, the present 
chapter has shown the important policy influence of factors which form 
the environment of policymaking: technology, broad socio-economic
influences, prevailing ideas and values, biophysical factors; and the 
variety of avenues and interactions by which such variables influence
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policy (proposition one). It has illustrated the highly interrelated 
nature of policy-influential variables (proposition two) supporting 
the need for a more holistic approach to the explanation of public 
policy. Centrally, as summarised in the preceding synthesis, it has 
outlined a pattern of important variables and relationships between 
them, and argued that these are of major importance in determining the 
general character of Western industrial society and its policies 
(proposition three). It has also been shown that the pattern of 
mutually reinforcing relationships between variables referred to above, 
and certain characteristics of these variables, embody considerable 
resistance to change (proposition four).
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PART II: EIA POLICY: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO
In Part One it was noted that this thesis seeks a better under­
standing of the determinants of public policy. It was proposed that 
this purpose could be furthered by adopting an approach to analysis 
which recognises more fully the nature of society as an interrelated 
whole. Part One listed a number of propositions about the determinants 
of public policy, derived from the above approach, which this thesis 
examines.
It was argued that such an approach requires the rejection, at 
least as a starting point for analysis, of any of the more all- 
encompassing theories of society, and of monodisciplinary approaches 
to the explanation of public policy. Rather, it was suggested that the 
analysis should begin at a more fundamental level by establishing a 
framework of categories of policy-influential variables and examining, 
from the literature, the general character of the influence of these 
variables, and their relationships with one another, on public policy. 
This was the task of Chapter Three, which also briefly examined the 
propositions put forward in Chapter One in the light of its findings.
Part Two seeks to confirm and refine the analysis of Part One by 
means of a review of the Australian government's EIA policy, together 
with two major case studies of public policy involving EIA. Each 
chapter in Part Two focusses on different aspects of EIA policy, 
emphasises different elements of the framework of policy-influential 
variables outlined in Chapter Three, and makes a different, although 
overlapping, contribution to the analysis of the determinants of 
public policy in terms of the propositions listed in Chapter One. For 
this reason, the chapters do not always use all of the framework of 
headings adopted in Chapter Three. The intention is that these 
chapters and Chapter Three taken together provide the necessary support 
for the propositions.
The content of the chapters in Part Two, their relationships to 
Part One and to the purposes of the thesis, and the reasons for the 
selection of the case studies, were examined in Chapter One. It was
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noted there that Chapter Four reviews the setting for policymaking in 
Australia and contributes to the evaluation of the conclusions in 
Chapter Three concerning the influence of the environmental variables 
on policy. Chapter Five examines the role of governments and the 
bureaucracy in implementing the Commonwealth EIA legislation, in the 
context of changing economic conditions and the different ideologies 
and policy priorities of each government. The chapter is therefore 
related in particular to the discussion in Chapter Three of the 
relationships and policy influence of governments, the bureaucracy, 
and governmental institutions.
Chapter Six examines the factors which influenced the implementa­
tion of EIA for the proposed new city of Monarto. In doing so it 
necessarily examines many of the factors which influenced decision­
making for the Monarto project more generally, and both levels of 
decision-making are drawn on to illustrate the determinants of policy.
The Chapter uses the full framework of variables described in Chapter 
Three to examine the way in which such variables took effect through 
the organisation's internal decisionmaking processes. Chapter Six is 
therefore relevant to much of the content of Chapter Three, and is 
particularly useful for evaluating the discussions in that qhapter of 
some models of the decisionmaking process, and concerning the range 
of sources of resistance to change.
Chapter Seven reviews the determinants of Australia's uranium 
mining and export policy, with particular reference to the role of the 
Ranger Inquiry. Because of the variety of important issues involved 
and the wide range of policy actors drawn into the public arena, uranium 
policy is a particularly useful case for examining the determinants of 
policy at the national level and evaluating many of the conclusions of 
Chapter Three. In particular the case study shows the effect of external 
variables on public policy, and helps to illustrate aspects of the 
'significant pattern of important variables and linkages between them' 
outlined in the concluding section of Chapter Three.
The final chapter draws on Parts One and Two to describe, in the 
Australian case, the characteristics of the pattern of important 
variables referred to above; to explain the Australian experience with 
EIA, and to evaluate the propositions put forward in Chapter One.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKING
This chapter discusses some aspects of the biogeophysical 
environment, economic conditions, technology, and institutions in 
Australia and their implications for EIA policy. It concludes with 
a summary of the provisions of the Commonwealth EIA legislation.
BIOGEOPHYSICAL FACTORS
The biogeophysical environment of a country affects its 
environmental policy in a number of ways. It does so directly by 
providing the natural assets which are the potential subject matter of 
environmental policy. It does so less directly by providing the 
resource opportunities and constraints which shape the pattern of human 
activity. Such activity in turn affects the environment in ways which 
become the concerns of environmental policy. The environment also 
interacts with the range of human attitudes and wants to generate 
environmental attitudes. Such attitudes influence both the nature of
f
human activity affecting the environment and the content of environ­
mental policy concerning such activity. There are thus a series of 
iterative interactions between variables in which environment plays 
a part. For those who find diagrams helpful, Figure 4.1 sets out some 
of these paths in a highly simplified form. All relationships in the 
diagram are two-way, except that attitudes and policy cannot affect 
environment directly, but only through their effects on human activity. 
Human activity and the environment, however, can affect policy directly, 
not only through the medium of attitudes, but by setting opportunities 
and constraints of which policy must take heed.
The diagram illustrates the various possible sequences involving 
environment as an influence on policy, for example:
environment policy
environment -* attitudes policy
environment -+ human activity -* policy
environment -+■ human activity -*■ attitudes -> policy
human activity -* environment -*• attitudes + policy
attitudes activity -► environment -* attitudes -*■ policy
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FIGURE 4 . 1 :
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT,  ATTITUDES,  
H U M A N  ACTIVITY AND POLICY
ATTITUDES  
( idea s,  need s,  wants,
b e l ie fs ,  k n o w l e d g e ,
va I ues)
BI OGEOPHYSI CAL
ENVI RONMENT
POLICY
HUMAN A C T I V I T Y
S T R U C T U R E S  
( production, technology,  
V inst i tut ions)  /
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and so on. Clearly, as in the last example, feedback loops are involved 
as attitudes and actions are modified as a result of experience of the 
effects of previous activities on the environment. The significance of 
some of these relationships for environmental policy, as they have 
developed in Australia's history, will now be briefly discussed.
Consider the general features of the environment which faced the 
white settlers. Australia is isolated, vast, hot, mostly flat, largely 
semi-arid, subject to erratic rainfall, drought, bushfire and flood, 
with generally poor soils, bizarre flora and fauna, and only one major 
navigable river system. European crops and farming methods adapted 
poorly to this environment, and it is not surprising that many new 
arrivals tended to find the new country a dismal and alien prospect.
On the other hand, there was little effective resistance by the 
Aborigines to the white invasion. The strange fauna were a valuable 
source of food. There was an abundance of land available for the large 
holdings necessary for productive efficiency. The conditions were well 
suited for the production of fine wool, at a time of rapidly expanding 
demand for it by the British mills. And wool was a product of 
sufficient value in proportion to its bulk to carry the long sea journey.
Given such circumstances one could not expect anything but an 
overwhelming predominance of exploitative attitudes and activities.
Here was a land whose strange plants and animals evoked little sympathy 
in those used to softer landscapes, and whose harshness and erratic 
climate and their accompanying misfortunes were likely to generate 
enmity rather than affection. The very vastness of the country made 
any inroads on its environment seem insignificant. And to the many 
settlers whose life was a struggle to maintain themselves with the 
necessities, there was little energy to spare for questions of 
conservation. Of course, the successful squatters by the mid-nineteenth 
century had become a wealthy and powerful class, but their interests 
tended to lie in aping the manners and pastimes of the English 
aristocracy (as some still do):
A noble pack of hounds was kept up by gentlemen 
squatters who met every season, hunting twice and 
thrice a week, and meeting at each others' houses, 
where good cheer and good and happy society were 
ever to be met .... a fine pack of hounds from the 
kennel appeared, full of life and glee, led away by 
the well-known master of hounds, Compton Ferrers, 
followed by thirty well-mounted gentlemen squatters 
(Captain Foster Fyans, quoted in Powell, 1976, p. 30).
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But Australian sentiments and appreciation of the 
Australian environment were developing, particularly among the 
native born (see generally Ward, 1965) . The proportion of the latter 
in the population, however, was greatly decreased by the great influx 
of immigrants in the gold rushes of the 1850’s. The impermanency and 
'get rich quick' mentality of gold mining inevitably encouraged 
materialistic and exploitative attitudes. Nevertheless, by the 1870's 
there were signs of an increasing concern with environmental 
management. The book Man and Nature by the American conservationist 
George Perkins Marsh found a considerable audience in Australia 
(Powell, 1976, p.60) and there was a growth of learned interest and 
societies concerned with conservation matters. The latter, however, 
included the acclimatisation societies, whose efforts to 'improve' 
the Australian environment by introducing exotic species had some 
disastrous as well as beneficial consequences.
An additional factor was the further development of the 'bush 
ethos'. By 1870 two-thirds of the population was native-born. There 
was a receptive audience for ballads about the Australian bush and 
those who lived there; and Australian artists had begun to develop 
indigenous styles which captured the essence of the landscape. 
Nevertheless, such tendencies never challenged the drive towards 
material progress and development. As Powell (1976, p .81) points 
out 'the aesthetic evocation of the bush was concerned with rural 
Australia in its entirety, not solely or even largely with the true 
wilderness areas ...'.
The size and emptiness of the Australian continent engendered a 
fear that if it were not developed and populated the 'Asian hordes' 
would invade and take it. A related, but less xenophobic idea has been 
that it is necessary to justify the possession of such a large country 
by developing it. Such ideas underlay the massive assisted 
immigration programmes after World War II, and persist to the present:
We have an obligation to the rest of the world, as 
well as to ourselves, to do our utmost to speed 
development in this country (the Deputy Prime Minister,
Mr. Anthony, Canberra Times, 25.3.77).
In his book Labor’s Rote in Modem Society, Arthur Calwell, the 
former ALP leader, captured the essence of the sentiment underlying 
the commitment of Australians to development;
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The economic and s e c u r i t y  a rguments  do not  
t o g e t h e r  p r o v i d e  t h e  f u l l  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
u n a n im i t y  t h a t  e x i s t s  on t h e  need f o r  n a t i o n a l  
deve lopm ent  . . .  The r e a s o n s  f o r  t h a t  u n a n im i t y  
l i e  d e e p e r ,  and a r e  bound up w i th  n a t i o n a l  
s e n t i m e n t .  A l l  A u s t r a l i a n s  f e e l  t h a t  i f  t h e  
number o f  t h e i r  f e l l o w  A u s t r a l i a n s  c o u ld  be 
g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d ,  t h e n  t h a t  would be a good 
t h i n g  in  i t s e l f  ( C a lw e l l ,  q u o te d  i n  H om e ,
1976,  p . 1 3 7 ) .
Such s e n t i m e n t s  became l e s s  f a s h i o n a b l e  in  t h e  l a t e  1 9 6 0 ' s  as  
t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  movement g a t h e r e d  momentum, and t h e r e  i s  t o d a y  
l e s s  emphas is  on i n c r e a s i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  f o r  i t s  own s a k e .  The n o t i o n  
o f  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  deve lopm en t ,  however ,  a l t h o u g h  more w id e ly  
q u e s t i o n e d ,  and sometimes o v e r t u r n e d  in  s p e c i f i c  i n s t a n c e s ,  i s  s t i l l  
d o m i n a n t .
The p r e c e d i n g  h i s t o r i c a l  n o t e s  i n t r o d u c e  a number o f  p o i n t s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  i n  te rms  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
d i s c u s s e d  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  The i n t e r a c t i o n  between  
t h e  env i ronm en t  and a t t i t u d e s ,  i d e a s  and v a l u e s  h e l p s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  
dominance o f  e x p l o i t a t i v e  a t t i t u d e s  t o  t h e  e nv i ronm en t  t h r o u g h o u t  
A u s t r a l i a ' s  h i s t o r y .  I t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  
which  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  p a s t  have i n f l u e n c e d  t h o s e  o'f t h e  
p r e s e n t ,  bu t  t h a t  such an i n f l u e n c e  e x i s t s  and h a s  a b e a r i n g  upon 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  t h e r e  i s  no d o u b t .  Each g e n e r a t i o n  does n o t  
d e c i d e  a f r e s h  i t s  a t t i t u d e s  t o  t h e  w or ld  a round  i t .  C e r t a i n  
a t t i t u d i n a l  themes run  c o n s i s t e n t l y  t h ro u g h  A u s t r a l i a ' s  h i s t o r y .  In 
e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r s  some o f  t h e  mechanisms by which a t t i t u d e s ,  i d e a s  
and v a l u e s  a r e  p e r p e t u a t e d  have  been d i s c u s s e d .
The p a s t  a l t e r a t i o n s  t o  t h e  env i ronm en t  as  a r e s u l t  o f  human 
a c t i v i t y  a l s o  have i m p o r t a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  p r e s e n t  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y ,  s i n c e  many components  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  
e n v i ro n m en t  have been reduc e d  t o  a p o i n t  where s p e c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  
needed  t o  p r e v e n t  f u r t h e r  damage o r  t o t a l  d e s t r u c t i o n .  Among t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  w h i t e  s e t t l e m e n t  on t h e  env ironm en t  was w h o l e s a l e  c l e a r i n g  
o f  t r e e  c o v e r  t o  improve p a s t u r e  and f o r  commerc ial  and o t h e r  
p u r p o s e s .  Timber  c o v e r  must have seemed so e x t e n s i v e  as  t o  be 
a lm o s t  i n e x h a u s t i b l e .  Bo l ton  (1981, p . 4 0 )  n o t e s  t h a t  ' a c c o r d i n g  t o  
a r e p o r t  o f  1861,  t h e  S t a t e  o f  V i c t o r i a  was c o v e re d  f o r  90 p e r c e n t  o f  
i t s  a r e a  by open t i m b e r  c o u n t r y ,  mounta in  woodland,  o r  dense  m a l l e e
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scrub; and that 'Commissioner Fry of the New South Wales Lands 
Department informed an official inquiry in 1847 that the Big Scrub 
in the Richmond River cedar country could not be cleared for five or 
six centuries. Within thirty years selectors were farming the 
same country, stripped of its timber.' The once extensive rain­
forests of the eastern coastal area by 1979 had been reduced to 
1.895 million hectares (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1981) or about 
0.2 percent of Australia's total area. Conversion of rainforest to 
agricultural land, particularly on steeper slopes, is of doubtful 
value since high rainfall causes erosion and infertility once the 
rainforest is removed. Accelerated wind and water erosion is a 
major problem over large areas of Australia due to removal of tree 
cover, overstocking and poor agricultural practices (see generally 
Downes, 1974).
Destruction of natural habitats by clearing, and the inroads 
of introduced species, have caused a rapid decline in the numbers 
of many fauna. Of the 119 species of Australian mammals, five are 
probably extinct and a further 22 species and many races of other 
species are endangered (Frith, 1974, p.149). The loss of rainforest 
habitats is of particular concern since these are 'of international 
significance as ancient and isolated reservoirs of a great variety 
of plant and animal species which, especially in northern tropical 
areas, have as yet been little studied by science.' (Committee of 
Inquiry into the National Estate, 1974, p.55).
The foregoing few paragraphs do little more than touch the 
margins of the environmental consequences of Australia's development. 
But they serve to make the point that the environment with which 
environmental policy is now concerned is a vastly different one 
from that seen by the early settlers. They also indicate 
the practical effects of the attitudes to the environment 
which have prevailed in Australia's recorded history. Such attitudes 
arose partly because of the dictates of survival, partly from wilful 
lack of concern with adverse consequences, partly from simple lack of 
understanding of such consequences, and partly because prevailing 
attitudes saw little value in the Australian environment in its 
unaltered state.
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The biogeophysical environment has also had enormous influence 
on Australia's socio-economic development, and hence on the subject 
matter of environmental policy. Great mineral wealth has ensured 
that controversies over mining activities dominate the environmental 
agenda. Proposals to mine mineral sands on Fraser Island, uranium 
in the Alligator Rivers region (both subject to public inquiries under 
Commonwealth EIA legislation) and to drill for oil on the Barrier 
Reef are high on the list of environmental issues which have 
received national prominence. Another controversy, the Lake 
Pedder hydro-electric scheme, can also be attributed to the effect of 
environmental characteristics on economic circumstances. Tasmania, 
with few of the environmental resources of the mainland States, has 
one in abundance, that of water flowing from high altitudes in 
terrain suitable for constructing dams for hydro-electric power. In 
a fine example of the perpetuation of attitudes by institutionalisation, 
the Tasmanian government in 1930 created the Hydro-Electric Commission 
to provide cheap power to attract industry; an aim which it has 
pursued doggedly and singlemindedly since. Unfortunately much of 
this activity, including the Lake Pedder scheme, has taken place in 
South-West Tasmania, one of the world's few remaining temperate 
wilderness areas. The other side of the water resources coin has 
been the preoccupation, in generally a dry climate, with irrigation 
schemes, often of doubtful economic and environmental value (Davidson, 
1969).
Environmental factors, together with the comparatively late 
settlement of Australia, help to account for the high level of 
urbanisation. By 1979, 41 percent of Australia's population lived 
in the two largest cities, 63 percent in the six largest, and 70 
percent in urban areas of 100,000 persons or more. The high reliance 
on overseas trade encouraged the development of port cities, the 
higher rainfall areas and better farming land were near the coast, 
allowing much of their servicing to be done from the coastal cities, 
and the main primary industries of wool, beef and wheatgrowing conducted 
on large holdings required only a low rural population density.
The urban trend was accelerated in the 1880's by the rapid develop­
ment of railway systems radiating from the major ports.
The high degree of urbanisation has been significant for 
environmental policy, since the strength of the environmental
127
movement has come from the urban population. City dwellers not 
making a living directly from the rural environment are less likely 
to see it in an exploitative or utilitarian light than rural 
populations. Rather, they regard it as an area for rest and 
recreation, and are concerned at activities which detract from this 
potential. In fact, many environmental issues in non-urban areas 
typically embody confrontations between locals deriving employment, 
increased trade or other benefits from the proposal in question, 
and conservationists who are urban-based or who have recently moved 
to the area from the cities (for example, the disputes about logging 
in the rainforests of northern NSW (AFR, 30.4.81) about the use of 
the herbicide 245-T in agriculture (NT,12-18.10.80) and concerning 
the woodchip industry (SH, 13.5.79), all embody such conflicts). 
Further, as the size and population density of cities increase, 
urban environmental problems have reached levels where they generate 
public awareness and interest group activity.
The Australian environment has also had its effects on 
institutions and thence on the nature of environmental policy. The 
nature of the Constitution is a prime example. The great distances 
and poor communications between the capital cities of each colony 
allowed them to develop with considerable independence, and this was a 
major reason for the assignment in the Constitution of limited 
specific powers to the Commonwealth and the wide range of residual 
powers retained by the States. The shape of the Constitution, as 
will be shown in subsequent sections, has had considerable 
consequences for environmental policy and EIA.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES
The prosperous economic conditions which prevailed in Australia 
for nearly three decades following World War II had by the late 
1960's helped to create circumstances which were favourable for an 
upsurge in environmental concern. With the economic downturn of 
the early 1970's, however, environmental questions gave ground to 
problems of inflation, economic stagnation and unemployment. Because 
of their various consequences for environmental policy and EIA, 
economic conditions and government responses to them will be examined 
more than cursorily here.
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Between 1959/60 and 1969/70, average unemployment in Australia 
was 1.9 percent, and the average rate of inflation 2.5 percent 
(Kasper et al. 1980, p.45), both figures better than those for most 
OECD countries. The average increase in real per capita GDP during 
the period, however, was 2.6 percent, a fairly modest performance. 
Nevertheless, while Australia's relative position declined somewhat 
between 1950 and the 1970's by comparison with many other industrial 
countries (Kasper et al., pp.3 and 5), it remained among the leaders 
in terms of real per capita GDP.
In the late 1960's it was generally considered that the 
favourable economic conditions would continue. The application of 
Keynesian economics seemed to have largely solved the problems of 
maintaining high levels of economic activity without excessive 
inflation or unemployment, and Australia's exceptional mineral wealth 
appeared to ensure a healthy economic future. Such expectations, 
together with the attainment of an increasingly high level of material 
welfare, provided suitable preconditions for greater attention to be 
paid to questions of quality of life and social reforms.
During the 1960's various social movements gathered force, 
usually triggered by similar developments overseas - greater 
'permissiveness', feminism, anti-Vietnam and other protest movements, 
pressures for greater public participation in planning, and the 
environmental movement itself. The increase in environmental 
consciousness was assisted by the growing evidence of environmental 
degradation, particularly in Australia's two largest cities, Sydney 
and Melbourne, where smog and pollution of waterways were increasingly 
obvious.
There was also an increasing 'middle classing' of Australia, 
both objectively and probably subjectively. Between 1947 and 1971 
the proportion of the workforce in 'white collar' occupations 
increased from 25.3 percent to 31.7 percent of the workforce (Kemp, 
1978, p.48). Kemp argues also that there has been a subjective 
movement of blue-collar workers towards middle class preferences, at 
least as reflected in the declining support of the former for the 
ALP (Kemp, 1978, p.69). It was from the affluent middle classes that 
much of the activation of the environmental and other movements of 
the 1960's came.
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The McMahon LCP government, while not giving the appearance of 
a government of reform, in fact made a number of responses to the 
changing mood, including some recognition of environment as a 
significant issue with the creation of the rather oddly-assorted 
portfolio of Environment, Aborigines and the Arts in 1971. The leader 
of the ALP, Gough Whitlam, however, captured more closely the mood of 
much of the public with his programme of extensive urban, social and 
environmental reforms. He was assisted also by many other factors, 
including the succession of unimpressive Liberal prime ministers 
following the retirement of Menzies, and the signs of an economic 
downturn. In the September quarter of 1972, less than three months 
before the Federal election, inflation was running at an annual rate 
of nearly 6 percent, having been 6.8 percent in 1971/72, and 
unemployment had risen above 2 percent. The rate of increase of real 
GDP had declined in 1971/72 to 4.4 percent from 5.1 percent the 
previous year. Figure4.2and Table4.1show the movements in various 
economic indicators for the period.
TABLE 4.1: AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1970/71 TO 1980/81
(These data are presented graphically in Figure 4.2)
Money supply CPI Av. weekly Real
(M3) earnings GDP
1970/71 6.8 4.8 11.1 5.1
1971/2 11.0 6.8 10.1 4.4
1972/3 25.7 6.0 9.0 3.7
1973/4 12.3 12.9 16.2 5.2
1974/5 15.7 16.7 25.4 1.6
1975/6 14.4 13.0 14.4 2.6
1976/7 11.0 13.8 12.4 3.2
1977/8 8.0 9.5 9.9 0.3
1978/9 11.8 8.2 7.7 4.4
1979/80 12.3 10.2 9.9 1.9
1980/81 12.7 9.4 13.2 2.9
Unemployment 
(calendar years)
1.3 (1970) 
1*5 (1971)
2.0 (1972)
1.8 (1973)
2.1 (1974)
4.7 (1975)
4.4 (1976)
5.5 (1977)
6.3 (1978)
6.2 (1979)
6.1 (1980)
5.8 (1981)
Notes: Unemployment is expressed as a percentage of the labour force.
All other figures are rates of change.
Sources: ABS, CPI Bulletin, C/N 6401 (CPI).
ABS, The Labour Force, C/N 6202, Dec. 1981 and C/N 6204, 1980 
(Unemployment).
ABS, Monthly Summary of Statistics, A/N 1304, Jan. 1982 (GDP, 
Average Weekly Earnings).
ABS, Year Book of Australia, 1981, 1980, 1977/8, 1974 
(Unemployment, Average Weekly Earnings, GDP).
ABS, Seasonally Adjusted. Indicators, 1981 C/N 1308 (M3).
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Few saw the downturn as the beginning of a long period of 
recession; rather it was seen as due largely to mismanagement of the 
economy by the McMahon government, a view which played a part in 
that government's subsequent defeat. Thus economic conditions 
contributed in a number of ways to the election of the Whitlam Labor 
government, an event significant for environmental policy because of 
that government's greater sympathy for environmental concerns, and 
its introduction, among other environmental initiatives, of the 
Commonwealth EIA legislation.
In economic terms, 1972/3 was largely a lull before the storm, 
although inflation began to increase rapidly in the second half of 
the financial year. Unemployment increased slightly, and the rate of 
growth of GDP continued to decline. The feature of 1972/3, however, 
was a huge increase in the money supply (by over 25 percent, measured 
as M3), reflecting a favourable balance of payments and large inflows 
of investment and speculative funds from overseas. The money supply 
growth contributed to the continuation of high inflation, which 
reached an annual rate of 12.9 percent in 1973/4. Another unusual 
contributing factor was a rapid rise in potato and meat prices.
During the year to September 1973, these contributed 38.7^percent 
to the overall inflation. At the same time, expanding government 
activity involved in implementing the wide range of ALP programmes 
was adding to an already strong level of demand, with a growth in 
real GDP of 5.2 percent for 1973/4.
In 1974/5 the dimensions of the problem became apparent.
Inflation peaked at an annual rate of 16.7 percent, and in the 
December 1974 quarter the annual rate of change of average weekly 
earnings of 31 percent was almost double the rate of inflation (Hughes, 
1980, p.59). Also in 1974/5 the growth of real GDP fell to only 1.6 
percent, unemployment jumped to nearly 4 percent, and the domestic 
budget deficit rose to $1949m as the government tried to stimulate 
the economy and maintain its programmes in the face of lower growth 
and falling receipts. The Whitlam government had reaped the whirlwind, 
and was widely held to blame for the economic situation. This was not 
entirely just, since the Australian experience was part of a worldwide 
recession; nevertheless, the actions of the government did worsen 
rather than ameliorate the effects of the recession on Australia.
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The economic situation assisted the Fraser LNCP government to 
election in 1976, on a platform of improved economic management, and 
with it came the dismantling or reduction of most of the Whitlam 
government's programmes, including a marked reduction in the 
implementation of the Commonwealth EIA legislation. Over the ensuing 
years, however, there has been little of the promised improvement in 
the economy. Real GDP increased by an average of only about 2.5 
percent per annum between 1976/7 and 1979/80 as compared with an 
average rate of over 5 percent during the 1960's. Real average weekly 
earnings actually declined during the same period, and unemployment 
rose to 6.1 percent in June 1980. At considerable cost, some small 
success had been achieved with inflation, which had fallen from an 
annual average of 11.9 percent in 1976/77 to 10.1 percent in 1979/80. 
1980/81 showed a little improvement in all these indicators, but by 
early 1982 they had once again deteriorated.
The adverse economic conditions were exacerbated by the 
Fraser government's economic policies, which in general must be 
said to have failed. From 1976 to 1979 real GDP grew by an average 
of 2.8 percent in Australia, and inflation averaged 11 percent; both 
worse than the OECD averages of 4 percent and 8 percent for the same 
period. From having one of the lowest unemployment rates in the OECD, 
Australia moved to one of the highest. Some of the dogmas of 
government policy were that inflation had to be controlled first, in 
the expectation that economic recovery would then follow; that in 
order to control inflation, budget deficits had to be eliminated and 
the money supply tightly controlled; and that real wages needed to be 
reduced in order to reduce unemployment. Despite quite draconian 
measures to reduce inflation, however, by the end of 1981 it still 
stood above the 10 percent mark and there was no sign of economic 
recovery. There is a downward spiral involved in attempting to 
reduce budget deficits, as Sheehan (1980, p.93) points out, since 
unless the private sector makes up the shortfall in demand, the level 
of economic activity and hence taxation revenue then tend to decline, 
requiring in turn further cuts or taxation increases to reduce 
deficits in subsequent budgets. This problem has been evident in 
the government's struggles to contain budget overruns in recent years. 
By February 1982 the current budget deficit was running $1200m in 
excess of its target (SMH, 21.2.82). And despite the falling share 
of wages, unemployment increased over the period.
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More g e n e r a l l y ,  a p u b l i c  mood o f  pessimism was induced  which 
c o n t r a s t e d  w i th  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  op t im ism o f  a decade  e a r l i e r .  At t h a t  
t im e ,  t h e r e  was a f e e l i n g  among c o n s i d e r a b l e  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
t h a t  e v e n t s  and government  d e c i s i o n s  cou ld  be i n f l u e n c e d  by p u b l i c  
p r e s s u r e ,  and t h a t  a r a n g e  o f  r e f o r m s  was bo th  p o s s i b l e  and n e c e s s a r y .  
The change in  a t t i t u d e s  was n o t  due t o  economic c o n d i t i o n s  a l o n e ,  b u t  
a l s o  t o  t h e  dou r  p o l i c i e s  o f  a government which p r e a c h e d  t h a t  s a c r i f i c e s  
must  f i r s t  be made in  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  about  improved c o n d i t i o n s .  I t  
has  been s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  a p p ro a c h  seemed t o  a ppe a l  t o  someth ing  deep 
in  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  p s y c h e .  However t h a t  may be ,  t h e  r e q u i r e d  s a c r i f i c e s  
were made, f o r  i n s t a n c e  i n  t e rm s  o f  a r e a l  unemployment  r a t e  o f  o v e r  
10 p e r c e n t ,  o r  a lm o s t  d o u b le  t h e  r e c o r d e d  one (Sheehan ,  1980, p. 4 0 ) ,  
b u t  w i t h o u t  even a d i s t a n t  s i g h t i n g  o f  t h e  p romised  l and .
Economic c o n d i t i o n s  and t h e  F r a s e r  g o v e rn m e n t ' s  r e s p o n s e s  to  
them had a number o f  c o n s eq u e n c e s  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n ta l  p o l i c y  and EIA.
The p o l i c y ,  b a sed  p a r t l y  on i d e o l o g i c a l  and p a r t l y  on economic g r o u n d s ,  
o f  r e d u c i n g  t h e  scope  o f  government  a c t i v i t y  and e x p e n d i t u r e ,  saw c u t s  
f a l l  more t h a n  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  on t h e  components o f  government  
a c t i v i t y  con c e rn e d  w i th  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n ,  as  w i l l  be seen  in  
C h a p t e r  5.  The d e s i r e  t o  c r e a t e  an a tm osphere  c o n d u c iv e  t o ' - p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r  growth saw a weakening  o f  e n v i r o n m e n ta l  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n c l u d i n g  
a d e c l i n e  in  t h e  u se  o f  t h e  EIA r e q u i r e m e n t .  Adding t o  t h e s e  
t e n d e n c i e s  was t h e  'New F e d e r a l i s m '  p o l i c y ,  i n v o l v i n g  Commonwealth 
w i t h d ra w a l  i n  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  f rom many s p h e r e s  o f  a c t i v i t y  i n  f a v o u r  
o f  t h e  S t a t e s .  Th i s  l e d  t o  a n a r ro w in g  in  t h e  r a n g e  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  
t o  which t h e  Commonwealth EIA r e q u i r e m e n t  was c o n s i d e r e d  a p p l i c a b l e .
The LNCP g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p o l i c y  o f  g i v i n g  p r i o r i t y  t o  r e d u c i n g  i n f l a t i o n  
r a t h e r  t h a n  unemployment  a l s o  d e c r e a s e d  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  u n i o n s  t o  
ban j o b - c r e a t i n g  p r o j e c t s  on e n v i r o n m e n ta l  g r o unds .
TECHNOLOGY
In c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t e c h n o lo g y  on p u b l i c  p o l i c y  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o c u s s e s  f o r  a number o f  r e a s o n s  on t h e  Repor t  o f  
t h e  Commit tee  o f  I n q u i r y  i n t o  T e c h n o lo g i c a l  Change in  A u s t r a l i a  
(CITCA). The Repor t  p r o v i d e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  examine t h e  f i n d i n g s  
o f  a m a jo r  r e v i e w  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change and i t s  economic ,  s o c i a l  
and e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s .  In examining such m a t t e r s  t h e  Repor t  
i s  t o  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t  c o n c e rn e d  wi th  s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n s ,
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although from a different perspective, to those of this thesis concern­
ing the relationships between technology, other policy-influential 
variables and public policy. The findings of the Report therefore 
provide a convenient vehicle for examining such questions. The Report 
also crystallises and articulates certain attitudes and values concern­
ing technological change and its consequences. Such attitudes are 
important not just in their influence on the conclusions of the Report, 
but more generally in promoting uncritical acceptance of technological 
change.
CITCA could have been virtually an EIA of alternative paths of 
technological change, using the term EIA in its broadest and most 
useful sense. Its central term of reference was:
To examine, report and make recommendations on the process of 
technological change in Australian industry in order to maximise 
economic, social and other benefits and minimise any possible 
adverse consequences.
CITCA, however, as will be seen, failed to meet this challenge 
and its Report read in stark contrast to the breadth of vision and 
thoroughness shown by the Ranger Inquiry (as discussed in Chapter Seven) 
in meeting its terms of reference. The very weaknesses of the CITCA 
Report point up the need for requirements for assessment of '-new technol­
ogies specifically dealing with social and environmental consequences. 
Given that the uncritical attitudes towards new technology shown in the 
Report are prevalent in society, some of the difficulties in instituting 
and implementing dispassionate assessment of the environmental impact 
of new technologies become apparent.
Two central assertions made by CITCA were that unemployment will 
not necessarily increase as a result of technological change, and that 
it is essential to maintaining (1) Australia's competitiveness in inter­
national trade, and (2) its economic growth, that Australia should keep 
up with international technological change. On employment, CITCA said:
Given that some likely technological changes will lead to the 
reduction in numbers of jobs in some areas, and that some new 
jobs will be created by the economic reactions that the same 
changes stimulate, the determination of the net effect on unem­
ployment depends on an assessment of which of these effects is 
likely to be larger in the future economic and social environment.
The Committee is not aware of any evidence that would allow 
such a quantitative assessment to be made about the future 
functioning of the Australian economy. In considering the 
effects of technological change in the recent past, however, the 
Committee cannot find evidence that the current high level of
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unemployment is attributable to technological change, and 
believes that the level is much more readily explained by 
reference to general economic conditions. (CITCA, 1980, p. 167).
And further:
... the available historical evidence shows that technological 
change has in the long term created wealth and employment, 
and that future technological changes will continue to have 
this effect. (CITCA, 1980, p. 74).
On international competitiveness and employment:
While it may be feasible in some circumstances to inhibit 
change within Australia or even to prevent some changes 
altogether, the costs of this option are likely to be high in 
terms of the competitiveness of Australian export and import- 
competing industries and in the long run it may be self- 
defeating in terms of its aim of maintaining employment. (CITCA, 
1980, p. 77).
On international competitiveness and growth:
Most countries are pursuing vigorous policies designed to 
develop and implement new technology in their industries.
Australia has virtually no influence over such overseas develop­
ments. If it chooses to keep up it will, of course, face 
adjustment problems; if, on the other hand, it chooses to reject 
or significantly to slow down technologically induced improvements 
in industrial efficiency, it is likely to face far more severe 
adjustments, which would be further aggravated by lack of growth 
in the domestic economy (CITCA, 1980, p. 167).
CITCA summarised its views as follows:
-There is a strong link between technological change and economic 
growth and thence higher incomes.
-There are numerous unsatisfied public and private needs in the 
Australian community for which people desire higher incomes.
-Satisfying the needs creates jobs, often in areas quite unrelated 
to the technological changes that generated the income that 
enabled the needs to be satisfied (CITCA, 1980, p. 81).
The Committee concluded that the Australian community would be 
best served if:
-industry uses the high level of expertise in the Australian 
community to develop new products and processes and thereby to 
create new employment opportunities
-industry in general keeps up with world technological 
development and where possible, in areas of particular advantage, 
attempts to lead
-people who are likely to be affected by technological change 
are properly informed and consulted
-a 'social safety net' is provided to assist people to adapt to 
change (CITCA, 1980, p. 169).
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Such views call for a number of comments. CITCA's view of the 
possible courses of action concerning new technology was largely 
limited to two extremes - either Australia ’chooses to keep up’ or it 
'chooses to reject or significantly to slow down’ technological change. 
This is a false dichotomy. It is possible both to encourage new 
technology and at the same time to subject it to thorough review. If 
the concern is that review requirements will discourage the adoption 
of new technology, then various compensatory measures can be taken to 
support technological innovation. Part of the reason for CITCA's 
failure to make this point is that it tended to see technological 
change as monolithic. Technological change was discussed as if it were 
one entity, whose characteristics are somehow externally given. This 
has been called the 'cargo cult' version of technology (Jones, 1981, 
p.93). The Report did recognise that within the new technology there 
may be some innovations which are less desirable than others. But it 
did not seem to recognise that there are alternatives both in relation 
to specific technologies and to the overall nature of technology and 
the direction which it might take. One would think that alternative 
technologies have by now had sufficient discussion and accumulated 
enough respectability to be substantially canvassed in such a report.
CITCA placed central importance on the achievement of economic 
growth:
The view of the Committee is that the Australian 
community has substantial unsatisfied needs for private 
and public goods and services, more leisure and better 
work, and that these could be met by increased national 
income through economic growth. (CITCA, 1980, p.65).
Such a statement completely begs the question of whether the social 
and environmental costs of such growth might outweigh its benefits.
And with economic growth, as with technology, CITCA was aggregating, 
as if there were only one entity called 'economic growth' which must be 
taken or left, instead of various aspects and forms of growth with 
differing advantages and disadvantages.
In reply to the criticism of economic growth to the effect that 
growth in demand 'is only sustained by promotion and advertising that 
create false wants for products of dubious worth and value to the 
purchasers' the Committee replied that 'even the allegedly satiated 
few are unlikely to resist entirely the new products and services that 
continue to be developed and made available' (CITCA, 1980, p.64), a
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Whether the greater income flowing to those who benefit 
as owners of resources or technology will show itself in 
newly created jobs will depend on what proportion of the 
higher income is saved and whether profitable opportunities 
exist for new investment; in present circumstances those 
with financial surplus show more interest in purchasing 
existing property rights or in speeding up the rate of 
technological change than in widening employment 
opportunities.
All of these judgements suggest that the bargaining 
power of those Australians who are dependent on employment 
for wage or salary is likely to be weakened: the
unemployment and declining real incomes many of them have 
experienced in recent years appears likely to continue 
(Coombs, 1980, p.14).
The LNCP government endorsed the broad thrust of the Report 
(CT 1.8.80), but while accepting many of the recommendations aimed at 
encouraging new technology, it rejected or ignored most of the 
welfare-oriented recommendations such as those concerning the 'social 
safety net' provisions for those who lose their jobs because of new 
technology or for reasons beyond their control.
The CITCA Report is largely a reflection of the attitudes of 
the conservative political parties and business and technological 
elites towards technological change. These elites have greater control 
over the course of technological change than groups which have 
differing views, such as some trade unions or sections of the public. 
The Report therefore indicates the likely course of technology and of 
technology policy and from these some consequences for environmental 
policy can be deduced.
In essence, CITCA concluded that undifferentiated technological 
change is to be encouraged and little needs to be done to improve 
assessment of new technologies, particularly with regard to their 
environmental consequences. This is in itself an environmental policy 
in an indirect way - a policy that the consequences of new technology 
for the environment will not be subjected to new and more rigorous 
forms of review; a policy which will also put increasing pressure on 
existing modes of appraisal including EIA.
The Committee in its discussion of technology assessment laboured 
the point that it might not be possible to predict a l l  the consequences 
of a given technological change: 'The Committee, however, has serious
doubts as to whether this aim can be achieved in respect of several 
important consequences' and '... it seems a logical possibility to the
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Committee that in a society in which decision-making is decentralised 
many final impacts are "unknowable” . ..' (CITCA, 1980, p.161). The 
implication seems to be that if you can't define all the consequences, 
don't try too hard to define any of them.
The Committee rejected the ideas of establishing an Office of 
Technology Assessment or a Technology Assessment Act. Instead, it 
suggested assessment at three levels. At the level of enterprises, CITCA 
recommended that standards for notification, provision of information 
and consultation similar to those set out in the National Labour 
Advisory Council guidelines should form the basis for technology 
assessments (CITCA, 1980, p.198). The guidelines, however, are 
concerned with management-employee relations concerning proposed new 
technologies at the enterprise level, and have nothing to do with 
social or environmental effects external to the enterprise. In fact 
the word 'environment' does not occur in the Committee's recommendations 
on technology assessment. At the industry level, CITCA suggested that 
'assessments should be made particularly to aid future labour 
adaptation' and that 'Industry Advisory Councils and the Industry 
Training Committees have the necessary expertise.' But Industry 
Advisory Councils consist of representatives of government, industry
4
and unions formed to facilitate consultation between government and 
the industry concerned on industry policy. They are unlikely to have 
the appropriate mix of skills to make balanced assessments of the wider 
social, economic and environmental effects of technological changes 
within their industry. Clearly neither would Industry Training 
Committees. Nor, as far as one can tell, did CITCA expect either 
body to undertake such broad investigations.
This leaves only the national level. There CITCA recommended that 
a Standing Committee of the Australian Science and Technology Council 
should be established '... to evaluate and report on the direct and 
indirect effects of technological change at the national level.'
There are several problems with such an arrangement. It provides no 
routine procedure for technological changes with significant social 
or environmental consequences to be notified to the Committee (unlike 
the Commonwealth EIA requirement where the Minister responsible for 
a proposal with significant environmental consequences must provide 
notification). There is no specification of the nature of social or 
environmental effects which would require assessment, nor of the 
matters which such an assessment should consider. There is no
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provision for the introduction of the technology in question to be 
delayed while assessment is completed, nor for public input to, or 
review of, the assessment. There is no requirement for anyone to 
make a decision about any report which is produced, nor is there any 
suggestion (other than a brief comment on Commonwealth powers in a 
supporting document) as to how any decisions limiting new technology 
might be enforced. One could extend these criticisms, but the central 
problem should be clear: that there are no procedures proposed which
would define what is to be investigated, the scope of such investiga­
tions, and how they are to be reviewed. Such matters would be 
entirely up to ASTEC and the government.
Commonwealth and State EIA procedures can and have been applied 
to some new technologies (e.g. the Ranger uranium inquiry) but the 
EIA procedures are not entirely suited to technology assessment (for 
instance, how is a proponent of a proposed action to be nominated 
when a whole industry is introducing a new technology). Procedures 
are needed which have been specifically designed for the task of 
technology assessment. Many new technologies are introduced without 
any requirement for government approval. Any procedures for technol­
ogy assessment would need to include means of early identification of 
new technologies with possible adverse consequences. The CITCA Report 
did not address this problem.
The failure of CITCA to consider alternative technologies is in 
a negative sense an environmental policy, since such technologies are 
designed to be less environmentally damaging or wasteful of non­
renewable resources than mainstream technology. It appears also that 
the Committee underestimated the rate of change and the magnitude 
of the impact of technology (Carter, undated, pp. 18-23), another 
factor which will add to pressure on the existing policy instruments 
for environmental protection.
Some of the more proximate factors explaining the line taken 
by the Inquiry were as follows:
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CITCA's terms of reference gave no clear direction to consider 
alternative patterns of technological change. Further, where one 
might have expected a strong representation of personnel qualified 
to examine the social and environmental consequences of technology, 
in fact the composition of the Committee and its Secretariat was 
heavily loaded towards technologists. According to Jones (1981, p.93) 
the Committee was biased in its selection of material, advisers, and 
consultations, seeking those which would conform with its preconceived 
views. (See also CITCA, 1980, Appendix A and B, which list 
Secretariat staff and those undertaking contractual work for the 
Committee). Certainly, much of the Report reads as advocacy rather 
than balanced judgement. In its Selected Papers on Technological 
Change (Volume Four of the CITCA Report) the Committee published only 
papers which it commissioned, none of the voluntary submissions to 
the Committee apparently being considered worth publishing. Of the 
fifteen papers published, all except three concern technological 
changes in specific industries, or means of providing incentives for 
technological changes, or attempt to demonstrate a strong relationship 
between technological change and economic growth. With one possible 
exception, all the papers were written by technologists, eoonomists, 
or the CITCA Secretariat.
In an earlier chapter it was argued that although to some extent 
new technology is self-generating, the development and use of new 
technology can be considerably influenced by society, and in 
particular by business and technological elites. It is generally in 
the interests of such elites if technological change is allowed to 
proceed with a minimum of interference, as is clear from the tenor of 
the industry submissions to the Inquiry. CITCA is a good illustration 
of the way in which the dominant forces in society can affect such an 
Inquiry so that its findings bring about little change.
The Report demonstrated a range of significant beliefs about the 
relationship between technology and society: the need to keep up
with technological change overseas; the belief in a strong linkage 
between technological change and increased economic growth and 
employment; the tendency to consider technological change and economic
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growth as desirable per se, and that technology assessment will 
unnecessarily slow down the rate of technological change; and the 
view that technology will make available new sources of raw materials 
and energy. Such beliefs largely reflect the prevailing relationship 
between technology and Australian society: rapid technological
change is taking place with extensive economic, social and 
environmental ramifications, but with little effort to understand 
or moderate such change. In the absence of such assessment, the 
criteria which apply to the introduction of new technology are those 
of the private and public organisations which introduce it. For the 
most part, policy responses encourage new technology or accept it 
as given and seek to adjust to it, rather than critically examining 
specific technological options or seeking to identify and evaluate 
alternative broad patterns of technological development and their social 
consequences.
INSTITUTIONS
Westminster conventions and public access to information
Australian institutions of government were largely based on 
those of Britain, but with some important differences. Elements of 
the Westminster system adopted in the Commonwealth Constitution 
included the vesting of formal executive power in the representative 
of the British monarch, the provision of both a popularly elected 
house and a house of review, and the appointment of ministers drawn 
from the parliament to administer departments of state. As in Britain, 
however, many of the Westminster practices were not recorded but 
simply assumed: for example, that the majority in the popular house
will form a government, select minsters, prime minister and cabinet, 
and that the head of state will, except under extraordinary 
circumstances, act on the advice of the ministry.
Major departures from the Westminster model, however, are the 
existence of a written constitution and the possibility of legislation 
being ruled unconstitutional by the High Court; and the federal 
system, represented in the Constitution by the division of powers 
between State and Commonwealth governments, and by the provision in 
the Senate for equal representation of States irrespective of 
population. The consequences of the federal system for environmental
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policy will be discussed later in this section. But first it is 
proposed to examine some of the implications of aspects of the 
Westminster system as it has evolved in Australia for the functioning 
of representative democracy, and in particular the extent to which 
the public can obtain information about government activities.
This is not to assume that a better informed public will 
necessarily bring about 'better' policies. The concern here is 
rather with identifying the locus of power, since a public which is 
better informed about government activity is likely, other things 
being equal, to demand policies which more closely reflect the will 
of the people. Whether such policies will be better in some sense - 
for example more optimal in their use of resources and less 
unnecessarily environmentally damaging - will depend on many other 
factors which shape public opinion and government policy. Nevertheless, 
a public better informed above government proposals and actions is 
one of the changes needed to bring about more environmentally 
sensitive policies.
In relation to restraints on public access to information three 
Westminster conventions are particularly relevant. These are: 
individual ministerial responsibility, ministers are responsible to 
parliament for the activities of their departments; cabinet 
solidarity and secrecy: ministers must support and take equal
responsibility for cabinet decisions, whatever their personal view 
of such decisions may be; and public service neutrality and 
anonymity, public servants must give full loyalty and impartial 
advice to any government, regardless of their own political beliefs, 
and their own views should not be seen to clash with those of the 
government.
The important questions are how these conventions relate to 
current practice, and what are their consequences for responsible 
government and public access to information. Their overall effect is 
clearly to consign large areas of information - cabinet proceedings, 
advice of departments to ministers - to secrecy. One view which was
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'argued at great length' before the Senate Standing Committee on 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs (SSCCLA) in its review of proposed 
freedom of information legislation was that 'the workings of the 
Westminster system are an almost total impediment to the legislation' 
(SSCCLA, 1979, p.25).
Such arguments give the preservation of the Westminster system 
unchanged an overriding priority, rather than balancing the likely 
public benefits and costs of proposed changes. A different view is 
that the conventions as stated above have been greatly modified in 
practice, and these changes are consistent with providing for greater 
freedom of information. It may be argued further, as did the SSCCLA, 
that freedom of information legislation would actually enhance the 
operation of the Westminster system, particularly in relation to 
individual ministerial responsibility (SSCCLA, 1979, p.44).
The convention of individual ministerial responsibility for 
departmental actions is becoming less realistic as the activities 
of government agencies increase in number and complexity, and together 
with other activities place increasing demands on ministers' time.
A recent study of Australian federal ministers at work concluded 
that 'the pressures on a minister's time mean that the horizons of 
many ministers are narrow, the schedules full and the details 
excessive' (Weller § Grattan, 1981, p.212). Nor do ministers always 
follow the traditional course of resigning when serious departmental 
deficiencies are exposed. The SSCCLA considered that greater freedom 
of information would revitalise ministerial responsibility because 
ministers would be required to answer for more of the activities of 
their departments (SSCCLA, 1979, p.43). But it is arguable that 
given the pressures on ministers, they should not have to spend even 
more time familiarising themselves with administrative detail. The 
RCAGA suggested in this context that the managerial responsibility of 
officials should be acknowledged and clarified, and procedures 
established to assess performance and to provide for accountability 
(RCAGA, 1976, pp.42,43).
Whether or not the fiction of full ministerial responsibility 
is maintained, greater freedom of information concerning departmental 
activities is likely to decrease the traditional anonymity of public 
servants. To some extent this has already happened - the views of
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some senior public servants, and sometimes their differences of 
opinion with government, are well known. (For example, the 
discussions of the Secretary of the Treasury, John Stone's economic 
views and his disagreements with the Prime Minister in NT 8-14.6.81 
p.3; 2-8.8.81 p.5 and elsewhere). If excessive power lies in the 
hands of the bureaucracy, and the links of accountability of 
departments to ministers and ministers to parliament have weakened, 
then it would seem desirable to open the public service to greater 
public scrutiny. The counterargument, however, is that for the 
public to be aware that public servants had expressed different 
views from their ministers would embarrass government, could lead to 
public servants being drawn into political debate, and would 
generally detract from the concept of a neutral public service 
willing to serve successive governments equally.
The first part of the argument, that it would be harmful for 
the public to be aware of the differing views of public servants and 
ministers, seems in itself to lack substance. The public would be 
able to make better informed judgements if it were aware of the 
options and the supporting arguments available to the minister, and 
bureaucratic awareness of the likelihood of such scrutiny could well 
enhance the quality of its advice. The main effect of secrecy here 
is to make life easier for government.
The second part of the argument, concerning the likely 
politicisation of the public service, has more substance. To quote 
the Public Service Board:
The concept of neutrality does not imply that public 
servants have no political views or associations.
Rather, it is concerned with the responsibility 
owed by a public servant to the government of the 
day, irrespective of its political complexion; 
impartial advice on policy options; and the whole­
hearted implementation of policy decisions made at 
the political level irrespective of whether they 
accord with the views of the officer (SSCCLA,
1979, p .45).
Reference was made in an earlier section to the problems of the 
1972-75 Commonwealth Labor government in overcoming the entrenched 
attitudes of sections of the public service derived from twenty- 
three years of Liberal-Country Party rule. If such opposition does 
occur, it may well be better to bring it before the public rather
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than tolerating subterranean resistance to the government's aims.
The Freedom of Information Act passed by the Commonwealth in 1982, 
while effectively leaning towards the traditional view concerning 
access to departmental documents, makes some concession to the 
public interest in such access. Internal working documents of 
government agencies are exempt from public disclosure if they would 
disclose advice obtained or the deliberative process of such agencies, 
where disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. The 
bottom line, however, is that it is the decision of the minister 
concerned whether such disclosure would be contrary to the public 
interest (s.36). There is appeal to a Document Review Tribunal on 
the question of public interest, but the opinion of the Tribunal is 
advisory only.
The second set of conventions which lead to secrecy are those 
of collective cabinet responsibility and solidarity. These, it is 
held, enable ministers to speak more freely in cabinet than if their 
views were to become known; they prevent the political damage to the 
government that would ensue if its internal differences were to be 
made public, and they promote the stability of cabinet government.
There is sometimes an odour of paternalism about the support for 
these conventions; for instance the view that ministers should be able 
'to meet together ... to seek the best and most appropriate solution 
and then to enunciate it with one voice ... so that the public is 
not ... confused' (Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, quoted in SSCCLA, 1979, p.37). Nevertheless, there have 
been many instances of public disagreements between ministers (e.g. 
see Solomon, 1976, pp.175-177). And much about cabinet proceedings 
and ministerial differences is leaked to the press by ministers with 
an axe to grind. Of course many matters discussed by cabinet must 
remain secret for valid reasons such as national security. But 
excluding such things it is a matter of judgement whether in the 
public interest the benefits of public knowledge of the advice on 
which cabinet decisions are based, or even of the differing opinions 
of ministers, would outweigh whatever political damage might be done 
to the government or any reduction in the frankness of cabinet 
discussion.
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The SSCCLA, however, failed to grasp this particular sacred 
cow by the horns, and recommended only that cabinet documents of a 
purely factual nature be made available. The Freedom of Information 
Bill did not take up even this recommendation, and exempts from 
public access submissions, official records, or documents disclosing 
deliberations or decisions of cabinet, other than documents which 
officially publish decisions (s.36).
The extent to which public access to information is available 
and the sources and strength of resistance to such access are 
indicators of the distribution of power in a political system, and 
adequate access is an important aid for environmental and other 
interest groups. It is therefore worth considering briefly the 
development and content of the proposed Commonwealth freedom of 
information legislation.
No Australian State has passed freedom of information legislation 
to date. The Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act 1982^ was ten years 
in the making. The Commonwealth Labor government, among various 
attempts to encourage more open government, in 1972 instructed an
f
interdepartmental committee to prepare proposals for freedom of 
information legislation. Almost two years later the Committee 
published a brief report which was criticised for the weakness of 
the proposed measures.
The LNCP government in 1976 reconvened the Committee, which 
produced a further report (Attorney-General's Department, 1976), 
most elements of which were incorporated in a Freedom of Information 
Bill published in 1978, which was again widely criticised. The Senate 
referred the Bill to the SSCCLA, which produced a report (SSCCLA, 1979) 
which exposed the inadequacy of the Bill, proposing 93 changes.
Prior to reintroduction of the Bill in Parliament, the 
government accepted only about one-third of the Committee's 
recommendations, and these did not include the most crucial substantive 
changes. Subsequently, however, in the Senate, a coalition of Labor,
Although not specifically referred to in the text, considerable 
assistance in reviewing the Commonwealth Bill was obtained from 
the following sources: Attorney-General, 1981; McMillan, 1980, 
1981; Bell, 1981.
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Australian Democrat and some government senators successfully 
supported a number of amendments, and the government introduced 
amendments of its own to prevent further dissension within its own 
ranks.
Although these changes greatly strengthened the Act, it still 
contains many restrictions on the provision of information. Some of 
these are as follows:
-24 statutory bodies are excluded from the scope of 
the Act. These include security organisations (e.g. the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation), agencies 
involved in commercial activities (the Australian Shipping 
Commission), industry consultative bodies (the National Labor 
Consultative Council) and industry financing or industry 
assistance bodies (the Australian Industry Development 
Corporation) (s.7).
-The Minister administering the Act may relax the requirements 
of the provision that an index of 'internal laws' be kept 
by an agency if complete compliance would 'unreasonably divert' 
its resources from other operations (s.9.6).
-The Act does not give access to documents in existence prior 
to commencement of the Act, except where these relate to 
the personal affairs of the applicant (s.12).
-An agency can refuse to provide information stored 'by 
computer (s.17) or where a request refers to all documents 
of a specified kind (s.24), if such requests would 'substantially 
and unreasonably' divert the resources of the agency.
-An agency has 60 days to notify an applicant of a decision 
on a request for information (s.19).
-An agency need only delete exempt material from a document 
so as to produce a non-exempt document if it is 'reasonably 
practicable' to do so, having regard to the nature and 
extent of the work involved' (s.22) and if the deletions do 
not make it misleading.
-The responsible Minister or principal officer of an agency, 
where the Minister has delegated this power, may issue a 
certificate conclusively exempting any document if its 
disclosure would be contrary to the public interest because 
it would damage national security, defence, international 
relations or Commonwealth/State relations; or because it 
would divulge material communicated in confidence by other 
countries or by the States to the Commonwealth (s.33).
-Submissions to Cabinet, official records of Cabinet, documents 
involving disclosure of deliberations or decisions of 
Cabinet other than documents which officially publish 
decisions, are all exempted from the Act (s.34). Similar 
provisions apply to Executive Council documents (s.35).
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-Internal working documents of agencies are exempted if they 
would disclose advice on the deliberative processes involved 
in agency functions and if such disclosure would be contrary 
to the public interest as interpreted by the Minister (s.36).
-Documents are exempt if secrecy provisions in other enactments 
apply to them (s.38). (There are some 290 such provisions in 
other Commonwealth legislation).
-Exemptions also apply where disclosure would:
•affect enforcement of the law and protection of 
public safety on several grounds (s.37);
•'have a substantial adverse effect on the financial or 
property interests of the Commonwealth or of an agency' 
(s.39);
•destroy or diminish the commercial value of information 
(s.43);
•be contrary to the public interest by having a substantial 
adverse effect on the government's ability to manage the 
economy or resulting in 'an undue disturbance to the 
ordinary course of business in the community' by giving 
premature knowledge of Government action (s.44);
•result in a breach of confidence (s.45);
•be in contempt of Court or Parliament (s.46).
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Some of the failings of the Act can be seen from the preceding 
paragraphs. There are too many grounds for exemption and these are 
often too broadly stated. Thus any decisionmaker bent on withholding 
information has a large number of possibilities to draw upon. There 
is also in some clauses a failure to provide that the countervailing 
criterion of the public interest should be considered. For example 
the exemption of documents where disclosure would diminish the 
commercial value of information (s.43) says nothing about the extent 
of such diminution, which might be extremely small, nor does it 
provide scope to take into account the public benefit which might 
arise from such disclosure.
The case for the blanket exemption of various organisations 
from the Act under s.7 is by no means obvious, since the extensive 
provisions in the Act for the exemption of various classes of 
information would seem to give more than adequate protection. The 
notification period of 60 days (s.19) is excessively long. A test 
carried out by the NSW Freedom of Information Council in 1981 showed 
that 21 out of 26 government departments were able to reply within
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30 days to requests (written as from members of the public) for 
information almost 20 years old (CT, 8.8.81). Under the US Freedom 
of Information Act requests must be determined within 10 working days 
except under certain exceptional circumstances.
Various aspects of decisionmaking under the Act are not subject 
to independent review, and are therefore left to ministerial or 
administrative discretion. For example, decisions made under the 
sweeping powers to conclusively exempt documents under ss.33, 34, 35 
and 36 are not subject to review by the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (s.58.3). The Document Review Tribunal may review the claim 
that a document is an exempt document under ss.33, 34 or 35 (s.58.4) 
or the claim that disclosure of documents under s.36 would be contrary 
to the public interest (s.58.5) but the Tribunal's findings are not 
binding on the appropriate minister, who needs only to have regard to 
them when making a decision.
The ten year gestation period of the Act, and its weaknesses, 
to a considerable extent reflect the power of the public service to 
further its own interests by delaying and diluting the proposed 
legislation. They are also in part a reflection of the concern of 
government not to lose its ultimate discretionary power over the 
release of information which might be damaging to its interests.
To quote the SSCCLA report once more:
Very often people have alleged that the Westminster 
system is under attack by freedom of information legislation 
when what is actually under attack is their own traditional 
and convenient way of doing things, immune from public gaze 
and scrutiny (SSCCLA, 1979, p.55).
The Constitution and environmental powers
The Australian Constitution gives specific powers to the 
Commonwealth, leaving the unexpressed residue to the States. In 
this way, the Constitution leaves to the States most direct powers 
over the environment and activities relevant to it such as land use, 
pollution control and mining. The Commonwealth government, however, 
has a number of powers which may be used to influence environmental 
matters. Opie (1976) classifies these powers into five groups: 
financial, regulatory, external affairs, executive, and sovereignty 
powers. Commonwealth powers in all these classes are subject to
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limitations which may reduce their effectiveness for environmental 
purposes. For example, taxation must not discriminate between 
States or parts of States (s.51(2)).
The Labor party has tended to be more centralist than the LNCP. 
During its three years in office the Whitlam Labor government exploited 
many areas of Commonwealth power much more fully than had been the case 
with previous governments. For instance, the Commonwealth has power 
under s.96 of the Constitution 'to grant financial assistance to any 
State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.'
Given the financial strength of the Commonwealth relative to the 
States arising from its controls over income taxation and loan raising, 
s.96 is a potentially powerful tool for imposing Commonwealth policies 
on Commonwealth-funded projects undertaken within the States. The 
Whitlam government used the power for this purpose. During its term 
of office the proportion of such tied or specific purpose grants rose 
from about 30 percent to over 50 percent of all Commonwealth payments 
to the States. In a number of cases the conditions imposed included 
the requirement that an EIS be prepared in conformity with the Common­
wealth Environment (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974-5. The Fraser LNCP 
government has, under its 'new Federalism' policy, reversed,the trend 
towards a higher proportion of tied grants.
The Commonwealth's regulatory power over trade and commerce 
featured in the Murphyores case (1976). The Commonwealth had 
instigated an inquiry under the Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974-5 into the environmental aspects of Commonwealth 
government decisions concerning the export of minerals from sand 
mining operations on Fraser Island, off the Queensland coast. The 
plaintiffs argued that the Minister for Minerals and Energy was not 
entitled to consider the Inquiry's report in determining whether to 
grant export approval under Regulation 9 of the Customs (Prohibited 
Exports) Regulations. The High Court found that given the trade and 
commerce powers of the Commonwealth government, the discretion vested 
in the Minister by Parliament could be exercised having regard to 
environmental matters. The decision was not centrally concerned with 
the validity of the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act. 
However, two members of the Court in passing pronounced the Act to be 
valid.
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The external affairs power under s.51 (29) has been interpreted 
by the High Court as allowing expansion of Commonwealth powers in 
implementing Australia's international treaty obligations. This was 
one of the grounds for the judgement in New South Nates v. Commonwealth 
(1975), giving the Commonwealth jurisdiction over the coastal sea and 
continental shelf, a decision of political and environmental importance. 
This power allowed the Commonwealth to declare a 36,000 square km. 
section of the Great Barrier Reef as a marine park (CT, 13.11.81) 
against the opposition of the Queensland State government.
The extent of Commonwealth executive powers over matters such 
as appropriation is unclear. From the AAV case (1975) and others, 
there appears to be considerable support for the view that the limits 
of executive powers coincide with those of legislative power. But as 
Crommelin and Evans (1977) point out in relation to the AAV case, this 
principle does not in itself provide a solution because of the 
differences concerning the limits of legislative power. Some support 
also emerged during that case for the view that there are certain 
national powers which arise from the Commonwealth's existence as a 
national government, rather than from any specific provisions of the 
Constitution; but again views differ as to the possible extent of such 
powers.
The Commonwealth has direct environmental powers over various 
geographical areas by virtue of its sovereignty over them. These areas 
include the Territories, the coastal sea and continental shelf, and 
land acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes. Finally, the 
relevance of the Commonwealth's defence power to some environmental 
matters should be mentioned. For example, defence is one of the 
powers called on in the Atomic Energy Amendment Act 1978. The 
practice demonstrated in that Act of listing a number of heads of 
Commonwealth power has been used in other recent Acts, apparently with 
the purpose of ensuring that if the Act is found to be invalid in some 
respects, it will remain valid in others (Whalan, 1977, p.297). The 
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 is a remarkable 
example of this approach. It makes reference (ss.6(l), 71(4)) to 
many of the sources of Commonwealth power discussed above, including 
the national power: 'appropriate to be established by the Australian
government, having regard to its status as a national government'
(s.6(l) (a)); and adds to these the Commonwealth's census and 
statistics and tourism powers.
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In addition to the above examples there are other powers which 
have been or could be used to achieve Commonwealth environmental 
purposes within the States. Nor has the High Court generally 
inhibited Commonwealth expansion in this area. Nevertheless the 
Constitution does create difficulties for a Commonwealth government 
bent on increasing its role in environmental management. While 
there are certainly areas where Commonwealth powers exist which 
might be more fully utilised, there are others where the 
Commonwealth might wish to act but does not have the power to do so. 
For instance, the Commonwealth was able to effectively prevent mining 
on Fraser Island because it had the power to prevent the export of 
the minerals obtained. Had the minerals found a market within 
Australia the Commonwealth would have had no jurisdiction.
As well as producing such anomalies the division of 
environmental powers under the Federal system creates other problems 
for environmental management. Competition between the States for 
development can lead to inadequate environmental review (e.g. see 
Davis, 1975). Where resources (such as the River Murray system) 
cross State boundaries agreement on adequate environmental measures 
can be difficult to achieve. Approaches to air and water pollution 
control have been fragmented. Strained relations between*, 
governments have at times decreased the effectiveness of environ­
mental management, as in 1974 when NSW refused to supply further 
information to a Commonwealth-funded study of the Botany Bay region 
(Butlin, 1976, Foreword).
In other instances an environmental asset within a State may 
be of national importance and yet the national government may have 
inadequate means of protecting it. This was ultimately the position 
in the Lake Pedder case (although the Commonwealth had missed earlier 
opportunities to act) where the Tasmanian government refused to 
accept an offer by the Australian government to provide finance to 
allow a moratorium on further flooding of the lake while additional 
investigations were undertaken.
As well as the problems arising from specific aspects of the 
division of powers, the very existence of a Federal system giving 
the States considerable powers has allowed politicians to appeal to 
parochial sentiments about States' rights. Although such appeals
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may be based on sincere beliefs, they are often called upon in support 
of policies based also on other considerations. This ploy has been used 
repeatedly in relation to environmental issues. In relation to the 
sections of the Barrier Reef Marine Park boundary which touched the low 
water mark, the Queensland Premier said ’we are not going to allow 80 
miles of that section of the coast to come under the control of somebody 
else' (CT, 13.11.81) and the Queensland Deputy Premier considered that 
the Great Barrier Reef is 'a State issue' (Age, 6.11.81). The main 
concern here was not just States' rights but that declaration of the 
marine park would prevent mining or drilling for oil within it. (See 
also note on p.152, concerning the July 1983 High Court decision on 
Constitutional powers.)
The Commonwealth EIA legislation
In June 1972 the Commonwealth LCP government, concerned at the 
vote-winning potential of the Labor Party's urban and environmental 
policies, and aware of increasing public interest in environmental 
issues, introduced a policy that EIS's should be prepared 'on 
environmentally important proposals being considered by cabinet' (Cass, 
1974). Under the Whitlam Labor government EIA legislation was 
proclaimed in December 1974, and the Administrative Procedures concerning 
the implementation of the Act were adopted in June 1975.
<
The Commonwealth Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals)
Act 1974-5 falls into three main parts. Sections 1-5 deal with 
definitions, the object of the Act, and the range of matters to 
which it applies. Sections 6-9 provide for the preparation of 
separate Administrative Procedures which contain the detailed 
requirements for EIA, and Sections 11-25 deal with the provisions 
for public environmental inquiries. Section 10 provides that any 
person may require the Minister to supply written information about 
what action has been taken or is proposed for ensuring consideration 
of the environmental aspects of matters to which the Act applies as 
defined in s.5.
The provision for separate Administrative Procedures allows 
greater flexibility, because these may be varied by order of the 
Governor-General (s.6.1) without undergoing the full process of 
parliamentary review required for legislative amendments. Any such 
order must be laid before each House of Parliament (s.7.1(c)) and
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either House may pass a resolution disallowing the order (s.7.3)).
The stated 'object* of the Act (s.5.1) is 'to ensure to the 
greatest extent that is practicable, that matters affecting the 
environment to a significant extent are fully examined and taken 
into account' in relation to a range of activities. The limited 
nature of this objective is noteworthy. There is no requirement 
that projects should be environmentally sound, or meet certain 
substantive environmental requirements; merely that the 
environmental consequences of proposed actions are fully considered. 
The 'environment' is defined as including 'all aspects of the 
surroundings of man, whether affecting him as an individual or in 
his social groupings', thus including the social as well as the 
physical environment.
The Act and Procedures, of course, apply only within the 
constitutional ambit of the Commonwealth Government. Within that 
ambit, however, the requirements were given the widest possible 
potential application, by specifying that the 'object' should 
apply to almost every conceivable type of government activity 
including proposals, works, agreements, arrangements, decisions, 
recommendations, and expenditure, where these are carried out by, 
on behalf of, or in conjunction with the Commonwealth Government, 
including specifically (s.5.2) 'matters of those kinds arising in 
relation to direct financial assistance granted, or proposed to be 
granted, to the States.'
Given such a broad range of potential application, one must 
look to the Procedures for detail as to the process of determining 
when an EIS is required, what it should contain, and how it is 
reviewed. (References to the Procedures here are made without 
prefix, references to the Act are preceded by s.). In simplified 
form, the main provisions of the Procedures are:
-A 'proposed action' is a matter referred to in s.5 of the 
Act (1.1).
-The Minister responsible for a proposed action (the action 
Minister ) designates the proponent (1.2.1). The proponent 
is generally the person or Department responsible for the 
execution of the proposed action.
-The proponent 'shall do all things necessary' to ensure that 
the Procedures are complied with before a proposed action is 
executed (1.3).
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-The proponent 'as soon as possible after a proposed action 
has been first formulated' (2.1) supplies to the Minister 
administering the Act (the administering Minister) 
preliminary information (as specified in 2.2) necessary 
for a decision as to whether an EIS is required.
-This information is reviewed by the Department administering 
the Act, which may either determine that an EIA is not necessary 
or refer the matter to the administering Minister, who then 
decides whether or not an EIS is required (3.1.1). In 
making such decisions the Department and the Minister are 
required to 'take into account' the likely results of the 
proposed action for various aspects of the environment 
specified in 3.1.2, for example whether it will have 'a 
substantial effect on the ecosystems of an area.’
-In deciding whether an EIS is required (3.3), or the 
matters with which it is to deal (4.4), the administering 
Minister or his Department may consult with any Commonwealth 
government agency, any State government or agency or any 
other person or body.
-An EIS is required to deal with certain matters 'to the 
extent appropriate in the circumstances of the case' (4.1). 
These are:
•the objectives of the proposed action;
•a description of the proposed action;
•the need for the proposed action;
•the consequences of not taking the proposed action;
•any 'feasible and prudent' alternatives to the proposed 
action;
•information and technical data adequate to permit 'a 
careful assessment' of the impact on the environment 
of the proposed action;
•a description of the environment that is likely to be 
affected by the proposed action and by the alternatives; 
•the potential impact on the environment of the proposed 
action and of the alternatives to the proposed action, 
including the primary, secondary, short-term, long-term, 
adverse and beneficial effects on the environment of the 
proposed action and of the alternatives;
•the reasons for the choice of the proposed action;
•the effectiveness of any safeguards for the protection of 
the environment to be applied in respect of the proposed 
action;
•any sources of information relied upon and any 
consultations during the preparation of the EIS.
-The proponent is to consult the Department concerning the nature 
and extent of the matters to be dealt with in the EIS (4.2); 
the Minister can, if necessary, determine the matters to be 
dealt with (4.3).
-The proponent may be required to provide a draft (as well 
as final) EIS (6.1). The Minister can determine whether the 
draft EIS is to be made available for public comment (6.2.3).
-The draft EIS must be made available for public comment for 
a period of at least 28 days (6.3.1).
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-A f i n a l  EIS i s  p r e p a r e d  by t h e  p roponen t  t o  t a k e  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  p u b l i c  and government  agency comment and i s  
s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  Department  f o r  e x a m in a t io n  
(8 .1  and 8 . 2 ) .
-The a d m i n i s t e r i n g  M i n i s t e r  may r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h a t  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  EIS (9 .2 )  b e f o r e  making 
t o  t h e  p r o p o n e n t  any 'comments , s u g g e s t i o n s  o r  recommendat ions 
t h o u g h t  n e c e s s a r y  o r  d e s i r a b l e  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t '  ( 9 . 3 ) .
-Each M i n i s t e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  e n s u re  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  EIS,  and 
any s u g g e s t i o n s  o r  recommendat ions made u n d e r  9 . 3 ,  a r e  
' t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t '  i n  m a t t e r s  t o  which t h e y  r e l a t e  ( 9 . 5 ) .
-The a d m i n i s t e r i n g  M i n i s t e r  o r  h i s  Departm ent  may r ev iew  and 
a s s e s s  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a s p e c t s  o f  a p r o p o s e d  a c t i o n  d u r in g  
o r  a f t e r  i t s  e x e c u t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  any 
s a f e g u a r d s  and t h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  f o r e c a s t s  o f  e n v i ro n m en ta l  
e f f e c t s  ( 1 0 . 1 ) .  They may t h e n  make comments and 
recom mendat ions  t o  t h e  p ro p o n en t  and t o  t h e  a c t i o n  M i n i s t e r  
c o n c e r n in g  any s a f e g u a r d s  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
env i ronm en t  ' t h a t  may be a b l e  t o  be a d o p te d  o r  a p p l i e d  . . . '
A wide range  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and M i n i s t e r i a l  d i s c r e t i o n  i s  
a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  P r o c e d u r e s .  The a d m i n i s t e r i n g  
M i n i s t e r ,  s u b j e c t  t o  v a r i o u s  m a t t e r s  t o  be ' t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t ' ,  may 
d e t e r m i n e  w h e th e r  an EIS i s  r e q u i r e d  ( 3 . 1 . 1 ( b )  and 3 . 1 . 3 ) ;  t h e  
m a t t e r s  t o  be d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t h e  EIS ( 4 . 3 ) ;  w h e t h e r  t h e  d r a f t  EIS i s
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t o  be  made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p u b l i c  comment ( 6 . 2 . 3 ) ;  w h e th e r  a p u b l i c  
i n q u i r y  s h o u ld  be c o n d u c te d  ( 7 . 2 ) ;  w h e th e r  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  
r e q u i r e d  ( 9 . 2 ) ;  w h e th e r  f u r t h e r  r ev i e w  i s  r e q u i r e d  a f t e r  e x e c u t i o n  
o f  t h e  p r o p o se d  a c t i o n  ( 1 0 . 1 ) ;  w h e th e r  a p r o p o s e d  a c t i o n  o r  c l a s s  o f  
p r o p o s e d  a c t i o n s  s h o u ld  be exempted from t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
p r o c e d u r e s  ( 1 1 . 4 ) ;  and w h e th e r  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  such  an exemption  
s h o u ld  be made p u b l i c  ( 1 1 . 5 ) .
I t  i s  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  o n ly  t h e  M i n i s t e r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
p r o p o s e d  a c t i o n ,  n o t  t h e  M i n i s t e r  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  t h e  A c t ,  can t r i g g e r  
t h e  P r o c e d u r e s  by n o m in a t i n g  t h e  p r o p o n e n t ;  and t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  
M i n i s t e r  need do n o t h i n g  more t h a n  e n s u r e  t h a t  any f i n a l  EIS o r  any 
s u g g e s t i o n s  o r  r ecom mendat ions  made in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i th  t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  
a r e  ' t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t '  ( s . 8  o f  t h e  A c t ) .  The d e c i s i o n  on w he the r  
and in  what form a p r o p o s a l  shou ld  p r o c e e d  r e m a in s  t h a t  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  
M i n i s t e r  ( s u b j e c t  t o  endorsem ent  by C a b in e t  i n  t h e  u s u a l  way) .
The p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  p u b l i c  i n q u i r y  a r e  m a in ly  embodied in  t h e  
Act  i t s e l f ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  some s u p p le m e n ta ry  R e g u l a t i o n s  and some
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reference in the Procedures. The administering Minister may direct 
a public inquiry (s.11.1) and appoint Commissioners (s.11.2) whether 
or not an EIS has been prepared. 7.1 and 7.2 of the Procedures 
require that the administering Minister, in deciding whether to 
direct an inquiry, should consider the action Minister's views and 
the significance of the environmental aspects of the proposed 
action. The Commissioners are not subject to direction by the 
Minister or government in the conduct of the inquiry (s.11.6). The 
inquiry must be held in public (s.14.1), except where the 
Commissioners decide that this is not in the public interest (s.14.2). 
Witnesses may be required to attend (ss.15,16). The Act does not 
directly require Ministers or government to do anything concerning 
the findings of a public inquiry.
The Act and Procedures create a framework for a flexible and 
discretionary process of obtaining and reviewing information about 
the environmental consequences of proposed actions. They provide 
guidelines concerning the information that should be provided as a 
basis for deciding whether an EIS is necessary, and the information 
that should be provided in the EIS itself. They designate those 
responsible for providing information and for making the various 
decisions required. They indicate who should be consulted and what 
matters should be considered when making certain decisions. But 
both procedural decisions as to whether and to what extent the 
procedures are to be applied, and substantive decisions as to 
whether proposals are to be modified as a result of information 
obtained about their environmental consequences, remain ultimately 
political decisions. The discretionary wording of the Act and 
Procedures, and the limitations on legal standing in Australia, make 
it unlikely that the Courts can be used to any great extent to 
dispute procedural or substantive decisions made under the Act.
This was a matter of deliberate design. Introducing the 
legislation, the Minister, Dr Moss Cass, said:
In developing the impact statement procedure we have 
noted difficulties that have accompanied its use in 
the United States. These have largely stemmed from 
mandatory requirements for statements and from 
procedures which result in too frequent a resort to 
the courts. We hope to avoid these difficulties, 
firstly, by making the impact statement requirement 
discretionary so that we can concentrate on the most
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significant proposals and, secondly, by incorporating 
the requirements into the normal process of 
governmental decisionmaking. (Parliamentary Debates,
26.11.74).
What then is to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act? 
The answer comes down to public and parliamentary pressure. The very 
existence of the Act allows the parliamentary opposition and pressure 
groups to argue that its provisions have not been followed in particular 
cases. The extent to which governments can ignore such arguments 
depends on both the extent of support for the protests and the strength 
of the government’s general position with the electorate. But even 
assuming that the government does comply with all the procedural 
requirements of the Act, is there any reason to suppose that the 
ultimate decisions which emerge will be substantially different? The 
argument here is that by providing for information to be obtained and 
placed before decisionmakers, they will become more aware of the adverse 
environmental consequences of their proposals and are therefore more 
likely to give a greater weight to such consequences in their decisions; 
and that providing information about the environmental consequences of 
decisions to the public will create greater public pressure on 
decisionmakers which will in turn influence their decisions.
Note: Constitutional powers and the 'dams case*
Although this thesis does not generally reach beyond the demise 
of the Fraser LNCP government in March 1983, the High Court's findings 
in July 1983 concerning the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission's 
proposal to dam the Gordon River are of such importance as to call for 
a brief comment. A four-three majority of the Court upheld on three 
constitutional grounds laws made by the Commonwealth government to 
prevent the flooding of parts of the south-west Tasmanian wilderness 
by the dam. These grounds were the external affairs power, s.51(29), 
based on which the Commonwealth had passed laws to implement its 
ratification of the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, under which the south-west Tasmanian 
wilderness has been declared a world heritage area; the 'corporations 
power', s.51(20), under which the Commonwealth had directed the 
Hydro-Electric Commission not to proceed with the dam; and the 'race' 
power, s.51(26), to make laws concerning 'the people of any race for 
whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws', based on which the 
Commonwealth said it was protecting archaeological sites of special
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significance to Aborigines. The Court's decision opened the 
possibility of very much greater Commonwealth intervention in areas 
previously left to the States.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter One it was suggested that the range of factors which 
form the 'environment' of policymaking are more influential in 
determining the character of public policy than is recognised in some 
accounts which focus on proximate actors and decisionmaking processes 
or other monodisciplinary explanations. It was noted that the term 
'environmental' variable is somewhat of a misnomer as such variables, 
as well as providing broad background conditions for policymaking, 
at times have quite specific and direct effects on policy. It was 
also argued that there is a need for a more holistic approach to 
explaining public policy which recognises the importance of the 
interrelationships between policy-influential variables, including 
the environmental variables. It was noted, however, that in dealing 
with the effects of such environmental variables, explanation must 
be largely indicative and interpretive in character. To demonstrate 
strict empirical linkage would require a far narrower focus^ , and 
the penalty would be the likely omission of significant explanatory 
factors.
Bearing these points in mind, this chapter has reviewed a number 
of the environmental variables in the Australian case and has 
indicated some of their more general implications for EIA policy.
Their effects will also be noted in more specific instances in 
subsequent chapters.
It was suggested that there are historical linkages between 
the physical environment, prevailing values, and some aspects of 
Australian institutions. Exploitative, pro-development and material­
istic attitudes were reinforced by the vast and largely harsh 
environment which settlers faced. Such attitudes are still prevalent, 
although not uniformly so, and they present obvious difficulties 
for the establishment and implementation of policies intended to ensure 
that the environmental consequences of decisions are taken into 
account. The physical environment has also helped determine the form
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of development, and therefore the types of impacts which occur; and 
it has played a part in shaping institutions relevant to environmental 
policy, including the division of powers under the Constitution.
Socio-economic conditions contributed to a climate in the 1970's 
at first favourable to increased environmental concern, but later 
decreasingly so. The long postwar economic boom had by the late 1960's 
created high levels of material welfare and job security for the 
majority, with an apparent future of continued improvement. It seemed 
that the country could afford to spend more on social welfare and 
environmental amenity, at a time when with material needs increasingly 
being met, there was a growing demand for non-material satisfactions. 
Conditions were therefore receptive for the growth in Australia of 
protest and other movements which were gaining ground overseas.
These included the environmental movement. Some unions, with 
alternative employment assured, placed green bans on developments 
thought environmentally undesirable. Environmental groups grew 
rapidly in number and membership. The Whit lam Labor government was 
elected on a platform emphasising social reforms. Its introduction 
of EIA legislation was supported by both major political parties.
Favourable economic conditions, the example of the environmental 
movement overseas, the success of the ALP, led by Whit lam, in inter­
preting the changing mood of much of the electorate - each contributed 
to the introduction of the Commonwealth EIA legislation.
By the mid-1970's conditions had changed. The economy was on 
the downturn and unemployment was rising. The Whit lam government was 
widely blamed for excessive spending and mismanagement. With 
unfavourable economic conditions and effective campaigning by the LNCP 
in Opposition, the Whitlam government's social and environmental 
programmes began to be seen as more than the country could afford, and 
with fewer alternatives, the losses to the economy and to employment 
of abandoning or delaying projects for environmental reasons assumed 
a greater importance, and unions were less likely to support 
environmental bans.
It was argued above that the Whitlam government received 
disproportionate blame for the worsening economic conditions; but 
nevertheless its commitments to its programmes of reform aggravated
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inflation and hampered its responses to the economic downturn. The 
government's increasingly poor performance in a number of areas and 
a series of wel1-publicised ministerial misdemeanours also greatly 
damaged its image and contributed to its loss of office.
Similarly, the Fraser government's responses to the economic 
downturn were coloured by political and ideological as well as economic 
considerations. It was argued above that its priority for attempting 
to bring about economic growth by reducing inflation at the expense 
of increasing unemployment, may have actually worsened the economic 
situation. The Fraser government's efforts to reduce public sector 
expenditure fell disproportionately on some sections of the 
Commonwealth public service. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
the area of environmental management was severely affected, and there 
was a considerable reduction in the extent of implementation of the 
EIA legislation. These outcomes, however, were not simply the result 
of more stringent economic policies, but were also due to the 
government's ideological commitment to reducing the role of the 
Commonwealth in relation to the States in a number of areas including 
environmental management and EIA, and to reducing the size of the 
public sector in favour of private enterprise. ,
Unfavourable economic conditions were thus an important factor 
in bringing about the poor record of implementation of the Commonwealth's 
EIA legislation. But as pointed out in Chapter Three, the effects 
of economic change on public policy are mediated through the political 
process, and will therefore vary with the political and other policy 
influences at work, including government responses and public 
perceptions of them. This was demonstrated by the differing responses 
of the Whitlam and Fraser governments to the economic downturn, reflect­
ing their different characteristics and ideologies. Similarly, each 
government's implementation of EIA was not just a function of changing 
economic circumstances, but an amalgam of factors including the 
Fraser government's lower priority for environmental matters and its 
views concerning the appropriate extent of Commonwealth government 
activity. The value priorities of the electorate were also important: 
the public support for the Fraser government, as well as reflecting 
disillusionment with the Whitlam government, signalled a willingness to 
abandon programmes of reform when it appeared that these would 
seriously conflict with the objective of economic growth.
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There were also many other factors involved in the poor implemen­
tation of the Commonwealth EIA legislation, including the strong 
resistance of most State governments and bureaucracies to the applica­
tion of Commonwealth EIA requirements within their boundaries, the 
resistance by many Commonwealth government agencies and private- 
sector developers to the EIA requirement; and also weaknesses in the 
EIA legislation itself which rendered it less effective. These and 
other influences will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
The discussion of technology and the CITCA Report demonstrated 
some significant attitudes to technology: the idea that Australia must
keep up with overseas technology, with its implied assumption that 
technology must be accepted as a whole, rather than selectively; the 
strong link believed to exist between technological change and 
economic growth, and the emphasis placed on achievement of economic 
growth in aggregate, without sufficient recognition that various 
patterns of technological change and economic growth are possible, 
some of which may be more beneficial than others; and the belief that 
future exhaustion of various non-renewable resources is not of great 
concern since technological change will replace them with others.
4The Report's conclusion that, in effect, little needed to be 
done to improve the assessment of new technologies, and its rejection 
of technology assessment legislation had an important negative 
influence on the prospects for more rigorous technology assessment.
Such a situation favours the interests of corporate and technological 
elites by leaving the control of technological change largely in their 
hands.
In Chapter Three it was suggested that the interactions of 
technology and society 'create a degree of directional inertia ... 
technological trends become institutionalised and are reflected in 
prevailing ideas and conventional wisdom, which in turn tend to main­
tain the course of technology'. The CITCA Report is a good example of 
this process in action. The Committee and its Secretariat were 
biased towards technologists in their composition and in their selec­
tion of inputs. The Report is as much a statement of attitudes and 
values as of conclusions based on detailed argument and evidence; as 
such its views tend to reflect those of the corporate and technological 
elites. The Report demonstrates the positive values which are often
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attached to technology as discussed in Chapter 3; and its findings 
largely reflect and support the existing relationship between 
technology and society: one where technological change takes place
with little assessment or control by government.
The prevalence of such views concerning technology, the momentum 
of technological change and its links with corporate welfare create 
difficulties for implementation of adequate EIA involving new technol- 
ogy, because of the pressures which they generate to bypass or dilute 
the EIA requirement. More generally, the Report illustrates some 
aspects of the linkages between values, mainstream technology, elites 
and the economic system which resist more rigorous evaluation of 
technological change or the pursuit of alternative patterns of 
technological and economic development.
The review of the relationship between the Westminster system of
government and public access to information about government activities
took up the discussion in Chapter Three concerning the relative
influence of ministers, public servants and the public on public policy.
That discussion advanced some reasons for the often tenuous and
uncertain link between public opinion and particular policies, and
for the strong influence of the public service on public policy. It
#
was argued that such influence is to a considerable extent shaped 
by the nature of the organisational environment of the public service, 
and is likely, among other characteristics, to embody considerable 
conservatism. In a subsequent section Chapter Three examined some of 
the characteristics of institutions and their relationships with those 
working within them which tend to lead to resistance to change.
The discussion in the present chapter of the extent of secrecy in 
Australian government and the limitations of the Freedom of Information 
Act further illustrates the latitude of governments and bureaucrats to 
take action free of public scrutiny. Such a situation increases the 
possibility of public policy being unduly influenced by sectional 
interests, such as those of elite groups with special access to 
government or those of the government or the bureaucracy themselves.
The limitations on public access to information pose some 
difficulties for the public's role in relation to EIA. It is important 
in order to ascertain both the need for EIA and the adequacy of EIA, 
that the public should have knowledge of proposed government actions
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and of the basis on which decisions are taken. With such knowledge, 
pressure for EIA can be initiated by the public before psychic and 
economic commitments to a proposal become too great. With increased 
access to internal government information, confirmation or otherwise 
can be more easily made of the sometimes misleading assertions, 
costings and environmental data provided in an EIS. And with better 
knowledge of governmental decisionmaking processes, the public can 
more easily ascertain whether the procedural steps required by EIA have 
been taken, and the environmental consequences considered, before 
final decisions are made.
The discussion of Commonwealth and State Constitutional powers 
indicated that the limits to the exercise of Commonwealth powers have 
not been just the result of boundaries imposed by the Constitution 
itself. They have also been due to the strong historical belief in 
States’ rights, coupled with a predominance of conservative Common­
wealth governments which have generally not wished to test the extent 
of their powers. As will be shown in the next chapter, the division of 
powers under the Constitution, with most direct environmental powers 
resting with the States, has generally had a conservative influence on 
EIA policy, with most States having weaker EIS requirements than those 
of the Commonwealth. A principal argument for a strong Commonwealth 
role in environmental matters is that where environmental assets are 
of national or international importance, such assets should be protected 
against State actions which may be biased towards more parochial 
considerations.
Finally in this chapter a brief review of the provisions of the 
Commonwealth EIA legislation has been given. Here again one sees the 
conservative influence of established institutions on some of the Act’s 
important characteristics, such as the extensive areas of ministerial 
discretion available in determining the Act's implementation and the 
consequent lack of scope for the public to bring the implementation of 
the Act before the courts for review. Such characteristics are shared 
by much Australian legislation. They reflect the Westminster 
principles, noted in Chapter Three, of ministerial responsibility and 
the accountability of public servants only through the accountability 
of ministers to cabinet and parliament. However, such provisions also 
embody the government's desire to retain political control over the 
implementation of the EIA requirement.
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CHAPTER FIVE: GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS AND THE 
COMMONWEALTH EIA LEGISLATION
I would prefer to deal with sandminers than 
with conservation groups. (K. Newman,
Minister for Environment, Housing and Community 
Development, quoted in Roddewig, 1978, p.138).
COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS AND EIA
The Whitlam Labor government came to power in 1972 on a 
platform of improving the quality of life, particularly in relation 
to urban services and social welfare. The main thrust of the Labor 
campaign had been directed to the less prosperous outer suburbs of 
the major cities, and it was there that Labor recorded large gains 
in the election. In office, Labor considered that it had a mandate 
to bring in rapid and extensive changes. In its three years in 
power, Labor introduced a national legal aid service, large increases 
in expenditure on education, abolition of university fees, a growth 
centres programme to relieve population pressure in existing cities, 
greatly increased assistance to the States for sewerage schemes and 
other urban improvements, Land Commissions to purchase and«.release 
land to stabilise residential land prices, universal tax-financed 
health insurance, Aboriginal land rights legislation, a Racial 
Discrimination Act, much greater provision of assistance to Aborigines, 
measures to define and preserve the national estate, increased 
financial assistance for conservation groups, Ombudsman legislation, 
funding of family planning clinics and women’s refuges. These were 
just some of the many changes. Whatever the limitations, faults or 
omissions in these programmes, they amounted to a major upheaval after 
the slow rate of innovation during the 23 preceding years of Federal 
Liberal-Country Party government.
Even in such a favourable climate for change, however, the 
implementation of the Commonwealth EIA legislation met with resistance 
within both the bureaucracy and the parliamentary executive of the 
government. The latter was exemplified in the dispute over sand mining 
on Fraser Island, off the Queensland coast, which led to a 
confrontation between the then Minister for Environment, Dr. Cass, 
and the Minister for Mines and Energy, Mr. Connor, backed by the
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Prime Minister. (The following is derived largely from Roddewig,
1978, pp.118-140, which gives detailed sources).
Fraser Island is reportedly the largest sand island in the 
world, with heavily forested dunes up to 235 metres high, and many 
beautiful and rare perched dune lakes. In November 1974 Connor 
notified the Prime Minister that he intended to approve export 
contracts for minerals from the Island. Connor did not notify Cass, 
but the Department of the Environment received a copy of the letter 
from the Prime Minister’s staff, and responded opposing export 
approval. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister wrote to Connor on the 
26th November 1974 agreeing to approval of the export contracts.
On December 11th 1974 the Commonwealth Environment Protection
(Impact of Proposals) Act was passed. The Act, however, did not
formally become law until given Royal Assent by the Governor-General
six days later. Connor approved the export contracts by telex on
13 December 1974, thus avoiding the decision being subject to the Act.
In February 1975 Dillingham^announced that it had export approval.
Cass said that he had not been informed that Connor had given formal
approval. In March 1975, after visiting Fraser Island, Cass
#announced an environmental inquiry under the Act into the mining and 
export of minerals from the Island.
The Urban Affairs Committee of Caucus (Caucus comprises all 
Labor members of Parliament) in April 1975 passed a motion calling for 
the suspension of the export permits pending completion of the inquiry. 
At a Cabinet meeting on the day before the matter was to be discussed 
at a full Caucus meeting, Connor threatened to resign if Cabinet 
supported a resolution by Cass that export permits should be deferred. 
Connor, backed by Whitlam, prevailed. At the subsequent Caucus meeting 
Cass' resolution failed by only one vote. In one sense it was a 
considerable achievement to lose by such a narrow margin against a 
Minister who had the Prime Minister's strong support. Shortly after­
wards, Cass was moved from the Environment portfolio to that of Media.
The Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974-5 
and Administrative Procedures were not introduced until late in the 
Labor government's term of office, leaving too short a period to fully 
evaluate Labor's implementation of them. Nevertheless, two major
The operator, D.M. Minerals, was a partnership of Dillingham 
Constructions Pty. Ltd. and Murphyores Inc. Pty. Ltd.
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public inquiries were instituted under the Act (none have since been 
held) , and in the six months after promulgation of the Procedures and 
before the fall of the Labor government, nine EIS's were directed 
(Calvert, 1978, Attachment 'D'). But the Fraser Island case shows that 
even in a government committed to social and environmental reform, 
conflicting interests create serious difficulties and place limitations 
on the implementation of environmental legislation even in the 
comparatively mild form embodied in the Commonwealth Act.
The Final Report of the Fraser Island Environmental Inquiry was 
issued in October 1976, and recommended that sandmining should only be 
allowed on a small portion of the Island's east coast beaches below the 
high water mark. Surprisingly to many, this recommendation was 
accepted by the Fraser LNCP government. There was some speculation 
that the Fraser Island decision was taken in order to offset to some 
extent the government's subsequent decision to proceed with the mining 
and export of uranium.
With some exceptions such as the Fraser Island decision, the 
Fraser government's record in environmental matters and in the implemen­
tation of EIA legislation was generally a poor one, as will clearly 
emerge from the following sections. Some reasons for the LNCP's low 
priority for environmental matters were noted in the previous chapter. 
Although aiming its electoral appeal more widely, the LNCP has strong 
links with the business community, and was therefore unlikely to be 
sympathetic to government measures which hamper business activities 
and to which the business community is hostile. Both the LNCP's 
economic policies and political philosophy supported reductions in the 
size of the public sector and in the degree of government intervention 
in the market economy and other areas of society. The LNCP government's 
'New Federalism' policy supported a greater degree of autonomy for the 
States. The adverse economic conditions in recent years have encouraged 
less stringent review of proposed developments. As will be shown later 
in this chapter, the LNCP's approach received substantial support from 
sections of the public service, where there was considerable resistance 
to the EIA requirement. All these factors contributed to a decreased 
role for the Commonwealth EIA legislation under the LNCP.
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The discussion will now turn to a review of the LNCP government’s 
implementation of the Commonwealth EIA legislation.
THE ADMINISTERING DEPARTMENT
The Commonwealth government's environmental functions were 
subject to an exceptional degree of destabilisation and devolution under 
the LNCP government. There were frequent changes of the responsible 
Minister and the environment portfolio was combined with a variety of 
others in a series of different Departments. There was a downgrading 
of the environmental function at the Federal level, reflected in 
severe and repeated staff and budget reductions and in the generally 
low ranking of Ministers responsible for the portfolio. Staff reduc­
tions and departmental changes led to a series of traumatic 
reorganisations, and there was continued uncertainty as to the 
government's intentions in the environmental area. The preceding 
points are demonstrated in the following chronological summary:
December 1970 LCP government establishes Office of 
Environment.
May 1971 Department of Environment, Aborigines and the 
Arts formed. <
December 1972 Newly elected Labor government creates
Department of Environment, Minister Dr. Cass.
June 1975 Cass moved to Media portfolio. Followed as
Minister for Environment in quick succession by 
Cairns, Whitlam and Berinson (the latter 
elevated from the backbench).
November 1975 Senator Carrick appointed Minister under LNCP
'caretaker' government.
December 1975 Under new LNCP government, Departments of
Environment, Urban and Regional Development, 
Tourism and Recreation and Housing wing of 
Housing and Construction amalgamated into 
Department of Environment, Housing and Community 
Development (EHCD) with Senator Greenwood as 
Minister. EHCD begins with 19 divisions, two 
special bureaux and a staff of 2256 including 
1156 on loan to the Australian Housing 
Corporation.
Jan.-April 1976 Reorganisation into 10 divisions, a Directorate
of Environment and a Studies Bureau. 125 staff 
redundant.
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Mid-1976 Following death of Greenwood, MacKellar Acting 
Minister and then Newman (from the backbench) 
appointed Minister.
Mid-1976 Staff ceiling reduced to 1780 and then to 1660. 
Most severe cut (almost 25%) of all Common­
wealth Depts. Continued uncertainty concerning 
government's policy and functional intentions 
for EHCD hampers reorganisation.
March 1977 Completion of transfer of 955 staff from former 
Australian Housing Corporation to Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs.
September 1976- 
June 1977
Reorganisation into seven divisions, a Studies 
Bureau and an Office of Environment Protection, 
with a total of 679 permanent staff.
December 1977 Responsibility for growth centres and 
decentralisation transferred from EHCD to 
new Department of National Development, under 
Newman. New Minister Groom appointed from 
backbench.
June 1978 EHCD permanent full-time staff 653. New ceiling 
of 500 set.
September 1978 Permanent Head of EHCD strongly protests staff 
cuts to Public Service Board in widely 
circulated letter {Age 5.9.1978).
November 1978 EHCD abolished. Environment function to 
Department of Science and Environment under 
Senator Webster.
December 1979 Thompson appointed Minister, Science and 
Environment.
November 1980 Environment function transferred to Department 
of Home Affairs and Environment under Ellicott.
February 1981 Ellicott resigns from Parliament. MacKellar 
temporarily appointed Minister of Home Affairs 
and Environment.
March 1981 Wilson appointed Minister of Home Affairs and 
Environment.
June 1982 McVeigh appointed Minister of Home Affairs and 
Environment.
(The preceding information was derived from -
1) Annual Reports, Departments of: Environment 1974/5, EHCD 1975/6,
1976/7, 1977/8, Science and Environment 1979/80, Home Affairs and 
Environment 1980/81;
2) Lloyd § Troy, 1981, pp. 235-256).
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Under the Labor government, the Department of Environment led a 
stable existence for most of its three years. Following the transfer 
of Cass to the Media portfolio , however, Environment had thirteen 
Ministers in less than seven years. Some of these changes were due to 
extraneous circumstances. Cairns was first demoted from Treasury to 
Environment, then dismissed by Whitlam for allegedly misleading the 
Parliament. Whitlam briefly took the portfolio while considering a 
successor. Greenwood died in office and MacKellar was temporarily 
appointed Minister after the resignation from Parliament of Ellicott. 
Even excluding these, however, the average tenure of Ministers after 
Cass was about nine months - far too short for Ministers to master the 
portfolio and provide stability and strong direction. Further, 
several Ministers had no previous ministerial experience and only two 
(Ellicott and Greenwood) had a reasonably high ministerial ranking.
Only one (Greenwood) was a member of the LNCP Cabinet while Environment 
Minister. Further, since ending its independent existence in December 
1975 the Environment portfolio was linked in turn with EHCD, Science 
and Environment, and Home Affairs and Environment, necessitating a 
series of reorganisations. EHCD in particular was in a constant state 
of flux.
#
The staff cuts sustained by EHCD were the most severe in the 
Federal public service. The ceiling of 500 staff set in June 1978 
represented less than half the level of 2% years earlier (excluding the 
1000-odd staff who were on loan to the Australian Housing Corporation 
at the earlier date). The continuing staff cuts, reorganisations and 
uncertainty were obviously detrimental to departmental morale and 
performance. Lloyd and Troy (1981, p. 255) wrote that: 'Throughout
its life, EHCD was pervaded with apprehension. Repeated reviews of 
programs and the pressure of staff ceilings created pessimism.' In a 
letter to the Acting Chairman of the Public Service Board, the 
Permanent Head of EHCD, Mr. Lansdown, said:
I realise the reductions which have already occurred and 
which may occur in the future reflect government priorities.
So now do most of the staff. Nobody wants to work for a 
dying institution. Morale is at rock bottom. Many have 
been sustained by the hope that things cannot get worse.
They have got worse and staff now expect them to worsen 
further. (Age, 5.9.1978).
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The latter expectation was correct, as in November 1978 EHCD 
was dismantled and its environmental functions transferred to the new 
Department of Science and the Environment.
Staff numbers employed in administration of the EIA Act have
declined considerably:
June 1975 Dept, of Environment, 25 officers in two
branches.
September 1978 EHCD, 30 officers within Environment 
Protection Division.
December 1978 Department of Science and the Environment,
24 officers within two branches.
February 1981 Department of Home Affairs and Environment, 
18 officers within one branch.
May 1982 Department of Home Affairs and Environment,
16 officers within one branch.
(Home Affairs and Environment, 1981; Anderson, 1982, p.2)
At the same time the number of EIS's directed has declined 
markedly since 1977/8 (Column D, Table 5.1). There has also been some 
decline in the total proposals examined (that is, notified to the 
administering department by other departments) and a considerable 
decline in the proportion of proposals considered environmentally 
significant and requiring further investigation (Column C), and there 
appears to be a decline in the proportion of total proposals subjected 
to the EIS requirement (Column E) although this trend is not clear.
There is no clear decline in the proportion of EIS’s directed on 
environmentally significant proposals (Column F).
Normally one might have expected increases in these variables 
in the first few years as government agencies grew accustomed to the 
requirements of the Act. There are several proximate reasons for the 
decline. The upheavals, staff cuts and uncertainty inflicted on the 
administering department, the frequent changes and low ranking of 
Ministers, have all contributed. Other factors, which will be discussed 
in subsequent sections, include the government’s ongoing review of the 
Act, and its desire to reduce the incidence of the Act on the States, 
a viewpoint supported by most of the States and the powerful mining 
lobby. There has also been a continued resistance by some government
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agencies to the Act, in the absence of a strong government commitment 
to its implementation and with the prospect of changes to the Act by 
the LNCP government.
Overall, BIS’s have been directed on only 1.16 percent of the 
total proposals examined, and this figure includes the large number 
of road proposals. The corresponding figure for the first five years 
of operation of the National Environment Protection Act in the U.S. 
was 3.5 percent (see Formby, 1981, p.222 for details) to the extent 
that the comparison is valid.
Five of the six EIS's revoked in 1975/6 related to road 
proposals. The Labor government had been concerned about the 
environmental and social costs of urban freeways, but the incoming 
LNCP government has effectively followed a policy of not concerning 
itself with such proposals under the Act.
Table 5.2 gives a classification of the types of proposal on 
which EIS’s have been directed. The figures reflect the uneven 
incidence of Commonwealth powers in environmental matters. The high 
proportion of mining EIS's reflect the Commonwealth's export powers; 
the low numbers of secondary industrial or land use EIS's result from 
the lack of Commonwealth power over such projects except in the 
Territories or where specific purpose Commonwealth funds are being 
used, as in road projects. The most significant aspect of the Table, 
however, is what it lacks; there have been no EIS's on programmes or 
policies, only on individual projects. Not only are programmes and 
policies likely in some cases to have effects of a magnitude beyond 
that of any discrete project, but the wording of the Act appears to be 
intended to encompass such decisions. Under s.5(l) the Act applies 
not only to works and other projects,but to the formulation of 
proposals, the negotiation, operation and enforcement of agreements 
and arrangements, the making of decisions and recommendations, and 
the incurring of expenditure.
Table 5.3 compares the percentage of proposals of various types 
examined over a ten month period compared with the percentage of EIS's 
directed in the same categories. The figures are not directly 
comparable since the EIS's were directed over a much longer period. 
Nevertheless the data indicate that there is no great disparity
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TABLE 5.2: EIS's DIRECTED UNDER THE COMMONWEALTH ACT
BY TYPE OF PROPOSAL 1975/6 TO 1981/2
Minerals 
Mines:
uranium 8
coal 6
iron ore 2
other 3 19
Aluminium:
alumina
refineries 2
aluminium
smelters 5 7
Oil, gas, shale:
exploration 1
development 4 5
Other: 2 2
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Transport
bridges, roads 11
dockyard
facilities 3
airports 3
other
Miscellaneous
Land Use
aerial gondola 1
tourist complex 2
residential
development 1
botanic gardens
extn. 1
crocodile farm 1
dam 1
Communications
radio facilities 1
telephone exchange 1
mail exchange 1
T.V. translator 1
telecommunications
tower 1 5
Timber Processing
woodchips 2
Pulp § paper mill 1_ 3
Power
generation 1
transmission 2_ 3
Military
dockyard facs. 1
training area 1
navigation
facility 1_ 3
Other 1_ 1
TOTAL 73
Source: Anderson, 1982 Attachment A.
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TABLE 5.3: PROPOSALS EXAMINED AND 
BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY
EIS's DIRECTED
Percentage of proposals Percentage of EIS'
July 1980 to April 1981 1975/6 to 1981/2
(N = 158) (N = 72)
Minerals 57.0 45.8
Transport 10.1 25.0
Miscellaneous
Land Use
17.7 9.7
Communications 6.3 6.9
Timber Processing 4.4 4.2
Power 0.0 4.2
Military 4.4 4.2
100.0 100.0
Sources: Anderson, 1982, Attachment A;
Home Affairs and Environment, 1981
between the types of action being notified and those on which EIS's 
are directed. It is not that EIS's were not being directed on policies 
and programmes, but rather that these were not being notified to the 
administering department.
It is worth noting that as well as the 158 proposals making up 
the above statistics, a further 593 proposals were listed for the same 
period. These were not identified individually, however. Many were 
included as departmental 'programmes'. These programmes consisted of 
lengthy lists largely composed of comparatively minor items. Thus the 
National Estate put forward 217 items, all of which one would expect 
to be environmentally unexceptionable. Defence similarly notified 82 
items, a few of which might require further review but would rarely 
have effects of a magnitude requiring an EIS. To such an extent the 
figures in Table 5.1 for the total proposals reviewed annually are 
inflated, and the proportion of EIS's directed to total proposals 
correspondingly reduced. Another large source of referrals was the 
Foreign Investment Board of Treasury; but these are apparently not 
regarded as referrals under the Act.
A breakdown by States and Territories of EIS's directed 
by the Commonwealth from 1975/6 to 1981/2 shows nothing very
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unexpected. The figures are: Queensland 15, New South Wales 13,
Western Australia 12, Australian Capital Territory,
Northern Territory, South Australia and Victoria each 7, Tasmania 4. 
Queensland, NSW and WA are high because of the preponderance of mineral 
developments there subject to export controls. The Territories are 
disproportionately high (in relation to population) because of the 
direct Commonwealth powers there, and the figure for Victoria seems 
rather low, even given its comparative lack of mineral developments.
It seems that no proposal has ever actually been abandoned as a 
result of an EIS (the Fraser Island decision was the result of a public 
inquiry) but the administering department has prepared a list of eight 
non-urban and twenty urban projects which have been modified as a 
result of environmental assessment (not necessarily an EIS) and a 
further list of nineteen projects modified as a result of 'comments 
received.' (Anderson, 1982, Attachments El, E2). Nevertheless, 
substantial deficiencies exist in the implementation of the Act, as 
will be illustrated further below.
A good understanding of the views of officials within the 
administering department concerning various aspects of implementation 
of the Act can be gained from the transcripts of evidence given to the
f
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and 
Conservation (reference, Environment Protection and Resource Management, 
1978-80) (HRSC).
The officials involved in the relevant testimony and their 
positions at the time of giving evidence were:
P.J. Crawford, Acting First Assistant Secretary (FAS), Commonwealth 
Department of Environment, Housing and Community 
Development (27.11.78);
R.G. Calvert, Acting FAS, EHCD, Environment Protection Division
(27.11.78) and Assistant Secretary, Proposals Assessment 
Branch, Department of Science and Environment (2.5.79);
H.G. Higgs, Director of Environment, Department of Science and 
Environment (2.5.79); and
G. Kelleher, Acting FAS, Environment Division, Department of Science 
and Environment (2.5.79).
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These were then the senior officials whose 
responsibilities were most relevant to the area under discussion.
In the following, for the sake of brevity the liberty has been taken 
of amalgamating and condensing question and answer into single 
statements. The page numbers noted are those of the Hansard transcript 
of the hearings (HRSC, 1978-9).
The Act's influence on the States:
-Criticism of the States for not having legislation 
equivalent to the Commonwealth Act has encouraged them 
to develop their own procedures and legislation.
-The Commonwealth brings a different aspect to some matters 
because it is dealing with problems throughout Australia 
which may not have arisen before in a particular State.
-The Commonwealth procedures emphasise public participation 
more than the States and this has encouraged the States to 
improve in this respect.
-It is 'a distinct possibility' that without Commonwealth 
legislation, particularly in Western Australia and Queensland 
where the mining industry is very active, there would be a 
tendency for competition to lead to less stringent 
environmental conditions (Calvert, p.240).
Ways in which the Commonwealth may become involved in 
assessment within the States:
-If seeking Commonwealth funds, the States normally inform 
the Department administering the Act.
-If Commonwealth involvement was not recognised initially, 
it may be that the States' environmental assessment will 
satisfy the Commonwealth action Minister, who is responsible 
for deciding whether or not to trigger the Commonwealth 
procedures (Calvert, p.254 and p.1020).
Commonwealth-State arrangements:
-Written arrangements have been agreed with five States 
concerning the procedures for Commonwealth-State cooperation. 
There would be no difficulty in incorporating these in 
legislation (Higgs, p.1029).
The Act and Commonwealth government departments:
-It is a long slow process of education and familiarisation 
to make other areas of government sensitive to environmental 
policy (Crawford, p.249).
-The Act is generally accepted in the project area but not in 
its wider applications. Departments which accept the Act at 
project level may be reluctant to do so in wider policy 
areas (Calvert, p.249).
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-There is a tendency to think the Act applies to the 
natural environment and there is not enough emphasis 
on social effects (Calvert, p.249).
-Opposition by departments to the Act is due to attitudes 
towards environmental protection, dislike of another 
department intruding into their affairs and uncertainty 
as to the resources required (Higgs, p.1016).
-Dialogue between the administering department and other 
departments has been initiated by both sides. The main 
problem has been the question of what is environmentally 
significant under the Act. In five cases memoranda of 
understanding formalising the resultant agreement have 
been completed. The number is small because the Act has 
been under review and departments are reluctant to commit 
resources when the basic rules may change (Calvert, p.1017).
-[Treasury initially refused to make a submission to the 
Standing Committee because they considered their 
departmental involvement with the Act insignificant]. From 
the administering department’s viewpoint, however, Treasury 
involvement has not necessarily been insignificant, with 
110 proposals referred informally (i.e. not under the Act) 
to the administering department in 1978/9 (Calvert, p.1023).
-[The Department of Trade and Resources also initially felt it 
inappropriate to make a submission to the Committee (p.1023), 
although it later did so]. The Act has been formally 
invoked by the Minister for Trade and Resources in relation 
to mining activities which require export approval, and in 
relation to uranium mining which requires other Commonwealth 
approvals as well. Seven such proposals were referred in 
1978/9. The administering department is not in a position, 
in such cases, 'to see what is going on and to say that more 
proposals should have come forward' (Calvert, p.1024).
-Although there were a number of areas of the activities of the 
Department of National Development to which the Act could be 
applied (oil drilling, energy projects) no proposals had been 
submitted in 1978/9 (Higgs, Kelleher, Calvert, pp.1025, 1026).
The low proportion of EIS's to referrals:
-Staff levels are not an important influence on this. There are 
a host of other factors, for example the areas where the Act is 
not being applied [e.g. to policies, as mentioned earlier] 
(Calvert, p.253).
Responsibility for triggering the procedures:
-If the administering minister [as well as the action minister 
as at present] had the power to trigger the procedures, the 
potential exists for the Act to be invoked for a greater number 
of proposals (Higgs, p.1030).
-If the triggering process had been changed in the above way this 
would probably not have meant more EIS's were directed. However, 
it may have triggered more information about proposals, 
depending on the administering minister (Calvert, p.1030).
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-The aim of the Act is to encourage ministers and 
bureaucrats to take environmental factors into 
account as a matter of course in decisionmaking. It 
is therefore appropriate that the action minister should 
have a formal responsibility for triggering the 
procedures. This might not prove effective in some cases 
but in the long term it should have an educative role 
(Kelleher, p.1031).
Legal standing and costs:
-Exception would not be taken to the proposals of the Law 
Reform Commission to expand the rights of standing. But 
ultimately environmental standards reflect community 
standards. It is probably up to ministers - they usually 
reflect community interests - to make decisions in that 
regard (Higgs, p.1034).
-In environmental cases costs should not be awarded but 
borne by the individual litigants (Higgs, p.1034).
Public requests for information:
-Ministerial responses to public requests for information 
have not been made 'promptly' as required under s.10 of 
the Act. The problem is that the administering minister 
has to obtain information from other ministers (Calvert, 
p .257).
The review of the Act:
l
-The review is probably the result of pressure from industry, 
States and Commonwealth government departments; and when the 
present government was elected it wished to review the 
legislation as a matter of course (Higgs, p.1011).
-The review began in early 1976 and is being carried out by 
Cabinet (Calvert, p.251).
-The cooperative arrangements with the States and the 
memoranda of understanding with some departments are a 
result of the review process (Calvert, p.250).
The mining industry:
-Of all industries the mining industry feels most strongly 
that the Federal Government should not be in this type of 
operation [EIA]. Its main concerns seem to have stemmed 
from the Fraser Island situation [where mineral sand mining 
was prohibited] (Higgs, p.1011).
-Many of the mining industry's products are exported which is 
where the constitutional power of the Commonwealth may become 
involved. It might be a matter of statistics which has 
generated the opposition in that industry because more of 
its projects are affected by the Act (Kelleher, p.1011).
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Consultants:
-The use of consultants to prepare EIA does not support the 
purpose of the Act in trying to cause those responsible for 
development proposals to take environmental factors into 
account. The consultant may have a lesser chance of 
influencing the ultimate shape of the project than if those 
responsible for it actually do the impact statement 
(Calvert, p. 256).
-If the proponents pass the responsibility for the EIS onto a 
consultant they may never develop the expertise themselves 
(Crawford, p. 256).
The above evidence, although couched in careful language, 
indicates a number of areas where considerable difficulties have been 
met in implementing the Act, because of resistances to it and because 
of weaknesses (from the point of view of obtaining fuller 
implementation) in the Act itself.
The evidence indicates that the Commonwealth has not received
notification from the States concerning proposals which should be
reviewed under the Act as often as it should have; that the Act has
/
not been accepted as applying to policy areas; that impacts on the 
social environment tend to be neglected; that there is considerable 
opposition by some government departments to the Act; that some 
proposals have not been notified under the Act by departments when 
they should have been (including one department with activities to 
which the Act would obviously apply which had not notified any 
proposals); that the administering department is not in a position 
to ascertain the extent of such omissions, nor has the action 
minister power to trigger the procedures, a power likely to have 
triggered more information about proposals; and that, in part because 
the Act was under review, other departments were reluctant to develop 
agreement as to its application within the administering department. 
Given the inevitable understatement, this is a formidable array of 
problems.
The convention of secrecy concerning the internal operations of 
government conceals the basis for decisions made under the Act and
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Procedures, for example how it is decided whether an EIS is required, 
whether the EIS is adequate and whether and under what conditions a 
proposal should proceed. However, some internal government documents 
concerning the 'Iwasaki case' became available to the writer 
(confidential note 5.1).^ These, together with other information 
concerning the case, provide a disturbing demonstration of the extent 
to which the government was prepared to shortcut or ignore both the 
administrative steps and the substantive requirements for the content 
of an EIS set out in the Procedures.
Iwasaki Sangyo (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. in April 1978 submitted to 
the Foreign Investment Review Board a proposal to develop a large 
international tourist resort on the central Queensland coast at 
Yeppoon. The resort would occupy 7,500 hectares and accommodate an 
ultimate tourist population of 22,000.
The EHCD's report (EHCD, undated) to the Minister on the draft 
EIS for the project noted, among others, the following inadequacies:
-Description of marine and terrestrial fauna, and 
surface and underground hydrological characteristics, 
are not adequate for detailed assessment purposes (p. 5).
-Control measures for insect pests are not identified or 
evaluated (p. 5) [the site is adjacent to tropical 
swamplands].
-Further fieldwork is necessary to evaluate finer scale 
detail necessary for the development of management plans 
for the total wetland (p. 6).
-The draft EIS provides only general information on 
aquifers found on the resort site and does not identify 
in any detail the possible consequences of resort 
development proceeding (p. 7).
In a few cases where it is necessary that the source of material 
should remain confidential the source has been included in a 
confidential Appendix which will be available only to the examiners 
of this thesis.
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-The feasibility and environmental acceptability of the 
proponent's essentially conceptual response to the complex 
drainage and sewage disposal issues posed by the site is a 
major area of concern (p.8).
-Alternatives to the proposed stormwater system should be 
considered also. The proposed system together with the 
proposed construction levels [height above sea level]
'gives rise to concern' about fundamental alterations of 
the drainage pattern (p.9).
-Resort stormwater runoffs could contain high concentrations 
of pollutants, and various treatment measures 'merit 
examination' (pp.10, 11).
-The draft EIS does not effectively substantiate the 
assumptions underlying solid waste generation, or include 
any detail of anticipated composition Cp-11).
-The effects of resort-generated traffic movements on 
conservation, noise, dust, community severance, burden of 
cost and other issues are not discussed (p.14).
-As the availability of airport infrastructure represents 
a major potential constraint to the successful operation 
of the resort in the scale projected in the future, the 
attention paid to this matter is 'undesirably limited'
(p.13).
-The population projections given are 'open to question in 
a number of respects' (p.14).
-There is no attempt to assess the social and cultural 
consequences of increasing numbers of foreign nationals 
coming into contact with the existing resident population 
(P-14).
-The economic benefits presented are the maximum benefits 
which may be derived. There is no cost/benefit assessment 
(p.15) .
-No survey of archaeological sites was made.
The preceding comments by no means exhaust the possibilities, 
however. The following is a selection of public comments and the 
proponent's replies (EHCD, undated, part D) .
Comment: Comment was received that the EIS failed to comply with
the procedures under the Act in that alternatives were 
not considered, detailed plans were unavailable and that 
treatment of environmental issues was inadequate.
Reply: The draft EIS was in the nature of an assessment of a
conceptual plan. Detailed environmental considerations 
will need to be examined under the provisions of Queensland 
legislation. Nevertheless, the document provided a broad 
environmental assessment of the tourist resort proposal 
sufficient to permit a government decision in principle 
to be made (p.16).
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Comment: A large body of comments criticised the need for future 
studies, asserting that no decision should be made until 
the results of these are available.
Reply: These comments failed to take into account the nature of the 
exercise and the need by the proponent to commit large funds 
to complete further studies and investigations, which, 
without prior Government commitment in principle, could not 
reasonably be expected (p.16).
Comment: A number of comments dealt with the minimal setback 
restrictions for building at the shore line and suggested 
further investigations to ensure beach and dune protection.
Reply: Most of these points were well made and point to the need 
for extreme care in developing the project (p.16).
Comment: Comments pointed to the "free-hand" provided to the 
proponent by the downgrading of State laws and statutes.
Reply: Advice was received that the Company would be severely 
restricted in its mode of operation by the imposition of 
the provisions of the International Tourist Centre Agreement 
Act in addition to other normal State regulatory measures 
(P-17)•
Comment: Many noted that the proposed location of the International 
Village complex and the marine park would conflict with the 
preservation of mangrove and other wetland habitats.
Reply: This comment appears to be a valid one and suggests that 
serious consideration be given by the proponent when 
detailed plans are prepared to moving the Village and Park 
southwards to a higher and a less environmentally sensitive 
location (p.17).
Comment: Many comments pointed to the lack of details regarding future 
insect pest control, a matter of considerable importance to 
the future resort operation.
Reply: It is acknowledged that this matter is one of some 
environmental sensitivity and concern. Additional in-depth 
investigation will need to be undertaken before an acceptable 
solution can be achieved (p.17).
Some comments from government agencies (EHCD, undated, Part E) were 
as follows:
Department of Foreign Affairs
The Department expressed concern about the social 
consequences of the development, particularly those 
associated with the establishment of a predominantly 
Japanese enclave in the Yeppoon area (p.20).
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Department of Primary Industry
The Department expressed concern about the environmental 
consequences of the resort proposal with respect to the 
marine nurseries of Fishing Creek and Corio Bay. In 
particular, it recommended consideration of relocating the 
International Village and the Marine Park southwards, 
further assessment of drainage and sewage effluent impacts 
on Fishing Creek, and elaboration of proposed methods of 
controlling insect pests (p.20).
Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service
The ANPWS listed in detail the shortcomings of the 
draft EIS in terms of inadequate presentation and 
information, faulty assumptions, internal inconsistencies, 
poor interpretation or evaluation of material and lack of 
consideration of alternatives. The Service suggested 
reappraisal of the concept plan, further detailed 
investigations of hydrology, drainage, waste disposal and 
pest control measures, and expressed concern about the 
operation of wildlife and marine exhibitions and the 
introduction of exotic plants into Australia (p.20).
Australian Heritage Commission
The Commission advised that its assessment panel was 
considering the nomination of the Corio Bay/Fishing Creek 
area for inclusion in the Register of the National Estate. 
Formal consideration of the panel's recommendations to the 
Commission would take place later in the year. Substantial 
modification to the resort concept plan and operation of 
the resort would be required if the area nominated is 
afforded conservation status.
The Commission comments that the EIS represents a 
feasibility study identifying "constraints to 
environmental modification" producing "recommended 
management options". It refers to inconsistencies and 
factual errors in the report, confusing presentation and 
inadequate quantitative data on many issues.
The Commission questions the whole water management 
strategy, the location of the International Village and 
the adequacy of development setbacks from the beach. The 
absence of any consideration of visual impacts, and the 
discussion of pest control, construction waste disposal 
and construction impact is criticised.
The Commission takes issue with the conclusion of the 
draft EIS that the site "offers little in terms of 
conservation, scientific, social or economic value"
(pp.20, 21).
The EHCD itself concluded (pp.21, 22):
The draft EIS is in the nature of a feasibility study of a 
conceptual plan prepared for a proposed tourist resort 
development. The term "environmental impact statement" 
is therefore something of a misnomer. The document
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presents few details of environmentally significant 
matters that will need to be examined before the resort 
development can proceed and highlights the need for 
further engineering and environmental studies and 
investigations.
In terms of satisfying the Administrative Procedures 
under the Impact of Proposals Act, the EIS is considered 
to be deficient with respect to three items under 
paragraph 4.1 of the procedures. These are:
-insufficient information to permit a careful 
assessment of the impact of the proposal
-difficulty in assessing the short-term,long-term, 
beneficial and adverse effects on the environment 
of the proposed action
-inability to assess the effectiveness of any 
safeguards and standards for the protection of the 
environment.
Since no firm proposal has at this stage been submitted, 
the draft EIS does not form a satisfactory basis for 
considering the environmental aspects of the Commonwealth 
decision on foreign investment approval for the Iwasaki 
Sangyo proposal (italics added)„
In an amazing about-turn, however, the EHCD report then 
went on to recommend that:
f
The Treasurer be advised that Iwasaki Sangyo (Aust.) Pty.
Ltd. has satisfied the requirements of the Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act with respect to its 
proposal to establish a Tourist/Recreation Resort on the 
central Queensland coast at Yeppoon on the condition that 
satisfactory assurances are obtained from the Queensland 
Government regarding its responsibility for continuing 
environmental monitoring of the proposed development 
(p.24, original italics).
Yet the preceding conclusions had clearly stated that the EIS 
did not satisfy the requirements of the Act and Procedures. One can 
only conclude that EHCD was under considerable pressure to recommend 
in favour of the project. Further, not only did the government fail 
to require an EIS which met the substantive requirements of the 
Procedures, it also failed to meet the procedural requirements. The 
following is a diary of the main events, derived from Australian 
Conservation Foundation Inc. v. The Commonwealth of Australia and 
Others, 1979; Australian Conservation Foundation, 1978; and EHCD, 
undated.
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1 3 . 1 . 7 8
2 7 . 4 . 7 8
2 4 . 5 . 7 8
2 0 . 6 . 7 8
5 . 7 . 7 8
2 0 . 7 . 7 8
2 6 . 7 . 7 8
2 6 . 7 . 7 8
2 7 . 7 . 7 8
3 0 . 7 . 7 8
9 . 8 . 7 8
2 9 . 8 . 7 8
1 1 . 9 . 7 8
M i n i s t e r  f o r  EHCD d i r e c t e d  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  EIS.
Iw asak i  s u b m i t t e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t  
a p p r o v a l  t o  Commonwealth Government .
Q ueens land  Government  p a s s e d  t h e  Queens land  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
T o u r i s t  C e n t r e  Agreement  Act  1978 a u t h o r i s i n g  t h e  p r o j e c t .
D r a f t  EIS p u b l i s h e d .
F e d e r a l  C a b i n e t  approved  t h e  p r o j e c t  s u b j e c t  t o  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c l e a r a n c e s .
End o f  p e r i o d  a l l o w e d  f o r  p u b l i c  comment on d r a f t  EIS.
P r o j e c t  g iv en  ' e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c l e a r a n c e '  by A c t in g  
M i n i s t e r  f o r  EHCD.
A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s e r v a t i o n  F o u n d a t io n  (ACF) w ro te  t o  t h e  
M i n i s t e r  r e q u i r i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  p u r s u a n t  t o  s . 1 0  o f  t h e  
E n v i ro n m e n ta l  P r o t e c t i o n  ( Im pact  o f  P r o p o s a l s )  Act .
E x p i ry  o f  90 day p e r i o d  a l l o w e d  f o r  e x a m in a t io n  o f  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t m e n t  p r o p o s a l s .
The T r e a s u r e r  announced government  a p p r o v a l  f o r  t h e  
p r o j e c t  t o  p r o c e e d .
ACF a g a in  w ro te  t o  M i n i s t e r  f o r  EHCD r e q u i r i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
' F i n a l  EIS '  made a v a i l a b l e .
M i n i s t e r  f o r  EHCD r e p l i e d  t o  ACF.
Two c l e a r  b r e a c h e s  o f  t h e  Act and A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  P r o c e d u r e s  a r e  
a p p a r e n t  h e r e .  The G overnm en t ' s  a p p r o v a l  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t '  t o  p r o c e e d  
announced  by t h e  T r e a s u r e r  on 3 0 . 7 . 7 8  was made b e f o r e  t h e  f i n a l  EIS 
was a v a i l a b l e  on 2 9 . 8 . 7 8 .  S e c t i o n  8 o f  t h e  Act  r e q u i r e s  t h a t :
Each M i n i s t e r  s h a l l  g i v e  a l l  such d i r e c t i o n s  and do a l l  
such t h i n g s  a s ,  c o n s i s t e n t l y  w i th  any r e l e v a n t  laws as  
a f f e c t e d  by r e g u l a t i o n s  u n d e r  t h i s  A c t ,  can be g iv e n  o r  
done by him -
(a)  f o r  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  t h e  t im e  b e in g  approved  
u n d e r  t h i s  Act a r e  g iv e n  e f f e c t  t o  i n  and i n  connex ion
w i t h  m a t t e r s  d e a l t  w i t h  by t h e  Depar tm ent  a d m i n i s t e r e d  by 
him . . .
(b) f o r  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  any f i n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impact  
s t a t e m e n t  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h o s e  p r o c e d u r e s  
and any s u g g e s t i o n s  o r  r ecom menda t ions  made i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i th  t h o s e  p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c co u n t  i n  m a t t e r s  
t o  which t h e y  r e l a t e  . . .
S e c t i o n  9 .5  o f  t h e  P r o c e d u r e s  r e p e a t s  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  s . 8 ( b )  o f  
t h e  A c t .  C l e a r l y  t h e  Government  c o u ld  n o t  have t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  a 
document which d i d  n o t  e x i s t  when t h e  d e c i s i o n  was made.
The M i n i s t e r ' s  d e l a y  o f  o v e r  s i x  weeks in  r e p l y i n g  t o  t h e  ACF 
a l s o  a p p e a r s  t o  have been i n  b r e a c h  o f  t h e  Ac t .  S e c t i o n  10 s t a t e s :
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In respect of a particular matter of a kind referred to 
in any of the paragraphs of section 5, any person may, 
by notice in writing, require the Minister to inform 
him in writing as to what action, if any, has been 
taken,, or is proposed, for ensuring consideration of 
the environmental aspects of the matter, and the 
Minister shall promptly [ italics added ] inform the 
person in writing accordingly.
The ACF took the Government to the High Court for these and 
other alleged breaches of the Act and Procedures, but the Court ruled 
that the ACF did not have legal standing in the matter. The finding 
was a significant one because it demonstrated that as well as the great 
degree of ministerial and administrative discretion which is written 
into Act and Procedures, even where these are breached there is little 
that public interest groups can do by way of legal action to enforce 
adherence to them.
As well as the above, there were a number of other actions by
government in the Iwasaki case which were at least questionable in
terms of the Act or the Procedures. The Queensland Government passed
a law authorising the project well before the draft EIS required by
the Commonwealth was available. This was a demonstration of the
commonly encountered disjunction between Commonwealth and State
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decisionmaking procedures as well as of the laxity of Queensland 
procedures in environmental assessment. The approval of the project 
by Federal Cabinet subject to environmental clearances prior to the 
end of the period allowed for public comment on the EIS is questionable 
in terms of the spirit, if not the letter of the Procedures. It 
would seem more commensurate with the object of taking environmental 
factors into account if the decision were made when all relevant 
considerations, including environmental ones, could be considered 
simultaneously. The ’subject to environmental clearances’ format 
smacks somewhat of a government having already made up its mind.
By giving priority to the requirement that a decision be made 
within the 90 days allowed for examination of foreign investment 
proposals, the Government effectively overrode the provisions of the 
Act and Procedures. If such practices were to become customary all 
sorts of rules and procedures could be invoked to cut short the impact 
assessment process. There is also no provision in the Act or 
Procedures for an 'environmental clearance' to be given by the Minister 
administering the Act. The Minister may only make 'comments, 
suggesfi°ns or recommendations' (9.3, Procedures) after examining the
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final EIS.
It may also be argued (as did the ACF in its Statement of 
Claim to the High Court) that not only were the draft and final EIS's 
deficient in terms of the substantive requirements of the Act and 
Procedures, as discussed earlier, but that because of these deficiencies, 
they did not constitute draft and final EIS's within the meaning 
pursuant to the Act and Procedures.
The Iwasaki episode marked a new low in the administration of 
the Commonwealth Act. It showed the extent to which government is 
able to avoid or subvert the requirements of the Act when it so wishes.
OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Commonwealth Government agencies display a variety of attitudes 
towards the Act, and there is clearly a core of resistance to its 
implementation. This may be illustrated from the responses of 
government agencies to the HRSC Inquiry. Nine such agencies made 
written or verbal submissions to the Committee concerning the Act.
These submissions were made in mid-1979, when agencies had had four 
years in which to become familiar with EIA requirements as set out in 
the Act and Procedures. ,
The Departments of Housing and Construction, Capital Territory, 
Transport, and Defence supported the Act and appeared to have established 
good working relationships with the (then) Department of Science and 
Environment in implementing the requirements of the Act. (HRSC, 1979, 
pp.17-21; HRSC, Hansard, pp.1070-1093 and 1296-1332). The Departments 
of Treasury, Trade and Resources, National Development, and Finance on 
the other hand, either wished to see substantial changes to the Act, or 
appeared not to be conforming fully to the requirements of the Act, or 
both. The National Capital Development Commission (NCDC) fell between 
these two groups, having shown reasonable compliance with the Act, but 
suggesting the value of alternative procedures and seeking greater 
flexibility in the implementation of the Act.
The NCDC in its submission made a distinction between EIA, which 
it carries out on 'all Commission proposals considered to have a 
significant impact on the environment' (NCDC, 1979, p.l) and the 
preparation and review of EIS's, only six of which had been carried out 
by the NCDC at that time. The NCDC's argument in favour of greater
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flexibility in achieving the objectives of the Act arose from the 
Commission's preference in most cases for a combination of internal 
environmental evaluation and direct consultation with affected 
community groups. The NCDC is an urban planning authority, and it 
noted that because of this, its operations may be particularly suited 
to a broad environmental planning approach rather than the EIS format.
With regard to the Department of National Development, the 
HRSC's comments are worth quoting at length:
The Committee notes that in its submission to the 
inquiry the Department did not regard the important matters 
of the development of national energy policies, or the 
application of those policies to the exploitation of energy 
resources, as a main area of activity within the Department's 
responsibilities in which effects on the environment have 
called for examination (HRSC, 1979, p.21).
While the Department has operated within the terms of 
the legislation the Committee believes that the Department 
has used the administrative discretions available under 
the Act to avoid the referral of projects to the Department 
of Science and the Environment. In ten months, from 1 July 
1978 to 24 April 1979 the Department had not referred a 
single proposal to the Department of Science and the 
Environment under the Act. In the previous year (1 July 
1977 to 30 June 1978) 129 proposals had been referred to the 
Department of Science and the Environment. The Committee 
notes that because of changes to the Administrative 
Arrangements at the end of 1978 the functions and 
responsibilities of departments were altered. However those 
areas of the former Department of National Development from 
which the majority of proposals were referred to the former 
Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development 
for advice during the 1977/78 financial year remain the 
administrative responsibility of the present Department of 
National Development. The Committee finds it difficult to 
accept that there were no proposals in the last financial 
year which warranted referral to the Department of Science 
and the Environment.
The Act (s.5(l)(c)) requires that matters affecting the 
environment to a significant extent are fully examined and 
taken into account in relation to the negotiation, operation 
and enforcement of arrangements, including agreements and 
arrangements with authorities of the States. In the light of 
this requirement for the Department to comment that it has not 
so far had to consider in detail the environmental 
implications of particular proposals because the assistance 
given by the Commonwealth represents part only of the cost of 
a project points to a fundamental lack of understanding of 
the legislation. To state that these projects are covered 
by State legislation does not discharge the duty of the
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Department to determine the significance of a project. The use 
of State assessments to aid the Department in determining the 
real significance of a proposal is a useful technique to avoid 
delay and duplication. The Committee believes that in those 
cases where an assessment was carried out by a State authority 
it is obvious that the proposal had significance and should 
have been referred to the Department of Science and the 
Environment. That Department would then be in a position to 
advise National Development as to the likely impact of a 
proposal.
From evidence presented to the Committee it is obvious that 
the Department of National Development has not established a 
working relationship with the Department of Science and the 
Environment (HRSC, 1979, pp. 22, 23).
According to a reliable source (confidential note 5.2), the drop 
in referrals by National Development noted by the HRSC followed the 
transfer of the former Environment Minister Mr. Newman from that port­
folio to National Development. With his experience in Environment, 
Newman was aware that the provisions of the Act could be avoided by 
non-referral and also wrote to other ministers pointing out this 
possibility.
The Department of National Development also saw difficulties 
(National Development, 1979, p. 5) in concluding a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the department administering the Act, as has been 
done by some other departments. The purpose of such Memoranda is to 
categorise the types of proposal likely to be environmentally signifi­
cant and which would therefore require notification to the 
administering department. The difficulty perceived by National 
Development was that of determining in advance the types of proposals 
likely to be environmentally significant.
The Minister for Trade and Resources initially considered that 
it would not be appropriate for his department to make a submission 
to the HRSC (Anthony, 1979). He later reversed this decision, however. 
The Trade and Resources submission stated that it is feasible to meet 
the requirements of the Act insofar as they relate to matters within 
the responsibility of the Department's portfolio and affecting the 
Australian environment. This would, however, 'give rise to a very 
considerable work load' (Trade and Resources, 1979, p. 3). This 
comment provides confirmation that the requirements were not then 
being met. The Department considered it 'questionable' whether it 
is feasible to meet the requirements on the Minister and Department
19]
so far as they relate to actions concerning matters within the 
portfolio responsibilities of other ministers and to the environment 
beyond Australia.
The first part of the latter comment appears to rest on a 
misunderstanding of the Act. The Department asserts (Trade and 
Resources, 1979, p .2) that the Act applies 'to decisions by Cabinet 
in which the Minister of Trade and Resources participates, including 
decisions covering matters outside his portfolio responsibility' 
(author's italics). But the Act clearly states (s.8(a)):
Each Minister shall give all such directions and do 
all such things as, consistently with any relevant laws 
as affected by regulations under this Act, can be given 
or done by him -
(a) for ensuring that procedures for the time being
approved under this Act are given effect to in and 
in connexion with matters dealt with by the Department 
administered by him and that any authority of Australia 
in relation to which he has ministerial responsibilities 
observes, and assists in giving effect to, those 
procedures (italics added).
The Procedures also refer throughout to the 'action Minister' - 
the Minister responsible for the proposed action - not to, other 
Ministers, as having to meet the administrative requirements. That 
such a misunderstanding should have still existed four years after 
introduction of the Act and Procedures is significant in itself.
Other comments by Trade and Resources show a similar lack of 
familiarity with the Act. The Department argues that because of the 
Act:
Ministers are inhibited from taking decisions 
expeditiously, urgently or confidentially. This 
would appear to follow from the mandatory nature 
of the Act and Procedures. For example, strict 
confidentiality on a sensitive matter may not be 
able to be preserved because of the necessity to 
invoke the Administrative Procedures (Trade and 
Resources, 1979, p.6).
Yet an outstanding characteristic of the Act and Procedures is that 
they are discretionary, not mandatory. Section 3.1.3 of the 
Procedures provides that:
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The administering Minister shall not make a determination 
... that ... an environmental impact statement is 
required if he is satisfied that to do so would be 
contrary to the public interest.
6.2.3 of the Procedures states:
... the Minister shall, if necessary, determine whether the 
draft environmental impact statement, or any part of it, 
shall be made available for public comment.
And 11.1 of the Procedures states:
A Minister, Department or an authority of Australia 
may request the Minister to exempt a proposed action, 
or a class of proposed actions from all or any of the 
requirements of these procedures.
This is hardly a mandatory process.
The Treasurer (Howard, 1979) advised the HRSC that because the 
Act legislation was under review, and "because Treasury involvement 
with a number of the environment Acts listed is insignificant', a 
formal submission by Treasury to the HRSC would be of no benefit. In 
fact, as will be shown, both the Treasurer and Treasury had strong 
views on the Act and were leading a behind-the-scenes campaign to have 
changes made to it. '
The Treasurer did undertake to have Treasury respond to any 
specific questions from the HRSC. The Secretary of the Treasury, 
however, answered only two of the six questions concerning the Act 
put to Treasury by the HRSC. One of these questions concerned the 
number of proposals submitted by Treasury to the administering 
department in 1977/78 and 1978/9. All such submissions were made 
by the Foreign Investment Review Board where it considered that a 
foreign investment proposal might involve environmental issues.
TABLE 5.4: FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROPOSALS 
REFERRED TO ADMINISTERING DEPARTMENT
Period Total proposals Proposals referred Environmental
considered by Board to administering 
Department
Number Percent of
conditions attached 
to approval
Number Percent of
July 1977- total approvals
June 1978 1343 197 14.6 26 14.6
July 1978-
March 1979 783 92 11.8 15 16.3
Source: Treasury, 1979.
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No EIS's were required for the above proposals. Although they 
were apparently not formal referrals under the Act, the large number of 
proposals referred does not support the view that Treasury's involvement 
in environmental matters is insignificant (Table 5.4).
The Treasury refused to answer the other four questions put to it 
by the HRSC on the grounds that they involved matters of government 
policy, since the Act was under review by government at that time. The 
questions were:
1. From the Department's point of view what aspects of the 
Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act should be 
amended?
2. A series of alternatives to the Impact of Proposals Act 
prepared by Department of Science and the Environment is 
attached. Which of these alternatives is most appropriate?
3. The Committee has been told that as the Act now stands it 
could be applied to almost all areas of Government activity.
. Should the Act be amended to more closely define its scope?
. To what areas should the Act be applied?
4. The Department of Science and the Environment has advised that 
it is discussing undertakings and agreement with Commonwealth 
Departments and that agreement has not been reached with the 
Department of the Treasury.
. What stage have these discussions reached?
. When is agreement likely to be reached?
The reason given by the Secretary for refusing to answer seems to 
be inconsistent with his willingness, noted previously, to make his 
views on policy matters known to the public on other occasions. Other 
departments saw no such difficulty. Further, the HRSC Inquiry, from 
which Treasury was withholding information on the grounds that the Act 
was under review by government, was itself providing a recognised input 
to that same review. (The HRSC had been asked by government to expedite 
its findings so that they could be taken into account in the review). 
Under such circumstances, to withhold information from the Committee 
appears to have been a misuse of the convention of secrecy.
Treasury's views regarding the Act, together with those of some 
of the other departments seeking substantial changes to it, were 
revealed in a series of leaked documents reported in the Australian
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F in a n c i a l  Review on the  22nd o f  October 1979 and on which the  fo l lowing  
i s  based .
The T r e a s u r e r ,  Mr. Howard, in  a l e t t e r  da ted  23 .11 .78  to  the  
M i n i s t e r  f o r  Environment s a i d  he was a t t r a c t e d  to  th e  view t h a t  the  
p r im ary  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  environment  should  r e s t  w i th  the  S t a t e s .  
The l e t t e r  con t inued :
Should t h i s  approach be a c c e p ta b l e  t o  you and our  
c o l l e a g u e s ,  I b e l i e v e  i t  would fo l low  t h a t  my 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  encompassing g e n e ra l  economic and 
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c i e s ,  f o r e ig n  inves tm en t  and exchange 
c o n t r o l ,  should be exempted com ple te ly  from the  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the  EPA.
I am su re  you w i l l  agree  t h a t  i t  would be u t t e r l y  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  fo l low  EPA p rocedu res  in c lu d in g ,  
p e rh a p s ,  an impact s t a t e m e n t  and p u b l i c  h e a r i n g ,  in  
th e  c o n te x t  o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  p r o s p e c t i v e  monetary 
and f i s c a l  p o l i c y  measures;  the  more so ,  o f  cou rse ,  
where they  come forward  in  the  Budget c o n t e x t .
In d i s c u s s i o n s  on such measures ,  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  i f  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  use  o f  s e n s i t i v e  
i n fo rm a t io n  f o r  p r i v a t e  ga in  i s  t o  be minimised.
I b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  Act and p rocedures  p l a c e s  
a l e g a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on me in  t h i s  a r e a  and i s  f a r  
too  open-ended,  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  my r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
f o r  g e n e ra l  economic management and unnecessa ry  in  the  
c o n te x t  o f  the  q u i t e  e l a b o r a t e  c o n s u l t a t i v e  p roceddres  
t h a t  a re  c e n t r a l  to  our  Cabine t  p r o c e s s e s .
As to  f o r e ig n  in v e s tm en t ,  a l though  we would expec t  
t h a t  th e  main env i ronm enta l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i l l  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  be with  th e  S t a t e s  in  th e  f u t u r e ,  under  
c u r r e n t  p o l i c y  th e  Fore ign  Inves tm ent Review Board 
t a k e s  account  o f  env i ronm enta l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  when 
s c r e e n i n g  p r o p o s a l s .
There i s  an e s t a b l i s h e d  p rocedu re  f o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
wi th  the  EHCD on such m a t t e r s ,  which i s ,  in  p r a c t i c a l  
te rm s ,  independen t  o f  the  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  th e  EPA and 
i t s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p ro c e d u re s .
There seems to  me to  be no com pell ing  reason  f o r  
a s p e c t s  o f  f o r e ig n  in ves tm en t  to  be s u b j e c t  to  the  EPA.
The d i f f i c u l t y  w i th  the  EPA ap p ly in g  fo r e ig n  
inves tment  d e c i s i o n s  i s  th e  i n c o m p a t a b i l i t y  between 
th e  r e s p e c t i v e  p ro ced u res  o f  th e  FIRB and th e  EPA, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in r e l a t i o n  to  t ime c o n s t r a i n t s .
One can t a k e  i s s u e  w i th  such views.  The need f o r  s e c recy  
should  not  be an a b s o lu t e  im p e r a t i v e ,  bu t  r a t h e r  a q u e s t i o n  o f  ba lance  
a g a i n s t  having th e  env i ronm enta l  consequences  o f  p ro p o s a l s  p r o p e r l y  
a s s e s s e d .  As no ted  p r e v i o u s l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  p r o v i s i o n s  in  th e  Act f o r  
waiv ing  v a r io u s  o f  i t s  r e q u i re m e n t s .  For i n s t a n c e  an EIS might
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be prepared but not released to the public; or the environmental 
aspects of a matter might be examined in confidence by staff of the 
administering department. The provisions of the Act might rarely be 
invoked, but nevertheless their existence is a safeguard to ensure 
that environmental matters are not on occasion ignored. The point 
made by the Treasurer concerning the incompatibility between the 
procedures of the Foreign Investment Review Board and the requirements 
of the Act in relation to time constraints has already been discussed 
with reference to the Iwasaki case. There is no necessity that the 
arbitrary 90-day review period of the FIRB should prevail over the 
requirements for EIA. As in previous examples, underlying the stated 
concerns about the Act there is a sense of impatience with environ­
mental matters and with the possible reduction in ministerial and 
departmental autonomy which the Act embodies.
The Treasury expressed similar views to those of its Minister 
in a paper dated 18.9.1978. It argued that its powers should not be 
used to protect the environment, that there should be a 'complete 
exemption from the application of the EPA for all the responsibilities 
under the Treasurer's portfolio'. The paper supported proposed amend­
ments which would exempt general economic and policy matters from the 
application of the Act, except for specific measures which have a 
direct effect on the environment (such as a decision to change tax 
incentives for clearing land).
The environmental effects of 'general economic and policy 
matters' however, may be of far greater moment than those of a specific 
proposal, and there is no more reason to expect that the environmental 
consequences of such matters will be considered than there is in the 
case of discrete projects in the absence of a specific means of 
ensuring that such consideration takes place. The problem with the 
Act, as has been shown earlier, is not that it has hampered broad 
economic and policy decisions but rather that, with the exception of 
the Ranger Inquiry, it has not been applied to them.
The leaked documents also confirmed that as well as Treasury, the 
Departments of Finance, Trade and Resources and National Development were
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involved in moves to bring about changes in the Act. In a minute 
dated 19.1.79, the Department of Finance suggested to its Minister 
that he should press for amendments limiting the application of the 
Act to areas under Commonwealth jurisdiction, Commonwealth activities 
in the States and specific cases of national importance. Provision 
should also be made to limit the duration and cost of public hearings 
under the Act. The minute said that if the Ministers for Trade and 
Resources and National Development also pressed for such changes, they 
could be supported in principle. It was noted that the above 
Departments would brief their Ministers that the Act should be amended 
along the lines suggested. The amendments were supported by the 
Department of Finance:
... on the grounds that the Act together with State 
government action in areas under their jurisdiction, 
would still provide for adequate protection to the 
environment and that there should be a reduction in 
cost to both the private and public sectors because of 
a reduced incidence of the need to prepare environmental 
impact statements (AFR, 22.10.79).
In view of the fact that a total of only fifty EIS's had been 
required in four years for the whole ambit of the Commonwealth 
Government's responsibilities the concern about costs seeips to be 
unwarranted.
The Department of Finance's submission to the HRSC (Finance, 1979) 
argues that there is no specific legislation requiring that financial 
factors are taken into account in government decisionmaking, and that 
rather than being embodied in 'a complex legislative procedure', 
environmental considerations should be taken into account '... on 
precisely the same footing as other considerations. Consequently we 
would tend to favour proposals that would reduce the formal legal 
requirements' of the Act (p.3). Such a view ignores the special 
factors which tend to lead to environmental considerations being 
neglected in decisionmaking.
The submission went on to suggest that 'in cases where a proposal 
is subjected to collective consideration by Ministers it could be 
arranged that the Minister responsible for the environment could 
raise environmental issues during discussion' (p.3). However, the 
Minister for Environment is rarely a member of Cabinet in LNCP 
governments. Further, time is needed to assess the environmental
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implications of proposals, and the procedures under the Act are 
intended to ensure that early notification is given to the 
administering department. Without such notification, the Environment 
Minister is likely to be confronted with fully developed proposals 
at any collective meetings of ministers.
In cases where a decision on a proposal is not subject to 
consideration by ministers collectively, the Department of Finance 
considered that a government direction 'that the Minister responsible 
for that action should satisfy himself that appropriate consideration 
has been given to environmental aspects' should be sufficient. Again, 
this view fails to recognise the many instances at State and Federal 
level where ministers and departments have ignored or downgraded 
environmental consequences. It ignores the natural tendency of 
government agencies whose expertise and inclinations lie in promoting 
certain forms of development or enterprise to fail to give weight 
to environmental and social factors external to the departments' 
traditional functions and which threaten to interfere with or 
sometimes prevent the carrying out of such functions.
The administering department has sought to agree Memoranda of 
Understanding with action departments. The main intention of the 
Understandings is to define more closely what is likely to affect 
the environment 'to a significant extent' in terms of the types of 
activities which fall within the responsibilities of the government 
agency with which the Understanding is agreed. In other words, to 
define categories of proposals which fall within or outside the scope 
of the Act. Inevitably, there are still grey areas, but the 
Understandings considerably reduce the extent of these. A danger is 
that in doing so they may exclude, as not significant, matters which 
in some instances might be so. This is not generally evident from a 
perusal of the five such Understandings which have been reached. The 
reluctance of government agencies to enter into such Understandings 
(only five have been finalised of a possible total of 30-40 in over 
five years since they were first conceived) indicates that they 
probably in fact tighten the environmental requirements on agencies. 
But departments have also given as a reason for not entering into 
Understandings the probability of changes to the Act.
The Understandings vary in form. That with Defence (Anderson, 
1982, Attachment D5) lists (p.l) some broad categories likely to be
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significant (e.g. ’acquisition or disposal of land or buildings where 
a change of use is intended') subject to the subsequent section. The 
subsequent section then gives a longer and more detailed list of 
conditions which, if they apply to the matters previously listed as 
likely to be significant, make them no longer likely to be significant 
(e.g. where 'the land involved is zoned for the proposed purpose, or 
the proposed development is compatible with adjacent land use and zoning 
under planning regulations' (p.3). What this amounts to is a checklist 
to allow the agency involved to determine whether projects likely in 
general to be significant are significant in a particular instance.
The Understanding with Australia Post, on the other hand,
(Anderson, 1982, Attachment D3) begins by listing matters not likely to 
be significant, and then lists circumstances under which the preceding 
matters may become significant. The Understanding with Administrative 
Services (Anderson, 1982, Attachment Dl) introduces a third 'double 
negative' variant by listing matters not considered likely to be 
significant (e.g. 'demolition of buildings') subject to the following 
paragraph which lists conditions under which the preceding matters 
remain not significant (e.g. that 'the Department of Administrative 
Services has complied with Section 30 of the Australian Heritage 
Commission Act'). The end result of each approach is of course much 
the same.
A few of the conditions seem rather questionable. For instance, 
a proposal will not be considered significant if the administering 
Minister or his department have not 'expressed a reservation' about a 
particular proposed action (e.g. Anderson, 1982, Attachment Dl, p.5).
But since they are not officially notified of a proposal unless it is 
considered significant, they may not be in a position to express such a 
reservation.
The preceding discussion illustrates that although the opposition 
of some departments to the Act in its present form is based to a degree 
on genuine concern as to the Act's merits, such opposition is often 
strongly coloured by less respectable motivations. These are implicit 
in the reluctance of some departments to make submissions to the HRSC, 
the superficiality and lack of familiarity with the Act evident in some 
submissions, and the way in which some departments have 'used the 
administrative discretions under the Act to avoid the referral of 
projects' to the administering department.
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COMMONWEALTH/STATE RELATIONSHIPS CONCERNING EIA
All the States have some form of EIA requirement. Only in 
New South Wales, Victoria and more recently South Australia are the 
requirements directly incorporated in legislation. It is not intended 
to review the State systems at any length here. A thorough review of 
that kind would require a dissertation in itself. The following is 
therefore largely confined to a discussion of Commonwealth/State 
relationships concerning the incidence of the Commonwealth EIA 
legislation within the States. However, as background to such a 
discussion, some comments on the EIA requirements of each State are 
necessary. The New South Wales situation is dealt with in somewhat 
more detail because the State's legislation incorporates a commendable 
effort to integrate land use planning and EIA requirements.
The EIA procedural requirements of the Commonwealth and the 
States are compared in Table 5.5.
New South Wales
New South Wales has had the longest and most extensive 
experience of any government in Australia with EIA and public 
environmental inquiries. Since the first Draft Manual was 'issued in 
1973, there has been an evolving series of procedural manuals issued 
for EIA, but these were not embodied in legislation. The public 
environmental inquiry system in New South Wales which existed prior 
to the current legislation had some interesting features. The first 
three inquiries were conducted in a formal and lengthy manner. As a 
result of this experience, it was decided to streamline and simplify 
the inquiry procedures (Coffey, 1978, p. 2). The main differences 
between the resultant form of environmental inquiry and the more 
conventional process were:
-Discussion based on an agenda. An agenda for 'round-table 
discussions' was prepared by the State Pollution Control 
Commission, usually based on the EIS and public submissions 
solicited by press advertisement. Evidence and discussion 
was confined to each agenda item in turn, although 
opportunity was given at the end of proceedings for other 
matters to be raised.
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TABLE 5.5: COMPARISON OF COMMONWEALTH AND STATE ElA PROCEDURES
Govern- EIA EIA [Title Responsible Decision Admin. jResult of jProvision Responsible Act ion
ment require- legisl- current for ;that EIS review of 'review lin EIA 1 for resulting
ments
first
published
ation legisl­
ation
or
procedures
triggering
procedures
' required EIS jprocedures 
for:
public!public 
review inquiry 
of EISl
initiating 
publie 
inquiry
from 
public 
inquiry
C' wth 1974 Yes Environ- Action •Admin. Admin. Advice Yes Yes Admin. Advice by
ment minister minister minister minister admin.
Protection 
(Impact of 
Proposals) 
Act 1974-5 
and Admin. 
Procedures
and his 
dept.
minister to
action
minister
NSW 1973 Environ­
mental
Planning
and
Assessment 
Act 1978 
and
Regulation
1980
EIS mandatory for 
some proposals, 
otherwise
action minister or 
his department
jl)Devel- 1) 
opment Decision 
consent 2) 
required: Decision 
local or advice 
govt, or (see 
other text) 
consent 
authority 
2)Devel­
opment 
consent 
not
required: 
action 
dept, or 
optional 
for admin. 
dept.
Admin.
minister
Admin, 
minister 
may:
1) Advise 
action 
dept.
2) Determine 
application 
if
'designated 
development1
Q' Id 1975 No Impact
(some Assessment
in- of
direct Develop- 
legis- ment 
lative Projects 
support) in Q' Id 
(1979)
Action 
dept.
Action 
dept.
|
Action Advice
dept.
(other 
govt, 
depts. to 
be
consulted)
No No
I
Vic 1977 Yes Environ- Action Action Admin. Advice Opt- Yes 1 Admin. ' Advice by
ment minister minister minister ional minister admin.
Assess- or local or local under minister
ment Act govt.; govt. ; Act /
1978 and also also but
Guide- optional admin. * norm-
lines for minister ally'
adminis- if public called
tering works or for
minister if cons-
if public ulted
works
WA 1978 No Procedures Proponent Admin. EPA Advice 'Norm- No Admin. EPA may make
(some for or action dept. ally minister enforceable
in- Environ- minister recomm- solic- or EPA policy
direct mental ends to ited' consistent
legis- Assessment EPA with
lative of inquiry's
support) Proposals findings
in W.A. j
(1978)
1973 Planning
Act
1982
Admin.
minister minister minister
Planning 
author­
ities to 
'have 
regard 
to' EIS
Tas 1974 No Guidelines
(some and 
in- Procedures 
direct for Envir- 
legis- onmental
Action
authority
Action Environ- 
auth. or mental 
Director Impact 
Envirorft Study 
if sched- Assess-
Advice or jOpt- " No 
impose ional 
conditions 
or
emission
lative Impact uled ment standards
support) Studies under EP Group
(1974) i Act 1973
Notes: 1) The above Table was prepared in early 1982 and to the best of the author's knowledge there have been
no major changes to late 1983.
2) Rather than the variety of terms used by the States, the terms 'administering' minister and department 
and 'action' minister and department have been used in this Table wherever possible to denote 
respectively the minister and department administering the EIA requirements and the minister and 
department responsible for approving the proposal.
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-Relative informality. Following submission of evidence on 
a given agenda item, proceedings took a form closer to that 
of a committee discussion than to judicial proceedings.
Invited participants were limited to those ’whose 
submissions contained points relevant to the inquiry'
(Coffey, 1978, p.3), but requests to participate were 
accepted. Legal representation was not allowed, although 
legal advisers could be present.
-Summary of proceedings. The chairman publicly dictated a 
summary of evidence and outcomes, usually after each 
person's evidence and at the conclusion of discussion on 
each agenda item. The summary provided the basis for a 
report and recommendations by the chairman to the SPCC.
A complete transcript of proceedings was not prepared, 
although they were taped.
The agenda system, allied with a more informal approach, 
expedited proceedings and reduced costs considerably. Those 
conducting public inquiries have complained of the repetition of 
the same arguments by different witnesses, and the inclusion of 
matter of little or no relevance. By specifying the matters to be 
resolved an agenda helps to reduce extraneous evidence, and 
witnesses who have just heard the other evidence on a particular 
agenda item can be more easily constrained from repeating it. An 
agenda system does, however, require those wishing to give 
evidence on most items to be present for most of the inquiry, or to 
make repeated attendances. This problem can be somewhat offset by 
the reduced length of the inquiry. But for an inquiry into a 
complex matter requiring evidence on a large number of aspects, the 
requirements for protracted or repeated attendance would make the 
agenda system impractical. The system appears to be best suited 
to discrete projects which do not have complex ramifications, and 
for such proposals it may be preferable to the more formal type of 
inquiry.
The preceding arrangements have been superseded by the 
provisions of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act ('the 
EPA Act') introduced by the NSW Labor government and passed in 1979. 
The Act provides for greatly revised and more closely related
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systems of land use planning, environmental impact assessment and 
public inquiries in NSW. The EPA Act provides for three 
'environmental planning instruments': State Environmental Planning
Policies, Regional Environmental Plans, and Local Environmental 
Plans. These have much in common with the previous system of town 
and country planning schemes, particularly at the Local Plan level. 
Policies and plans are subject to public exhibition and comment 
prior to gazettal in the conventional way. But the environmental 
planning instruments are intended to cover a wider range of issues 
than conventional plans, and there is increased emphasis on the 
Regional Plans, which are more suited to encompassing social, 
economic or natural environmental units than are plans based on 
local government areas. Regional and Local Environmental Plans 
must be based on an environmental study of resources and constraints.
A requirement for EIA under the EPA Act may arise in two 
distinct ways. All proposals which require development consent 
must be accompanied by information on likely environmental impacts 
(s.77(3) (c)). For certain 'designated developments' an EIS is 
mandatory (s.77(3)(d)). The 'consent authority' must consider 
environmental impact (s.90(1) (b)) , when determining development 
applications. For activities which do not require development 
consent, but which are likely to affect the environment 
significantly or which are 'prescribed' activities (s.112(1)) the 
'determining authority' must obtain and consider an EIS.
The latter provision applies particularly to public sector 
decisions which are not subject to development consent, whereas the 
designated developments are largely of kinds normally carried out by 
private enterprise. Both 'designated developments' and 'prescribed 
activities' are categories of proposals where it is considered in 
advance that the environment is likely to be significantly 
affected. A list of designated developments has been published in 
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 1980 (schedule 
3) made under the EPA Act, but prescribed activities had not been defined 
at the time of writing. Figure 5.1 shows the alternative routes through the 
EIA requirements for proposals according to whether or not they 
require development consent.
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Where development consent is required, the consent authority 
must consider the development’s environmental impact before making 
a decision (s.90 (1) (b)) . The consent authority is usually a local 
government, or the administering Minister or the Director of his 
department or another minister or department. A copy of any EIS 
is forwarded to the administering department where that department 
or its minister is not the consent authority (s.84(l)). S.101
provides that the administering Minister may direct the consent 
authority to refer a development application to him for determination 
'in the public interest having regard to matters of significance for 
State or regional environmental planning'.
Where development consent is not required, the Director of 
the administering department may examine the EIS and make 
recommendations to the determining authority (s.113(5)) which the 
latter must take into account.
The Minister administering the EPA Act may at any time direct 
a public inquiry (s.119(1)) into matters including the environmental 
aspects of designated developments and activities referred to in 
s.112(1). Where the inquiry involves an application for a 
designated development the Minister can determine the application 
after considering the findings of the inquiry (s.89(l)). Where the 
inquiry concerns an activity under s.112(1) (a prescribed activity 
or one likely to significantly affect the environment) the Minister 
may only give advice as to whether the activity should proceed or not 
or proceed in a modified form (s.114). The provisions reflect the 
difference between matters requiring development consent, which fall 
directly under the administering Minister's responsibilities, and 
non-consent activities, which are the responsibility of other 
determining authorities.
The EPA Act was passed together with several cognate Acts.
These include the Land and Environment Court Act establishing a 
Court having jurisdiction in environmental planning, pollution control, 
local government and land valuation and compensation. Section 123 of 
the EPA Act makes a unique provision, in terms of EIA in Australia, 
to relax the rules of standing:
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Any person may bring proceedings in the Court for 
an order to remedy or restrain a breach of this Act, 
whether or not any right of that person has been or 
may be infringed by or as a consequence of that breach.
Queensland
The Queensland EIA procedures are very decentralised, and 
supported only indirectly by legislation. A Procedural Manual was 
first produced by the Environmental Control Council, a statutory 
body, in 1975. In 1978, however, the Council, which had sometimes 
been troublesome to the government, was abolished by amendment of 
legislation with the formidable title of the State and Regional 
Planning and Development, Public Works Organisation and Environmental 
Control Act 1971-74. The new s.29 gives the Co-ordinator General 
power ’to coordinate departments of the Government ... in activities 
directed towards ensuring that in any development proper account is 
taken of the environmental effects.’ Departments and agencies are 
required to take environmental effects into account, and 'to have 
due regard to such policies or administrative arrangements as are 
approved from time to time by the Minister' [administering the Act]. 
In 1979 the Co-ordinator General's Department produced a booklet
f
setting out such policies and administrative arrangements. In it 
the government department responsible for carrying out or approving 
the proposed development is responsible for deciding whether an 
'impact assessment study' is needed, and whether the proposal should 
proceed. There is no provision for any other authority to review the 
need for an EIA or its adequacy, nor is there any suggestion (much 
less any requirement) that the EIA document should be made public or 
that public comment should be obtained. There is a requirement, 
however, that advisory bodies (various government agencies) should be 
consulted concerning areas where they have expertise.
Victoria
The Victorian government did not publish its Guidelines for 
Environmental Assessment until 1977. In May 1978, however, the 
Environmental Effects Act 1978 was passed, Victoria becoming the 
first State to embody EIA-type requirements directly in 
legislation.
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The Act is peculiarly drafted in that while s.3.1 states that 
it applies to public works, which are defined as excluding municipal 
works, s.8.1 refers to any person or body who 'is required by any 
Act or law to make a decision which could have a significant effect 
on the environment’, thus including not only works other than 
public works, but also decisions concerning matters other than 
works. S.8.2, however, raises doubts again by referring only to 
'works'. But from the accompanying Guidelines (Ministry for 
Conservation, 1978, pp.1,2) it appears that the Act is intended to 
apply to decisions on other matters as well as works.
The requirements for decisions on public works, however, 
differ from those for other decisions. The proponent of public 
works which could reasonably be considered to have a significant 
effect on the environment (s.3.1) must submit a Preliminary 
Environment Report, if he doubts that the Act applies, or an 
Environment Effects Statement if he thinks the Act does apply 
(s.4.1). In cases where no Report or Statement has been submitted, 
the Minister administering the Act may call for either one (s.6.1) 
as may also the action Minister (s.7.1). But for municipal works 
and other decisions, it is left to the discretion of the«decision­
making body or the action Minister to refer the matter to the 
Minister administering the Act for advice (s.8.1). The power of 
the latter under s.6.1 to call for a Report or Statement does not 
appear to have been intended to apply to decisions other than 
public works unless the Minister's advice has first been sought.
Having obtained a Report or Statement, the administering 
Minister must provide an assessment of it as soon as reasonably 
practicable (s.6.3). The only duty then imposed on the action 
Minister is to consider the assessment, and in the meantime the 
works in question may not proceed (s.6.2). The administering 
Minister may call an inquiry and can choose whether or not it is 
held in public (s.9). The Act contains no provision for third 
party appeal or independent review of decisions. The locus of 
decisionmaking is unchanged. The Act simply gives the administering 
Minister power to be used at his discretion, to ensure that the 
environmental consequences of certain proposals are put before 
decisionmakers.
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Western Australia
For some time Western Australia did not favour formalising 
EIA procedures (O'Brien, 1976, pp.264-267), although some EIA's 
were carried out. In 1978, however, Procedures were published 
(Department of Conservation and Environment (DCE), 1978) 
incorporating a requirement for preparation of Environment Review 
and Management Programmes (ERMP), similar to EIA but with 
particular emphasis on environmental management subsequent to 
approval. The Procedures are not detailed. Decisions as to 
whether an ERMP is required are made on an ad hoc basis by the 
Environment Protection Authority after advice from the DCE. Guide­
lines for the content of ERMP's may be prepared by DCE in 
consultation with the proponent; ERMP's have been confined to 
projects rather than programmes or policies.
The Management Programme portion of the ERMP requires:
(a) Details of the unavoidable deleterious effects and 
benefits which the proposed action is assessed to 
have on the environment.
(b) Environmental management proposals including research, 
monitoring periodic reassessment and reporting'.
(c) Commitment by the proposer to amend the operation of 
his proposal in the light of results from (b) (DCE,
1978, p .6).
The Management Programme requirement has been stressed by 
representatives of the DCE as constituting a substantial difference 
from, and improvement on, conventional EIA procedures. This is 
largely a matter of emphasis, however. The Commonwealth 
Administrative Procedures (4.1(j)) require the EIS to 'describe, 
and assess the effectiveness of, any safeguards or standards for 
the protection of the environment intended to be adopted or applied 
in respect of the proposed action.'
An interesting feature of Western Australian legislation has 
been the frequent reliance on Agreement Acts between the State 
government and proponents of industrial and mining projects. About 
fifty such Acts have been passed, mostly since 1960 (Kelly, 1976).
The Agreement Acts were introduced for a number of reasons, including 
that of defining the respective rights and obligations of the State
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and the developer, such as responsibility for the provision of 
infrastructure for major projects; to overcome conflicts with 
existing statutes, and generally to expedite developments. In 
recent years, environmental provisions have been increasingly 
included in these Acts, although generally such provisions have 
been directed towards reducing harm to the environment on the 
presumption that the project would proceed. Some of the more 
recent Agreement Acts have included a requirement for a detailed 
ERMP. The environmental provisions of Agreement Acts are not 
known to have led to the abandonment of a project, and the latter 
would seem unlikely given the stage of approval signified by the 
passing of a detailed Agreement Act. However, ERMP's under such 
Acts have led to project modification.
South Australia
EIA guidelines were produced by the South Australian 
Environment Protection Council in 1973, although these had 
ambiguous status, being produced by the Council in its advisory 
role rather than by government. EIA legislation has been in the offing 
for most of the subsequent period, but just as it appeared «.to be 
close to fruition it was further delayed by a change of government 
in 1979. The proximity of legislation probably contributed to the 
failure to produce official EIA procedures. An Environmental 
Impact Assessment Handbook was produced in 1978 (South Australian 
Department for the Environment) 'for internal distribution'. Few 
EIS's have been published in South Australia, although the 
Department considers that much has been achieved by its involvement 
with projects following notification by the proponent, without 
necessitating the production of EIS's (Lothian, 1978).
In January 1982 South Australia introduced the Planning Act 
1982. This incorporates a provision that where a person proposes to 
undertake a development 'that is in the opinion of the Minister 
[administering the Act] of major social, economic or environmental 
importance' (s.49(l)) the Minister may have prepared, or require 
the proponent to prepare, a draft EIS. After the Minister has 
considered public submissions on the draft, and after any amendments
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to the HIS which he considers necessary have been made, the Minister 
may 'officially recognise' the EIS.
In determining whether consent should be granted to a development 
and under what conditions, planning authorities are required to 'have 
regard to' (s.49(7)) any officially recognised EIS.
Tasmania
Tasmania's EIA procedures (Guidelines and Procedures for 
Environmental Impact Studies, Dept, of the Environment, 1974) are 
not embodied in legislation. However, classes of premises likely 
to be serious polluters are listed under the First Schedule to the 
Environment Protection Act 1973 and the Director of Environment and 
Conservation can refuse a licence to operate such premises. This 
power has been used to require environmental impact studies for 
some of the larger operations.
It is also government policy that an environmental impact study 
is required for any proposal likely to have a significant impact on 
the environment of the State (Department of the Environment, 1974, 
p. 5). However some government agencies have failed to provide 
EIA's on some important proposals. The Department has stated:
Unfortunately, the extent of co-operation by State and 
Local Government Authorities in the implementation of the 
Government's policy has varied widely. In some cases, 
excellent working arrangements exist between the Department 
of the Environment and decision-making authorities in 
environmental investigation and assessment. In other 
cases, however, co-operation has been somewhat tardy or 
non-existent (Tasmania, Parliament, 1978, p. 6).
Moreover, the Department has no control over development 
carried out under the control of local government, unless Commonwealth 
or State funding is involved (Chapman, pevs. comm., 1978).
It is interesting to speculate as to the underlying reasons 
for the differences in the relative strengths of the EIA requirements 
of the seven governments. These can be divided into two groups:
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on one hand the Commonwealth, New South Wales and to a lesser extent 
Victoria, all with EIA legislation setting out or supporting fairly 
explicit EIA procedures and requirements, and including specific 
provisions for public review of EIS’s and for public environmental 
inquiries. On the other hand Queensland, Western Australia and 
Tasmania, without specific EIA legislation and with less thorough 
procedural requirements. South Australia, despite its recent 
legislation, has more in common with the second group. Its past 
performance concerning EIA has been poor, it has taken many years 
to incorporate the EIA requirement in legislation, and the EIA 
provisions in the Planning Act 1982 for a number of reasons can only 
be described as weak.
To analyse the performance of each State in implementing 
its requirements is beyond the scope of this study; but as an 
informed judgement, in degree of adequacy of implementation the 
respective States would still fall into the same two broad groupings.
In seeking the reasons for this one might first look at the 
parties in power, on the assumption that Labor governments ,.are more 
likely to introduce stronger environmental requirements. At the 
Federal level and in NSW this was certainly the case, although the 
Liberal government in NSW had quite a long and respectable record in 
EIA and environmental inquiries. The NSW environmental legislation 
introduced by the Labor government, however, was stronger than that 
which had gone before. Similarly, although there was considerable 
bipartisan agreement to the introduction of the Commonwealth 
legislation, its implementation by the LNCP, as has been shown, 
has been weaker than under Labor. On the other hand Victoria 
introduced EIA legislation under a Liberal government, and the 
former long-running Labor governments in South Australia and Tasmania 
failed to introduce such legislation or to implement EIA 
procedures strongly.
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It is necessary therefore to look beyond political parties 
to more complex sets of relationships between natural resources, 
population, industrial mix, institutions and politics. These have 
manifested themselves in different ways in their consequences for 
EIA in each State. Thus Tasmania is a small island State, generally 
resource-poor except for some mountainous areas with high rainfall 
which are of high conservation value and are also suitable for 
the development of sources of hydro-electric power. The difficulty 
of attracting industrial development, and the strong perceived need 
to do so, has created an atmosphere unsympathetic to strong 
environmental controls, where organisations such as the Hydro-Electric 
Commission (HEC) and others have been able to ignore EIA requirements. 
In particular the heavy reliance on cheap power to attract industry 
has enabled the HEC to become a major political force, able to 
override environmental concerns.
South Australia is similarly poor in natural resources, and the 
reluctance to pursue EIA strongly there has in part been due to a 
desire not to discourage scarce new industrial development. But it 
has also arisen from a number of other factors. These included a 
Labor government whose programmes reflected to a considerable extent 
the predelictions of its leader Don Dunstan in giving greater 
priority to various social reforms than to protection of the 
physical environment. Also, responsibilities for various aspects 
of pollution control and environment protection had become 
decentralised to various departments, and these resisted any 
suggestion of relocating such controls in a strengthened environ­
mental department. The State also has a strong tradition of 
British-style town and country planning whose proponents tended to 
see a minor role for formal EIA requirements. For these and other 
reasons, including its separation at that time from the land-use 
planning function, the Department for the Environment was 
comparatively weak in bureaucratic terms and not in a good position 
to push for strong EIA legislation.
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For rather different reasons, FIA requirements in the 
resource-rich States of Queensland and Western Australia have also 
been comparatively weak. These States are heavily dependent on 
extractive industry. Relatively small populations concentrated in 
coastal cities face enormous hinterlands offering the prospect of 
further mineral discoveries and development. Both States have 
been ruled for many years by conservative governments with 
stridently pro-development leaders and little patience with 
environmental considerations which stand in the way of economic 
growth.
New South Wales and Victoria, while not lacking in mineral 
resources, have well-developed secondary and tertiary sectors and are 
not so dependent on mining. Their population density is comparatively 
high and they lack the vast, empty inland regions of Western Australia 
and Queensland. They also contain a higher proportion of the urban 
middle class and urban unions; both groups important in the 
environmental movement, and whose influence encouraged the 
governments in both States to recognise the environment as a vote­
winning political issue from the late 1960's.
The preceding comments of course are highly oversimplified 
and are not intended to substantiate any detailed conclusions. They 
serve, however, to provide some support for a point which this study 
seeks to demonstrate in more detail in relation to the Commonwealth 
experience with EIA; namely that it is necessary to examine a wide 
range of factors and their interrelationships, not just the 
narrowly political ones, in order to explain policy.
The discussion also shows the variety of approaches to EIA by the 
States, which makes integration with the Commonwealth requirements more 
difficult. As well as the dissimilarities noted above there are others; 
for instance in whether a 'final' EIS is published after public comment, 
whether the reviewing agency's comments on the EIS are published, 
whether EIA requirements purport to extend to policies and programmes, 
and even in the definition of 'environment' which in some cases is 
confined to the physical environment.
Such differences, however, should not be allowed to obscure 
some essential similarities. With the exception in some respects
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of New South Wales, all the requirements are highly discretionary. 
And even where they unequivocally require ministers or departments 
to do something, there is little or no possibility of such 
requirements being legally enforced by third parties. Other 
weaknesses in various States are the lack of mandatory public 
review of the EIS, or of provision for a public inquiry to be 
called, or for the administering Minister as well as the action 
Minister to trigger the procedures, or for administrative review 
of the EIS by a government authority other than the action Minister. 
The incidence of implementation in all States has been patchy at 
best, and the standard of EIS's produced mediocre and uneven in 
quality, with many commonly encountered weaknesses such as the 
failure to examine alternative courses of action adequately. EIS’s 
have often been poorly related to the decisionmaking process, 
appearing after most of the major decisions on the proposal have 
been made, or have failed to influence such decisions. The result 
of leaving the implementation of EIA legislation to political and 
administrative discretion, or of failing to embody EIA requirements 
in legislation at all, has meant that such requirements are to a 
considerable extent a facade for a less than adequate reality.
This, as has already been shown, is clearly the case even,with the 
Commonwealth legislation, which is the most sweeping of all in its 
legislatively defined intentions, with its wide potential application 
and its detailed administrative procedures. Yet its discretionary 
format has allowed only part of its potential to be realised and 
its provisions to be subverted, shortcircuited or ignored for large 
areas of government activity.
Turning now to the subject of Commonwealth/State relationships 
concerning EIA: in 1973 the Australian Environment Council (AEC),
composed of the ministers responsible for the environment from State 
and Federal governments, set up a working party 'to consider the 
philosophy of, and to prepare uniform guidelines for' EIA (AEC,
1973, p .33). The working party, however, agreed that it would not 
be possible to formulate uniform guidelines, because of differences 
between State approaches to EIA, for example concerning the degree 
of public participation (Tasmania, for instance, was opposed to 
public environmental inquiries (AEC, 1973, p.37)). The Council at 
its fifth meeting endorsed the principle of each State introducing
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l e g i s l a t i o n  on envi ronmenta l  impact assessment p rocedu res ,  but  was 
never  ab le  t o  ach ieve  agreement on u n i fo rm i ty .
The o ve r la p  o f  Federa l  and S t a t e  EIA requ i rem en ts  has been a 
p e r e n n i a l l y  c o n t e n t io u s  i s s u e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  the  s t ro n g  advoca tes  
o f  S t a t e  s o v e re ig n t y  in  Queensland,  Western A u s t r a l i a  and Tasmania.  
Queensland r e fu s e d  to  g ive ev idence  t o  th e  (Commonwealth) House o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  S tand ing  Committee on Environment and C o n s e rv a t io n ' s  
(HRSC) review o f  the  Commonwealth l e g i s l a t i o n .  The submission by 
th e  D i r e c t o r  o f  Conserva t ion  and Environment,  Western A u s t r a l i a ,  
s t a t e d :
At the  t ime o f  i t s  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  th e  Commonwealth Act 
was p r i m a r i l y  d e f i c i e n t  in  t h a t  i t  o f f e r e d  no r e c o g n i t i o n  
o f  e x i s t i n g  S t a t e  env i ronmenta l  l e g i s l a t i o n  cover ing  
s i m i l a r  a r e a s .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e r e  was d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  
e f f o r t  and r i s k  o f  c o n f l i c t  with  th e  S t a t e s  in 
envi ronmenta l  assessment . . .
The Act t h e r e f o r e  appears  c e n t r a l i s t  and an i n t r u s i o n  
i n t o  e s t a b l i s h e d  S t a t e  r i g h t s  (HRSC, Hansard,  1979, p. 682).
and f u r t h e r :
Although r e c o g n i s i n g  t h e  l e g a l i t y  o f  th e  Environment 
P r o t e c t i o n  (Impact o f  P roposa ls )  Act as de termined  by th e  
High Court o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  d e c i s i o n ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  the  S t a t e  
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  env i ronm en ta l  m a t t e r s  con f ine d  w i th in  S t a t e  
boundar ie s  and only  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  S t a t e  a re  th e  concern 
o f ,  and should  be t h e  s o l e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f ,  t h e  Western 
A u s t r a l i a n  government (HRSC, Hansard,  1979, p.  685).
The f i r s t  s ta t em en t  i s  a p e c u l i a r  one when i t  i s  cons ide red  t h a t  
a t  t h e  t ime o f  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the  Commonwealth Act,  no S t a t e  had 
l e g i s l a t i o n  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  EIA. Western A u s t r a l i a ' s  ERMP requ i re m en t ,  
f o rm a l i s e d  in  p u b l i sh e d  p rocedu res  on ly  in  1978, i s  only  i n d i r e c t l y  
su p p o r ted  by l e g i s l a t i o n .
The problem with  t h e  second s t a t em en t  l i e s  in  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  d isagreement in  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  whether  m a t t e r s  only a f f e c t  
t h e  S t a t e .  S t a t e  governments have a t  t imes argued  t h a t  m a t t e r s  
which a re  c l e a r l y  o f  concern  to  many A u s t r a l i a n s  l i v i n g  in o t h e r  
S t a t e s ,  o r  which may cause  them a c t u a l  lo s s  o f  amenity th rough 
no longe r  be ing  ab le  to  en joy  v i s i t i n g  the  damaged o r  d e s t ro y e d  p ie c e  
o f  environment in  q u e s t i o n ,  a re  s t i l l  wholly S t a t e  m a t t e r s .  The 
Lake Pedder and Gordon River cases  in so u th -w e s te rn  Tasmania a re  
c l e a r  examples,  as  i s  th e  perhaps  l e s s  well-known example o f  b a u x i t e
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mining in the jarrah forests of Western Australia. (Hughes, 1980, 
describes the latter case).
Mr. Porter's additional evidence illustrates the Western 
Australian government's peculiar interpretation of matters 'only 
affecting the State':
Mr. Simon - Would it be unfair to say that ... the basis 
of your government's approach to Commonwealth involvement 
in environment ... is, that it has no role to play 
whatsoever?
Mr. Porter - ... I have qualified that in relation to the 
high seas ... But regarding development, I think it is 
true to say that developments that take place in Western 
Australia should be wholly the responsibility of the State 
government.
Mr. Simon - If the Commonwealth Government ... considered 
that the jarrah forest in Western Australia was unique and 
ordered it preserved as part of the National Estate ...
There may well be conflict between Commonwealth and State.
Do you see that as an area of responsibility for the 
Commonwealth Government ...?
Mr. Porter - I see that the preservation of the jarrah 
forest is primarily the concern of this State government ...
Mr. Simon - Is it the only [jarrah] forest in the country?
i
Mr. Porter - Yes.
Mr. Simon - Therefore you consider that it is unique 
enough to make it part of the National Estate?
Mr. Porter - Yes.
Mr. Simon - Therefore has the national government the 
responsibility?
Mr. Porter - I think it is questionable whether you can 
follow from one to the other ...
Mr. Simon - So you would not allow the Commonwealth to 
have any responsibilities whatsoever for a national unique 
feature in Western Australia.
Mr. Porter - Yes, I think that is the attitude of the 
Western Australian Government (HRSC, Hansard, pp.697-699).
At the other end of the spectrum, the South Australian 
witnesses emphasised to the HRSC the cooperative nature of Federal/ 
State relationships:
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Chairman - Some States have seen the Commonwealth 
Environment Protect (Impact of Proposals) Act as an 
intrusion by the Commonwealth into State areas. You 
seem to disagree with that view. Do you think any 
variation is required in the Act?
Mr. Inglis - If there is intrusion arrangements have been 
satisfactorily defined for dealing with it ...
Chairman - So you do not see it as an intrusion now 
that the situation has been sorted out and defined?
Mr. Inglis - No. It is a working relationship between 
two governments which to date has worked satisfactorily 
(HRSC, Hansard, p.542).
The 'arrangements’ referred to above have been reached in some 
form with all States, although Queensland would accept only an 
exchange of letters agreeing to a case by case approach on proposals 
by third parties. Most of the arrangements fall into two parts.
The first is an agreement between the Environment Ministers of the 
State and the Commonwealth that their respective governments will 
cooperate in such matters as:
-Informing each other about projects which could significantly 
affect the environment and which require approvals from both 
governments;
-Deciding whether an EIS is needed, whether the Commonwealth 
is to be involved in assessment, and if so, consulting on 
the scope of its contents so that a single document will 
satisfy both governments;
-Negotiating arrangements for joint assessment of the EIA, and 
consulting on the terms and conditions of any public inquiry.
The second part of such arrangements is made between the respective 
Commonwealth and State government departments primarily responsible 
for the environment. It contains a more detailed clarification and 
division of responsibilities between the two governments concerning 
proposals involving a Commonwealth interest but to be carried out 
within the State. The division of responsibilities is typically as 
follows, based on the Victorian procedures (Victoria, undated):
To be examined under the Commonwealth Act:
-Works of the Commonwealth;
-Third-party proposals within the exclusive powers of the 
Commonwealth and not subject to State approval;
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-Programmes financed by specific purpose Commonwealth 
grants.
Matters for joint Commonwealth and State assessment:
-Proposals subject to export approval.
To be examined under State requirements:
-Most proposals requiring foreign investment approval;
-Proposals financed by Commonwealth general revenue 
grants, by borrowing approved by Loan Council, or partly 
financed from a Commonwealth programme but not directed 
to a particular project;
-Proposals under Commonwealth programmes and wholly or 
partly financed by the Commonwealth but carried out by 
third parties or State government authorities.
To be assessed under State or joint assessment procedures as 
appropriate:
-"One-off" proposals partly or wholly financed by the 
Commonwealth but to be developed by the State.
The New South Wales government would accept only the first 
part of the proposed arrangements agreeing to cooperation, not the 
detailed division of responsibilities. This was in line with Labor 
party policy that the Commonwealth government should have'a strong 
role in environmental protection. The New South Wales Labor 
government's Minister for Planning and Environment at that time said:
Clearly, the Federal government has devised a way in 
which it can sidestep not only its statutory responsibilities 
but its moral responsibility of exercising its unique and 
unduplicated role as guardian of the national environmental 
resource (Landa, 1977, p.10).
The agreements do represent a retreat by the Commonwealth from 
the extent of application of the Act envisaged by those in the 
Commonwealth Labor government most closely associated with its 
introduction. The agreements, however, only confirm the 
trend which had already occurred under the Federal LNCP 
government: that the Commonwealth had increasingly confined the 
application of the Act to major projects of national importance (Calvert, 
pers. comm. , undated).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have seen resistance to implementation of the 
Act by Commonwealth governments, by the bureaucracy, and by the States. 
Within the Labor government, conflicting interests created difficulties 
(as in the Fraser Island case) despite the government’s commitment to 
reform. With the LNCP in office, environmental priorities nosedived.
The administering department was subjected to savage staff cuts, a 
series of reorganisations, and a rapid succession of ministers generally 
of low ranking and limited experience.
Various policies which influenced the government's priorities 
have been noted in this and the previous chapter: comments by the
Treasurer confirmed the government's desire to return environmental 
functions to the States and to reduce the incidence of the Act on 
Commonwealth government departments; and comments by public servants 
suggested the influence of industry, particularly the mining industry, 
together with pressure by the States and Commonwealth government 
departments, on the government's approach to EIA.
There was a marked decline in implementation of the Act, as shown 
by a decline in the numbers of proposals examined, of those receiving 
further investigation, and in the number of EIS's directed. The 
government conducted a review of the Act, and there was considerable 
support within cabinet for moves to amend it. The government (as shown 
by the Iwasaki case) was prepared to ignore both procedural and 
substantive requirements of the Act when considered expedient, and in 
some cases ministers avoided triggering the provisions of the Act by 
not referring environmentally significant proposals. Such actions 
illustrate the lack of enforceability of the legislation, arising from 
both its discretionary nature and the problems of obtaining legal 
standing, as for the ACF in the Iwasaki case. Other weaknesses in the 
Act include the inability of the minister administering it to trigger 
its Procedures, leaving the administering department with no procedural 
means of ascertaining the impacts of proposals which have not been 
referred to it.
Evidence to the HRSC showed a range of problems in implementing 
the Act, many of them due to resistance to it by departments. Some
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departments conducted a campaign for the Act to be amended. Progress 
in agreeing Memoranda of Understanding with departments as to the types 
of activities likely to be environmentally significant was extremely 
slow.
While much of the poor departmental implementation of the Act 
arose from legitimate problems or concerns with aspects of the Act 
itself, much also derived from motivations related to the sources of 
institutional resistance to change discussed in Chapter Three. Some 
departments were reluctant to co-operate with the HRSC or to make 
referrals under the Act. Departmental evidence and correspondence cited 
above showed the tendency to accord departmental functions a higher 
priority than EIA, to adhere to pre-existing procedures, and to avoid 
and seek exemption from the provisions of the Act. Evidence to the 
HRSC by EHCD officers referred to the dislike by other departments of 
intrusion into their affairs and unsympathetic attitudes to environmental 
protection.
The extent to which departments were able successfully to resist 
implementation of the Act and to campaign against it, illustrates the 
capacity of the bureaucracy noted in Chapter Three to independently 
influence the course of government policy. Despite differing degrees 
of support for the legislation among members of the Whitlam government, 
the resistance to the Act by sections of the bureaucracy was against 
prevailing government policy; under the Fraser government resistance 
by the bureaucracy and opposition within the government to the Act 
reinforced one another.
With the possible exception of New South Wales, State EIA legisla­
tion, where it exists, is weaker than that of the Commonwealth. The 
States, with one or two exceptions, have campaigned strongly and with 
considerable success to restrict the application of the Commonwealth 
Act within their boundaries.
The different approaches to EIA of the various States reflect 
differences in their size, resources, levels of urbanisation and 
industrialisation, and their politics and history. Nevertheless, there 
are essential similarities in the various EIA requirements, with the 
exception in some respects of New South Wales, including their highly 
discretionary nature and the lack of recourse to the Courts. Overall, 
State EIA requirements and their implementation have generally been weak.
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The potential overlap of Commonwealth and State requirements has 
been a perennially contentious issue, particularly for some States, 
which have adopted very broad definitions of matters which should 
remain solely State responsibilities. Under the Fraser LNCP government, 
formal agreements were reached in some form with all the States, but 
such agreements confirmed the trend which was already occurring under 
that government of confining the application of the Act in the States 
to major projects of national importance.
Thus the conclusions of Chapter Five relate to those of Part One 
in a number of ways. Together with Chapter Four it illustrates the 
wide range of policy influences involved in the decline in implementation 
of the Act, including the economic downturn, the change of Federal 
government, the policies and beliefs of the incoming Fraser government, 
and pressure from industry, sections of the bureaucracy and most State 
governments. The extent to which government and bureaucracy were able 
to reduce the implementation of the Act by avoiding its requirements 
and utilising its discretionary provisions, and the Fraser government's 
severe downgrading of the administering department, illustrate the 
discussion-in Chapter Three concerning the latitude of governments and 
bureaucracy to take action which, at best, lacks clear public support.
The capacity of the bureaucracy, noted in Chapter Three, to make 
as well as administer policy, at times against the wishes of government, 
was demonstrated by the success of some Commonwealth departments in 
resisting compliance with the Act and campaigning to reduce its 
application. The history of the Act's implementation also shows the 
influence of many of the sources of resistance to change identified in 
Chapter Three, as institutional limitations such as those inherent in 
the Constitution and in the discretionary provisions of the Act 
combined with bureaucratic resistance to reduce the Act's effectiveness.
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CHAPTER SIX:
EIA AND THE MONARTO DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION 
INTRODUCTION
The upsurge of interest in environmental issues in the late 1960s 
helped to draw attention to the adverse effects of rapid growth on 
quality of life in Australia's major cities, particularly in Sydney 
and Melbourne. There were fears in South Australia that its 
capital city, Adelaide, would suffer increasingly from similar 
problems. After canvassing several options for limiting Adelaide's 
growth (SPA, 1972(a)), the State government decided to develop a 
new urban growth centre on a site 70 km east of Adelaide (Figure 6.1). 
The Monarto Development Commission (MDC) was established in January 
1974 with powers to plan and construct the new city.
Planning for the new city for an ultimate population of
approximately 180,000 continued until mid-1976, when the State
government decided for a number of reasons to postpone the
commencement of construction for an indefinite period. Planning
/
for Monarto had in many respects reached a quite advanced stage, but 
had been hindered by a lack of solid commitment to an agreed rate of 
development and a specific financial programme by the Commonwealth 
and in the later stages by the South Australian government.
The EIS produced by the MDC was the first major EIS published 
in South Australia. This case study examines the factors which 
influenced the implementation of EIA at the MDC. In doing so it also 
examines many of the factors which affected the more general planning 
for the new city, since these in turn influenced EIA.
The case study employs the same framework of headings as was 
used in Chapter Three to examine the literature of the determinants 
of public policy, although for convenience in exposition the headings 
are used in a different order. The case study is not self-contained, 
however, in that many of the broader influences on public policy which 
were also influential in the Monarto case are discussed in other 
chapters.
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FIGURE 6 . 1 :
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M O N A R T O
AND S U RR OU N DI N G  REGI ON
S O U R C E :
MONARTO E I S  PHASE I
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The writer was Director of Environmental Planning (DEP) at the 
MDC from March 1974 to March 1977, responsible for EIA and all 
environmental aspects of planning and development. Consequently a 
number of sources of information were available which would 
not be accessible to a non-participant researcher.
An important aspect of the Monarto case for the purposes of 
this thesis is that the writer's participation provides an 
unusual opportunity to examine what is often a missing link in the 
understanding of the causal chain of public policy - the internal 
decisionmaking processes of government organisations. Considerable 
information can be obtained about the determinants of public policy 
by examining the public statements of politicians, the details of 
policies and legislation, the activities of pressure groups, and 
all the other information in the public arena. But such information 
omits that part of the decisionmaking process which takes place 
behind the closed doors of politicians and bureaucrats.
In seeking to understand the determinants of public policy, 
it is clearly important to know to what extent and in what way 
these internal processes affect decisions. Something can«be 
deduced about such processes from the publicly available information. 
Mbre can be ascertained from interviews with participants. But 
participants are often not forthcoming about the details of the 
personal stances and interactions of those making decisions.
Access to files is often limited, and much of significance is not 
committed to paper.
Lloyd and Troy (1981, p. xiv) note that 'the formation, 
development and operation of all levels of government remain largely 
unrecorded.' Self (1981, p. x) says:
In countries which follow the Westminster model, civil 
servants are careful to avoid disclosures which suggest 
the existence of administrative or political conflicts.
Academic researchers are denied access to the files 
for the same reason. Thus any administrative history 
which does appear (until a long time afterwards) tends 
to be a rather panglossian description of a conflictless 
world...
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Information obtained by actual participation in the decisionmaking 
process can provide a far more immediate and detailed acquaintance 
with organisational decisionmaking than is available by other means.
On the other hand, the participant may be more prone to subjectivity; 
and much of the information obtained may be difficult to document.
Many such sources are verbal: much of the important discussion
at formal meetings at the MDC was not minuted, and much took place 
informally. In some cases it is not possible to attribute material 
to specific sources. Because of the importance attached to documentation 
in an academic thesis and the problems faced in this respect by any 
participant study, the various classes of sources used in the Monarto 
case are discussed below. These were:
Published material including reports published by 
the MDC.
Unpublished reports prepared by the MDC or by private 
consultants or government agencies. Many of these 
reports would have been made available to the public 
if directly requested; others would have been # 
regarded as confidential.
MDC internal files. Some MDC files relevant to my 
work as DEP are available. The main such sources 
are the minutes of the weekly Policy and Management 
(P$M) meeting, attended by the General Manager (GM) 
and Directors; those of the weekly Directors meeting 
(DM) which the GM did not attend; and the Environmental 
Planning Division (EPD) general file.
Information from confidential sources. In cases 
where I believe sources should remain confidential,
I have used a system of confidential notes, which 
will be available only to the examiners of this thesis.
. Unattributed material. In participating in the working 
life of an organisation, information arrives from a 
variety of sources, many of them verbal. One builds
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up a picture of the behaviour of other government 
agencies, for example, from the accumulation of 
comments and verbal reports from subordinates and 
others dealing with such agencies as well as from 
personal contacts with them. Similarly, within 
one's own organisation, information on some matters 
is built up piecemeal over time from a variety of 
sources, so that it is simply not attributable to 
specific individuals. Many undocumented decisions 
were made as a result of collective discussion and 
argument; others, including many concerning EIA, by 
Directors acting autonomously in their own areas of 
responsibi1ity.
In Innovation and Reaction Lloyd and Troy (1981) recount the 
history of the Commonwealth Department of Urban and Regional 
Development, where Troy, on leave from an academic post, was Deputy 
Secretary and Lloyd the relevant Minister's press secretary. Their 
account has considerable documentation, but also includes extensive 
unreferenced material based on their personal knowledge of events.
They comment: •-
Some of the ignorance [of the internal workings of 
government] is also due to the way academics have 
treated the subject of public administration ... We 
seek to dispel the mystique which surrounds the 
bureaucratic process. Consequently this is not a 
piece of conventional writing about public administration.
It does not follow the pattern of carefully structured 
academic argument which builds reference by reference, 
footnote by footnote. (Lloyd and Troy, 1981, p. xiv)
Let it be clear that the present case study does not pursue the 
course followed by Lloyd and Troy, and includes extensive documentation. 
Nevertheless, because of the advantages of day-to-day participation in 
organisational activities which are not available to the external 
researcher, it is considered that information and opinions arising 
from such participation which cannot be referred to specific sources 
are of value. Consequently, some unattributed material is included.
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To make my role as a participant clear, I have referred to 
myself in the first person throughout, rather than in the third 
person as is sometimes done in participant studies.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCES
The social and economic factors which influenced the decision 
to proceed with the Monarto proposal also contributed to a climate 
in which the case for the new city was seen as sufficiently compelling 
for the decision to proceed to be taken, and the site chosen, without 
reference to any need for EIA. It was not until the bulk of the land 
had been purchased, and the MDC had been in operation for several 
months, that work on EIA began. The lack of statutory backing for 
State government EIA requirements, and for those of the Commonwealth 
until December 1974, and the comparative novelty of the EIA requirement, 
also contributed to this situation. Consequently, while the EIS 
contained a summary of the reasons for the decision to develop a 
new city and the choice of site, this was merely a report on the basis 
for decisions already taken, and in no sense was the EIS part of the 
basis for these decisions. The Monarto EIS was constrained to take 
the choice of site and the decision to proceed as given, and confined 
itself to assessing the impacts of the proposed development on the 
site and region (MDC, 1976, p. 1.8). Thus the course of action by 
State government in the early stages was such that EIA had no 
opportunity to play its part as a component in a balanced review of 
whether or not to proceed. Short, perhaps, of any subsequent 
disclosure of impacts of a highly adverse nature, that decision had 
already been made. The main remaining functions of EIA were to 
satisfy Commonwealth authorities contemplating the contribution of 
funds to the project, and to identify and ameliorate the impacts of 
the development on the selected site and region. It is relevant, 
therefore, to consider the nature of the social and economic conditions 
which contributed to the decision to proceed with the new city and 
the choice of site in a manner which omitted the carrying out of EIA 
until a later stage. The following discussion is based in part on 
the draft Monarto EIS Phase I, pp. 3.1-4.2 (MDC, 1976).
In the early 1970's forecasts had been made that on the then 
current rates of population growth, Adelaide could almost double in 
size to a population of 1.6 million by the year 2000. There was concern
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that, if unchecked, such growth would reproduce in Adelaide the 
problems associated with large and rapidly growing cities which were 
evident in Melbourne and Sydney, such as increased pollution, traffic 
congestion, long travel times, high land prices, and pressures on 
social facilities and urban management. As well as these general 
concerns, there were factors specific to Adelaide which indicated the 
need to limit its growth. The capacity of the available residential 
land within the boundaries of the Metropolitan Development Plan was 
estimated as 1.39 million people (SPA, 1974). Given the estimate of 
1.6 million people by the year 2000, this meant that Adelaide's 
development would further encroach on the Adelaide Plains to the 
north and south of the city, and on sections of the Adelaide Hills.
Much of the remainder of the Adelaide Plains is valuable agricultural land, 
and the Adelaide Hills are a major scenic, recreational and conservation 
asset close to the city. With increasing pressure on the remaining 
residential land in the metropolitan area, marked increases in land 
prices were expected. A substantial increase in land prices in the early 
1970's had been attributed to a decrease in the ratio of lots available 
to lots used for new dwellings (DURD, 1975).
Several possibilities were considered by the State Planning Authority 
(SPA) to restrict Adelaide's growth (SPA, 1972(a)). These included 
stimulating the growth of selected country towns, development of new 
cities, promotion of higher density development in Adelaide, development 
of a second urban centre twenty-five miles south of the present city 
centre, and expansion of the metropolitan area in a series of self- 
contained towns or districts. For various reasons most of these 
possibilities were rejected, and it was concluded that the development 
of new cities, together with the encouragement of high density development 
in Adelaide, should be pursued.
A further perceived benefit of the development of a new city was the 
possibility of providing, as expressed in the goals set for Monarto by 
State Cabinet, 'an alternative urban environment to that of existing 
Australian cities' (MDC, 1974(a), p. 40). Little choice is available 
in Australia other than living in large cities or small country towns.
A new city with an eventual population of about 200,000 would provide a 
further level of choice. However, the idea of an alternative urban 
environment referred not only to size, but to the opportunity, in planning 
a new city unhampered by existing urban development and controlled by one
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development authority, of providing a better and more innovative urban 
environment which would avoid many of the problems associated with the 
divided control and inadequately planned growth prevailing in most 
major cities (MDC, 1976, p. 3.8).
Another major attraction of the new city proposal to the State 
government was the possibility of Commonwealth government financial 
support for the project. The Commonwealth LCP Government before 1972 
had made moves towards providing Commonwealth assistance for growth 
centres. The programme of the Commonwealth Labor Government elected in 
December 1972 emphasised the promise of a better quality of life for 
those living in the less advantaged areas of major cities. One of 
the means of fulfilling this promise was a commitment to the promotion 
of growth centres to reduce pressures on existing cities (Lloyd and Troy, 
1980, esp. pp. 161-164, discuss the growth centres programme). To a 
small and resource-poor State the prospect of a substantial inflow of 
Commonwealth grant or loan funds was particularly attractive. Early 
(and optimistic) financial forecasts by the MDC envisaged the possibility 
of Commonwealth funding to the order of $124 million over a five year 
period (MDC, 1974). (Chapter 5 discusses the Commonwealth's financial 
powers). »
The combination of a period of economic prosperity and optimism, 
a growing concern with quality of life issues, both State and Commonwealth 
Labor Governments committed to action on such issues, the prospect of 
Commonwealth financial assistance, the visionary appeal of an ideally 
planned new city, and signs of the strains of population growth in 
Adelaide, gave the new city proposal a momentum which would not be 
slowed by the sober considerations and delays required for any in-depth 
environmental, financial or cost-benefit assessment.
An Advisory Committee of senior public servants chaired by the 
Hon. G.R. Broomhill, the Minister for Conservation at that time, was 
appointed in September 1971 to recommend possible sites for a new city. 
According to the Chairman of the Committee (Broomhill, pers. comm., 1975) 
in order to prevent speculation in land it was decided not to carry out 
detailed investigations of alternative sites; the Committee confined its 
efforts to a broad assessment of the best general location for 
establishing a new town. For the same reason, strict secrecy was 
maintained during the deliberations of the Committee; and no formal 
records were kept.
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Factors considered included relative land costs; the availability 
of transport routes or the costs which would be involved in constructing 
such facilities; the suitability of sufficient land on which to build 
a city; the likely size of any city; the ease or difficulty of a water 
supply to the city; the disposal of wastes, particularly sewage; and 
general access and proximity to existing markets and centres of 
population.
Against such a background three major areas developed for further 
consideration - one near Port Pirie on Spencer Gulf, one near Murray 
Bridge on the River Murray; and one in the South-East near Mount 
Gambier. On the population predictions then available it was considered 
that any new city proposed was likely to be the first of several. A 
site close to Murray Bridge was finally favoured because of its location 
in relation to water supplies, transportation, and the existing 
metropolitan area of Adelaide. It was considered important to keep 
associated costs as low as possible.
The existing and proposed transport systems between 
Adelaide and the possible area of the new city were such 
as to ensure that such costs would be kept low. Further, 
the new site would be sufficiently close to the centpal 
industrial areas, from which much of the raw and 
manufactured materials from which much of the new city 
would be built would be available; and there would be a 
pool of expert technical and constructional advice 
available close to hand. (Broomhill, pers. comm., 1975)
By April 1972 the Committee's recommendation that the new city 
should be within thirty kilometres of Murray Bridge had been accepted 
and the State Planning Authority had been asked to designate a specific 
site within that area. The Authority's report, based only on superficial 
environmental studies carried out in the limited time available, was 
published in October 1972 (SPA, 1972(b)) and the recommended site was 
designated in November of the same year. Not only economic, social 
and political factors, but the prevailing climate of ideas and beliefs, 
had contributed to the decision and its rapid implementation. 
Considerations of environmental impact had played only a minor part 
in decisionmaking, and many of the environmental problems of the site 
(discussed in subsequent sections) had not been identified or their 
importance sufficiently recognised.
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We will now turn to a discussion of the ways in which social and 
economic factors affected the characteristics of the proposal itself, 
and hence the nature of the impacts which were to be assessed. In 
essence, prevailing social and economic conditions were influential 
because the new city had to provide a total package of attributes which 
would be sufficiently competitive with those of Adelaide to attract the 
required numbers of residents, and these attributes had to be provided 
at an acceptable cost to the potential residents and to government (e.g. 
’Marketing of residential land and housing at Monarto’, UE 11.8.76).
This helped to ensure that many of the components of the new city and 
their environmental consequences would not differ greatly from those of 
other Australian cities. The prevailing view within the MDC was that 
too much of a departure from conventional urban patterns would increase 
the risk of non-acceptance by potential residents, and the provision of 
much higher levels of environmental and social amenity was limited by 
cost considerations. In most areas, therefore, the Monarto plans made 
no radical departures, but tended rather to make improvements to the 
conventional patterns of urban living (see generally Monarto: General
Planning Proposals, MDC, 1975).
For example, while planning provided for a range of residential 
densities, and for a higher proportion of medium to high density living 
than usual in new suburbs, the majority of dwellings would be detached 
homes on lot sizes similar to those of Adelaide (MDC, 1975, p.33). This 
entailed a number of environmental disadvantages over higher densities, 
for instance lower levels of service at a given cost for public transport, 
and therefore higher private vehicle use; longer journey distances; 
higher energy use resulting from both the preceding factors and from the 
higher heating and cooling costs of detached dwellings; and additional 
water usage on large gardens (significant in a dry climate). Similarly, 
because of the relatively low overall residential densities, and the view 
that public preference for using private motor vehicles was too strong 
to accept a substantial transfer to public transport, it was considered 
that a transport system which emphasised public transport at the expense 
of the private car would be unattractive to potential residents and 
excessively costly. The proposed system was therefore the conventional 
one of buses running fixed routes mainly on public roads with some 
exclusive rights-of-way, with future consideration to be given to a 
demand-sensitive system in off-peak periods. In such instances, changes 
tended to be marginal improvements rather than major innovations; for
251
instance the emphasis on provision of cycling and walking paths to reduce 
vehicular journeys (MDC, 1975, pp. 38-43; MDC, 1976, pp. 7.22-7.24).
In other areas, the MDC's overall control over planning and 
development enabled it to introduce considerable improvements in social 
and environmental amenity within the limitations provided by the need to 
attract new residents at an acceptable cost. Thus it was possible to 
plan for a hierarchy of urban centres so that community facilities and 
employment opportunities were distributed to maximise access and minimise 
travel times. Great emphasis was placed on determining the type and 
distribution of community facilities required by the future population 
based on its likely age and socio-economic composition (Yuncken Freeman, 
undated). Similarly, the overall spatial location of roads, residential 
areas and community centres could be arranged to complement the visual 
and physical characteristics of the landscape. Public and private 
buildings were to be designed and oriented to reduce energy use for 
heating and cooling. A central heating and cooling plant was proposed 
for the city centre. Buffer zones were planned to reduce noise from 
major roads and industrial areas. In such instances, the need to attract 
new residents helped, rather than hindered, environmentally satisfactory 
planning. #.
Economic factors in many cases had quite direct effects. Monarto, 
because of its location away from sea transport and the additional distance 
to the suppliers, markets and labour pool of Adelaide, would have 
difficulty in attracting industry (Plant Location International, 1976).
This would be unfortunate for industrial employment prospects, but meant 
that pollution from industry was unlikely to be a major problem. High 
costs also contributed to the rejection of some alternatives which were 
environmentally more desirable, as in the selection of the site for the 
sewage treatment works (Caldwell Connell, 1976). Some important regional 
studies, for example on the environmental effects of the recreational 
activities of future Monarto residents on the region, were not undertaken 
partly because of cost considerations.
We have seen that social and economic variables affected the planning 
and EIA for Monarto in a number of ways. They influenced the timing of 
the decisions to proceed with the project and site selection in relation 
to the commencement of EIA; the MDC's interpretation of the desires of 
potential residents shaped the project and had both positive and negative
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effects on its future impacts; economic factors directly affected the 
prospects for industry locating at Monarto and hence its likely impacts; 
cost considerations in some instances resulted in less environmentally 
desirable options being chosen.
Finally, economic considerations were central to the deferral of the 
Monarto proposal, with the Federal government's loss of office in November 
1975 virtually removing the possibility of Federal government financial 
support for the project. However a number of other factors was also 
involved (see 'The Decisionmaking Process' below).
BIOGEOPHYSICAL FACTORS
Here the concern is with biogeophysical factors as they affected the 
implementation of EIA policy. In other words, we are not concerned with 
an exposition of the environment at Monarto and the impacts of the 
proposed development for its own sake, but only insofar as these matters 
influenced the outcome of EIA policy implementation in the Monarto case, 
especially in ways which have implications for the more general 
understanding of the factors which influence the outcomes of EIA policy 
and public policy.
I
Nevertheless as a basis for the subsequent discussion it is 
necessary to give a bare outline of the biogeophysical environment at 
Monarto and the ways in which the proposed development appeared likely 
to affect the environment. The following description of the site and 
region is drawn from MDC (1975) (especially pp. 6.1-6.4).
Monarto is on the eastern edge of the Mounty Lofty Ranges where 
the foothills meet the Murray plains. To the east is the River Murray, 
to the south lie Lakes Alexandrina and Albert and beyond them Southern 
Ocean. The site lies on an upthrust block tilted gently to the south 
and east. The resultant high ground to the north and west, together with 
high dunes to the south and low hills close to the eastern boundary, give 
the site the shape of a broad shallow bowl. Approximately fifty percent 
of the site is covered by slopes of less than five degrees.
Shallow soils occur on most of the site, with considerable areas of 
outcropping rock. There are significant areas of sheet calcrete, and 
salt scalds occur sporadically throughout the site. Extensive deep soils 
are found only in parts of the centre and south-west of the site.
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The foothills to the west of the site are drained by the Bremer River 
system which discharges into Lake Alexandrina, while the northern and 
central parts of the site are drained by a series of short streams which 
flow into the Murray. These streams are largely ephemeral though they 
carry saline seepage flows for extensive periods. Runoff from the 
southern sections of the site drains into an internal depression.
The site experiences hot dry summers and cool wet winters, with 
summer daytime maxima sometimes in excess of 40°C. Frosts occur during 
the winter months. Average annual rainfall on the site is low, decreasing 
from approximately 425 mm in the west to approximately 300 mm in the 
north-east. Strong north-westerlies and north-easterlies are the dominant 
winds of the winter months. Summer winds are dominated by afternoon sea 
breezes from the SSW. Due to its concave shape, the site is subject to 
frequent nocturnal radiative cooling inversions, with cold air ponding 
in the lower areas.
There are only minor remnants of the original vegetation of the 
region. The Murray Mai lee and the open woodlands of the western flanks 
of the Ranges have been cleared for cereal growing and grazing, and the 
red gum forests of the Murray floodplains have been replaced by irrigated
I
pasture. Scattered remnants of the original vegetation cover about twenty 
percent of the Monarto site. There are two larger stands of native 
vegetation, one on the eastern hills and the other in the centre of the 
site. A wide variety of birds occurs throughout the region but the 
terrestrial fauna has been severely depleted by the destruction of its 
habitat.
Six small towns with populations exceeding one thousand lie within 
a 40 kilometre radius of the site. Murray Bridge with a population of 
over 8,000 is the regional centre and also services the Adelaide-Melbourne 
rail and road links. The site itself supported a small farming community.
Potential regional impacts
The construction of Monarto would require approximately twenty-five 
million cubic feet of rock aggregate, sands and fill. This would entail 
noise, dust and visual impacts from quarrying and transportation. Most 
such sources would be outside the site and therefore beyond the MDC's 
jurisdiction. Known sources of sands were scarce and development of the 
major deposit at Reedy Creek appeared likely to conflict with its value 
as a conservation area.
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Monarto would obtain water supplies from the Murray River but this 
would largely represent a transfer from Adelaide, which is also depend­
ent on the Murray for future expansion. However, Monarto's hotter, 
drier climate would result in higher water demands per head than 
Adelaide, and additional water would also be required to meet evapora­
tion losses and flushing needs for the proposed amenity lake near the 
city centre. Salts in irrigation water would return to the Murray in 
more concentrated form, together with other pollutants, and increased 
site runoff could affect groundwater levels in the Murray basin.
A high proportion of treated sewage from the new city could be used 
for commercial or recreational irrigation in summer, although for short 
periods in summer almost all the effluent might be discharged into the 
Bremer River and would then represent the major part of the stream flow. 
In winter most of the effluent would be discharged into the river, and 
should usually be assimilated by the higher winter stream flows. Winter 
flows in the Bremer are variable, however, and a high level of sewage 
treatment would be required in summer and winter. There was also concern 
that heavy metal precipitates in the river from the Brukunga mine 
upstream would be mobilised by reactions with elements of the sewage 
discharge.
Monarto's growth could affect the regional population and economic 
base in a number of ways. It would draw off some population and industry 
from the small towns in the region to Monarto. On the other hand, the 
region already loses population to Adelaide, and Monarto would help to 
retain some of it in the region. Regional towns would benefit economic­
ally from the increased passing and tourist trade from Monarto, and from 
housing demands as dormitories for the new city. The development of 
Monarto would result in landuses competitive to commercial agriculture, 
such as recreation and subdivision into sub-economic units for hobby 
farms and rural residences. Sub-economic units can have a range of 
undesirable environmental consequences such as those arising from poor 
land management.
Increased recreational activity, although overlapping with that 
which would have come from Adelaide in any case, would place a higher 
demand on the Murray lakes and the Murray River valley because of their 
proximity to Monarto, with increased water sports, river bank recrea­
tion, and demand for holiday houses placing pressure on the limited 
areas available. Much greater pressure than before would also be 
placed on the few substantial areas of native vegetation in the region.
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Potential site impacts
Air quality would be affected in the prevailing dry conditions by 
dust from construction and from farming operations upwind of the site; 
and, unless carefully controlled, by odours from a cold air ponding 
area containing a proposed industrial area, a sewage treatment plant 
and a waste disposal site as well as residential areas. Mild pollution 
problems could also arise during inversions from a combination of 
industrial and vehicular sources. The hot dry summers and cold winter 
winds would result in high energy use for heating and cooling.
The large areas of shallow soils on the site would mean high 
excavation costs, and the significant portion of the site with highly 
saline soils would require costly subsurface drainage if developed.
Much of the site has soils quite susceptible to erosion, the likelihood 
of which would be increased by clearing and construction and the greater 
runoff due to urbanisation. There are also small areas of expansive 
clays which would require special building design.
The main catchment area on the site drains into the Murray.
Although annual rainfall is low, extremely high short term flooding 
occurs. As well as increasing runoff, urbanisation would lead to 
increased water pollution from sources such as oil spills, waste 
discharges, litter and garden insecticides.
Increased human intrusion and fire hazard would affect the few 
remaining areas of native vegetation on the site. Although most such 
areas would be retained for parks and recreation, some would be destroyed 
by development including a significant stand of the rare Acacia 
rhigiophilla. The few native mammals and reptiles still found on the 
site would be unlikely to survive urbanisation. On the other hand, 
removal of rabbits and stock would allow existing vegetation stands to 
regenerate. Historic buildings and artefacts of some interest exist 
on the site and special action would be needed to preserve them during 
development. (The preceding comments on site and regional impacts are 
based on MDC (1975) esp. pp. 1-3).
As well as examining the broadly stated potential impacts already 
mentioned, it was also necessary to look in greater detail at the more 
localised and specific impacts of the various stages and components of
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development, such as activity centres, residential areas, highways, 
gold courses and drainage schemes. Other matters requiring attention 
were the need to arrive at a strategy and locate sites for disposing of 
solid and liquid wastes, and to assess their resultant impacts; and to 
incorporate in planning adequate buffer zones or other means for 
attenuating traffic and industrial noise. As the whole of the site had 
been compulsorily acquired and the former farming community had moved 
elsewhere, it was necessary to plan for the maintenance of the large 
areas of the site which would not be developed for many years. In all 
these matters it was necessary not only to assess the magnitude of the 
impact involved, but also to provide inputs to the planning process 
which would help to reduce the magnitude of such impacts.
The biogeophysical environment and EIA
What consequences did the interactions of the proposed development 
with the biogeophysical environment have for the EIA process? The 
semi-arid environment at Monarto is in many respects a fragile one, and 
this aggravated the likely impacts of urban development and made the 
task of assessment larger. The considerable range of components of urban 
development and the numerous likely impacts also complicated the 
assessment task. (MDC, 1975 and MDC, 1977 list over 200 reports 
relevant to the EIA of Monarto.) Many such components (for example 
sewage treatment) merited separate EIA in addition to that carried out 
for Monarto as a whole. Many categories of impact were, if fully 
investigated, tasks of considerable extent and complexity, for example 
the effects of Monarto’s recreation needs on the regional environment 
(SPA, 1973; MDC, 1975, pp. 8.86-8.98).
Important administrative problems for EIA arose between the physical 
boundaries of the potential environmental impacts of Monarto did not 
coincide with the administrative boundaries of the MDC and other 
government agencies. Where other government agencies were responsible for 
specific components of Monarto’s development (main roads, sewage), the 
MDC had no clear authority over the actions of such departments with 
statutory powers of their own (see ’Institutions' below), and was therefore 
in a position of having to produce an EIA covering actions over which it 
had no direct control. This led to complications in obtaining detailed 
information about such proposals and their likely impacts and in seeking 
environmentally desirable project modifications from other government
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authorities whose priorities and conceptions about environmental 
protection were often different from those of the MDC.
Administrative overlap also occurred because the likely regional 
impacts of the Monarto proposal extended well beyond the geographical 
area in which the MDC had jurisdiction, into areas for which a variety 
of State and local government authorities were responsible (MDC, 1976, 
pp. 8.14-8.22). Again the MDC was in the anomalous position of having to 
prepare an EIA for impacts (for example those of recreation) in areas over 
which it had no ameliorative powers, or where it had to rely on other 
authorities to provide basic data (for example in relation to River Murray 
water quality). Such basic environmental data was in many areas 
non-existent or inadequate, and the understanding of many environmental 
processes involving pollutants and impacts was often even less adequate. 
The Monarto EIS Phase I contains many statements such as:
The nutrient loads carried by the Murray are not well 
understood. Continuous sampling and testing of 
phosphorus, nitrogen and total Kjedahl nitrogen began 
only in 1972. ... There are a number of unknown factors
in the processes of eutrophication applying to these 
waters. ... No data on heavy metals is presently 
available. (MDC, 1976, p. 8.41) <
These, it is emphasised, are comments about Australia's major waterway, 
the main source of water for over a million people.
In many cases the potential impacts of Monarto and other sources 
overlapped (for example regional recreation demands from Adelaide and 
Monarto) and again, information concerning the impacts from other sources 
was often inadequate:
A noticeable absence of field information relating to 
recreation patterns in this State, and particularly 
those within the Region, is apparent in most recent 
reports handling this topic. It is, consequently, 
difficult to analyse and suggest conclusively how 
recreation demands arising from Monarto's development 
might be absorbed into the Region's overall recreation 
patterns, and more specifically, the exact nature of 
impacts that might be expected. (MDC, 1976, p. 8.86)
In such cases, while Monarto was required to produce an EIA, it would 
have needed massive funding to carry out the necessary regional studies 
and in any case such action would have been seen as conflicting with the
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functions of other government agencies. Such conflicts are further 
discussed below under the heading of ’Institutions'.
Where basic data need to be obtained, or experiments carried out to 
produce a better understanding of biogeophysical relationships, there is 
a conflict between the need for adequate information and that of producing 
an EIA in time for it to influence decisions. Much environmental data 
cannot be produced more rapidly than the slow march of the seasons allows, 
and the acquired momentum of decisionmaking tends to outstrip the 
collection of such data. A similar conflict occurs between the need for 
EIA and the amount of detail available concerning the proposed 
developments and hence their impacts. As time passes, proposals are 
developed in more detail and hence their impacts can be forecast more 
accurately; but the further planning proceeds the greater the financial 
and psychological commitment to it, and as a general rule, the less likely 
it is for the project to be cancelled. A balance point must be found 
between accuracy of impact assessment and the extent of resources 
committed to the project. In the Monarto case such problems were made 
more complex because some components of planning were at a much more 
advanced stage than others. For example, the site for the sewage treatment 
works had been purchased as early as 1974, yet a ’Phase One’ EIS on sewage 
treatment and disposal (Caldwell Connell, 1976), which called for further 
environmental studies, was not produced until February 1976. By that 
time, with planning and design based on the selected site well advanced, 
there was little prospect of relocation of the sewage treatment works to 
any alternative site.
We will now turn to some comments on the way in which the 
biogeophysical environment helped to shape the Monarto proposal itself, 
thus in turn shaping the task of EIA. As noted earlier, physical 
contraints on the growth of Adelaide contributed to the decision to 
proceed with the development of Monarto. Biogeophysical factors were 
considered in the process of selecting the Monarto site and played a 
large part in determining some of the components of the proposal. The 
decision to provide an artificial lake near the city centre, for instance, 
was influenced by the need to counteract the likely negative effects on 
the attitudes of potential residents of the hot dry summers and inland 
location of Monarto (Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey, 1976).
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The biogeophysical environment of the site also influenced both the 
spatial location and the design of the various elements of the town plan.
At the time the General Planning Proposals (MDC, April 1975) were being 
evolved, the detailed programme of environmental studies leading to 
publication of the Phase I EIS in January 1976 was barely under way.
There was, however, sufficient preliminary information for a broad 
evaluation of physical features such as slopes, drainage, vegetation, 
soils and landscape; from which a rough assessment of engineering costs 
and environmental values could be made. A landscape plan was then 
evolved based on these environmental constraints and opportunities, and 
the distribution of urban functions considered within its framework.
This approach, although based on sketchy information, made the task of 
EIA much easier since unnecessary conflicts between natural features 
and the urban plan were greatly reduced.
Biogeophysical considerations also influenced the design of 
components of the plan. For example, a drainage system was proposed 
which used broad shallow overland channels to retain water in the 
catchment and release it slowly, rather than using conventional fast­
flowing piped systems (MDC, 1977, pp. 5.21-5.27). Major roads were 
designed to follow the contours of the land. The design and height of 
buildings were to blend with the landscape. Again, such approaches eased 
the task of impact assessment - although in many instances there was 
scope for concern as to the adequacy of the data base and the execution 
of the concept.
Finally, it is worth noting the likely effects of biogeophysical 
factors on the potential viability of the project. The problems in 
attracting industry due to the geographical location of the site have 
already been noted. Some of the unfavourable environmental characteristics 
of the site, such as its inland location and a climate somewhat hotter 
in summer, colder in winter and drier than Adelaide caused considerable 
adverse public comment, to the extent that the MDC published a booklet 
'The Monarto Climate - What's It Really Like’ (MDC, undated) in an 
attempt to reduce such criticism.
While none of the adverse potential impacts reviewed earlier were 
individually of great importance for the viability of the proposal, 
collectively they were quite significant. The penalties of such problems
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would occur either as environmental damage or as the cost of ameliorative 
or preventative action. Other costs would be incurred not because of 
the impacts of development on the environment, but because of the effects 
of unfavourable environmental characteristics on development: for
example the higher levels of water use and of energy for heating and 
cooling likely due to climatic conditions; increased engineering costs 
due to the site's predominantly shallow soils and areas of high salinity; 
and the cost of 'compensatory' features such as the proposed amenity lake.
Concluding comment
That biogeophysical factors had significant effects on the planning 
and EIA for a new urban development is not surprising. What the 
foregoing has attempted to emphasise is the variety of ways in which the 
biophysical environment interacted with other policy-influential 
variables to affect various levels of decisionmaking concerning the 
Monarto proposal. Examples include the administrative conflicts arising 
from the overlap of environmental impacts into a variety of administrative 
jurisdictions; the insufficiency of existing environmental data and the 
conflict between the time required to collect such data and the realities 
of the decisionmaking process; and the influence of physical factors on 
urban location, design, costs and viability, and on public attitudes to 
the proposal.
INSTITUTIONS
The functions vested in the MDC under the Monarto Development 
Commission Act 1973 were:
13. (1) The functions of the Commission are to undertake and
carry out the social and physical planning, development and 
construction of the city of Monarto.
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1) of 
this section, for the purpose of carrying out its functions -
(a) the Commission may provide, or arrange for the 
provision of, within the designated site, buildings, 
roads, bridges, works for the supply of water, gas
or electricity, sewerage or drainage works, amenities 
and other matters and things whether or not of the 
same kind as the foregoing for, or incidental to, 
that purpose;
(b) the Commission shall have regard to all matters that 
in its opinion are necessary to be considered in 
order to ensure that the physical, social and
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economic development of the city of Monarto proceeds 
in the best interests of the people of the city;
and
(c) the Commission shall, by all means reasonably
available to it ensure so far as is practicable that 
the people of the city of Monarto are kept informed of 
the reasons for and the background to the decisions of 
the Commission and, to the greatest extent possible, 
are afforded an opportunity to participate in the 
formulation of the policy on which those decisions are 
based.
(3) The Commission has power to do all things necessary to be 
done for or in connection with or incidental to the performance 
of its functions or the exercise of its powers.
These apparently wide powers were potentially limited, however, by 
the general presumption at common law that a general Act will not override 
a specific Act (Cole, 1976, p. 6). This meant that the multitude of 
specific statutes relevant to various aspects of urban planning and 
development would still apply to Monarto. Under S.38 of the MDC Act, 
such legislation could be suspended or varied:
38. (1) The governor may, upon consideration of any special
circumstances, by regulation dispense with, suspend or vary, 
so far as is necessary, for the successful development of the 
city of Monarto within the designated site, any provision of 
any Act, by-law, rule or regulation or other provision having 
the force of law (under whatever authority made) which is in 
force within the designated site and which in the opinion of 
the Governor prevents or impedes or would prevent or impede 
such successful development and any such regulation shall apply 
and have effect as if it were enacted in this Act.
Nevertheless, until such action was taken, the legislation would 
still apply. Much of the South Australian legislation relating to 
environmental protection was weak, however, (see generally Cole, 1976) 
and therefore of little assistance in bringing about improved 
environmental standards at Monarto.
Table 6.1 lists some of the legislation relevant to environmental 
planning and control at Monarto. The Table understates the real 
position. An earlier study (SADEC, 1973) listed 61 Acts concerning 
environmental protection in South Australia, many of which would have 
had some relevance to Monarto.
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TABLE 6.1
SOME ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO MONARTO'S DEVELOPMENT
I Base Legislation
(a) Murray New Town (Land Acquisition Act, 1972)
(b) Monarto Development Commission Act, 1973
(c) Murray New Town (Land Acquisition) Amendment Act
II Commonwealth Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act, 1974
III State Laws Relating to the Environment
(1) Water Resources
a) River Murray Waters Act, 1935-1971
b) Water Conservation Act, 1936-1972
c) Waterworks Act, 1932-1969
d) Water Conservation Act, 1936-1975
e) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
f) Water Resources Act, 1976
(2) Planning and Development Act, 1966-1975
(3) The Building Act, 1970-1971
(4) Waste Management - Control of Contamination of Air, Land and Waters
INDUSTRIAL - Solids and Liquids
a) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
b) Police Offences Act, 1953-1974
- Air Pollution
a) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
b) Health Act, 1935-1973 (and Regulations)
NON-INDUSTRIAL - Liquids and Solids
a) Sewerage Act, 1929-1972
b) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
c) Beverage Container Act, 1975
- Air Pollution
a) Common Law
b) Health Act, 1935-1973 (and Regulations)
c) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
d) Road Traffic Act, 1961-1975
(5) Noise Pollution
VEHICULAR NOISE
a) Road Traffic Act, 1961-1975
b) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
DOMESTIC NOISE
a) Police Offences Act, 1953-1974 
INDUSTRIAL NOISE
a) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
b) Noise Abatement Bill, 1976
(6) Road Configuration and Dimensions
a) Planning and Development Act, 1966-1975
b) Local Government Act, 1934-1975
c) Highways Act, 1926-1975
Source: David Cole, A Preliminary Investigation into Legislation Relevant
to the Physical Environment of the Proposed City of Monarto. 
(Report to MDC, 1976).
Land use and planning controls alone present quite a complex picture 
for the Monarto region. The region was subject to two Development Plans, 
the Outer Metropolitan and Draft Murray Mallee. These plans contained 
both broad environmental principles and more specific environmental 
provisions. Six of the local councils within the region were preparing 
detailed local plans. Until such plans are operational, Interim 
Development Controls are applicable to changes in land use and buildings. 
The State Planning Authority (SPA) also exercised Interim Development 
Control over a wide corridor of land between Adelaide and Monarto. Other 
land use controls operating within the region included control by the 
MDC within the designated Monarto site, joint control by the MDC and SPA 
for 10 kilometres outside the boundary of the site; SPA control of land 
use changes along the River Murray within two kilometres of the 1956 
flood level; watershed controls administered by the Engineering and 
Water Supply Department (E$WS); and controls over land acquired by 
various government departments for specific purposes (e.g. recreation 
reserves, sanctuaries, public works reserves) (MDC, 1976, pp.8.14-8.22).
There was also much legislation not primarily concerned with 
environmental protection which was nevertheless indirectly relevant to 
EIA, such as that setting out the powers of public utilities. An early 
MDC listing (LEG, 10.3.75) indicated more than 130 statutes related in 
some way to Monarto's development. Also, government agencies became 
involved with the Monarto project not only because of their statutory 
responsibilities, but because the Government's policy was that the 
resources of State government agencies should be used wherever possible 
for investigation, planning or construction for Monarto.
The major functions of government agencies with statutory or other 
responsibilities related to Monarto's physical environment can be 
divided into those involved in physical development (e.g. highways, 
sewage), those administering environmental controls (health, land use, 
mining) and those concerned with obtaining or disseminating environmental 
information (meteorology). In many cases, agencies are engaged in more 
than one, or all three of these activities (E$WS). EIA requires 
information involving all three of the above functions: the details of
the proposed action, the characteristics of the affected environment, 
and the nature of any controls which will apply to the development; 
together with the additional function of estimating likely impacts.
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For some EIA’s the developing agency may carry out all such 
functions, but since most developments have impacts on various aspects 
of the environment, and because government agencies tend to specialise 
in particular aspects of the environment, several such agencies are 
likely to be drawn upon. In addition to obtaining information on each 
of the functional areas, it will often be necessary to establish the 
magnitude of any additional impacts from other sources, a question quite 
often involving still further government agencies. If one considers the 
great range of developments entailed in building a new city, multiplied 
by the number of separate impacts of each development, multiplied by 
the number of government agencies involved in obtaining, for each 
potential impact, information concerning the affected environment, the 
magnitude of impact, the controls applicable, and any overlapping impacts, 
the magnitude of the task of EIA on a complex development and the 
likelihood of problems arising from divided authority and overlapping 
jurisdiction become apparent. Also, some of the relevant functions may 
be carried out by private sector organisations, as developers or as 
consultants to government agencies, and these add another level to the 
institutional complexity of the task of EIA.
In the Monarto case my original plan was that the MDC# would be 
responsible for assessment of impacts arising from the project as a whole 
(for example site runoff, effects of recreation) including the necessary 
regional investigations. Government agencies or private developers 
responsible for particular components of development with substantial 
environmental impacts would be required to carry out EIA and produce 
EIS’s concerning those components. This approach was set out in the 
Draft Plan for Environmental Study (MDC, 1975(a)) distributed to relevant 
government agencies. This plan, however, did not sufficiently recognise 
the extent to which liaison with other government agencies would be 
required, and in retrospect we suffered from having devoted insufficient 
effort to such liaison on environmental matters.
The first part of the plan, concerning impacts of the project as a 
whole on the surrounding region, met with difficulties because it involved 
the MDC in carrying out regional studies beyond the boundaries of its 
statutory authority. This is the commonly encountered situation where 
the EIA requirement for the proponent to assess all significant potential 
impacts cuts across the statutory authority of other agencies concerning
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particular aspects of the impacted environment such as land use control. 
Existing information concerning the impacted environment was frequently 
inadequate to use as a basis for assessing impacts. The MDC then had 
the choice of carrying out the necessary studies itself, or persuading 
the relevant authority to do so. If the MDC planned to do the studies 
itself, there was criticism within the MDC concerning the cost of such 
studies, and whether they were the MDC's legitimate responsibility; and 
the latter criticism was often echoed externally by the government 
agencies into whose areas the study would fall. The internal criticism 
was partly due to a lack of understanding of the EIA concept, partly due 
to opposition to it, and partly a result of the internal politics of the 
MDC. An additional difficulty was that the divisions within the MDC 
concerning environmental studies and EIA were inevitably transmitted to 
other government agencies (see 'The MDC's senior staff' below).
If the MDC's Environmental Planning Division (EPD) took the course 
of trying to persuade the relevant government authority to carry out the 
necessary studies, unacceptable delays would often be encountered due to 
the difficulties of altering the established programmes of such agencies.
It is natural that a government agency faced with a request to alter its 
programmes to carry out work or supply data will be reluctant to do so 
for purposes not directly related to its own objectives. Even if it 
complies, it is unlikely to treat the matter with the same sense of 
urgency as a proponent faced with the task of preparing an EIS and 
carrying out planning activities within tight time constraints. For 
example, the effects of possible future runoff from the Monarto site on 
the water quality from the River Murray were of concern. There was 
inadequate information as to existing water quality in the Murray 
adjacent to Monarto (MDC, 1975, pp. 8.38-8.41). However, despite 
considerable efforts by members of the EPD, the E$WS, which was responsible 
under the Water Resources Act 1976 for water quality, could not be 
persuaded to institute special studies of pollutant levels and low flows 
in the Murray adjacent to Monarto (confidential note 6.1). Similar 
difficulties were encountered in attempting to persuade the South 
Australian Highways Department to examine the environmental impacts of its 
surface drainage plans for the site in more detail (Highways Dept., 1977).
In such a situation the proponent is faced with either revising time 
horizons, producing an incomplete EIS, or carrying out studies (if
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sufficient funds are available) which might have been better carried 
out by departments with pre-existing expertise, facilities and data.
The result of these circumstances was that while the MDC did carry out 
a number of regional studies, some were not of sufficient depth, and 
other areas requiring investigation were not studied other than by use 
of data already available. (The EIS Phase I and 2 make frequent 
reference to the need for additional data (MDC, 1976, 1977).)
The second part of the plan, that agencies responsible for specific 
aspects of development should prepare an EIS themselves, also encountered 
problems. There was no State statutory requirement for EIA, and few had 
been done in South Australia at that time. There were resistances within 
both the MDC and other government agencies to carrying out EIA. My 
innocence was shattered at an early Interdepartmental Coordinating 
Committee meeting when the E$WS representative delivered an unscheduled 
diatribe against the EIA requirement (confidential note 6.2). I was also 
warned by a senior staff member of the South Australian Department of 
Environment (SADEC) as to the difficulties I would probably encounter 
from some government agencies concerning EIA (confidential note 6.3).
The best argument the MDC could use to convince other, government 
agencies to produce EIA was that where Commonwealth funding was being 
sought, the EIS requirement of the Commonwealth legislation had to be 
followed. However, the agencies involved in aspects of development were 
somewhat removed from the immediacy of this requirement, since they would 
be indirectly funded through the MDC, and the Commonwealth Department of 
Environment exerted no pressure on them whatsoever (see 'The reviewing 
agencies' below). In any case, the major part of the hoped-for 
Commonwealth commitment to Monarto was never finalised, so the MDC was 
never able to face government agencies with the unconditional statement 
that Commonwealth funding will be available subject to EIA.
Despite such handicaps, EIA's were produced on several of the 
components of development, and some form of EIA was carried out on most 
major components, even where the results were not formalised into an 
EIS document. However, the component EIS's which were produced were not 
taken through the formal processes such as advertising for public comment 
and forwarding the EIS to the Commonwealth Department of Environment for 
review as required by the Commonwealth legislation. Instead they were 
used as inputs to the EIS prepared by the MDC for the project as a whole.
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There they were listed as subsidiary reports and it was noted that they 
were available to the public. The EPD had initially favoured applica­
tion of the full Commonwealth procedures to each major component EIS 
(EPD, 2.12.74), but the difficulties of persuading the government 
agencies preparing them to follow the full procedures led us to accept 
the above.
The main purpose here has been to illustrate the way in which 
institutional characteristics and rigidities affected the process of EIA 
for Monarto. The multiplicity of statues and government agencies; their 
specialist and often development-centred orientations, cross-cutting 
the more comprehensive requirements of EIA; the momentum of their 
programmes; the lack of State EIA legislation; all militated against 
effective EIA. It is worth making the further point that in dealing 
with matters in an accustomed way and when not having to deviate too 
far from established programmes, the State Government departments 
involved were usually competent and often highly efficient, as for 
instance in the soil surveys of the site carried out by the Department 
of Agriculture, or the tree-planting programme carried out by the 
Department of Woods and Forests. It was when such organisations were 
asked to adjust to requirements which cut across accepted concepts,
t
practices and responsibilities that the institutional and psychological 
resistances to such changes began to adversely affect performance.
THE ACTORS
The MDC's senior staff
In the Introduction to this chapter the comparative dearth of 
information on the internal workings of government was noted. In any 
organisation, its internal structures and relations are likely to have 
a significant bearing on its decisions and policies, and this was 
certainly the case in relation to planning and EIA within the MDC.
The Commission itself comprised a Chairman and two part-time 
Commissioners. The management structure for much of the life of the MDC 
consisted of a General Manager (GM) to whom reported no less than eight 
Divisional Directors. These were the Directors of Architecture (DArch), 
Town Planning (DTP), Social Planning (DSP), Engineering (DEng), Industrial 
and Commercial Development (DI^CD), Environment Planning (DEP), Public
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Relations (DPR), Administration and Finance (DA$F). To this considerable 
number was added, at a later stage, an Urban Fconomist, subsequently 
promoted to Director, Economic and Corporate Planning (DE$CP). Each 
Division at full strength employed about five staff, mostly professionally 
qualified. The GM later took the combined positions of Chairman and GM, 
but is referred to throughout as the latter.
Broad groupings of Directors
Among the Directors there developed a number of groupings and 
alliances, some stable, some shifting, based on similarities in background, 
profession, attitudes, or simply according to the needs of the moment.
These groupings and the personalities of individual Directors were of 
central importance for both the progress of EIA and the management of the 
MDC, and it is therefore essential to examine them in some detail.
Four Directors (DEng, DA$F, DTP and DI£CD) had career backgrounds in 
the South Australian Public Service. The other four had come from 
elsewhere in Australia; one (DPR) had a background largely in private 
enterprise; the other three, DArch, DSP, DEP, although most recently 
employed by government, had significant private sector experience. Here 
was the first line of demarcation. Those Directors from the South 
Australian Public Service (SAPS) had extensive contacts throughout the 
State bureaucracy, which they could utilise to pursue their ends. Their 
ambitions and loyalties were oriented towards the State bureaucracy, and 
in that bureaucracy lay the peer group with whose judgements they were 
most concerned. Their frame of reference was by virtue of experience 
that of the career public service, in relation to which the MDC was only 
a stepping stone in a bureaucratic career. The non-SAPS Directors, 
however, had with one exception (DPR) moved to South Australia specifically 
to join the Monarto project. The success of the project, and the internal 
relationships of the MDC, were more important to them in the absence of 
established networks of public service contacts and established careers 
in the service. With their more varied experience, the non-SAPS tended 
to find the public service way of doing things unduly restrictive.
One manifestation of the differing orientation of SAPS and non-SAPS 
was the markedly greater amount of time the SAPS spent outside the MDC 
maintaining contacts and discussing aspects of Monarto's planning and
249
other matters with colleagues in various government agencies. This was 
evident from the number of comments by SAPS Directors at MDC meetings 
which were introduced or supported by reference to opinions or 
information gleaned from external contacts.
The division between SAPS and non-SAPS showed itself in a variety 
of ways. There was a concern by the non-SAPS at what they saw as a lack 
of flexibility and receptiveness to innovation on the part of the SAPS, 
and a reciprocal concern by the SAPS about the non-SAPS failure in many 
instances to follow established public service procedures or to relate 
their activities to those of other government agencies. An example 
encapsulating these differences in outlook occurred at the Policy and 
Management (P$M) meeting on 9.8.76 (P$M was a weekly meeting attended by 
all Directors and the General Manager). The MDC had been informed that 
$150,000 was available in the Minister for Mines and Energy's budget for 
solar energy research, which it was hoped would be devoted to the 
practical development of solar energy. DArch (a non-SAPS) suggested that 
the MDC could work with other bodies in developing specific solar energy 
projects at Monarto. DEng (a SAPS), however, said that the matter (and 
the money) should be referred to the State Energy Commission. The debate 
between innovation and caution was a continuing theme at the MDC (e.g.
EPD, 5.8.75; DM, 22.1.76 and 19.2.76; P$M, 2.2.76 and 23.2.76).
One perennially contentious matter arose from the MDC's ongoing 
negotiations with the Federal government concerning funding for Monarto.
The General Manager invariably nominated DEng and DA£F (both SAPS) and 
later also DE&CP, to assist him in such negotiations. It was suggested 
a number of times without success (e.g. by DArch, DSP and myself in a 
memo to the General Manager and Directors (EPD, 15.8.76); again at the 
Directors' meeting on 11.3.76 and at the subsequent P£M meeting on 
15.3.76) that 'a wider and more representative range of the disciplines 
•available within the Commission' should take part in such negotiations. 
These suggestions were based on concern that aspects of the case for 
Monarto - the quality of its planning and design, and its environmental 
and social benefits - were not being adequately presented at such meetings, 
with adverse consequences for Monarto's funding.
This disagreement also marked another grouping of Directors, largely 
overlapping with the SAPS and non-SAPS, into what might be called the
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’hards' and the 'softs'. The softs included the non-SAPS Directors hut 
also the DTP, a SAPS. The softs showed a greater concern with social 
and environmental values, and those aspects of urban design and quality 
less amenable to quantification and measurement. The hards, whose interests 
by training and inclination lay in the financial, economic and technical 
aspects, centred on DEng and DA£F, with the later addition of DE^CP.
The softs (excluding DTP, whose approach was more circumspect) twice 
more approached the General Manager as a group. In the first instance, 
they expressed concern that the hards were stifling innovation and 
concern with quality of life issues in the planning of Monarto. The 
second approach was to suggest an early move by MDC staff to the site,
(DM 17.11.75) in order to demonstrate a positive commitment to the project.
Both these approaches met with a largely negative response. The 
GM had a cautious attitude towards innovative ideas (P$M, 2.2.76, 23.2.76, 
5.3.76). The proposal for an early move to the site illustrated the 
division between the main groupings of Directors, with DE$CP, DA£F, and 
DEng opposed to it (DM 17.11.75, p. 2).
A point which the discussion of the early move to the*.site helped 
to confirm was that the members of the hard/SAPS grouping showed a great 
reluctance to actually live at Monarto themselves - the hope which some 
expressed was that by the time such a requirement arose (and a 
willingness to do so had been part of the conditions of employment of 
the MDCO they would have moved to a position elsewhere, that they could 
commute from Adelaide, or in some cases that they would maintain their 
Adelaide residence and obtain smaller, secondary accommodation at 
Monarto. As long-term Adelaide residents this was understandable, but 
it illustrates the SAPS lesser identification with and dependence on the 
Monarto project than was characteristic of the non-SAPS, a factor which 
contributed to the differences between the two groups.
Specific Directors and EIA
Sometimes reinforcing, sometimes crosscutting the broad groupings 
already described were several other allegiances and enmities. DArch and 
DTP maintained an uneasy alliance. At one point each told me they had 
made a specific agreement not to oppose each other's proposals in Policy
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and Management and Director's meetings, but to resolve any differences 
privately. DSP and I had a mutual sympathy based on the similarity of 
our positions in attempting to inject a greater degree of social and 
environmental concern into the work of the Commission. Relationships 
between DEng, on the one hand, and DArch, DSP and me on the other, were 
poor, but DEng maintained good relationships with DE$CP and all the SAPS 
except at times DTP, whose position was generally somewhere between SAPS 
and non-SAPS and hards and softs.
DEng, responsible for all major works such as roads, sewage, drainage, 
water supply, the artificial lake, was the Director whose actions could 
most hinder or help in determining the quality of the EIS and the standard 
of environmental inputs to planning and construction. Unfortunately, he 
also proved to be the most recalcitrant in such matters. An early warning 
of this occurred in response to a document which I circulated in December 
1974 setting out the proposed functions of the EPD (EPD, 2.12.74).
DEng wrote to the GM expressing his opposition to these proposals 
(EPD, 5.12.74). The GM, however, passed the memo to me for comment. It 
began with the statement that the EPD paper 'has the appearance of having 
been written in complete isolation' and that '... it seems* to be 
impractical' (DEng's italics). I was surprised both by the vehemence 
with which these views were expressed, and because I could see little 
justification for them in fact or in terms of the EPD paper itself. In 
support of the point concerning isolation, for example, DEng suggested 
that the document did not 'take into account the fact that what are stated 
as objectives of the environmental division form an essential and major 
part of the objectives of several other divisions'. My reply noted that:
... the objectives are suggested, not 'stated', for 
adoption by the MDC, not just the EPD. The objectives were 
developed in conjunction with all Divisions in the first 
instance, and in their revised form have been accepted 
and placed in official documents developed by both SP and 
TP Divisions. This is not isolation. (EPD, 16.12.74)
One noteworthy comment was made by DEng in support of his view that 
the document was impractical: 'The document gives the impression that
a main objective is to gain by decree and instructions what should be 
achieved by co-operation ...'.
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Now w hile  I b e l i e v e d  t h a t  the  document in  f a c t  emphasised 
c o o p e r a t i o n  r a t h e r  than c o e r c io n ,  th e  p o in t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  i n d i c a t e d  a 
fundamental  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  op in ion  concern ing  the  r o l e  o f  the  EPD. DEng 
saw th e  EPD as simply a s e r v i c e  d i v i s i o n  to be c a l l e d  upon when he saw 
f i t .  I b e l i e v e d  t h a t  as  DEP I was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the  envi ronmenta l  
a s p e c t s  o f  p la nn ing  and t h e  EIS, and t h a t  I should have a u t h o r i t y  
commensurate w i th  t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y :
At p r e s e n t ,  Eng inee r ing  and o t h e r  D iv is io n s  have a u t h o r i t y  
to  c a r r y  out  work . . .  which may have an env ironmenta l  
im pact .  The EPD has  no a u t h o r i t y  a t  p r e s e n t  to  ensure 
t h a t  env i ronm en ta l  f a c t o r s  a r e  ad eq u a te ly  c o n s id e re d .
This i s  a o n e - s id e d  s i t u a t i o n .  A u th o r i t y  does not  
g u a ran tee  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  but  i t  i s  l i k e l y  to  help  induce 
i t .  (EPD, 16 .12 .74)
The o p p o s i t i o n  o f  DEng to  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  EPD con t inued  
u n re s o lv e d  th roughout th e  l i f e  o f  th e  p r o j e c t .  Major c o n s u l t a n c i e s  were 
commissioned,  f o r  example on th e  hydrology o f  th e  s i t e ,  and major 
e n g i n e e r in g  d e c i s i o n s  ta k en ,  w i thou t  r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  EPD, and to  ensure  
in  such cases  t h a t  th e  env i ronmenta l  a s p e c t s  were co n s id e re d ,  o r  even to 
a s c e r t a i n  what was be ing  done,  was a c o n t in u in g  b a t t l e .  A case  in  p o in t  
concerned  th e  p o l i c y  and management c h e c k l i s t  (copy P$M, 8 ,1 .7 6 )  which 
DEng was d e l e g a t e d  to  develop  as th e  c e n t r a l  means o f  m on i to r ing  th e  
t a s k s  to  be c a r r i e d  ou t  by th e  MDC, t h e i r  t a r g e t  d a t e s  fo r  com ple t ion ,  
and to  h i g h l i g h t  p o s s i b l e  problems and c o n f l i c t s .  Despite  p r i o r  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  them i n  th e  P$M meeting ,  envi ronmenta l  m a t t e r s  were 
i n i t i a l l y  com ple te ly  om i t te d  from th e  l i s t .
These problems had c o n s i d e r a b l e  consequences f o r  th e  EIS and f o r  the  
q u a l i t y  o f  env i ronmenta l  i n p u t s  to  t h e  Commission’s work. Environmental  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  would be s e t  up to p rov ide  d a t a  in  a form adequa te  fo r  
e n g i n e e r in g  pu rp o s es ,  but  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  fo r  t h o s e  o f  envi ronmenta l  
p r o t e c t i o n .  In a memo to  t h e  GM da ted  14 .5 .76  (EPD), I argued th e  case 
t h a t  b a s i c  env i ronmenta l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  should be managed by th e  EPD, 
and t h a t  where a l a r g e r  p r o j e c t  had an envi ronmenta l  component, a member 
o f  t h e  EPD should  be r e s p o n s i b l e  to t h e  p r o j e c t  manager fo r  d e t e r m in a t io n  
o f  t h e  env i ronm enta l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  and f o r  bu d g e t in g ,  
c o o r d i n a t i o n ,  d i r e c t i o n  o f  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  and s a t i s f a c t o r y  com ple t ion  o f  the  
env i ronm enta l  a s p e c t s .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  I argued t h a t  such ar rangements  
shou ld  apply  to two major s t u d i e s  - th e  management o f  the  exper im en ta l
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farm, which involved irrigation of a range of soils and monitoring of 
the effects (e.g. with respect to salinity), and Phase Two of the 
Sewage Treatment Works EIS. The latter arrangement, I thought, had 
been previously agreed with the Engineering Division, but I found that, 
not for the first time, both the EPD and Engineering Division had 
budgeted for the same study.
In other cases, studies which were supposed to be investigating 
certain environmental problems failed to do so. An initial hydrology 
study did not adequately answer the question of the environmental 
viability of the proposed artificial lake (Kinnaird Hill de Rohan and 
Young, 1975) . Such a lake had been an accepted central feature of the 
preliminary planning for Monarto even before formation of the MDC in 
January 1974. Yet it was not until 15.5.75 that a study was undertaken 
which properly tackled the problems of turbidity, salinity, high 
evaporation, and possible eutrophication of the lake; a study which was 
not completed until September 1976 (Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey, 1976) 
by which time detailed planning of the city centre and other areas 
adjacent to the lake had been completed. The point here is not only 
that many projects could have been designed in a more environmentally 
satisfactory way. Also, many environmental studies which* if taken 
together, might have engendered serious doubts about the suitability of 
the Monarto site, were not completed until too late a stage in the 
decisionmaking process. However, problems internal to the MDC only 
contributed to such delays. As has been noted, the larger cause was the 
failure to carry out adequate environmental studies before the decision 
to proceed with Monarto was taken and the MDC established.
A related difficulty concerned liaison with other major government 
instrumentalities providing engineering services, such as the 
Engineering and Water Supply Department. DEng's SAPS background provided 
him with a range of contacts with such agencies, and this made the EPD's 
task of communicating with them more difficult. At one time DEng 
proposed to the GM that any contacts with them should be made through him.
The problems of the relationship with DEng cannot be ascribed simply 
to a specific personality clash, since DEng had similar differences of 
opinion with DArch and DSP. However, since their work did not overlap 
with that of DEng as much as that of the EPD, disagreements with them 
were less frequent.
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Part of the problem may have arisen from an engineer’s training, 
which perhaps tends to foster a certain conservatism and scepticism 
towards new or unquantifiable concepts. A contribution based on such 
views can be a useful and necessary one, provided that it is not allowed 
to dominate to the point of destructiveness. The essence of the problem, 
however, was DEng's freely expressed view that engineers are capable of 
dealing with the environmental aspects of their proposals and that such 
matters should therefore have been his responsibility.
The situation eased somewhat once the Engineering Division acquired 
additional qualified staff, since cooperation within the MDC was usually 
considerably greater at levels below that of Director. Such officers 
were younger engineers who by training or inclination had a greater 
concern for environmental matters, and in any case were somewhat removed 
from the ambitions and empire-building at Director level. Nevertheless, 
their discretion was limited, and problems continued to arise.
The difficulty which I faced was essentially one of balancing the 
need for conciliation and cooperation against the extent to which I was 
prepared to compromise my ideas about what constituted adequate 
environmental planning. It seemed to me that if they were, not treated 
with greater sensitivity, the environmental aspects of Monarto could 
well become a matter for public controversy, as had those of many other 
major projects in Australia. If this happened I would be held chiefly 
responsible for any failings in environmental planning, whatever my 
difficulties within the MDC might be.
The point being made here is that to some degree, similar 
difficulties must be expected when attempting to introduce any change 
which challenges the dispositions, training, autonomy or authority of 
those affected. This applies however logical and necessary the changes 
might appear to those implementing them, or even to an impartial 
observer, and helps to explain some of the implementation difficulties 
encountered by EIA in the MDC and elsewhere.
The position of the Director, Town Planning (DTP) in relation to 
the EPD was more ambivalent than that of DEng. On the one hand, like 
DEng, he saw the EPD as an infringement upon a function which he was 
capable of carrying out. On the other hand, he professed a reputation
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for being sympathetic to the environment in his work. Further, he 
believed that the town planner’s role and expertise was the central one 
of coordinating and synthesising inputs from other professions. Such 
beliefs would have been inconsistent with a lack of receptiveness to 
the inputs to be provided by the EPD. At the same time, however, he 
considered that the acceptance or rejection of such inputs should be at 
his discretion. His attitudes are illustrated by a memo objecting to 
my Division adopting the title of Environmental Planning Division.
The word environment should be prefaced by an adjective 
otherwise it is meaningless ... I presume you mean the 
physical environment ... I respectfully submit therefore 
that my Division and my profession is the core group 
planning the physical environment. Town and Country 
Planning is synonymous with Physical Planning ... .
At all times their [Architecture, Landscape Architecture 
and Town Planning] professions seek input in their 
planning and design from what are commonly understood 
these days as the environmental disciplines - generally 
the natural and physical sciences.
I have gained some recognition over the years as having 
some skills in using the inputs of the environmental 
disciplines to solve planning and design problems ... .
(EPD, 15.10.74)
I
DTP'S strength was in relating the landscape to the components of 
urban development so as to retain as much as possible the natural 
features of the site and made the most of them visually and for 
recreation. But his recognition of the depth of studies needed to 
examine some of the environmental problems of the site did not always 
match his enthusiasm for designing with nature. The document 'Monarto: 
General Planning Proposals’ published by the MDC in April 1975 makes 
little or no mention of many of the environmental problems associated 
with the site, even to the extent that they were understood at that stage; 
for example the areas of saline soil with their associated problems 
for building and domestic irrigation, the high erodability of considerable 
areas of the site, the summer dust storms, the poor proposed siting of 
the sewage treatment works upwind of the site, and the potential for 
air pollution.
A visual approach to environmental features can be misleading. As 
an illustration, a great deal was said about the need to preserve the 
largest remaining stand of scrub, near the centre of the site. Ecological
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s t u d i e s  l a t e r  showed t h a t  most  o f  t h i s  woodland was o f  l i m i t e d  v a l u e ,  
a s  i t  was too  o l d  t o  r e g e n e r a t e  ( E n v i ro n m en ta l  S c i en c e  and S e r v i c e s  
C o n s u l t a n t s ,  1977) . On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  DTP a c c e p t e d  EPD i n p u t  t o  t h e  
v a r i o u s  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  Monarto town p l a n ,  and E I S ' s  were p r e p a r e d  as  
p a r t  o f  t h e  p l a n n i n g  o f  each  r e s i d e n t i a l  a r e a  ( e . g .  T r a c t  C o n s u l t a n t s ,  
1976;  N a t u r a l  Systems R e s e a r c h ,  1 9 7 5 ) .  In most i n s t a n c e s ,  a r e a s o n a b l e  
d e g r e e  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  be tw een  t h e  Town P l a n n i n g  D i v i s i o n  and EPD was 
a c h i e v e d .
As m en t io ned  e a r l i e r ,  t h e r e  was a c o n s i d e r a b l e  mutual  sympathy 
be tw een  DSP and m y s e l f  i n  o u r  r o l e s  o f  p r o v i d i n g  'new'  i n p u t s  t o  t h e  
p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e r e  was one i m p o r t a n t  a r e a  o f  
d i s a g r e e m e n t .  The Commonwealth Envi ronment  P r o t e c t i o n  (Impact  o f  
P r o p o s a l s )  Act r e q u i r e s  t h a t  E I S ' s  s h o u ld  c o v e r  t h e  im pac ts  o f  p r o p o s a l s  
on t h e  s o c i a l  as  w e l l  as  t h e  p h y s i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t .  DSP, however ,  to o k  
t h e  view t h a t  h i s  D i v i s i o n  had p roduce d  i t s  own do c u m e n ta t io n  on t h e  
s o c i a l  p l a n n i n g  a s p e c t s  o f  Monarto ,  t h a t  such  do c u m e n ta t io n  would no t  
be r eworked  i n t o  t h e  r e q u i r e d  EIS f o r m a t ,  t h a t  t h e  Commonwealth Depar tment  
o f  Envi ronment  was no t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  eq u ip p e d  w i t h  s t a f f  q u a l i f i e d  t o  
j u d g e  t h e  ade quacy  o f  d o c u m e n t a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  i m p a c t s ,  and t h a t  i t  would 
be b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  EIS t o  c o n c e r n  i t s e l f  w i t h  p h y s i c a l  im pa c ts  and t o  
l e a v e  s o c i a l  a s p e c t s  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  government  b o d i e s  conc e rne d  w i th  
s p e c i f i c  a s p e c t s  o f  s o c i a l  p l a n n i n g  and w e l f a r e .  The outcome was t h a t  
o n l y  a l i m i t e d  amount  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a bou t  s o c i a l  im pa c ts  co u ld  be 
i n c l u d e d  in  t h e  EIS (MDC, 1976, p p . 5 . 1 - 5 . 1 1  and 8 . 2 - 8 . 1 3 ) .  The l a c k  
o f  a th o ro u g h  rev i e w  o f  s o c i a l  i m p a c t s  i n  t h e  EIS was s t r o n g l y  c r i t i c i s e d  
by b o t h  S t a t e  and F e d e r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  ( s e e  'The r e v i e w i n g  
a g e n c i e s '  b e lo w ) .
The o t h e r  D i r e c t o r s  p l a y e d  a l e s s  c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
EIA and e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p l a n n i n g ,  and can  be d i s c u s s e d  more b r i e f l y .
DA$F, w i t h  many y e a r s '  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  SAPS, was p r i n c i p a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  SAPS r u l e s  and p r o c e d u r e s  w i t h i n  t h e  
MDC. This  was d e s p i t e  t h e  d e l i b e r a t e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  MDC as  a 
s t a t u t o r y  body w i t h  f reedom from p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  to  
a l l o w  g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  c a r r y  o u t  more r a p i d  and i n n o v a t i v e  work.
The non-SAPS b e l i e v e d  t h a t  SAPS r e g u l a t i o n s  were i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  an 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  to  c a r r y  o u t ,  u n d e r  t i g h t  t im e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  t h e  
m u l t i t u d e  o f  t a s k s  i n v o l v e d  i n  b u i l d i n g  a new c i t y  in  t h e  i n n o v a t i v e  way 
r e q u i r e d  by t h e  MDC's  o b j e c t i v e s .  However, t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d i s c r e t i o n  o f
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Directors was gradually enmeshed by rules and regulations, so that even 
minor matters had to be referred to DA$F and were at times subjected 
to lengthy delays (e.g. EPD 3.12.75).
The Directors of I$CD and PR had little to do with the EIA, but 
generally supported the need for environmental studies. Both maintained 
generally good relations with other Directors and avoided most disputes. 
DE$CP arrived late on the scene, and partly for this reason had little 
influence on EIA and environmental planning. As a former Commonwealth 
public servant and a hard-nosed economist, however, his attitudes 
placed him in the SAPS/hards camp on most issues. DArch was generally 
cooperative on environmental matters and was a strong exponent of 
environmentally sensitive architecture.
Figure 6.2 gives an approximation of the position of the senior 
staff on two scales: the strength of SAPS-type attitudes, and their
orientation as softs or hards - the interest and importance they generally 
assigned to environmental and social issues as compared with economic, 
financial, technical and engineering and construction aspects. The 
positions are based on my own subjective judgement, and the diagram is 
intended to do no more than give an impression of the relative positions 
of Directors on the two scales. The important point illustrated is that 
the SAPS and hard groupings largely coincided, as did the non-SAPS and 
softs. This of course need not necessarily have been the case, as DSP 
or DEP, for instance, might have been appointed from the SAPS or DEng 
or DA§F from private enterprise. The situation as it existed, however, 
was unfortunate, because the two broad divisions among the Directors 
reinforced one another, so that the SAPS, for instance, as well as 
sharing similar public service backgrounds, attitudes and contacts, 
found other similarities in interests and outlooks, as did the 
non-SAPS/softs grouping.
Except in a few instances, all the members of each grouping did 
not act together in a planned way. But there were many instances where 
two or three individuals from a given grouping would deliberately 
combine to attack of defend some action or proposal. And frequently, 
without prior discussion, individuals within each grouping would support 
one another at meetings. Such support usually entailed something more 
than a coincidence of views. There was in addition a degree of
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emotionally-coloured recognition that one was supporting a colleague 
in need of assistance whose views were generally similar to one's own, 
and who might be expected to return the favour on another occasion.
In addition to these more overt forms of mutual assistance, the 
existence of a group of others with similar ideas allowed Directors, 
rather than having to accommodate uncomfortable ideas and values, to 
obtain sympathy and reinforcement for their own positions.
There appears to be a similarity between the characteristics of 
those senior staff located towards the extremes of the non-SAPS/softs- 
SAPS/hards spectrum, and the personality patterns of 'low scorers' and 
'high scorers' respectively as described in The Authoritarian Personality 
(Adorno et al., 1950, particularly pp. 473-486. Although the methodology 
of The Authoritarian Personality has been strongly criticised, e.g. 
Christie and Jahoda (ed.), 1954, its conclusions in broad terms appear 
to stand). However, to illustrate the point fully with reference to 
MDC documentation would require a lengthy digression. All that will be 
said here is that to the extent that authoritarian personality 
characteristics were involved, this would contribute to explaining the 
difficulties encountered in introducing the changes required by EIA.
It would also help to explain the strains within the MDC if its senior 
staff, already divided into two groups by reason of experience and 
profession, were further divided by personality patterns which placed 
the members of the respective groupings in opposite halves of the 
spectrum of authoritarianism.
The role of the General Manager
One might think the two major groupings of Directors were evenly 
matched; however, the SAPS had a considerable advantage in the strength 
of their public service contacts; further, the GM tended to take a 
position more towards the SAPS/hard grouping, and to move further towards 
that grouping during the life of the project. This move probably 
reflected the change from the 'build it fast, plenty of funds available' 
philosophy initially prevailing in government to the low profile, problems 
with funding, and doubts about the project's future prevalent towards 
the end (see 'The Decisionmaking Process' below). The GM's position, 
however, tended to vary more according to the specific issue being 
addressed than did those of Directors. Nor was he as directly influential
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as might be expected, because his style was largely one of remaining 
aloof from most personal and professional disagreements, and from the 
'professional' aspects of planning, although when he did intervene, he 
would brook no opposition (e.g. his dispute with Head, Publicity Services, 
P$M, 9.8.76). The GM's activities were largely directed to managing 
the MDC's relations at the highest levels, for example with Ministers, 
permanent heads and principals of consulting firms. His indirect 
influence, however, was considerable, because of the courses of action 
(such as the bureaucratisat ion of the MDC) which he would tacitly 
approve.
On environmental matters the GM supported the need for EIA because 
he understood its political significance; it was necessary to produce 
the EIS document in order to satisfy the public and State and Commonwealth 
Governments. He did not fully understand, however, the need for an 
ongoing environmental input into planning and often spoke as if the task 
would be over once the EIS had been produced. Nor did he, although made 
aware of the problems (e.g. EPD, 14.5.76), ever intervene sufficiently 
to sort out the respective responsibilities of DEng and myself, or to 
give the EPD the degree of authority and support necessary to operate 
most effectively. This was inevitably reflected to some extent in the 
quality of the EIA.
Many of the rivalries and disputes within the MDC could have been 
greatly abated by a General Manager prepared to become more involved in 
planning decisions and in the settlement of disagreements. A 
contributing factor here was the wide span of control, with eight and 
later nine Directors reporting directly to the GM. The need for a 
revised management structure was pointed out to me (EPD, 14.8.74) and 
others early in the life of the Commission, but nothing was done until 
its dying days three years later. However, the fact that two potential 
positions of assistant general manager were pencilled in during the 
whole of this period increased tensions among the Directors, as several 
including DEng, DTP and DArch saw themselves as possible candidates, and 
even those who did not had their own preferences for the positions.
Some of the management problems of the MDC were recognised by 
implication in a paper The Management Task within the MDC put forward by 
the GM in March 1976 (PfjM, 5.3.76). It noted: '"back door" or "going
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around others" tactics in presenting cases or pursuing causes should be 
avoided' (p. 1) 'Directors ... should see themselves principally as 
managers rather than as technicians in their particular professional 
fields' (p. 5) '... ensuring that approved procedures and provisions 
for interdivisional liaison and coordination are adhered to' (p. 6).
Sources of resistance to change
There were thus a number of factors related to the senior staff of 
the MDC which handicapped the input of environmental considerations to 
decisionmaking and the carrying out of EIA. The nature of these 
confirms much of the discussion in Chapter Three of the character of 
bureaucracy and the personal and organisational sources of resistance 
to change.
At the personal level, complacency, habit and primacy, together 
with the effects of bureaucratic socialisation, were apparent in the 
way Directors would apply accustomed ideas and procedures to new 
situations, and in the tendency of the SAPS to see matters from a public 
service rather than a Monarto viewpoint. The operation of selective 
perception was demonstrated in the tendency to seek reinforcement from 
those colleagues with similar views, and to minimise contact with others.
The effects of professional socialisation were apparent in most 
Directors, for instance in their readiness to refer to professional 
qualifications as a reason for claiming authority over various functions 
and in the assertion of the virtues and importance of their profession. 
Here is another example from the Directors' meeting (18.12.75), concerning 
a consultancy commissioned by DArch:
Director Eng. asked for details of the 'energy' consultancy 
which has recently been commissioned for the first Local 
Activity Centre. In view of the need to coordinate all 
energy studies and the availability of local consultants 
competent to carry out this work he suggested that all 
future proposed energy consultancies should be referred 
to the Engineering Division for comment.
As in a similar example referred to earlier, it can be seen that 
linked with professional socialisation, expressed in the belief that 
energy studies should fall within the domain of the Engineering Division,
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is concern with what were referred to earlier as positional costs and 
benefits, in this case the additional authority entailed by control over 
such studies. This incident was part of a continuing effort by DEng to 
gain greater control over projects concerning energy (see also DM,
19.2.76).
The tendency to give greater weight ’to opinion within than opinion 
without' noted in the study of the Whitehall civil service by Heclo 
and Wildavsky, was also evident in the MDC, as noted in the case of 
the SAPS Directors. As another example:
The Head of Publicity Services [formerly DPR] asked whether 
in view of the Monarto holding situation there was need for 
the production of an audio-visual presentation recording 
the achievements of the MDC. The Chairman expressed the 
view that the best publicity for the Commission was the 
completion of high quality work, and that the Commission 
already had a good reputation in this respect.
No special 'blowing of trumpets' would be necessary, and in 
fact could be counter-productive when we needed to take a 
low posture on Monarto in a holding situation. (P£M, 28.6.76)
It is doubtful, however, whether the MDC's work was well known
f
outside its immediate contacts. In March 1976, when planning was well 
advanced, Mr Ivor Wardle, the Member for Murray (an electorate which 
encompasses the Monarto region) in the South Australian Legislative 
Assembly, wrote to the MDC: 'I am repeatedly asked for details of the
development of Monarto and find that I am unable to answer the queries' 
(Wardle, 1976).
The GM's conservative attitude to publicity reflected his public 
service background. Much of his discussion of publicity related to 
means of ensuring that his own or ministerial approval would be 
obtained (P$M, 29.3.76). This is understandable in a statutory authority 
responsible through its minister to parliament. But it does illustrate 
one source of the bureaucratic tendency to favour 'opinion within'.
In balancing the potential conflict between responsiveness to 
ministerial direction and responsiveness to the public, the GM leaned 
towards concern with possibly unfavourable parliamentary or ministerial 
reaction (P$M, 9.8.76) rather than the active pursuit of public support 
at the risk of some adverse comment. Such concerns, together with values
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and attitudes influenced by professional and occupational socialisation 
within the bureaucracy, tend to slow bureaucratic responsiveness to 
external pressures for change.
In this section the backgrounds, personalities, relationships and 
groupings of the MDC's senior staff have been discussed in relation to 
their effect on the implementation of EIA and the management of the MDC, 
and in terms of some theoretical considerations introduced in earlier 
chapters. While some of the problems (for instance, the self-reinforcing 
features of the groupings of Directors) were specific to the MDC, many 
of the characteristics which have been discussed could occur in any 
organisation, and would be likely to pose similar difficulties for 
change. Nor were the individuals concerned anything but competent in 
their own fields. The difficulties encountered arose because they were 
being asked to accept concepts and take actions which in many ways ran 
counter to their training, experience, attitudes, personalities and 
personal ambitions, within a management structure which seemed almost 
designed to exacerbate such problems.
The public, interest groups
The analysis here is largely confined to the question of public and 
interest group influence on EIA and environmental aspects of the Monarto 
proposal, rather than that of public attitudes to the proposal in 
general. It should be noted, however, that despite the GM's wary 
attitude to publicity he accepted the desirability, strongly pursued 
by the 'softs' Directors (DTP, DSP, DArch, DEP and DPR), of encouraging 
public participation in the planning process. A consultant's report, 
however, noted the 'confusion of aims' within the MDC concerning public 
participation (Sandercock, 1975, p. 132) and generally the MDC's 
approaches to public participation were the conventional ones to obtaining 
public comments on plans and reports, distributing questionnaires and so 
on, although the Social Planning Division in particular had begun to 
implement a more innovative approach involving identification and contact 
with 'stakeholders' in the new city (Sandercock, 1975, pp. 134-139).
The MDC went to some lengths to obtain public comment and input 
to the process of environmental planning and impact assessment. A 
questionnaire inviting comment was sent to 38 organisations interested 
in various aspects of the environment, talks and site tours were given
264
to interest groups, student groups, and business organisations, and 
the EPD produced a series of documents reporting on its approach to, 
and progress with environmental studies. These were
The Draft Plan for Environmental Study, January 1975 
Environmental Study Progress Report, April 1975 
Draft Monarto EIS Phase I, January 1976 
Monarto EIS Phase II, September 1977
Each document requested public comment, which was responded to in 
subsequent reports. Over 400 of each of these documents were distributed.
The Draft Monarto EIS listed 109 people or organisations who had 
made written submissions concerning environmental aspects of Monarto's 
development up to the time of its publication. Table 6.2 gives a 
breakdown of the sources of these comments.
TABLE 6.2
SOURCES OF PUBLIC COMMENT PRIOR TO MONARTO EIS PHASE I
Source Number Percentage
Environmental interest groups 36 33
Government agencies 27 25
Individuals 23 21
Other interest groups 12 11
Universities/research organisations 9 8
Private sector 2 2
109 100
Source: Derived from draft Monarto EIS Phase I (1976), Appendix 7,
pp. 1-8.
These figures indicate quite an extensive response, particularly in 
the number of environmental interest groups participating, given that 
the project had not become very environmentally controversial. The
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individual responses showed an elitist bias, with five doctors and 
three professors among those commenting. The 'other interest groups' 
were predominantly those such as the Royal Australian Institute of 
Architects with an interest in environmental matters but not with 
environment as their principal concern.
By contrast only eighteen written comments were made in response 
to the draft EIS Phase I. Table 6.3 shows the proportions of these 
comments received from various sources compared with those received 
prior to publication of the Phase I EIS.
TABLE 6.3
COMPARISON OF SOURCES OF PUBLIC COMMENT
Comments on EIS Comments prior to
Phase I EIS Phase I
SOURCE Number Percentage Percentage
Environmental interest <.
groups 3 17 33
Government agencies 11 61 25
Individuals 1 6 21
Other interest groups 2 11 11
Universities/research
organisations 1 6 8
Private sector - - 2
18 100 100
Source: Table 6.2 above; and derived from Monarto EIS Phase II (1977),
Appendix, pp. 1-72.
The proportion of comments on the draft EIS Phase I received from 
environmental interest groups and individuals shows a marked decline 
compared with those received prior to its publication. It seems likely 
that to some extent this was because such groups have limited resources, 
and considered that a sufficient contribution had already been made.
They were probably also reasonably satisfied that the project would have
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no overwhelmingly adverse effects, and that the draft EIS Phase I and 
the approach being taken by the MDC to environmental planning were 
generally adequate. Nevertheless there were areas where the public 
comment could have been considerably stronger, as will be discussed 
below.
Excluding comments by government agencies, 47 separate comments 
on the Phase I EIS were made in the seven submissions from other sources. 
These can be categorised as follows:
TABLE 6.4
SUBJECTS OF NON-GOVERNMENT COMMENT 
ON MONARTO EIS PHASE I
Subject Number of Comments Major Minor
Presentation of EIS 9 - -
Planning 7 3 4
Site impacts 15 3 12
Regional impacts 10 7 3
Impacts on both region and site 6 5 c 1
47 18 20
Source: Derived from Monarto EIS Phase I (1977), Appendix, pp. 1-72.
Comments on the presentation of the EIS concerned such matters as its 
length and detail (some considered it too long and complex, others wanted 
more information and detail) or queried the need to include certain 
matters - for instance the discussion of the need for Monarto, the 
objectives of Monarto, the alternatives to Monarto and alternative sites, 
and social and economic considerations, all of which are required by the 
Commonwealth Act. 'Planning' comments were those whose subject was 
centrally a planning one, rather than one of environmental impact, for 
example concerning the provisions for attracting older people to Monarto, 
or the amount of employment required in the early stages of development. 
Included here also are comments concerning the need for, and site of, 
the new city, and the related question of the capacity of the Adelaide 
metropolitan area.
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The remaining comments were divided almost equally between those 
concerned with site impacts and those impacts with a regional 
significance. A rather high proportion (more than half) of these 
comments were directed to comparatively minor impacts, such as the 
preservation of roadside vegetation or the question of invasion by weeds 
of areas of native vegetation within the site. The eighteen comments 
classified as major were concerned with the subjects shown in Table 6.5.
TABLE 6.5
SUBJECTS OF MAJOR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EIS PHASE I
Subject Number of
Comments
Location of sewage treatment works in 
relation to odours 2
Need to specify waste disposal sites 1
Effect Monarto on regional population and 
economic base 1
Effect Monarto on regional towns and 
countryside 1
Effect on water quality of Murray 2 *.
Conservation of native vegetation and 
ecologies 5
Effects of an necessity for artificial lake 2
Need for tertiary sewage treatment 1
Need for Monarto 1
Population capacity of Adelaide metropolitan 
area 1
Choice of Monarto site 1
18
Source: Derived from Monarto EIS Phase II (1977), Appendix, pp. 1-72.
It is interesting to compare these actual areas of comment with 
those which might have appeared to warrant the most public comment 
because of the magnitude of the potential impacts or because the MDC’s 
assessment was weakest in these areas (see also the earlier discussion 
of site and regional impacts).
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The first of these concerned the need for an overall assessment 
of the economic, social and environmental need and justification for 
Monarto. Although the EIS itself assumed that this decision had already 
been made, this was no reason for those commenting on the EIS not to 
argue that particularly in view of changing circumstances and greater 
information, a full review of this question would be desirable. None of 
the public comments adverted to this matter. Secondly, no submissions 
attempted to take an overview of the total range of impacts of the 
proposal, or suggest that while in themselves none of the impacts were 
of outstanding importance, taken together they might constitute a 
significant argument for re-examining the other benefits and costs of 
the proposal.
Thirdly, turning to the more specific areas of impact, arguably 
the most important of these was the impact that increased recreational 
and other pressures would have had on the Murray River and its environs. 
Here the pressures separately attributable to Monarto would be at their 
greatest, since Adelaide is over an hour's travel time away from the 
Murray but Monarto only a few minutes; and where Adelaide has ocean 
beaches, Monarto has no nearby body of water other than the Murray and 
its lakes and the proposed artificial lake. The pressures,, for riverfront 
residences and holiday homes, and for riverbank recreation and water 
sports, would be greatly increased (MDC, 1976, pp. 8.94, 8.95). However, 
since these areas were not within the MDC's jurisdiction, and because of 
the costs of a thorough study, little had been done to quantify the 
likely increase in recreation pressures and their likely effect on 
various sections of the river. None of the submissions highlighted this 
point, although there were references to the effects of increased 
recreation on the region and recommendations for the preservation of 
some specific areas along the Murray.
A fourth major concern (and it is difficult to allocate an order of 
priority to the remaining points) would have been the effect on the 
surrounding region of increased pressure for subdivision or conversion 
of farmland to residences or hobby farms. Again this matter was largely 
outside the MDC's jurisdiction; nevertheless a substantial study to 
quantify the likely effects should have been undertaken by the State 
Planning Authority or jointly with the MDC, rather than falling back on 
the questionable proposition that the SPA's land use controls were
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sufficient to control undesirable consequences (MDC, 1976, p. 2). Only- 
two of the public comments were directed to such regional effects and 
then only in a general way.
Dealing with the remaining concerns more briefly, the fifth was 
the viability and environmental impacts of the proposed amenity lake, 
which embodied the problems of high water usage for flushing and 
replacement of evaporation, and conflicting problems of algal growth 
and turbidity (two public comments received); sixth, the effects of 
treated sewage discharge on the Bremer River and its users (one comment); 
seventh, the effect of high and probably increasing salinity in 
considerable areas of the site on costs, buildings and gardens; eighth, 
the increased water usage at Monarto (less rain, higher evaporation, 
amenity lake requirements) compared with that of an equivalent population 
remaining in Adelaide; ninth, the composite effect of the environmental 
and other disadvantages of Monarto on its population, and the extent to 
which these would be offset by other advantages. There were no specific 
comments on the last three subjects. Finally, the ten major matters for 
concern would include the conservation of various areas of native 
vegetation or ecologies (in addition to the specific problem of the 
Murray environs already mentioned), the topic to which the'-most comments 
(five) were directed.
While too much weight cannot be placed on analysis of the small 
number of non-government comments received on the EIS Phase I, their 
general tone and subject matter was fairly representative of earlier 
public comment on the environmental impact of the proposal (see also 
the sample of public comment on earlier environmental reports in MDC, 
1976, Appendix 7). In general, the public comments were largely directed 
to comparatively minor impacts, rather than questioning major components 
of development or the overall viability of the plan itself. The forte 
of the environmental interest groups was recommending specific areas 
for conservation rather than considering the impacts of proposals. To 
a large extent this reflected the interests of the groups themselves.
Of the 36 environmental interest groups which commented prior to the 
EIS Phase I, almost all were specific-interest groups (Murray Bridge 
Field Naturalists Society, Society for Growing Australian Plants,
SA Region) rather than broad-spectrum organisations such as the 
Australian Conservation Foundation (MDC, 1976, Appendix 7).
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Finally, we will look at how effective the comments on the EIS 
Phase I were in terms of acceptance or action by the MDC (Table 6.6).
Only in one very minor case did these comments instigate MDC action.
In other areas the comments either supported a course of action being 
taken by the MDC anyway, were disagreed, or were not within MDC 
responsibilities. Therefore public comment on the EIS Phase I had very 
little direct influence. The MDC had considered the issues quite 
extensively and had established views on most of them by the time public 
comment was received. Even in a case where public comment on an EIS does 
raise major new issues or unexpectedly strong objections, however, it is 
in the nature of organisations that the proponent is likely to take a 
defensive posture rather than showing an immediate willingness to make 
major changes to the proposed course of action.
TABLE 6.6
MDC'S RESPONSE TO CRITICAL COMMENTS ON EIS PHASE I
Types of Comment and Response Number
Uncritical comments 
Suggestions or critical comments:
a) Disagreed by MDC 23
b) Agreed but not MDC responsibility 2
c) Matters still under investigation 3
d) No comment - not MDC responsibility 1
e) Minor correction accepted 1
f) Comments partially disagreed by MDC 3
TOTAL COMMENTS
14
33
47
Source: Derived from Monarto EIS Phase II (1977), Appendix,
pp. 1-72.
There are, however, several other arguments for soliciting and 
publishing public comment on an EIS, even when such comment does not 
have a direct influence on the proponent.
Public comment may reinforce the position of environmental planners 
within the organisation, by showing that their concerns are shared by the
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public. Public comments will be considered by the reviewing agency, 
which may recognise the strength of certain comments where the proponent 
does not, and place additional pressure on the proponent to modify the 
proposals. Publication of adverse public comment can also generate 
additional public concern and media publicity. Even where public comment 
is mistaken, the proponent has the opportunity to correct misconceptions 
and raise the level of public debate.
Nevertheless, in the Monarto case, the most extensive, influential 
and useful public input was that received in the earlier stages prior 
to publication of the EIS Phase I (see Table 6.2) when the dimensions 
of the problem were being defined and information about the regional 
environment being sought. Here inputs from conservation groups and 
individuals with a specific knowledge of the area were most useful in 
drawing attention to, and highlighting the importance of, areas of 
conservation value in the site and region.
The influence of the public and interest groups on EIA at Monarto 
has been examined only in relation to comments and inputs directed to 
the MDC. Many other forms of public and interest group influence exist. 
However, although the Monarto project itself was controversial, the 
question of its environmental impacts did not become a matter of major 
public controversy, and therefore did not become subject to all the 
usual processes of such controversy: lobbying of politicians by the
public, letters to the press, demonstrations, television appearances by 
environmental activists and so on, which mark efforts by interest groups 
and individuals to gain public attention and to influence decisionmaking.
My own reaction was one of continued surprise at the comparative 
lack of public pressure concerning some of the adverse potential impacts 
of the proposal. To some extent this must be attributed to a number of 
activities undertaken by the EPD which helped to defuse public criticism.
A series of reports were published which outlined the proposed course of 
action and the progress of environmental studies; contact with individuals 
and groups concerned with environmental matters was initiated and 
welcomed; an informal advisory committee of various representatives of 
conservation groups was established; and the genuine concern of the EPD 
with environmental matters appeared to be evident (e.g. MDC, 1977, 
Appendix, p. 35). The very existence of a group concerned exclusively 
with environmental matters within such an organisation as the MDC was
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unusual, and encouraged the confidence of environmental groups (e.g.
MDC, 1976, Appendix 7, p. 4).
There was also no single, major impact which could capture and 
focus public attention, but rather a series of less significant impacts; 
and the favourable potential impact of Monarto in slowing the growth of 
Adelaide provided a strong counter-argument on social and environmental 
grounds. Some interests appeared to accept the desirability of the 
project as a whole (e.g. Society for Growing Australian Plants, MDC, 
1977, Appendix, p. 35).
Nevertheless, despite these extenuating circumstances, the 
performance of the interest groups in highlighting and obtaining action 
concerning aspects of the Monarto proposal harmful to the environment 
was not a strong one. For such groups to be fully effective, a far 
higher level of coordination and professionalism would be necessary.
The result, of course, was that the MDC's environmental programme was 
not as good as it would have been under greater public pressure.
At the same time, the MDC's approach to public participation both 
generally and with respect to EIA and environmental planning involved 
no devolution of power, just an active dissemination of information 
and the seeking of advice and comment.
The reviewing agencies
Both the Commonwealth Department of Environment and the South 
Australian Department of Environment and Conservation (SADEC) were 
involved in reviewing the Monarto EIS; the former by virtue of the 
Commonwealth EIS legislation, which would apply to Monarto if the 
Commonwealth continued to contribute to the funding of the development. 
There was no South Australian EIA legislation; to support its rare use 
of the EIA requirement (at that time only one other formal EIS had been 
produced in South Australia - on a proposed bus depot), SADEC relied 
on a Cabinet directive purportedly requiring EIA on projects with 
significant environmental impacts (SADEC, 1978, p. 8). Despite 
several requests, I was never able to obtain a copy of this directive. 
Nor did SADEC have its own guidelines for EIA at that time; reference
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was made to some guidelines which had been proposed by the South 
Australian Environment Protection Council (SAEPC, 1974).
During the period under review, the Commonwealth Department was 
greatly affected by Federal political and administrative changes as 
discussed in earlier chapters, in particular by the change in government 
in late 1975, the Department's subsequent amalgamation into the 
Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development (EHCD) 
in December 1975, the reductions in staff dealing with environmental 
matters, and disruption due to the major re-organisation and fall in 
morale which subsequently took place (see Chapter Five).
SADEC also lost some major functions during the period and became 
the Department for the Environment (SADE). Both State and Federal 
Departments also suffered the disadvantage for most of the period of 
having a responsible Minister quite low in Ministerial ranking, and 
this fairly accurately reflected the standing of these Departments in 
relation to the rest of the public service. In general the influence 
of both Departments over matters affecting the environment probably 
declined over the period, more so in the case of the Commonwealth 
Department. <
At that time there was no clear agreement between the two Departments 
as to which should have the primary responsibility for reviewing the 
environmental aspects of State projects with Federal funding such as 
Monarto. The MDC was therefore required to liaise with both Departments 
concerning the preparation of the EIS. In the event, there was 
infrequent liaison between the MDC and both Departments, and the majority 
of such liaison was initiated by the MDC. For example, I made several 
visits to Canberra, but no member of the Department visited the MDC.
Most contacts with SADEC also were initiated by the MDC. Within both 
Departments the project officers responsible for liaison with the MDC 
were changed several times and there were sometimes long delays in 
answering correspondence. In his political memoirs, the South Australian 
Premier at that time, Don Dunstan, notes that 'other departments would 
complain bitterly that if a file went to Environment it was lost forever - 
it would never re-emerge' (Dunstan, 1981, p. 284). The staff shortages 
and administrative changes in both Departments were to a large extent 
responsible for such failings, but there was also a lack of recognition
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of the need for closer liaison and co-ordination. One senior officer 
of SADE, for example, told me that proponents preparing EIS's were 
'on their own' and should not expect to receive guidance from the 
Department (confidential note 6.3).
The lack of liaison and changes in personnel had some unfortunate 
consequences. Neither Department made any substantial comments until 
the publication of the Draft EIA Phase I. Yet both the Plan for 
Environmental Study and an Environmental Study Progress Report had 
been published earlier. Many of the comments made by both Departments 
could have been made at a far earlier stage and the MDC's environmental 
studies programme adjusted accordingly. SADE's comments on the draft 
EIS Phase I reflected these problems. Some ignored relevant sections 
of the EIS or of earlier reports, others ignored matters which had 
been discussed with senior officers of SADE, and we strongly disagreed 
with many others. I was told later by a senior officer of SADE that 
had he seen the comments (as should have been the case) he would not 
have allowed them to go out in their original form (confidential note 
6.4) .
My main concern was that if, as required by EIA procedures, the 
comments were subsequently published in the EIS Phase II, in order to 
defend our work I would have to refute them in the strongest terms, 
and this would have damaged relationships between the MDC and SADE and 
reflected poorly on both organisations. I requested a meeting on 
this matter which somewhat surprisingly was attended by the Director 
of SADE as well as the officer who had prepared the comments 
(confidential note 6.5), and as a result the comments were substantially 
revised to the version which appears in the Draft EIS Phase II. 
Nevertheless, these contained some echoes of the original comments. For 
example:
We found the section dealing with social and economic 
considerations somewhat weak by comparison with other 
parts of the document. While we consider that an 
Environmental Impact Statement should devote its main 
emphasis to the implications of the project upon the 
physical environment, nevertheless it is important that 
the social implications of the development be addressed 
as well.
Three areas in which we feel further consideration 
should be given are:-
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1. The implications upon the social fabric and economic 
viability of the project of variable rates of 
development than originally envisaged.
2. The likely social and economic consequences of 
the new city upon the existing residents and 
business of the region and nearby towns.
3. The social problems generally associated with new 
town development, particularly for families relocated 
from established communities.
In these instances, the means of resolving adverse consequences 
should be developed. It would seem appropriate for the 
Social Planning Division to undertake these studies as part 
of its overall involvement in social planning.
The MDC's response (MDC, 1977, Appendix, p. 71) was that it had 
previously published two documents which set out the proposed course 
of action on EIA, and that such comment should have been made earlier; 
that the EIS had emphasised the physical impacts but addressed the 
social implications as suggested, so that the question was one of degree; 
that it was abundantly clear from Section 5 of the EIS dealing with 
social and economic factors that the second and third areas suggested 
for study had in fact already been extensively studied; that the second 
point was discussed at some length in the EIS (MDC, 1976, pp. 8.2-8.13); 
and that it was debatable whether, under the first point, the effect 
on economic viability of different growth rates was an appropriate 
subject for the Monarto EIS.
Closer liaison would have enabled such differences to be sorted 
out at an earlier stage, and in addition would have had a number of 
other benefits. For any reasonably large project, there is a considerable 
range of potential impacts which can be studied. Many have criticised 
the encyclopaedic nature of some EIS’s, which list every possible impact, 
rather than concentrating effort on the important ones. But in the 
absence of close liaison with the reviewing authority it is prudent 
for the proponent to try to cover as wide a range of impacts as possible, 
in order to avoid subsequent criticism of having missed some out. This 
problem could be avoided, however, if the reviewing agency and the 
proponent could come to early agreement as to the depth in which each 
of the probable impacts should be examined. Better liaison would also 
enable the reviewing agency to make an earlier input, not just to the 
environmental study programme, but to the decisions on development
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which are inevitably being made prior to production of the EIS.
Closer liaison would help transfer the emphasis to meeting substantive 
rather than procedural EIA requirements. EIA procedures are a means 
to the end of ensuring that matters affecting the environment are 
fully taken into account. Given the unfortunate reality that 
decisionmaking will not generally be suspended while an EIS is prepared, 
it is more important for the environmental authorities to become involved 
at an early stage, than it is to require and comment on a monolithic 
document which is frequently produced at too late a stage in the 
planning process to have any great influence on decisions.
Another function in relation to EIA which SADE did not perform was 
to assist the MDC in obtaining the necessary coordination and 
cooperation with other State government departments in carrying out the 
necessary environmental studies. As discussed previously, the impacts 
of Monarto extended into the jurisdictions of other government agencies 
where the MDC had no authority. SADE's comment on this point in response 
to the Phase I EIS, and the MDC's reply to it, are worth quoting:
Comment
The more general issue of the responsibility of the Commission 
for impacts outside the Monarto site should be clearly 
expressed. As the proponent, the Commission is responsible 
for the identification and assessment of likely impacts 
which result from the project. Where it has indirect control 
over impacts, such as in the matter of construction materials 
then this control should be exercised; in this case by 
procuring materials only from acceptable sites. Where, 
however, the Commission cannot exercise control over the 
impact, it should make explicit recommendations to the 
Minister responsible for the appropriate action to be taken.
Reply
While it may be desirable that the Commission should be 
responsible for the identification and assessment of all 
likely regional impacts resulting from the project, in 
practice difficulties arise in obtaining both funding and 
allocation of responsibility where such regional studies may 
be seen as overlapping with the ongoing responsibilities and 
existing programmes of other government authorities. In 
such cases co-ordination is needed which cannot always be 
effectively undertaken by the proponent. (MDC, 1976, 
Appendix, p. 72)
The SADE comment was unrealistic and showed little understanding of, and 
offered nothing to solve, the fundamental problem of the conflict
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between the responsibilities of the proponent to meet EIA requirements 
and the responsibilities of other authorities for areas where the 
impacts occur.
There were fewer problems with the comments by EHCD, partly 
because, forewarned by the experience with SADE, I had visited Canberra 
to discuss the EIA with the officer reviewing it. As with SADE, 
however, he was the third or fourth project officer for Monarto in 
less than two years and appeared to be unaware of much of the previous 
documentation which the MDC had forwarded to EHCD and of previous 
discussions. The EHCD comments suggested that the EIS should have been 
substantially shorter and was too technical and detailed for the 
layman; yet at the same time EHCD asked for further information 
concerning: the effects of a slower rate of growth than was planned
for; economic viability; the effects of sewage effluent; the more 
detailed planning proposals; several aspects of recreation; the 
likelihood of there being commercial mineral deposits under the site; 
and the presence of toxic metals in the soils (MDC, 1977, Appendix, 
pp. 64-68). Such comments offered little to solve the problem of 
finding a suitable compromise between comprehensiveness and readability. 
To say that an EIS should be directed to the intelligent layman was 
of no help, since it had been written with this in mind.
The EHCD comments also showed a lack of thoroughness in reading 
the report. For instance, they asked whether the possibility of a 
substantial increase in hobby farms had been taken into account and 
the effects assessed, a question which was answered on page 8-80 of 
the Draft EIS Phase I, under the heading of 'sub-economic units'.
If the reviewing agencies wish to propagate high standard of 
EIA they must themselves maintain high standards in their comments 
and assistance to proponents, together with an understanding of the 
problems which proponents face. However, low government priorities 
for environmental concerns and inadequate staff levels are not conducive 
to such improvements.
Environmental consultants
Where institutions are expected to implement change, such as the EIA 
requirement, adjustments are necessary not only in attitudes and
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procedures, but in the acquisition and implementation of the 
requisite skills. The lack of such skills can be a further source 
of delay and resistance to change. Skills in environmental planning 
an impact assessment in the early 1970’s were in short supply. One 
way of seeking to redress this problem was to employ environmental 
consultants.
The MDC was under a directive to confine its staff members to 
less than seventy. This ceiling, coupled with the requirement for 
rapid progress to be made in planning and developing the new city, 
brought about the extensive use of the services of consultants in most 
aspects of the MDC's operations. Environmental studies were no 
exception to this. The EPD at full strength (which was not reached 
for some time) had a staff of five, but a high proportion of its time 
was spent on coordinating and evaluating work done by consultants.
By the time the Phase I EIS was published in January 1976, seventy-eight 
environmental studies were listed as being completed or in progress 
(MDC, 1976, pp. 1.11-16), the majority of which had been initiated 
in the preceding eighteen months. Although the EPD was directly in 
charge of only about half of these studies, it had substantial 
involvement in management or use of the output of most of the remainder.
Three types of consultants were used for environmental studies; 
professional consultants, academics, and other government agencies. 
Academic consultants were often unreliable in meeting deadlines for 
completion of their work; in fact the absence of any apparent sense of 
time constraints was at times quite remarkable. They also showed 
insufficient understanding of the need to relate their work to the 
requirements of the client, tending to pursue particular research 
interests or their own interpretation of the problem. Undoubtedly 
some academic consultants suffer from none of the faults listed. To 
the extent that such failings did occur, however, the progress of the 
EIA suffered, in that the initial strategy of using a high proportion 
of academic consultants caused delays and did not provide information 
in the most useful form.
Full-time professional consultants exhibited a rather different 
set of characteristics, including of course the common tendency to 
expand the brief and recommend further work at the end of it. Because
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of the difficulty of keeping a number of environmental specialists 
fully employed, there was a tendency for consulting firms to carry 
out environmental studies with staff whose main qualifications and 
experience lay in other areas. In one case the consultant, without 
notifying the MDC, used completely different and far less suitably 
qualified personnel than those listed on their original proposal 
(confidential note 6.6). There were also consulting firms with a high 
level of environmental expertise. These were often small or 
medium-sized firms who specialised in particular types of environmental 
work (e.g. Environmental Science and Services, 1977).
The MDC was required to use the services of other government 
departments wherever possible, and they were used as consultants in 
a number of areas of planning with environmental implications. From 
an environmental point of view, such arrangements were not usually 
advantageous, since as discussed previously, the level of environmental 
concern and expertise in these agencies was generally not high.
In addition to the problems associated with each type of 
consultant, the use of a high ratio of consultants to internal staff 
has many drawbacks. Consultants' hourly rates are far higher than 
those of internal staff. Each consultant has to spend time becoming 
familiar with and available information, and the task of providing 
information and maintaining liaison with consultants is time-consuming 
for internal staff. Where a number of consultants are used the cost 
of this non-productive activity becomes high. In general, the work 
of consultants is not as controllable as that of in-house staff, since 
they are usually physically located elsewhere and are ultimately 
answerable to their own hierarchy rather than to the client. When 
consultants complete their task, the expertise they have developed 
concerning the project is lost, except insofar as this is 
incorporated in their report or has been passed on to internal staff.
In the light of the MDC's experience, it seems probable that a better 
EIA at a lower cost would have resulted from a lower ratio of 
consultants to in-house environmental specialists.
Such points are not just relevant to the implementation of EIA. 
They also illustrate some more general sources of resistance to 
change. Expertise takes time to develop, and in the meantime the 
adequacy of environmental studies suffers. Procedural compliance with
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EIA requirements, by means of short-term use of consultants to 
produce an EIS, avoids the acquisition of internal environmental 
staff and the changes in internal procedures and attitudes desirable 
to foster an improved environmental input to planning in the longer 
term. Normatively, it is a matter for concern that the emphasis on 
producing the EIS document has not been matched by an equal stress 
on the need for more fundamental improvements in environmental 
expertise and attitudes within organisations.
Other actors
The remaining actors can be dealt with more briefly, since their 
influence on EIA implementation was not large, even though in some 
cases their influence on the Monarto project overall was a major one.
Initially the Monarto Development Commission itself (as distinct 
from the body of people employed by it) consisted of two part-time 
Commissioners, a full-time Chairman, and the GM. The Chairman and 
the GM, however, soon found themselves in disagreement on many matters. 
The Chairman's private enterprise orientation and the GM's public 
service background did not make for an easy compatibility. An early 
indication of the problem was a letter from the Chairman td the GM 
(EPD, 7.1.75) asking for information on a range of matters, including 
the 'promotional concept of industry and commerce for Monarto'. The 
formal request stemmed from the Chairman's view that he was not 
being kept fully informed. The Chairman was eventually persuaded 
to retire early (confidential note 6.7).
The GM later took the joint position of Chairman and GM. Given 
the GM's resultant strong control, the two part-time Commissioners 
had no great influence on the course of events by virtue of their 
position although both supported the need for EIA to be carried out.
One of the Commissioners, however, who had been nominated to the 
Commission by the Commonwealth Labor government, following the fall 
of that government took a position on the staff of the South Australian 
Minister for Planning, Hugh Hudson, who was also in charge of Monarto. 
In this position he had some influence, and ultimately took the view 
that the Monarto project should be deferred (confidential note 6.8).
Prior to becoming Minister for Monarto, Hudson as Minister for 
Education had been critical of the money being spent on the Monarto
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project. Dunstan hoped that placing Hudson in charge of Monarto 
would, as often happens, change him from critic to partisan (Dunstan, 
1981, p. 269). In my view this change did not occur. While Hudson 
may have suspended judgement for a time, he was finally instrumental 
in the deferral of the project. Both Hudson and his predecessor,
Don Hopgood, indicated to me their recognition of the need for EIA, 
although the strength of their support was never tested.
The Monarto concept was usually seen as an initiative of the 
Premier, but as he recounts it (Dunstan, 1981, p. 191) the Minister 
for Conservation at the time, Glen Broomhill, was in favour of 
developing the new city rather than allowing Adelaide to spread; and 
although Dunstan was doubtful at first, he gradually became convinced. 
As we have seen, the acceptance of the Broomhill committee’s 
recommendation of the Murray Bridge area for the site, and the SPA's 
selection of the actual site within that area, foreclosed any 
meaingful consideration in the EIA of options to these decisions.
The Opposition parties in South Australia, although opposed to 
the Monarto project, had little to say about the EIA. Their opposition 
to Monarto was not particularly effective, although they did have 
some success in campaigning in Mt. Gambier (in the south-east of the 
State) on the basis that the new city should have been located there 
rather than at Monarto. They were assisted there by some indiscreet 
remarks to the same point made by the Governor of South Australia,
Sir Mark Oliphant. The Opposition, however, largely missed the 
opportunity to use the environmental problems as one plank in a strong 
campaign against Monarto. We were expecting a great deal of Opposition 
comment when the draft EIS Phase I was released, but little eventuated. 
One can only speculate as to the reasons for this. It was in part 
because although the EIS identified a number of adverse impacts, none 
of them were of an overwhelmingly adverse kind, and most could be 
limited by careful planning; there were clearly a number of 
countervailing environmental advantages as far as limiting the 
expansion of Adelaide was concerned; and the EIS was at least evidence 
that environmental consequences were being carefully considered.
The media, similarly, had very little interest in the EIA. After 
the Phase I EIS was released I was asked to give one television 
interview, in which the questions asked were fairly innocuous, and
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I had two radio interviews during the whole period. The Monarto 
project as a whole received more attention, and the media comment 
tended to be unfavourable (P$M, 29.3.76), but an analysis of comment 
on this wider issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.
TECHNOLOGY
In seeking explanations of policy, analysts are accustomed to 
considering that various actors, organisations, or economic factors 
may have one or another influence at different times or under 
different circumstances. Technology, however, has a taken-for-granted 
aspect in much of both policymaking and policy analysis, as described 
in Chapter Three. There are of course exceptions where the 
technology itself is controversial. But in most cases the 
application of mainstream, conventional technology, and its 
consequences, are simply assumed by both policymakers and analysts 
seeking to explain public policy.
There is, of course, no given and immutable course of 
technological development and use. To illustrate the extent to 
which an alternative technology and its accompanying social structure 
could vary from those in existence, the following is a listing of 
the characteristics of such an alternative based on a 'soft' or 
ecologically sound technology.
'Hard.' technology society
1. ecologically unsound
2. large energy input
3. high pollution rate
4. non-reversible use of
materials and energy sources
5. functional for limited time
only
6. mass production
7. high specialization
8. nuclear family
9. city emphasis
10. alientation from nature
11. consensus politics
12. technical boundaries set by
wealth
'Soft ' technology society
ecologically sound 
small energy input 
low or no pollution rate 
reversible materials and energy 
sources only 
functional for all time
craft industry
low specialization
communal units
village emphasis
integration with nature
democratic politics
technical boundaries set by nature
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'Hard.' technology society
13. world-wide trade
14. destructive of local culture
15. technology liable to misuse
16. highly destructive to other
species
17. innovation regulated by
profit and war
18. growth-oriented economy
19. capital intensive
20. alienates young and old
21. centralist
22. general efficiency increases
with size
23. operating modes too
complicated for general 
comprehension
24. technological accidents
frequent and serious
25. singular solutions to
technical and social 
problems
26. agricultural emphasis on
mono-culture
27. quantity criteria highly
valued
28. food production specialized
industry
29. work undertaken primarily
for income
30. small units totally
dependent on others
31. science and technology
alienated from culture
32. science and technology
performed by specialist 
elites
33. strong work/leisure
distinction
34. high unemployment
35. technical goals valid for
only a small proportion 
of the globe for a finite 
time
'Soft' technology society
local bartering 
compatible with local culture 
safeguards against misuse 
dependent on well-being of 
other species
innovation regulated by need
steady-state economy 
labour intensive 
integrates young and old 
decentralist
general efficiency increases with 
smallness
operating modes understandable 
by all
technological accidents few and 
unimportant
diverse solutions to technical 
and social problems
agricultural emphasis on diversity
quality criteria highly valued
food production shared by all
work undertaken primarily 
for satisfaction <. 
small units self-sufficient
science and technology integrated 
with culture
science and technology performed 
by all
weak or non-existent work/leisure 
distinction 
(concept not valid) 
technical goals valid 'for all 
men for all time'
Source: Robin Clarke, quoted in Dickson, 1977, p.103.
The listing is an idealised one and it is not suggested that 
Monarto could have been developed on such lines. What is shown is 
how far the plans for Monarto were from the ideal type of a stable 
state, minimum environmental impact, soft technology society, despite 
the attention given to the environmental aspects of planning. Only 
on items 2, 3, 9, 10 and 23 could any worthwhile movement towards a 
softer use of technology and its accompanying social changes be 
perceived, and then such movement was small. Under item 2, as we
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have seen, some reduction in energy use by the design of buildings 
was planned, and there was a disputed proposal for a central 
heating and cooling plant for Stage One of the city centre, using 
wind and solar energy. Nothing was otherwise planned on any major 
scale to develop or encourage the use of alternative energy 
sources, despite the unusually plentiful supply of sun and wind 
on the site. Nor were energy savings to be brought about by any 
substantial transfer from private to public transport.
With regard to item 3, considerable attention was given to 
the control of pollution from various sources. However, the 
strategy was one of cure rather than prevention. The emphasis was 
on the problem of getting industry to locate at Monarto at all:
'for the bulk of industry, there are few resources provided by the 
area which will engender growth' (Plant Location International,
1976, p. 21). There was little or no thought given to seeking a 
mix of low pollution, alternative technology industries. Rather, 
the approach was one of welcoming existing industrial technology 
(with the exception of some 'offensive trades') and placing 
pollution controls on it, for example in terms of emission standards 
and stack heights (see Strauss, undated). Similarly, the quantity 
of domestic and industrial waste likely to be produced was*taken 
as given, and attention directed to the means of disposing of it 
rather than reducing it at source. Again, disposal was to be by 
the conventional method of landfill, although voluntary partial 
recycling was being considered (MDC, 1976, p. 7.39). Likewise, 
sewage treatment was to be by conventional processes (Caldwell 
Connell, 1976).
Concerning point 9, efforts were made to encourage a feeling 
of community by the planned provision of a full range of community 
facilities and by designing residential areas to focus on community 
centres. Of course design and facilities are only two of the many 
facets of society which impart a sense of community or otherwise, 
and most such factors were beyond the control of the MDC even had it 
desired to change them. Similarly, in relation to point 10, the 
components of the urban plan were designed to retain the most 
attractive natural features of the site, but urban design is 
only one factor of many determining the extent of alienation from 
nature. Under point 23, the emphasis on public participation would
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have helped to make the 'operating modes' of the new city more 
accessible to comprehension.
On most of the other items Monarto would have fallen firmly 
into the pattern of a hard technology society. Even in the unlikely 
event that those responsible for Monarto had wanted to move much 
more substantially towards a soft technology community, such a 
course would not have been feasible without parallel changes in the 
surrounding society. To give some examples: labour intensive,
small energy input, natural materials craft industry would for most 
product categories be swamped by low cost mass-produced items 
produced elsewhere. Attempts to reduce the waste stream by avoiding 
wasteful packaging and requiring recyclable materials would have 
only minor impact on a local scale, given the national and international 
nature of suppliers and markets for most products. Reducing the 
emphasis on materialist values and consumerism would be a daunting 
task in a segment of a society which elsewhere continued to hold 
such values and reinforce them with advertising pressure. Fostering 
of alternative energy sources would require heavy subsidisation 
where supplies of non-renewable energy sources were still readily 
available. Selective use and control of technological innovation 
would not be feasible alongside a wider community where technological 
change is for the most part uncritically accepted.
The discussion so far has been intended to illustrate two 
points. The first is that the combined weight of mainstream 
technology, the prevailing economic system, and the materialist 
standards by which industrial society judges its welfare and by 
which government is judged, combine to make deliberate radical 
changes in only parts of the fabric of society or technology extremely 
difficult.
The second point concerns the criteria by which environmental 
impact is assessed. An EIS should explain the need for the proposal 
being assessed, it should examine the alternatives to the proposal, 
and it should set out the environmental impacts of the proposal 
and of its alternatives. In practice, however, these matters are 
examined only within the context of the prevailing technology and 
society. The need for the proposal is discussed assuming existing
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socio-economic conditions, not in terms of whether there would be 
a need for the project if a more environmentally compatible 
society existed. Similarly, only those alternatives which are 
acceptable within the context of existing society and technology 
are examined. The EIA for Monarto could have considered the 
alternative of a soft technology society at Monarto, but of course 
it did not, because there was no chance of such an alternative being 
implemented.
Similar arguments apply to the evaluation of impacts. Once 
impacts have been ascertained, decisionmakers compare them with the 
need for the proposal. Where impacts are simply stated (e.g. the 
increase in pollution levels with be X) the decisionmaker must 
apply his own value system for balancing impacts against need.
Where those preparing the EIS have allocated or imputed values to 
impacts (either by rating them on some scale or stating or implying 
their degree of seriousness) the decisionmaker will either 
uncritically accept these or reject or modify them according to 
his own values. In either case, those preparing the EIS or making 
decisions about it are likely to be heavily influenced in the value 
systems they apply by those prevalent in the surrounding society. 
Further, since the alternatives reviewed are usually only those 
based on mainstream technology and society, those preparing and 
reviewing the EIA will not have the opportunity of comparing the 
impacts of the proposal with those of any soft technology 
alternative.
Thus EIA, despite its sweeping objectives, in practice becomes 
at three levels - assessment of need, selection of alternatives, 
and evaluation of impacts - largely a captive of mainstream society 
and technology. This is not to say that EIA does not serve a 
useful purpose in reducing environmental damage; it is rather to 
demonstrate some of the ways in which such initiatives for change, 
even when adequately implemented, can be restricted in their 
effects by existing conditions, as was the case with EIA for 
Monarto.
IDEAS
In discussing other policy-influential variables, the ideas, 
concepts, beliefs and values relevant to them have necessarily been
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discussed also. This section is therefore largely a brief drawing- 
together and review of such ideas and their significance for the 
EIA process for Monarto.
As we have seen, the prevailing climate of ideas in the early 
1970's was favourable to the Monarto project. There was an 
Australia-wide increase in concern with quality of life issues, 
particularly in the rapidly growing cities. The widespread belief 
in the country's rosy economic future made greater action on such 
issues seem affordable, and such action to many appeared to be 
overdue. This climate of opinion was opportune to, and fostered by, 
both Commonwealth and South Australian Labor governments with 
their programmes of reform. These included the new cities programme, 
based on the idea of reducing the pressures of growth in existing 
cities by redirecting part of it elsewhere. All these circumstances 
gave a strong impetus to the Monarto proposal, leading to its 
rapid implementation and the somewhat hasty choice of site well in 
advance of any substantial environmental assessment.
The ideals of social reform were reflected in the goals and 
objectives set by State Cabinet for Monarto's developments
Goals
To establish a new city to re-direct a large proportion 
of the growth of Adelaide, thereby limiting its size.
To offer its inhabitants an alternative urban environment 
to that of existing cities.
The planning of a new city is to include a high level 
of citizen participation.
Obj ectives
It is to be a balanced, largely self-contained community.
It is to offer equality of opportunity to all socio­
economic groups.
Its development must be appropriate to the regional 
environment.
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Its planning must be creative.
The development plan must be flexible.
Transportation is to provide full mobility and allow 
for changes of emphasis on various modes, with particular 
emphasis on public transport.
Planning standards are to be of a high order.
Source: MDC (1974), p. 40.
The conflict between the implementation of these ideals and 
more conservative views was an important aspect of the history of 
the Monarto proposal. Similarly, it is helpful to the understanding 
of EIA policy implementation to view it as the introduction of a 
new set of ideas meeting resistance based on pre-existing ideas 
and values.
The conflict between the responsibility of the MDC fo^ 
producing an EIA and the responsibilities of other government 
departments was a conflict of ideas as well as institutions. When 
it is argued, for example, by a town planner that there is no real 
need for EIA since existing land use controls prevent undesirable 
impacts, the disagreement is on one dimension about the relationship 
between different statutory requirements. On another dimension (e.g. 
DTP'S memo (EPD, 15.10.74) quoted earlier concerning the 
establishment of the EPD), the town planner is asserting the 
superiority of the process with which he is most familiar and in 
which he is professionally trained; he is supporting the organisation 
with which he works and into whose collective beliefs he has been 
socialised; and he is defending his profession, the source from 
which his status and power arise. Since, in the last analysis, 
such views are based to a large extent on emotions such as loyalty 
or self-esteem, they are not strongly susceptible to reasoned 
argument.
Similarly, as has been shown, within the MDC the predominant 
SAPS/hards preference for public service attitudes and procedures,
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their conservative reactions to innovative ideas and their 
comparatively low priority for social and environmental concerns 
versus economic and technical matters, reflected their public 
service and professional backgrounds and contrasted with the 
attitudes of the non-SAPS/softs grouping, which in turn appeared 
to be related to their own career backgrounds. Ideas and stances 
on policy are not just arrived at in a detached, rational way; they 
are strongly influenced by organisational and professional backgrounds, 
and the consequence is often a tendency to resist change.
There were many other ideas held by various actors which had 
important consequences for the Monarto EIA. As we have seen, two 
sets of ideas which played a major part in shaping the proposed 
development were the desires and requirements in the shape of 
homes and urban facilities of those most likely to move to Monarto, 
as interpreted within the MDC; and the prevailing acceptance of 
conventional technology in almost every aspect of the new 
development. It was argued above that the weight of existing 
technology hampers departures from it. Existing lifestyles and 
technology by their very existence shape people's expectations, wants 
and values, so that those human wants whose satisfaction is emphasised, 
and the technological means by which they are satisfied, tend to be 
regarded as the natural order of things. Society and technology 
create institutions and wants which in turn maintain the form of 
society and technology.
The lack of understanding of the EIA requirement itself and 
the ideas embodied in it should also be mentioned. Despite the 
clear application of the Commonwealth EIA legislation to 
Commonwealth-funded projects, it was argued by more than one senior 
staff member of the MDC that it was unnecessary to carry out EIA. 
Similarly, as we have seen, the mainly local conservation groups 
involved with Monarto were largely preoccupied with conserving 
particular areas of environment value, and did not fully understand 
or make use of the wider purposes of EIA as a means of reviewing 
all aspects of the project from an environmental viewpoint. The 
lack of media and Opposition attention to the EIS and environmental 
aspects of the development were also at least partly due to a lack 
of familiarity with such issues. Such matters were to some degree
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attributable to the relative novelty of the EIA requirement at 
that time, and illustrate the information-lag aspect of resistance 
to change.
THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
Models and reality
In the discussion of the decisionmaking literature in Chapter 
Three it was argued that elements of four characterisations of the 
decisionmaking process - incrementalism, rationality, bureaucratic 
politics and the 'garbage can' or non-decision model - can all be 
present in a given decisionmaking process. It was further suggested 
that in all four models insufficient emphasis is placed on the 
influences and constraints exerted by variables other than the 
immediate decisionmakers and their organisations, such as elites, 
technology, commonly accepted ideas and values, and socio-economic 
conditions. In the Monarto case the preceding pages have shown how 
such external variables influenced decisionmaking within the MDC.
The first point, however, concerning the characterisation of the 
decisionmaking process at the MDC in terms of such models, and its 
implications for EIA, has not yet been specifically discussed. There 
is no doubt that decisions were not just made on the basis of 
bureaucratic politics, or occurred as a result of the 'somewhat 
fortuitous confluence' of streams of problems, solutions, participants 
and choice opportunities postulated by the non-decision model. Given 
that a city had to be planned and built, and an EIS produced, there 
was also a great deal of rational thought concerning the best means 
of achieving such objectives. There was also much discussion of 
the need for more rational policymaking - e.g. the 'policy formulation 
flow chart' put forward at the Directors Seminar (DM, 12.2.76). But 
rational decisionmaking occurred only within certain boundaries, set 
by considerations of bureaucratic politics and organisational 
constraints.
For instance, within the EPD a high proportion of effort went 
towards rational planning aimed at carrying out EIA, but between some
291
Directors EIA became a matter of bureaucratic politics embodying 
the activities which have been discussed under the heading of MDC 
senior staff. From that discussion it should be clear that in 
matters which involved senior staff, bureaucratic politics based 
on position and disposition often predominated. Here too, though, 
there were areas where rational planning was dominant.
What is sometimes forgotten in pointing to the dominance of 
bureaucratic politics is that many decisions are made by decision­
makers on tasks which fall clearly into their own areas of responsibility 
and therefore are made rationally or incrementally but do not enter 
the arena of bureaucratic politics. This was true of much of the 
work of the MDC's Directors. In issues which fell between Directors, 
also, many matters were dealt with in a non-partisan way, where the 
Directors concerned had common interests or were not affected by 
personal or organisational interests. Thus while bureaucratic 
politics played an important part in the MDC's decisionmaking it 
was far from being the exclusive mode.
For example, the work of the Director of Public Relations 
initially did not overlap with the areas of responsibility, of other 
Directors, and hence did not become controversial between Directors, 
although between DPR and the GM it became contentious and bureaucratic 
politics ensued. To constrain DPR the GM placed other Directors on 
committees to overlook various aspects of DPR's work (e.g. P$M,
12.2.76), and DPR and the GM began to voice their dissatisfaction with 
each other in various quarters. To a point such disagreement was 
still a rational one over the course of action appropriate for the 
MDC in public relations, but it became personalised quite rapidly. 
Similarly the differences between DEng and myself were in one aspect 
rational disagreements over the extent to which environmental 
factors should be considered in the planning of Monarto and the 
appropriate means for doing so. But inevitably such questions, as 
has been shown, became inextricably tangled with questions of 
personal interests and values.
It is useful here to mark the distinction between limited 
rationality and the comprehensive rationality with which the 
bureaucratic politics model is often contrasted. Bureaucratic
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politics is not the antithesis of rationality. The individual 
actors playing bureaucratic politics may be acting quite rationally 
by their own lights. The difference is that in bureaucratic 
politics actors are pursuing their differing personal and 
organisational goals and their different conceptions of overall 
objectives, whereas under comprehensive rationality actors are 
assumed to be pursuing an agreed set of goals in a systematic and 
unified way, so that decisions can be treated as if they were being 
made by a unitary actor. Although emotions and prejudices also play 
a part in bureaucratic politics, they are not an essential feature.
In general, at Director level individuals operated with one eye 
on the pot and the other up the chimney - rational considerations 
of how to meet the objectives of the MDC and carry out the individual's 
own responsibilities were balanced against his assessment of his own 
interests, seasoned with personal allegiances and dislikes, and the 
result was the actor's stance on an issue.
To what extent did non-decision processes influence outcomes?
There is always likely to be an element of fortuitousness present 
in the decisionmaking process. Chance meetings, relevant information 
received by coincidence, accidental conjoining of problems and 
solutions, all occur and influence outcomes. Non-decision processes 
were more significant towards the beginning and end of the MDC's life, 
as the following discussion shows.
Changes in decisionmaking modes over time
There was an initial, honeymoon period of a few months where 
bureaucratic politics was less apparent as Directors attempted to 
structure information and determine courses of action and priorities 
from the great range of options then available. This period consisted 
in essence of a struggle to impose some degree of rational order on what 
was initially rather a 'garbage can' situation, with streams of actors, 
problems and opportunities arriving in a somewhat random manner from 
a point of view within the MDC. The following passage from a memo 
which I wrote nearly five months after the MDC had commenced full 
operations conveys some of the flavour of the initial period, and 
the beginnings of bureaucratic politics:
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At present we have eight directors who meet as a group 
and reach agreement on some matters. Other matters 
are left in abeyance because of disagreement, or 
independent action is taken with which the majority 
may not agree. Some matters which are argued are not 
followed up and translated into action. Priorities are 
not sufficiently discussed, and unimportant matters 
are often followed up before important ones. Many 
matters are discussed at length without a decision being 
made because of opposing contributions from eight 
people. Other matters which only concern two or three 
people are also discussed at length while the other 
Directors wait. Problems arise where Directors take 
action or make recommendations in areas which other 
Directors see as their area. Committees of Directors 
are appointed by the General Manager which other 
Directors believe they should be on and can contribute. 
There are other problems, but I think we all agree that 
there is an overall problem even if we disagree on its 
nature and solution. (EPD, 14.8.74)
As matters were brought more under control and individual 
positions on various issues became known, bureaucratic politics 
increased until it challenged rational planning as the dominant mode, 
and this situation persisted for the bulk of the life of the MDC.
In the last year of the active life of the MDC, there was a 
further change in the character of the decisionmaking process within 
the MDC to one with increased 'non-decision' elements, but which again 
did not correspond closely to any one of the models which have been 
discussed. The central factors bringing about this change were the 
growing doubts about the future of the project. This injected a 
number of further sources of uncertainty into the decisionmaking arena.
No longer able to plan on the basis of what had seemed fairly assured 
sources of finance, planning had to consider various options based 
on different sources and levels of funding. The possibility of 
having to seek considerable private sector participation and financing 
required basic rethinking of many aspects of financing, development 
and marketing of what had previously been planned as a largely 
government-financed operation (see generally Doric Research Group, 1976). 
Successive revision of development plans and budgets to a series of 
lower growth targets was also required, and all such planning had 
a large uncertainty factor.
Conflicting information about the prospects of Monarto proceeding 
added to the uncertainty. New actors were introduced, and others
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took on a new importance, as Federal and State politicians and 
officials and private sector representatives were canvassed for 
information and lobbied for support. Within the MDC, social and 
environmental concerns became increasingly subordinate to questions 
of costs and returns . In the hope of ensuring its survival during 
any lengthy hiatus, the MDC sought to undertake consultancy work for 
other government agencies. These consultancies began to compete for 
priority with each other and with ongoing work on the Monarto 
programme, and such conflicting priorities were difficult to resolve
The following material illustrates the prevailing situation 
and some of its effects. The source is the minutes of the P$M 
meetings except where indicated, and the statements are those of the 
GM except where indicated. The material has been paraphrased here 
for the sake of brevity
18.11.75 Premier Dunstan says Liberal Federal Government would
probably mean end of Monarto project (The Advertiser).
20.11.75 Minister confirms Cabinet position that Monarto will 
go ahead (DM).
19.1.76 Minister confirms no retrenchments of staff even if 
reductions in Monarto programme occur. GM notes 
further clarification expected after Premiers' 
conference in early February.
9.2.76 Commission noted Monarto's finances might not be 
resolved until March/April.
23.2.76 Senator Greenwood indicates Federal Government 
considering possibility of assisting growth centres, 
including Monarto.
1 .3.76 Clash in priorities between MDC's consultancy work 
and Monarto programme. Obtaining consultancy work 
important in case Monarto project delayed.
15.3.76 Government considers option of 'Care and Maintenance' 
budget for 1976/77.
22.3.76 Probable Ministerial meeting on Monarto with Greenwood 
before end April.
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1.4.76 MDC Briefs C o m m i t t e e  reluctant to produce project 
p a ckage without clearer financial guidelines. Director 
A$F concerned that without pro j e c t  package, impossible 
to produce budget. P r oblem o f  un c l e a r  priorities  
between c o n s u l t a n c y  work and Monarto work (DM).
7.6. 7 6 From Ministerial m e e t i n g  o f  2.2.76 indications were 
that Mon a r t o  will proceed.
28.6.76 No State G o v e rnment d e c ision on funding Monarto until 
after Federal G o v e r n m e n t ' s  August budget.
2.8.76 Need for a d d itional staff due to M D C 's c o nsultancy  
w o r k l o a d  d i s c u s s e d  with Minister. Minis t e r  was 
advised staff m o r a l e  o f  a 'high standard'.
2 7 .8.76 More details will be k n own after Ministerial m e eting  
expected Sept./Oct. Possi b l e  n e c e s s i t y  of some staff 
secondment or tr a n s f e r  to o t her agencies.
13.9.76 Three prog r a m m e s  to be c o n s idered by Directors:
1) continued delay;
2) fairly slow development;
3) more v i g o r o u s  e x pansion involving p r ivate
sector. *
20.9.76 M i n i s t e r  says State Government m ay be forced to defer 
p r oject b e y o n d  two years. Directors suggest 
c o nsideration o f  fourth progr a m m e  entitled 'where do 
we go from here?'
23.9.76 Requirements o f  indefinite h o lding include staff 
r e d u c t i o n  from 58 to 40 (memo from Chair m a n  to 
M i n i s t e r ) .
4 . 1 0 . 7 6 Directors i n f ormed of content of memo 23.9.76.
18.10.76 S t a f f  required in h o lding period 28-35.
6. 1 2 . 7 6 Chairman will seek Government decis i o n  as soon as 
possible c o n c e r n i n g  staff position.
4.1.77 Chairman reque s t s  p a per on range of options between
1) possible disposal of the site;
2) proc e e d i n g  with major d e velopment almost  
solely by pri v a t e  sector funding.
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The growing uncertainty made work on the EIA more difficult. 
This was not only because of the difficulty of maintaining the level 
of effort. Also, various studies which we had relied on for 
information for the Phase II EIS had to be deferred; and to obtain 
any priority in assistance from other government agencies became 
increasingly difficult as doubts about the future of the project 
became more widespread.
In many ways the conditions under which the MDC was operating 
during the above period approximate those suggested by Olsen under 
which the non-decision model is likely to apply:
where both activation and definition of the situation 
are changing ... where the definition is complex, 
involving many values and decisionmaking variables, so 
that the situation is difficult to analyse ... (Olsen,
1976, p. 85)
But when one looks at the decisionmaking process itself, as distinct 
from the conditions under which it took place, non-decision 
characteristics did not predominate. For instance, Olsen postulates 
that:
The outcome is seen as an unintended product of certain 
processes having dynamics of their own. "Decision" in 
these models is a post factum construct ... (Olsen, 1976, 
p. 83)
This was not the case within the MDC. Decisions were heavily 
affected by outside influences and by uncertainty, so that the 
autonomy of the MDC was greatly reduced; decisions were therefore 
subject to change, and planning took the form of preparing for 
various options. But the outcomes of the processes within the MDC 
were not just 'unintended products' of the non-decision kind; they 
were deliberate choices to defer some decisions, studies or construction 
activities and to revise others in the light of what was known at the 
time.
In the latter days of the MDC there also was a decrease in 
bureaucratic politics insofar as the programmes of the MDC were 
concerned, since there was some uniting effect on the Directors of 
the common problems, for example:
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The Director TP expressed a fear of the MDC breaking 
into a number of separate professional groups as a 
possible result of accepting widely varying briefs 
for work outside Monarto; co-ordination might be lost 
and demands on in-house resources disjointed unless 
a conscious effort were made to retain present 
identities. (DM, 10.6.76)
There was also less incentive to be concerned about one's bureaucratic 
position within the MDC, and less latitude to play bureaucratic 
politics, since the capacity of individuals to make decisions was 
steadily confined by the rundown of the project. Bureaucratic 
politics was played quite heavily, however, concerning the consultancy 
work to be done by the Commission, with some Directors competing for 
the management of these consultancies and attempting to promote 
consultancies for the MDC which fell into their own fields of 
expertise (e.g. P$M, 13.9.76).
It might be argued that the conditions under which the MDC was 
operating in its latter period were highly unusual. But any 
relatively weak organisation being pushed one way and another by 
strong external forces is in a similar, if not so extreme position.
The situation, discussed elsewhere, in which the Commonwealth 
Department of Environment found itself in 1976 after the accession 
of the Federal LNCP government was a similar one, with protracted 
restructuring, amalgamation, and staff reductions. In fact, for 
most environmental agencies similar circumstances are likely to be 
the normal conditions under which they operate, since they are 
usually weak organisations in a strong environment. The normative 
implication is that environmental organisations should develop 
appropriate management techniques for the situation of a weak 
organisation in a strong environment in which they are likely to 
find themselves (e.g. see Rondinelli, 1976).
The EPD throughout most of its life was in essence in a microcosm 
of the position of many large government environmental agencies: 
it was a relatively weak group in a strong environment. Thus the 
EPD faced similar difficulties in its everyday operations to those 
that the MDC faced in its latter days. As has been shown, the EPD had 
difficulty influencing planning so that major construction would be 
carried out in a more environmentally satisfactory way, and had 
insufficient influence on several primarily environmental studies
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carried out by other Divisions. Nor was there any question of the 
construction programme being delayed until adequate environmental 
studies had been completed. In most cases, those responsible for 
preparing EIA within organisations will find themselves in a 
similar position. Except in the unlikely event that there is strong 
and well enforced EIA legislation, or powerful public support they 
will have to adapt their timetable of studies to the timetable of 
the project, and to accept the configuration of the project largely 
as given.
Decisionmaking processes and extra-organisational influences
Incrementalism, rationality, bureaucratic politics and 
non-decisionmaking were concurrently present in the MDC's decisionmaking. 
However, the strength of each in the mix varied according to the 
issues and personnel involved, and over time. During the bulk of 
the MDC's life, decisionmaking was characterised by a conflict 
between bureaucratic politics and efforts to achieve more rational 
decisionmaking. Near the beginning and end, however, the situation 
was rather one of attempting to impose rationality on a non-decision 
situation created by the strong external forces affecting the MDC,
4and bureaucratic politics was less prominent.
The character of the MDC's decisionmaking process was thus 
significantly affected by the nature and strength of forces external 
to the organisation, including, broadly speaking, the organisation's 
degree of autonomy. This suggests a need to develop an increased 
understanding of the relationships between extra-organisational forces 
and the characteristics of internal decisionmaking processes: for
example, such an approach might examine the relationship between the 
degree of autonomy of an organisation and the extent of bureaucratic 
politics within it.
Statements such as 'what a government does in any particular 
instance can be considered largely as a result of bargaining among 
players positioned hierarchically in an organisation' (Allison and 
Halperin, 1971, p. 43) overstate the explanatory power of the 
characteristics of the decisionmaking process itself. In the case of 
the MDC earlier sections have attempted to show the influence of 
'environmental' variables on decisions; this section has shown that the
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nature of the MDC's decisionmaking process itself was subject to the 
strength of outside influences.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Monarto case study has examined the various internal and 
external influences on the implementation of EIA by the MDC, with a 
particular emphasis on the way such influences took effect through the 
organisation's internal decisionmaking processes. In examining the 
influences on the implementation of EIA it has been necessary to review 
many of the factors which affected the urban planning and design of 
Monarto and the decisions to begin and terminate the project. Each of 
these levels of decisionmaking can be drawn upon to contribute to the 
understanding of the determinants of public policy. The following 
review first relates the findings of the case study to the literature 
review of Chapter Three, and then to some of the general propositions 
listed in Chapter One.
Socio-economic factors affected both planning and the EIA for
Monarto in several major ways. Prosperous economic conditions, and<
the then comparatively rapid population growth of Adelaide, led to 
the decision to proceed with the development of a new city, and the 
selection of its site, backed by only hasty and inadequate environmental 
studies. A range of other influences was involved, however, including 
a growing public interest in quality of life issues, State and 
Commonwealth governments sympathetic to such concerns, the prospect 
of Commonwealth financial assistance, an increasing awareness of the 
social and environmental problems of large cities, and a potential 
shortage of residential land in Adelaide. Added to these was the 
attraction of the idea of an alternative, planned urban environment, 
particularly given Adelaide itself as an example of the benefits of 
visionary urban planning, and given also the reasonably successful 
experience with Adelaide's existing satellite city, Elizabeth. Economic 
prosperity underpinned the interest in quality of life issues, but for 
that interest to be expressed in the form of a new city proposal 
required the conjunction of a variety of circumstances. Another 
conjunction of circumstances, this time unfavourable, including an 
Australia-wide slowing of population growth and the demise of the
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Federal Labor government and therefore of the possibility of 
Federal funding for Monarto, led to the decision to defer the project.
Socio-economic factors also greatly influenced the nature of 
the proposal itself. To attract residents, the new city had to 
provide a package of attributes which would be competitive with 
those of Adelaide. This meant, at least in the minds of its planners, 
that there should be no major departures from conventional urban and 
housing patterns. Economic disadvantages related to the geographic 
location of Monarto meant there would be difficulty attracting 
industry to the site. Cost considerations in some instances led to 
environmentally less desirable options being chosen.
In Chapter Three it was argued that economic variables alone 
cannot explain public policy. Governments consider both the economic 
and political consequences of decisions, and there is a need to 
recognise the selective way in which economic variables enter the policy 
process through the perceptual screens of policymakers. The Monarto 
case has illustrated the range of non-economic as well as economic 
considerations involved in decisionmaking, both in the decision to 
develop the new city and in the internal decisionmaking processes of 
the MDC. The Directors showed differing levels of concern with 
economic considerations, with the 'hards' grouping demonstrating a 
higher priority for such concerns as against social and environmental 
aspects. The tendency to be selective in their sources of information 
was apparent, as Directors gravitated towards others with similar 
views inside and outside the MDC.
The relationships between the biogeophysical features of the site 
and the characteristics of the proposal posed various difficulties for 
EIA. The semi-arid environment, for instance, tended to aggravate 
many of the impacts of urban development. In Chapter Three it was 
pointed out that the biogeophysical environment is not simply a passive 
recipient of human activity, but interacts in complex ways with 
other factors in influencing public policy. In the Monarto case, 
for example, the variety of potential environmental impacts arising 
from the various components of the proposal, and the extension of many 
impacts into the surrounding region, led to problems of overlapping
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authority with the large number of government agencies involved in 
the construction of Monarto or possessing statutory powers in the 
region. In this situation the MDC was in an anomalous position.
While as the proponent it was responsible for preparing the EIA, the 
statutory responsibility for the affected environment, for construction 
of parts of the overall proposal, and for collection of relevant 
environmental data often rested with other government departments.
The priorities of such departments were often quite different from 
those of the MDC. Essentially, this was a clash between the new 
institution of EIA and the existing institutions embodied in the line 
departments.
Both the internal and external reactions of the EIA requirement 
for Monarto help to confirm much of the discussion in Chapter Three 
of the sources of resistance to change arising from the structural 
and procedural rigidities of organisations, the effects of 
professional and organisational socialisation, certain personality 
characteristics, and defence of personal position and status. 
Externally, the ongoing programmes and established methods of other 
government agencies were hard to modify. Such organisations were 
inclined to believe that their existing methods dealt adequately 
with environmental factors. Some were unwilling to prepare EIS's; 
in other cases EIS's were largely window-dressing for decisions 
already taken.
Within the MDC, the profession-based Divisional structure worked 
against more integrated approaches to planning and EIA. A feature 
of the MDC's internal processes was the way in which Directors 
brought with them concepts and values from their previous professional 
and organisational experience, and approached decisionmaking within 
these established conceptual frameworks. The opposition of some 
Directors to the EPD and the EIS requirement grew from their 
differing values concerning the environment, their beliefs that 
their professional training equipped them to handle the environmental 
aspects of their work, and concern at the intrusion into their own 
customary areas of responsibility.
302
It was argued in Chapter Three that the influence of the public on 
public policy is indirect and uncertain, and that certain elites tend 
to have a disproportionate influence over the policy process. For 
Monarto, the role of public participation was largely limited to that 
of advice and comment, and there was a lack of pressure from environ­
mental groups. The responsible State Ministers, although active in 
some matters concerning Monarto, did not intervene in its planning and 
design. The result was that the technological, professional and 
administrative elites involved had a great deal of latitude in the 
planning of Monarto.
Both social and technological determinism were rejected in Chapter 
Three. It was suggested rather that the interactions between technol­
ogy, society and other variables tend to have a mutually reinforcing 
momentum which resists change. Consider, for example, some of the 
linkages between variables which influenced the nature of planning for 
Monarto and caused problems for the implementation of EIA. Despite 
the directive to plan Monarto innovatively, mainstream technology and 
design was adopted for the various components of urban development 
with only comparatively minor variations. This was in part a consequence 
of the need to achieve economic viability for the project, which in 
turn required the provision of housing and urban facilities competitive 
with those of Adelaide in order to attract future residents. To be 
competitive did not necessarily mean to be very similar, but the values 
and judgements of the MDC planners favoured the adoption of planned 
housing and urban facilities not greatly different from those of 
Adelaide.
In the case of engineering services the links between technology, 
institutions and professional values were particularly evident. Where 
an organisation has extensive experience in the application of a 
particular technology, experience, training and established procedures 
tend to perpetuate the use of such technology. The approach to 
sewage treatment, for example, was the conventional, high technology 
one with which the E&WS were familiar, and any meaningful consideration 
of alternatives in the EIS was precluded by the clearly apparent lack 
of interest of the E$WS in such alternatives. Similar problems were 
encountered with the planning and design of other major engineering 
works both within and outside the MDC.
303
The decisionmaking processes concerning the planning of the 
Monarto proposal and the implementation of EIA within the MDC can 
be viewed from one partial perspective as a conflict between various 
sets of ideas and values tending towards either change or continuity.
Such conflicts included those between innovation and convention in 
the planning of Monarto, between the new requirements of EIA and 
established professional and organisational responsibilities and 
autonomy, and between increased Commonwealth intervention and State 
sovereignty, to name a few. But these were not just dispassionate 
conflicts of ideas. They were emotionally loaded questions where 
positions taken tended to reflect professional and organisational 
loyalties and likely gains and losses to personal or organisational 
power.
The Monarto experience supports the conclusions of the discussion 
of policymaking and decisionmaking in Chapter Three, where it was 
suggested that none of the bureaucratic politics, incremental, 
rational-comprehensive and non-decision models provides a sufficient 
explanation of decisionmaking processes and that each form may 
co-exist in the same organisation or predominate at different times.
It was also argued that the bureaucratic politics model, particularly, 
does not give sufficient weight to extra-organisational influences, and 
that generally the models failed to provide a framework for understanding 
extra-organisational forces and the way in which they bear on internal 
organisational processes.
Within the MDC, while elements of each mode of decisionmaking were 
always present to some degree, some were more dominant under certain 
conditions. An early predominance of rational planning gave way to 
a growing proportion of bureaucratic politics. This was increasingly 
replaced, as the future of the project became more doubtful, with a 
process which had characteristics of the non-decision model but which 
did not fully conform to it. These changes in the character of the 
internal processes of the MDC were linked to changes in the extent to 
which it was subject to external forces.
As previously noted, the Monarto case study is not intended to 
be self-contained. Many of the influences at work in the Monarto 
case are examined in other chapters - for example changing economic
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conditions over the period, and the different approaches of the 
Federal LNCP and ALP governments to environmental policy and EIA.
Other influences such as business/government relationships are not 
illustrated by the Monarto case and are discussed elsewhere. It 
therefore does not provide a complete basis for examining the general 
propositions put forward in Chapter One. The intention is rather to 
examine the propositions in the final chapter in the light of the 
literature review of Part One and the case studies of Part Two taken 
together, since each chapter is designed to emphasise somewhat 
different aspects of the determinants of public policy. Nevertheless, 
with these reservations in mind, comments can be made about some of 
the propositions based on the Monarto material.
The case study has shown the important part played by 
'environmental' variables (proposition one): socio-economic conditions,
technology, prevailing ideas and values, and biogeophysical factors in 
shaping both the planning of Monarto and the implementation of EIA.
It has illustrated the wide range of variables and their interactions 
which influenced the implementation of policy (proposition two) and 
some aspects of the 'pattern of important variables and linkages 
between them ... which is a major factor in determining ...4 the 
character of public policy (proposition three), a pattern which was 
outlined at the end of Chapter Three. Centrally, the planning and EIA 
of Monarto, both inside and outside the MDC, demonstrated the strong 
and mutually reinforcing relationships between government agencies with 
their institutionalised power, the technologies which they implement, 
and the ideas and values of the professional elites within such 
organisations.
Such factors, together with a range of others which have been 
described, provided a great deal of resistance to change in the form 
of the EIA requirement (propositions four and five). In particular, the 
case study showed the part played by the combination of personal and 
organisational sources of resistance to change in the decisionmaking 
process.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE RANGER INQUIRY
AND AUSTRALIA'S URANIUM POLICY
This chapter examines the determinants of Australia's uranium 
mining and export policy, with particular reference to the role of the 
Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry. In doing so it considers the 
influences which shaped the role and effectiveness of the Inquiry 
itself.
The Inquiry was established by the Australian government in July 
1975 under the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974- 
1975. Its purpose was to inquire into the environmental aspects of 
the proposal to mine the Ranger uranium deposits in the Alligator 
Rivers Region of the Northern Territory. Uranium had been mined on 
a small scale in Australia since the 1950's but mining ceased with the 
downturn in demand in the early 1960's. Expectations that an upsurge 
in uranium demand would occur in the 1970's led to renewed exploration 
and major deposits were discovered in the Alligator Rivers Region 
early in that decade. In October 1974 the Commonwealth government 
signed an agreement with Peko Mines Ltd. and the Electrolytic Zinc Co. 
of Australia Ltd. (Peko-EZ) for the development of the Ranger mine. 
However, the commencement of mining became subject to the completion 
of the Inquiry.
A remarkable feature of the issue of uranium mining and export in 
Australia has been the wide range of interesting, varied, controversial 
and in some cases vitally important questions entangled with it; and 
consequently the considerable number of contending interests which have 
been activated by it. Such characteristics, and the public debate and 
media coverage which they have generated, have made the uranium issue 
unusually fertile ground for observing the determinants of public 
policy in action.
Regional aspects of the uranium issue include the effects of 
mining on an area of considerable scenic beauty and ecological variety 
and richness, mostly in a near-natural state; the clash between 
Aboriginal and white society in one of the few areas where Aborigines 
are the largest ethnic group and where many retain their traditional 
ties with the land; and the need to resolve the competing land use
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FIGURE 7.1:
LOCATION MAP: RANGER URANIUM DEPOSIT
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requirements of Aborigines, mining companies, conservation, pastoral 
interests and tourism.
International aspects include the relationship between nuclear 
power generation and the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and 
nuclear war, terrorism and sabotage, and questions associated with the 
nuclear fuel cycle including reactor safety and the disposal of 
radioactive waste« These in turn raise further questions concerning 
the adequacy of existing international safeguards arrangements, the 
need for any additional safeguards, the political stability of 
potential customer countries, and the possible tradeoffs between 
selling more uranium and imposing stringent safeguard conditions on 
sales.
Among related questions are the likely demand and supply 
situation for uranium; whether energy-poor countries, particularly 
developing countries, would be adversely affected by the withholding 
of Australian uranium; and the likely effects of any such policy on 
Australia's international political and trade relationships, including 
its capacity to influence international efforts to prevent nuclear 
proliferation. Linked with these issues are questions concerning the 
likely benefits and costs of nuclear power as compared with other 
energy options, including the 'soft' energy sources such as solar and 
wind power.
The uranium issue has also involved the question of the desirable 
levels of government participation and foreign ownership in uranium 
mining and enrichment. It has brought about cleavages within the 
Labor Party and the union movement on the issue of whether mining 
should proceed, and generated a major campaign by environmental groups 
and a counter-campaign by mining interests. It has contributed to the 
fall of a Labor government by way of that government's attempts to 
raise overseas loans intended in part to finance uranium development.
It has brought about a full-scale public environmental inquiry, 
providing the opportunity to assess the value of such an inquiry and 
the extent to which its recommendations were reflected in subsequent 
government policy.
The Inquiry itself is the most wide-ranging and thorough example 
of environmental impact assessment so far carried out in Australia. It
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is for this reason, and because of the variety and salience of the 
issues and participants involved, that uranium policy has been 
chosen as a major case study.
It should perhaps be noted beforehand that because this study 
is concerned with examining the determinants of uranium policy, it is 
divided into sections, each dealing with a major policy actor or 
influence. It is therefore only in chronological order within each 
section.
The contents of this case study are as follows: after a brief
description of the Alligator Rivers Region, the study first deals with
the evolution of the uranium policy of the Labor Party, which was in
office during the period when uranium mining and export became a
nationally controversial issue. The discussion then examines the
nature and conduct of the Inquiry. Following some comments on the
LNCP's position on uranium issues prior to ard during the Inquiry, the
findings of the Inquiry are compared with the ensuing 1977 policy
statements of the LNCP government„ The economic and political
influences external to Australia on the market for uranium and on
Australian government policy are reviewed, together with the government's
#
responses, particularly in relation to its safeguards requirements for 
uranium exports.
Internal influences on uranium policy are then examined - 
environmental interest groups, trade unions, mining companies, public 
opinion, and Aborigines. The discussion of mining companies includes a 
review of the implementation of the government's environmental 
requirements for the Ranger and Nabarlek mines, It also contains a 
summary of the existing and proposed uranium mines in Australia in 
early 1983. The final section looks at the negotiations between 
government and Aborigines concerning uranium mining in the Region, 
and at some of the impacts of mining on the Aboriginal communities.
The regional setting
Significant uranium deposits are widely distributed in Australia. 
However, the size and richness of the discoveries in the Alligator 
Rivers Region attracted the first proposals for major new mining 
developments during the resurgence of interest in uranium of the 1970's.
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Consequently, the Region became the centre of the controversy over 
uranium mining and export,,
The Region is very remote from the major population centres of 
Australia,, It is in the Northern Territory, which is in a transitional 
stage between direct control by the national government and 
statehood. In 1978 (after the Ranger Inquiry), the Territory received 
a considerable degree of self-determination, but this falls far short 
of full statehood.
Figure 7.1 shows the location of the Region. The Region is 
largely undeveloped. It has a monsoonal rainfall pattern, with 
extensive seasonal flood plains featuring large populations of wild­
fowl. The flood plains and the rugged escarpment of the Arnhem Land 
Plateau, over 600 kilometres long and rising up to 250 metres above the 
adjoining lowlands, are the Region's outstanding natural features.
There are five distinct subregions - the tidal flats, the flood plains, 
the lowlands, the plateau and the southern hills and basins. The 
distinctive subregions and the large seasonal changes have given rise 
to a diverse biology considered to be one of the richest in Australia 
(Second Report, 1977, p. 17).
•<
Most of the Region is regarded as prospective for uranium. The 
four major uranium orebodies so far discovered are all in lowland areas 
within a few hundred metres of the escarpment or its outliers. Three 
of the deposits - Ranger, Jabiluka and Koongarra - are within the 
boundaries of the National Park gazetted in 1975 but not declared by 
the time of the Inquiry. The fourth deposit, Nabarlek, is in the 
adjoining Arnhem Land Aboriginal Reserve. There were, until recently, 
two pastoral leases in the Region and portions of five others. Feral 
pigs and buffaloes originally brought in by Europeans have become 
established in the Region and have caused considerable environmental 
damage.
Aborigines have lived in the Region for at least 25,000 years 
and made much use of the rock shelters along the escarpment, where 
there are large numbers of archaeological and art sites, the latter 
considered to be 'amongst the best in Australia, if not the world' 
(Second Report, 1977, p. 36). One important sacred site, Mt. Brockman,
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is close to the Ranger deposit„ Since European intrusion began, 
Aboriginal numbers have been greatly reduced, but prior to the 
commencement of mining development they made up 800 of a permanent 
Regional population of about 1000 (Second Report, 1977, p. 18). The 
Aborigines have tended to forsake their traditional nomadic lifestyle 
in favour of a more sedentary one, and are largely concentrated around 
the Oenpelli Mission. However, because of the relatively low level of 
European occupation, traditional institutions continue to play an 
important role and they retain a belief in the religious relationship 
which binds them to their land (Second Report, 1977, p. 40) „
THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY
Prior to and during its term of Federal office from 1972 to 1975, 
Labor Party policy favoured uranium mining and export. But towards the 
end of that period there was a rising tide of opinion against mining 
within the Party, which peaked in a change of policy at the ALP's 
National Conference in 1977. Under the new policy a Labor government 
would declare a moratorium on uranium mining and treatment and repudiate 
any commitment by a non-Labor government to uranium mining, processing 
or export. t
The 1971 ALP National Conference had uncritically endorsed a 
policy of stimulating the growth of nuclear technology:
... particularly by the earliest possible Commonwealth 
initiative to establish nuclear power stations ... Labor 
will work for the enrichment of Australian uranium resources 
in plants ... located in Australia and which have at least a 
majority Australian control of equity and policy (ALP,
1971, p. 16)„
Any such nuclear industrial capacity was not, however, to be used for 
producing nuclear weapons for Australia’s defence force. Further, the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was to be 
ratified (ALP, 1971, p„ 47).
The ALP took office in 1972 with a number of other policies 
which were to influence the course of events on uranium mining. A 
Labor government would implement ’ ... direct Commonwealth and State 
participation in oil and mineral search and exploitation throughout 
Australian land and offshore territories.' (ALP, 1971, p. 15).
Exclusive corporate land rights were to be granted:
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o.o in  re g a rd  to  land  a t  p r e s e n t  re se rv e d  fo r  the  use o f  
A b o r ig in e s ,  o r  where t r a d i t i o n a l  occupancy . . .  can be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  from a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  o r  o th e r  ev idence . . .
A b o r ig in a l  land  r i g h t s  s h a l l  c a r ry  w ith  them f u l l  r i g h t s  
to  m in e ra ls  in  th o se  lan d s  (ALP, 1971, p. 31).
A nother r e s o l u t i o n  foreshadowed th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  th e  Environment 
Assessment (Impact o f  P ro p o sa ls )  Act in  1974 under which th e  Ranger 
In q u iry  took  p la c e :  'S t r i n g e n t  s a feg u a rd s  a g a in s t  th e  p o l l u t io n  o f
th e  n a t u r a l  environm ent w i l l  be implemented and ad m in is te re d  . . . '
(ALP, 1971, p . 4 0 ) .
Among th e  e a r l i e s t  a c t io n s  o f  th e  incoming Labor government were 
th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  NPT, th e  f r e e z in g  o f  a l l  a p p l i c a t io n s  f o r  
mining and e x p lo r a t io n  on A b o r ig in a l  r e s e r v e s ,  and th e  appointm ent 
o f  Mr. J u s t i c e  Woodward to  an A bo rig in a l  Land R ights  Commission to  
a d v ise  on how b e s t  to  implement th e  g ra n t in g  o f  land r i g h t s .
The NPT and A u s t r a l i a ' s  membership o f  i t  p layed  an im p o rtan t  p a r t  
in  th e  Ranger I n q u i r y ' s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  and in  th e  LNCP governm ent's  
uranium p o l i c y .  The R eports  o f  th e  A borig ina l Land R igh ts  Commission 
le d  to  th e  A b o r ig in a l  Land R igh ts  (N orthern  T e r r i to r y )  A ct, p assed  
a f t e r  L abor’ s te rm  in  o f f i c e .  I t  was under t h a t  Act th a t< th e  Ranger 
In q u i ry  was g iven  power to  make f in d in g s  concern ing  A bo rig in a l  c la im s  
to  t r a d i t i o n a l  ow nership  o f  la n d .
The incoming Labor M in is te r  f o r  M inerals  and Energy, Mr. R.F.X. 
Connor, w h o le h e a r te d ly  acc ep ted  th e  1971 ALP p la t fo rm  o f  A u s t r a l i a n  
ow nership  and government p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  th e  development o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  
m in e ra l  and energy  r e s o u r c e s ,  and uranium enrichm ent w i th in  A u s t r a l i a .  
But one o f  h i s  f i r s t  moves was to  r e fu s e  to  approve f u r t h e r  ex p o r t  
c o n t r a c t s  f o r  uranium . T h is  he l a t e r  j u s t i f i e d  in  term s o f  th e  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  n a tu r e  o f  th e  market (K elly  and S a d d le r ,  1982, p . 10). 
Events j u s t i f i e d  h i s  judgement as  th e  p r i c e  o f  uranium in c re a s e d  more 
than  s i x f o l d  in  r e a l  term s between 1973 and 1976 (Table 7 .1 ,  p. 328).
Connor may a l s o  have wished to  d e lay  mining w h ile  he pursued  
h i s  purpose  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a uranium enrichm ent p la n t  in  A u s t r a l i a .
His e x te n s iv e  e f f o r t s  to  develop  such a v en tu re  in c lu d ed  a p ro p o sa l  
to  Japan  to  in v e s t  in  an enrichm ent p la n t  in  exchange f o r  payment in  
term s o f  e n r ic h e d  uranium (A ust. 2 .7 .7 5 ) .  However, th e  Japanese
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suggested that a two-year study was required (AFR, 1.8.75) and no 
agreement had been reached by the end of Labor's term of office.
Eventually, in October 1974, Connor announced an agreement for 
the development of the Ranger uranium deposit under which the 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) as the vehicle for 
government participation would provide 72.5 percent of the capital 
required for the project and Peko Mines Ltd. and Electrolytic Zinc 
Company of Australia Ltd. 27.5 percent. Subsequently, however, there 
was disagreement between Peko-EZ and the government concerning the 
interpretation of the agreement. The dispute was said to be over 
whether Peko-EZ would have 50 percent equity in the venture or would 
supply its share in the form of loans to the operating company (Aust., 
11.10.75). Connor did not seem anxious to resolve the difficulties, 
and it was not until a year later that final agreement was reached, 
with Peko-EZ obtaining 50 percent equity, the right to 50 percent of 
the net proceeds and contributing 27.5 percent of the finance for the 
project (Age, 11.10.75).
At the Federal Conference of the Labor Party in February 1975 
Connor had not yet been damaged by the loans affair. His ^influence 
over uranium policy prevailed against growing dissent within the 
Party. Connor did agree, however, to ask his Department to carry out 
a study of the environmental consequences of uranium mining and 
export (AFR, 6.2.75). This was apparently by way of compromise after 
Connor, with the support of Whitlam, had rejected a proposal for a 
full public inquiry. Whitlam and Connor argued that the delay of at 
least a year associated with such an inquiry would jeopardise 
Australia's integrity in the eyes of overseas customers and delay the 
introduction of an alternative technology to countries embarrassed by 
the oil crisis (Butler, 1978, p. 6).
The Minister for Environment, Dr. Cass, however, was convinced of 
the need for a public inquiry and proceeded with arrangements for one 
as he was entitled to under the Environment Assessment (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974. As noted in an earlier chapter, Cass and Connor 
were also in disagreement over the question of mining and export of 
mineral sands from Fraser Island. Nevertheless, according to at least 
one writer 'in the main, Connor was sympathetic to Cass on
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environmental matters’ (Reid, 1976, p. 277, n. 52) and Connor had 
supported the introduction of the Environment Assessment Act. It 
appears that Connor agreed (AFR, 12.3.75) to a public inquiry under 
the Act, although with narrower terms of reference than those finally 
agreed.
The change to broader terms of reference was precipitated by a 
High Court challenge to the Fraser Island Inquiry by the proponent of 
sandmining on the Island, Dillingham-Murphyores. The Prime Minister,
Mr. Whitlam, who was at that time temporarily Minister for 
Environment, has said that the High Court challenge led him to 
discover that the terms of reference for both the Ranger and Fraser 
Island Inquiries had been drawn up without reference to the Attorney- 
General’s Department (Butler, 1978, pp. 8, 9). The terms of reference 
for both Inquiries were re-drafted and finally gazetted on 16 July 1975. 
At the same time Mr. Justice Fox was appointed to the Ranger Inquiry,
replacing Dr. Hookey who was also at that time Presiding Commissioner
of the Fraser Island Inquiry.
During the course of that year, Connor's position had been 
weakened by his involvement in the loans affair and by mounting 
criticism of his secretiveness and apparent lack of progress on uranium 
and other minerals and energy matters. Ultimately Whitlam appointed a 
Resources Committee towards the end of 1975 which much reduced Connor’s 
power, altered many of his policies and greatly expedited final 
agreement between the government and Peko-EZ. The Deputy Prime
Minister, Mr. Crean, a member of the Resources Committee, said in what
amounted to a public condemnation of Connor's policies:
I think we have been a little bit silly over our stand 
on uranium. I think our plans for an enrichment plant here 
have just been in limbo, like so many other things in this 
area ... Most of the things are getting quick action 
because quick action is needed. The only thing that is sad 
is that it could have happened 18 months ago (Age, 10.10.75).
The loans affair which brought down Connor and was central to the 
fall of the Labor government arose from his desire to finance major 
government-owned development projects, including uranium enrichment, by 
overseas borrowing. The Opposition was able to argue that the 
government had acted illegally and unconstitutionally in December 1974
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in authorising the proposed borrowing of $US4,000 million without 
seeking prior approval of the Loan Council. Such approval was 
required by the 1927 Financial Agreement between the Commonwealth and 
States, an Agreement which by s,105A(5) of the Constitution had a 
status equivalent to sections of the Constitution. In view of the 
purpose and twenty-year term of the proposed borrowing, the government's 
argument that the loan was for 'temporary purposes' appeared to be 
inadequate (Crommelin and Evans, ed., 1977, p.60). The loans affair 
became the main 'reprehensible circumstances' by which the Opposition 
justified its decision to block Supply in the Senate and ultimately 
bring down the Labor government. Connor's own resignation was 
precipiated by his having misled parliament as to the time at which he 
ceased to negotiate for the loan.
During the remainder of the Labor government's term in office it
was apparent that, despite the Inquiry, the government was planning to
proceed with uranium mining. This was evidenced by the finalisation of
the government's agreement with Peko-EZ in October 1975; by Crean's
statement while a member of the Resources Committee that 'Australia
should start selling uranium now' (Age, 10.10.75); by extensive
activity by public service task forces on uranium policy; and by the
#
visit to Japan of a senior AAEC official to assess the uranium market 
(Aust., 11.10.75). But the government's initiatives were brought to 
an end by the Supply crisis, the dismissal of the government by the 
Governor-General in November 1975, and Labor's defeat in the subsequent 
election.
In Opposition, the ALP moved towards a policy of opposing uranium 
mining and export. To some extent this change was influenced by the 
Reports of the Ranger Inquiry, both of which were released between the 
1975 and 1977 National Labor Party Conferences. In November 1976 
Labor frontbencher Bill Hayden stated that he had reconsidered his 
pro-mining view as a result of the information contained in the First 
Report (Saddler £ Kelly , 1982, p.13). Others such as frontbencher
Mick Young also changed their views.
The Ranger Inquiry's Reports, of course, were only one factor in 
such changes. The growing public and trade union opposition to uranium 
mining and export (see subsequent sections) also influenced views 
within the Party. Another factor was the tireless anti-uranium
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campaigning of Tom Uren, at that time Deputy Leader of the Opposition, 
a long-serving politician with extensive grassroots contacts in the 
Party and the union movement.
In April 1977 the Labor Premier of South Australia, Don Dunstan, 
at that time often billed as Labor’s most successful politician, made a 
much-publicised switch to opposing uranium mining, after having been 
under pressure from a largely anti-uranium State Cabinet (AFR, 7.4.77). 
By the time of the ALP National Conference in July 1977 anti-uranium 
sentiments in the Party were widespread. A new uranium policy was 
moved by Clyde Holding and seconded by Dunstan. The proposed policy 
stated that having regard to the range of problems associated with the 
nuclear fuel cycle and particularly those of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and the absence of safe procedures for the storage and 
disposal of radioactive wastes,
... it is imperative that no commitment of Australia's 
uranium deposits to the world's nuclear fuel cycle should 
be made until a reasonable time has elapsed for full public 
debate on, and consideration of, the issues; 
the Australian Labor Party is satisfied that the 
abovementioned problems have been solved; and 
the Australian Government endorses Recommendation 6 of the 
First Fox Report which states: 'A decision to mine dnd sell
uranium should not be made unless the Commonwealth Government 
ensures that the Commonwealth can at any time ... immediately 
terminate those activities permanently, indefinitely or for a 
specified period.'
Accordingly, a Labor Government will -
23(a) declare a moratorium on uranium mining and treatment in 
Australia;
(b) repudiate any commitment of a non-labor Government to the 
mining, processing or export of Australia's uranium;
(c) not permit the mining, processing or export of uranium 
pursuant to agreement entered into contrary to Labor's policy.
(ALP, 1977, p. 25).
The new policy was moved as an amendment to a less severe 
proposal by the shadow minister for mines and energy, Paul Keating, 
which had been produced by the Party's Minerals and Energy Committee. 
Their proposal had suggested a moratorium until at least 1980, 
and had said that a Labor government 'would not be bound by' rather 
than 'would repudiate' any commitments of a non-Labor government. 
Keating, however, accepted the amendment (AFR, 8.7.77) and it was passed 
unanimously. There were few speakers in the debate and none backed the
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original Minerals and Energy Committee's suggestion or any more moderate 
position.
Such unanimity, however, was not a true reflection of the position 
within the Party, which remained divided on the issue. Prior to the 
Conference, Uren on the one hand, and Whitlam, Keating and Hurford on the 
other, had been making conflicting statements about aspects of uranium 
mining (AFR, 1304077)0 Whitlam, Hayden and Hawke, all known for more 
moderate attitudes to uranium mining, did not speak in the uranium 
debate at the Conference,,
During the campaign for the December 1977 Federal elections,
Labor gave the uranium issue some prominence. The ALP's television 
campaign included several advertisements concerning uranium, one 
featuring Dunstan explaining why he had changed his views on uranium 
mining, another comparing the relative shortness of recorded history 
with the length of time some radioactive wastes remain deadly. There 
were differences within the Party as to the electoral effectiveness of 
the uranium issue, and the 'hard-sell* anti-uranium advertisement, 
featuring a baby playing with a hand grenade, was not used until the 
last week of the campaign, after the opinion polls had become very 
adverse for Labor (AFR, 9012077). The ALP's leaders, with one or two 
exceptions, did not give uranium policy the same prominence in their 
personal campaigning as had the television advertisements. The 
government parties generally said little about uranium during the 
campaign, clearly considering other issues such as the record of the 
Whitlam government, economic management and proposed tax cuts more 
electorally appealing»
Although Labor lost the election, little could be said about the 
part played by the uranium question, partly because of the range of 
other issues prominent in the campaign» There was also the surprisingly 
high proportion of votes gained by the Australian Democrats in their 
first Federal election, after they had campaigned on a pro-environment 
and anti-uranium platform. It may be that Labor's anti-uranium 
television campaign helped the Australian Democrats. The percentage of 
votes obtained by the main parties were Liberal 38.3 (-3.2), National 
Country Party 9.6 (-0.1), Australian Democrats 9.4, ALP 40.1 (-2.8).
The figures in brackets are the change from the corresponding 
percentages in the December 1975 elections.
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The Labor Party retained its uranium policy unchallenged at the 
1979 National Conference. Earlier in the year, it had seemed that 
Dunstan might once again change his position on uranium mining. In a 
sense he had been hoist with his own petard, since at the time of the 
1977 ALP National Conference where he was one of the prime movers of 
the moratorium policy, the potential of the huge Roxby Downs uranium- 
copper-gold deposit in South Australia was not yet known. Under pressure 
to change his stance on uranium, particularly from his pro-mining 
Minister for Mines and Energy, Hugh Hudson, Dunstan undertook a two-week 
overseas trip in January 1979 to assess reported advances in nuclear 
waste disposal technology.
Much of the pressure on Dunstan arose from the poor economic 
position of South Australia, which had a contracting manufacturing base 
and the highest rate of unemployment at that time of any Australian 
State. The economic situation threatened the progressive social 
programmes which the Dunstan government had introduced and indeed the 
government’s tenure in office. In a State with few substantial 
mineral resources, the Roxby Downs find was of great economic 
significance. Estimates made at that time were of deposits worth 
$54 billion (AFR, 18.1.79), the mining of which would creat'e over 5000 
jobs (NT, 3.2.79).
Before leaving on his overseas investigation, Dunstan conceded 
that it could lead to modification of Labor’s hard-line policy on 
uranium. A committee chaired by Hudson had already drawn up a proposed 
policy by which uranium mining could proceed under certain conditions 
including its ratification by a State referendum (AFR, 19.1.79).
In the event, Dunstan on his return from overseas said that it 
had not yet been established that the nuclear industry was safe, and 
that the South Australian government would maintain a ban on the mining 
and processing of uranium for the forseeable future (CT, 6.2.79). Labor 
lost the next State election in September 1979, but it is difficult to 
attribute this specifically to its uranium policy. Illness had forced 
Dunstan to retire from politics shortly after his overseas trip. His 
replacement, Des Corcoran, had little of Dunstan’s charisma.
The Federal election in October 1980 saw little emphasis placed 
on uranium by either party, in a contest which Labor came close to
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winning. With the continuing recession, issues of economic management 
dominated the election campaign. The uranium issue had also declined 
somewhat in public prominence. After the commencement of uranium mining 
in early 1979, the campaign against mining by environmental groups lost 
some of its momentum, and public interest had correspondingly subsided. 
As one prominent anti-uranium activist has written, 'The start of 
uranium mining ... in early 1978 was a strong blow to the anti-uranium 
movement. There has been some feeling of not knowing what to do next' 
(Martin, 1982, p. 35). Union opposition to uranium mining had also 
declined. Inevitably, these circumstances were reflected within the 
Labor Party and in the prominence given to the uranium issue in its 
election campaign.
The 1982 ALP National Conference saw a change in the Party's 
uranium policy. After the moratorium policy was adopted in 1977, there 
had always appeared to be an imbalance between the views of the Party's 
Federal parliamentary leadership on the matter and those of the rank and 
file. There was a greater concern among the leadership about the 
electoral consequences and practical difficulties of implementing the 
moratorium and the repudiation of existing contracts and agreement for 
the mining and sale of uranium.
#
Early in the conference a proposed new policy supported by Hayden, 
Keating, Bowen and others was circulated. Under the proposed policy, 
operation of existing mines with finalised sales contracts at July 1982 
would have been allowed and the possibility of opening new mines with 
rigorous safeguards was left open (AFR, 6.7.82). At a meeting the week 
before the conference the Victorian centre-unity faction had decided 
to support the existing policy (AFR, 6.7.82), leaving its leader,
Bob Hawke, in a difficult position since he personally favoured a change 
in policy. A prior meeting of about 30 left-wing delegates also decided 
to support the present policy, but the NSW right-wing with 15 of its 
State's 23 delegates (AFR, 29.6.82) favoured the proposed policy change.
Immediately before the uranium debate at the conference, it 
appeared that the Victorian centre-unity faction would hold the balance 
of power. Although it seemed to some observers that those in favour of 
retaining the existing policy would be in a small majority, there was 
still a great degree of uncertainty, and the possibility that in the
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emotionally-charged atmosphere of the debate, and with most of the 
Party’s leaders in favour of change, sufficient delegates might be 
swayed to support the proposed new policy.
Believing that those favouring the new policy were likely to win, 
the Victorian State Secretary of the Party, Bob Hogg, put forward a 
compromise proposal intended to provide for the phasing out of mining 
and export rather than its immediate cessation in the event of Labor 
winning government. Hogg, a member of the Victorian Left, which 
favoured the existing policy, had to temporarily forgo his status as a 
delegate to propose the change. Hogg presented his amendment as an 
anti-uranium policy which, unlike the existing policy, embodied a means 
of implementation. However, Uren and Labor's shadow minister for 
environment, Stuart West, both argued that the amendment was pro-mining. 
Hayden, on the other hand, told the Conference that there would be a 
’massive flight of capital’ from Australia if the existing policy were 
implemented (AFR, 807„82)0
The Hogg amendment was adopted by 53 votes to 46. The new policy
is a lengthy and sometimes repetitive one, giving evidence of its hasty
preparation. The amendment takes the form of an addendum to the previous
#policy, all of which has been retained. The amendment commences with 
the words: 'This policy [the previous policy] will be implemented in the 
light of the following -’ (ALP, 1982, p 0 134) thus purporting to be a 
set of observations and conditions for putting into effect the 1977 
policy.
The first six paragraphs (ALP, 1982, paras. 55-60) of the 
amendment summarise the reasons for Labor's opposition to the growth of 
the nuclear power industry in terms of its perceived problems and 
dangers. Paras. 62-63a recognise that an incoming Labor government:
will inherit an existing position of Australia under the 
Fraser government of having made treaties and authorised 
contracts of supply of uranium to a growing number of 
countries with little effort to impose controls and 
conditions on supply; (ALP, 1982, p. 135).
Para. 63b states that in repudiating existing commitments an ALP 
government ’has neither a moral, legal or political obligation to 
compensation to the industry as such.’ Para. 63c comes to the heart 
of the amendment:
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.00 understanding the difficulties which could be encountered 
in the implementation of that commitment [to repudiation] our 
minimum position would be a total unequivocal commitment to 
phase out Australia’s involvement in the uranium industry and 
that certain conditions as outlined will and must be applied 
to those mines existing in production as of July 1982.
The amendment goes on to commit a Labor government to preventing 
any new uranium mines from being developed (63d, 64d). However, it 
makes a specific concession to developments such as Roxby Downs in 
South Australia in that applications for the export of uranium mined 
incidentally to other minerals would be considered on a case by case 
basis (64c)0
Under the amended policy ’if the only recourse is to implement a 
policy of phasing out the industry’ [as opposed to immediate moratorium 
and repudiation] certain conditions are to apply. Some of these would 
be quite draconian if strictly applied; for instance para. 65a:
... miners, producers and users of the products of the 
nuclear fuel cycle accept responsibility for developing 
effective waste disposal mechanisms, satisfactory safety 
and occupational health conditions, proposals and funding 
for the decommissioning of nuclear plants and also provide 
financial assistance for the development of safe alternative 
energy sources;
There is also provision for an ALP government to renegotiate bilateral 
safeguards agreements if necessary, in order to impose conditions on 
the nuclear practices of the customer country (para. 64b). Some 
interesting examples are given (para. 66), including:
Any contract with the French government could only be 
contemplated subject to that government ceasing all nuclear 
testing programmes in the Pacific ... any contract with 
the Japanese could only be contemplated subject to them 
withdrawing from their intention to dump waste material 
in the Pacific ... any contract with the West Germans would 
be subject to them ceasing the supply of technology and 
equipment to countries such as the Argentine which is leading 
to the establishment of yet another nuclear armed country.
Overall, the document reads as it was, an agonised attempt to 
reach a compromise which would give a Labor government a little, but 
not too much, room for manoeuvre. However, there are enough potential 
conflicts in the wording of the policy to allow for more latitude in 
interpretation concerning the phasing out of the existing industry 
than was probably intended by its proposer.
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Of the two major parties the Labor Party is often seen as the 
party of change, reform and idealism. While this is not always true, 
there is certainly a tendency towards these things, just as in the 
LNCP there is a tendency towards conservatism. One of the problems of 
being a party of change is that there is always the likelihood of 
moving too fast for the electorate and for the more conservative 
elements within the party. The choice between change and conservatism 
thus often becomes, or at least is seen to be, not just a choice between 
two different approaches to winning office, but between maintaining 
principles and ideals or gaining office by adopting a more pragmatic 
approach which seeks to move closer to the middle ground in terms of 
appeal to a conservative electorate.
There are therefore strong reasons for tensions within the Labor 
Party between a cluster of attitudes centred on idealism and reform, 
and another centred on pragmatism and caution. Such tensions are 
exacerbated because these clusters of attitudes tend to be identified 
respectively with left and right factions within the Party. The course 
of Labor Party uranium policy formulation since the mid-1970's 
illustrates and reflects the tension and the fine balance between the 
pragmatic and idealist orientations0
#
By being the party more receptive to reform, Labor is in many 
respects faced with an inbuilt electoral disadvantage, since attempted 
social change, as has been argued throughout this thesis, is fraught 
with difficulties and resistances arising from a range of sources. At 
times, of course, the slow accumulation of the desires of society for 
change outstrip the laggard responses of conservative government, and a 
Labor government is voted in„ In part, this is what happened after 23 
years of LCP government under Menzies. Or it may become apparent to the 
electorate that conservative solutions applied over a period have not 
achieved the promised results. This in part is what happened after over 
seven years of the Fraser government. Except in such unusual 
circumstances, however, a Labor party seeking to obtain and retain power 
must present itself largely in the colours of the status quo and, as the 
Wran and Dunstan Labor governments have done so successfully, introduce 
reforms gradually and selectively.
THE INQUIRY
Following its establishment in 1975, the Inquiry heard almost
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300 witnesses over 121 days. It produced its First Report in October 
1976, and its Second (and final) Report in May 1977. The Inquiry was 
established under the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 
1974-5 ('the Act'), with the following terms of reference:
The Commission is required to inquire:
in respect of all the environmental aspects of:
(a) the formulation of proposals;
(b) the carrying out of works and other projects;
(c) the negotiation, operation and enforcement of 
agreements and arrangements;
(d) the making of, or the participation in the making 
of, decisions and recommendations; and
(e) the incurring of expenditure,
by, or on behalf of, the Australian Government and the 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission and other authorities 
of Australia for and in relation to the development by the 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission in association with 
Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd of uranium deposits in the 
Northern Territory of Australia. (First Report, 1976, p. 1)
Together with the definition of environment embodied in the Act: 
'all aspects of the surroundings of man, whether affecting him as an 
individual or in his social groupings' these terms of reference 
provided a potentially very wide scope for the Inquiry, and the 
Commissioners adopted a broad interpretation of them.
#
In its First Report the Inquiry examined the question of whether 
'the use of uranium in the nuclear power industry carried with it risks 
and dangers of such a nature and magnitude that Australia should not 
export it, or mine it at all' (First Report, 1976, p. 2). In its Second 
Report it examined the regional and local effects of the Ranger mine 
and the cumulative regional effects of all the other proposed uranium 
mines in the area» It placed these in the context of a plan designed 
to provide 'a reasonably satisfactory accommodation between competing 
interests and the conflicting uses to which land in the region can be 
put.' (Second Report, 1977, p. 9). The Inquiry thus ranged far 
beyond a strict preoccupation with the effects of the Ranger mine alone, 
and became at one level an inquiry into the national and international 
implications of the proposed export of Australian uranium, and at 
another level an inquiry into the effects of uranium mining on the 
Alligator Rivers region. The Commissioners also gave the social as 
well as the biophysical effects of mining considerable weight, as 
witness their concern with the impacts of mining on Aboriginal society.
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That the Inquiry should take such a broad view of its 
responsibilities was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Ranger 
EIS prepared on behalf of the proponents did not deal at all with the 
possible dangers associated with the nuclear power industry (First 
Report, 1976, p. 2). Nor is it unsurprising that an Inquiry based on 
a single mine should generate a quite comprehensive regional plan. 
Referring to the definition of environment in the Act, one of the 
Commissioners noted:
Even in the face of that definition, it was put to the 
Commission by learned counsel that ownership of land 
adjacent to that on which uranium mining is proposed was 
irrelevant to the Inquiry. ... it is clear that we as a 
Commission would not have been able to perform a useful 
function in terms of the Object of the Act if such matters 
as ownership of land in the region of the proposed mine 
were ignored. Goodness knows what limitations would be 
placed on environmental inquiries if narrower definitions 
of environment were adopted. And how useless such inquiries 
would be! (Kelleher, 1977, p. 9).
The breadth of the Inquiry was attributable not only to its terms 
of reference but to the weight of evidence presented to it and to the 
character of the Commissioners themselves. The latter were by 
background and disposition inclined to a generous view of the matters 
to be examined and of the role of the public in such examination.
The Presiding Commissioner, Mr. Justice R.W. Fox, was the Senior 
Judge of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court. The 
Commissioners were Professor C.B. Kerr, Professor of Preventive and 
Social Medicine at the University of Sydney, and Mr. G.G. Kelleher, a 
civil engineer and Hearings Commissioner with the then Commonwealth 
Department of Environment. The Presiding Commissioner's views as to 
the scope and purpose of the Inquiry are illustrated by his comments 
during the hearings in reply to a criticism based on the cost of the 
delay to mining attributed to the Inquiry:
I think when you make that sort of statement, you must, 
as I'm sure you do as a fair-minded man, give weight to the 
fact that seemingly a very substantial part of the population, 
sees such dangers and some sections at least, a very 
responsible section, sees such dangers in the connection of 
the mining of uranium that we should not mine it at all. And 
I think I'm right in saying that most, or at least, well I 
think it's most and virtually all the Trade Union Movement 
has said it will not. And what we're here to do is to try
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and assist the country by exploring the pros and the cons, 
including considerations as to whether we should mine it 
at all. And you would recognise that one sure way to anarchy 
and all sorts of other things, is not to let responsible 
sections of the community, and it may be a majority for all 
you or I know, have a voice in a question of such dramatic, 
awesome depth as the question as to whether uranium is such 
a dangerous substance ... (Transcript, p. 7628).
In exploring the pros and the cons the Presiding Commissioner 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Inquiry's findings of fact, 
as compared with the value judgements passed on them in the form of 
recommendations (First Report, 1976, p. 5, and Transcript, p. 13447).
As we understand the intended operation of the Act, it 
is that members of the public (as well as the Minister) be 
provided with findings of fact as determined by an 
independent tribunal, so that they can form their own 
opinions and, if necessary, influence parliamentary and 
government action. (First Report, p. 5).
It is debatable, however, whether facts can be so neatly separated 
from value-judgements in many instances. Further, the Inquiry held 
the view that where values were involved in making judgements about 
the evidence, these should be those of society in general (First 
Report, 1976, p. 19). In reply to a witness who suggested 'that the 
Inquiry should have debated the ethical questions as a basis for 
proceeding to the technical ones, the Presiding Commissioner said:
You see I'm afraid that when you address us about the 
desirability of having a philosophical debate that is 
both outside our terms of inquiry and would be futile 
and indeed it would be worse than that because you may 
find a tendency for a government, any government to appoint 
as Commissioners to an Inquiry such as this, people whose 
philosophical views are known. That would be disastrous to 
this sort of Inquiry, wouldn't it? In other words, what 
plainly this Commission is required to do, as indeed are 
all Commissions, I think virtually without exception, is 
to act on their understanding 'of accepted standards and 
values. ... (Transcript, p. 7372).
One wonders, with Saddler and Kelly (1982, p. 19) whether there 
are such generally accepted standards and values, and whether the 
Commissioners could successfully substitute such values for their own. 
The view that such inquiries should apply generally accepted values 
is questionable. Some public inquiries could conceivably perform a 
valuable function in suggesting that certain values, other than those
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commonly held, would be more appropriate in the interests of the 
community. Any such value judgements, if clearly expressed, can like 
other recommendations be accepted or rejected by governments and public. 
One suspects that many inquiries do make value judgements without any 
great concern as to whether these vary from those which might be said 
to be generally accepted.
The Inquiry's view of the public's role had two aspects; first, 
that the public should be the final arbiter:
Ultimately, when the matters of fact are resolved, many 
of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones.
We agree strongly with the view, repeatedly put to us by 
opponents of nuclear development, that, given a sufficient 
understanding of the science and technology involved, the 
final decisions should rest with the ordinary man and not be 
regarded as the preserve of any group of scientists or experts, 
however distinguished. (First Report, 1976, p. 6).
Secondly, the Inquiry valued the input provided by members of 
the public. One of the Commissioners has said:
... it is my opinion that the requirement that evidence in 
inquiries constituted under the Environment Protection Act 
be taken in public assisted the Ranger Inquiry. I go further 
and state categorically that much of the relevant information 
on which we based our Reports would not have been available 
from official sources. On some matters we would have been 
uninformed, perhaps unintentionally. (Kelleher, 1977, pp. 15, 16).
The preceding comments are also relevant to a criticism of the Inquiry
made by Sir Philip Baxter (a former Chairman of the AAEC) and others.
The concept that all decisions of government should 
be the subject of public debate, and that everyone should 
have the right to know all about everything, is today a 
political catch-cry. To me it is a dangerous heresy.
Our technological civilisation produces a continuing 
stream of problems of a most complex technical character.
In many cases judgments must be made on issues which 
cannot be proved absolutely one way or the other. Only a 
small proportion of the population is capable of under­
standing issues of this sort, even if they were to make 
the effort. Many elected representatives, though not 
all, are in the same situation. The experts must in the 
end be trusted. To submit such matters to the ballot 
box, the street demonstration, or the politician who has 
a divine conviction that he understands technical problems, 
can only lead to trouble and possible disaster. (Baxter, 
1975, p. 456).
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A related criticism was that none of the Commissioners had 
'practical experience in the matter being examined' (Woods et at. , 1978, 
p. 26). The Inquiry made the following comment concerning some of the 
evidence provided by experts involved in the nuclear industry:
In considering the evidence, we have found that many 
wildly exaggerated statements are made about the risks 
and dangers of nuclear energy production by those opposed 
to it. What has surprised us more is a lack of objectivity 
in not a few of those in favour of it, including distinguished 
scientists ... There is abundant evidence before us to show 
that scientists, engineers and administrators involved in 
the business of producing nuclear energy have at times painted 
excessively optimistic pictures of the safety and performance, 
past and present, of various aspects of nuclear production. 
(First Report, 1976, p. 6).
The Presiding Commissioner showed considerable resolution concerning
some of the difficulties which faced the Inquiry. In early 1976 the
newly elected LNCP government announced its intention to terminate a
number of Commissions of Inquiry established by the previous government.
Press reports claimed that the Ranger Inquiry was "high on the list" of
these (Aust. 4.2.76). The Presiding Commissioner, while noting that
no direction from the government had been received, drew attention to
<
the statutory independence of the Commission under the Environmental 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974-5, Section 11(6) which reads 
in part 'a Commission is not subject to directions by the Minister, or 
otherwise by or on behalf of the Australian Government, in or in 
relation to the conduct of an Inquiry'. (Transcript, p. 5242).
The Presiding Commissioner was also moved to comment more than 
once on the inadequacy of evidence submitted by some government 
agencies, for example some of that tendered by the Department of the 
Northern Territory:
What we want to know is what the Government plans, what 
it has in mind, what it would do, and we've allowed six 
months to go by to get that information and you can 
understand therefore, particularly when you have in mind 
the pressures that are on us to try and bring in a report 
as soon as possible ... you can understand my reaction 
when I read a statement like yours ... (Transcript, p. 9966).
On another occasion, referring to his adjournment of the Inquiry 
in March 1976, the Presiding Commissioner observed that 'we adjourned
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for 2^ weeks waiting for the government to tell us
what the proposal is into which we're inquiring'.
(Transcript, p. 7628).
During the course of the Inquiry many statements were made by 
members of the government which indicated that the government favoured 
the mining and export of uranium, although such statements were usually 
accompanied by the disclaimer that no final decision would be made 
until completion of the Inquiry. The accompanying publicity inevitably 
'aroused concern in the minds of many people and raised doubts as to 
the role of the Commission and the futility of continuing with the 
Inquiry which it has undertaken' (Presiding Commissioner, Transcript, 
p. 5241). The Presiding Commissioner felt it necessary to emphasise 
the government's stated intention to make no final decision pending 
the findings of the Inquiry. In the event, even though the government's 
intentions were quite plain, the continuation of the Inquiry was still 
useful in that as well as considering whether mining should proceed, 
it set out quite comprehensive proposals for the way in which mining 
and export should be carried out, including the appropriate safeguards. 
It was also at least conceivable that the Reports of the Inquiry 
might have brought about a strong enough public reaction to induce the 
government to reconsider its position. f
The procedures of the Inquiry, partly due to the provisions of 
the Act under which it was constituted, were quite formal, although 
witnesses were encouraged to speak for themselves rather than being 
represented by counsel, and for the most part they did so (Saddler,
1978, p. 4). The Inquiry was required to base its findings on evidence 
taken on oath or affirmation and on documents submitted as exhibits. 
Witnesses prepared a written submission and were cross-examined by 
counsel for the Inquiry, by the Commissioners and by the Inquiry's 
team of expert advisers. Cross-examination by other witnesses was also 
allowed.
The Inquiry permitted extensive cross-examination of witnesses 
by representatives of conservation groups. The Act makes no specific 
provision for the recognition of organisations, other than the 
proponents. Nevertheless, the Commission recognised nine organisations, 
which were allowed to make final written submissions and to be 
represented at a special concluding session. These were the
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Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) and Ranger Uranium Mines 
Pty. Ltd. (the joint proponents), the Australian Conservation 
Foundation, the Conservation Council of South Australia, Friends of 
the Earth, Northern Pastoral Services Ltd., Pancontinental Mining 
Ltd. (the proponent of another proposed uranium mine in the region), 
the Northern Land Council and the Oenpelli Council (representative 
Aboriginal organisations).
A criticism of 'the formal style of giving evidence' was that it
... is not necessarily the best means for a commission 
to make itself familiar with difficult technical aspects 
of a project. IVe often felt that matters would be 
better understood if we could sit down around a table with 
the commission and its advisers, explain an aspect of the 
project to them, and answer all their questions until they 
were completely satisfied. It was frequently impossible 
to achieve this result in the question and answer court 
room style. Thus we would suggest it would be an advantage 
if an inquiry was permitted a more flexible means of 
taking evidence and was perhaps allowed to have its advisers 
thrash out problems with relevant experts and come back to 
the inquiry with an agreed statement. (Woods et dl. , 1978,
p. 26).
The problem with the last part of the suggestion is that it would 
deny the Commissioners and the public a knowledge of the process of 
reaching agreement, with its exposure of values, assumptions and 
alternatives considered, and thus would deny the opportunity for them to 
question such matters which are fundamental to the purpose of a public 
inquiry. Whether the Commissioners did meet problems in making 
themselves 'familiar with difficult technical aspects'is another 
question. The Reports appear to demonstrate a considerable capacity 
for setting out such matters clearly. There are, however, other 
arguments for less formal procedures for some Inquiries, to which the 
concluding Chapter will refer.
The Commission appeared to have a rather sanguine and perhaps 
idealistic view of the efficacy of public and parliamentary debate in 
influencing policy:
Our final recommendation takes account of what we 
understand to be the policy of the Act under which the 
Inquiry was instituted. It is simply that there should 
be ample time for public consideration of this Report, 
and for debate upon it. We therefore recommend that no 
decision be taken in relation to the foregoing matters
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until a reasonable time has elapsed and there has 
been an opportunity for the usual democratic processes 
to function, including, in this respect, parliamentary 
debate. (First Report, 1976, p. 186).
The First Report, while making a number of subsidiary 
recommendations concerning the risks and problems associated with 
the use of uranium in the nuclear power industry, made no overall 
recommendation as to whether or not mining and export of uranium 
should proceed. This caused considerable criticism.
One of the Commissioners has given two reasons for the 
decision not to make such a recommendation. The first was based 
on the Commission's attitude to public and parliamentary debate:
Perhaps more than any other matter which concerns governments 
in today's environment, the development of nuclear power 
involves questions of ethics, of faith in the ability of 
technology to solve the problems it creates, of the 
commitment of society to continued increases in the rate 
of material production and energy use, of the likelihood 
of nations forgoing violence or the threat of it, and of the 
responsibility of a small nation to consider the welfare of 
others. These are matters which affect all Australians.
They deserved public debate so that Parliament could act in 
the knowledge of the public's attitude to them. (KeT-leher,
1977, pp. 14, 15).
In the event, the Presiding Commissioner expressed disappointment 
at the level of public debate following release of the First Report 
(AFR 23.3.77) and the parliamentary debate was also brief and lacking 
in quality. As far as public debate was concerned, much had already 
taken place via the media before and during the Inquiry, and 
interested parties had put a great deal of effort into making 
submissions to the Inquiry, at least partly in the expectation that 
it would make a definite recommendation on the central issue. The 
Inquiry, as has sometimes been said, acted as a lightning rod for the 
opposing interests, and their appetite for further debate must thereby 
have been diminished. Further, it was clear that the government was 
determined to proceed with the mining and export of uranium, and an 
escalation of effort by either side would have seemed rather futile. 
Nor was parliamentary debate, however spirited, likely to sway the 
government from its course. Also, the Labor Party was far from 
unanimous in its opposition to uranium mining, and the political
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returns of such opposition were debatable, since opinion polls 
showed a majority (although a declining one) of Australians were 
in favour of developing uranium resources.
This is not to disagree with the view that public and parliament 
should have been given the opportunity to inform themselves 
represented by the Inquiry and its Reports. But given the length of 
the preceding debate, there was unlikely to be a large reservoir of 
concerned members of the public ready to enter the debate once provided 
with a more readily accessible source of information.
There also seems to be an implication in the Commission’s view 
that had it made a definite recommendation, this would have stifled 
public debate. But it is arguable that the opposite might have been 
the case (particularly if the proposed course of action had not been 
the one favoured by government).
One other consequence of the Inquiry's not recommending whether or 
not mining and export should take place was that this, together with 
the wording of the other recommendations, led to an interpretation by 
some government leaders and sections of the press that the Commission 
had given a 'green light' for mining to proceed.
The other reason cited by Commissioner Kelleher for not making a 
recommendation on the principal question was in essence that in a 
situation where some countries are already partially dependent on 
nuclear power and might be forced to become more so in the future, and 
given also the Inquiry's strong concern with the risks of proliferation, 
Australia should take the course most likely to influence other nations 
to reduce these risks. That course:
... will depend on factors which will vary with time - including 
the dependence of other countries on Australia's uranium, the 
efficacy of safeguards and the contribution which Australia may 
make, either as a supplier or as a potential supplier of uranium, 
either independently or in association with other states, to 
reduce the risks. In this situation, a blanket, unqualified 
recommendation would have been folly on logical grounds.
(Kelleher, 1977, p. 14).
The Ranger Inquiry stands out among environmental inquiries held 
in Australia, not only because of the importance of some of the issues 
discussed, but because of its wide scope and thoroughness. It was 
fortunate in having Commissioners who adopted a wide interpretation of
331
their terms of reference, and who recognised the value of public 
input; in having a resolute Presiding Commissioner willing to assert 
the prerogatives of the Inquiry, and in having Commissioners and 
supporting staff capable of producing reports of a high quality.
The findings of the Inquiry are discussed in the following 
section, where they are compared with the LNCP government's 1977 policy 
statements made in response to the Inquiry's recommendations.
THE LIBERAL-NATIONAL COUNTRY PARTY
The Liberal and National Country Parties have consistently 
favoured uranium mining and export. There have been only isolated 
cases of dissent, such as Don Chipp's resignation in 1977, partly on 
this issue, to form the minority Australian Democrats. LNCP interest 
in the nuclear industry has at times extended further. In 1969 the 
Gorton government announced that a nuclear reactor would be built, 
and there may also have been some flirting with the idea of acquiring 
a nuclear capability - Gorton as a Senator had favoured the idea 
(Ball, 1979). When Gorton was replaced by McMahon as Prime Minister, 
however, the reactor project was shelved after site work had actually 
started, partly because the government had signed (but not ratified) 
the NPT in 1970. More recently, the then Liberal Premier of Western 
Australia, Sir Charles Court, announced plans for a nuclear reactor 
there in the 1990's (CT, 25.4.79)„ The Federal LNCP government under 
Fraser has also strongly pursued the establishment of a uranium 
enrichment plant in Australia„
While LNCP support for uranium mining and export has been 
consistent, the upsurge of public concern in the mid 1970's about the 
dangers of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the inception of the Inquiry, 
saw a change in the public rationale for the LNCP's position on the 
issue. The earlier emphasis on the large potential economic gains from 
uranium mining were largely replaced by assertions about Australia's 
international obligations to make its uranium resources available, both 
to meet world energy shortages and to help reduce proliferation.
Within the LNCP, Doug Anthony, its Deputy Leader, Leader of the 
National Country Party and Minister for Trade and Resources, was by 
far the most vocal supporter of uranium mining and export.
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In February 1976, on the eve of a visit to Japan for discussions 
which included the subject of uranium sales, Anthony announced that 
while the government's decisions would have regard to the outcome of 
the Inquiry, the government was of the view that exploration for 
uranium should be conducted by private enterprise, not the AAEC; that 
it was considering the long-term legislative basis for the development 
of the uranium industry; and that it had been having discussions with 
uranium producers about orderly development and marketing, although 
its long-term aim was for companies to be relatively free to plan the 
development of their deposits and negotiate sales contracts (Anthony, 
media release, 1.2.76)0 The prices of uranium stocks subsequently 
rose sharply on the Australian stockmarket0
In March 1976, addressing the Australian Mining Industry Council, 
Anthony said 'I believe the best way to ensure that we do not provoke 
others to try to get access to our resources by force is to make those 
resources available to them on fair and reasonable terms (CT, 30.3.76). 
This statement provoked considerable criticism, even from the Liberal 
backbenches (SMH, 31.3.76). Opposition leader Whitlam accused Anthony 
of insulting Australia's major trading partner and said he should 
apologise unreservedly to the people of Japan (Age, 1.4.76}.
In the same speech Anthony said that if Australia did not develop 
its uranium deposits it would have to face one day the judgement of a 
world that cried out for the energy it needed to feed, clothe and house 
its people. This was a theme he hammered constantly in subsequent 
years, even after the Inquiry had disagreed with it (First Report, 1976, 
p. 164). Anthony claimed also that Australia's uranium reserves would 
give the nation a position of tremendous influence, even power, in the 
world economy (CT, 30.3.76). In parliament the next day he said 'We 
know by the year 2000 more than 50 percent of the world's power 
generation will come from uranium fuel unless other forms of energy 
are found' (CT, 31.3.76).
In April 1976 the government caused some consternation in the 
mining industry by requiring a minimum of 75 percent Australian 
ownership in new uranium mining projects, a change from its preceding
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policy which required 50 percent for both uranium and other mining 
ventures. In announcing this requirement, the Federal Treasurer,
Mr. Lynch, related it to the 'unique status' of uranium but also said 
that 'the unavailability of Australian equity capital on reasonable 
terms and conditions will not prevent a project, considered by the 
government not to be against the national interest, from being allowed 
to proceed (Age, 2.4.76).
In August 1976 Anthony visited the Middle East and Europe for 
talks involving possible uranium sales. In March 1977, speaking to the 
National Press Club, he made his pro-uranium position so clear that 
the Australian Financial Review used the headline 'Anthony signals 
uranium go-ahead' (AFR, 25.3.77). Just over a month later, under the 
rather unoriginal headline 'Fraser signals uranium go-ahead' the 
Australian Financial Review reported the Prime Minister as saying that 
Australia had a global responsibility at a time of world energy 
shortage and countries receiving adequate supplies of uranium were 
more likely to postpone *the use of plutonium as a nuclear fuel (AFR,
2.5.77).1
At a press conference in Washington two days later, Anthony 
apparently misquoted Dr. Schlesinger as saying 'that Australia is an 
indispensable element in making for a successful NPT'. He told the 
press that the mining and export of uranium was part of Australia 
accepting America's ideals and following its lead to the world on 
non-proliferation. On nuclear wastes, he said 'I do not see how that 
is Australia's concern at present. It's a problem for other countries', 
and 'there is no problem of storing wastes. There's not a large 
quantity' (AFR, 4.5.77).
All the preceding statements were made during the course of the 
Inquiry, the last two only two weeks before submission of the Second 
Report to government on the 17th May 1977.
On the Tuesday before the Second Report was made available to 
the public, Cabinet sat for over eight hours to decide on the 
safeguards under which the government would allow the export of uranium,
* President CarterFs non-proliferation policy aimed at discouraging 
spent fuel reprocessing had been announced in April 1977. This * 
would be assisted by reliable supplies of natural uranium.
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so that they would be available for Fraser, who was about to leave 
on an overseas trip to the U.S. and Europec A draft statement on 
safeguard conditions was released the day before the release of the 
Second Report (Craig, 1978, p. 5).
All these activities and statements made increasingly farcical 
the government’s repeated claim that no decisions would be made 
before the Inquiry's report was considered. Reporter George Negus 
said on television the night before the government's decision that 
he would not insult the viewers' intelligence by speculating on what 
the decision was likely to be (Smith and Kamarul, 1978, p. 13). It 
was clear that the decisions, except for some details of implementation, 
had been made, and that it was their announcement that was awaiting 
the Inquiry's Second Report„
In the three-month period between the release of the Second 
Report and the government's announcement of its uranium policy in 
August, matters continued in the same vein. Returning from overseas, 
Fraser said that Australia would use the sales of its uranium to 
Europe as a bait to secure markets for other Australian products 
(AFR, 29„6o77). In Washington in May Anthony had said that 'uranium 
would give Australia a new influence around the world' but 'I would 
hate people to think we were going to use that very great influence 
as some kind of bargaining arrangement' (AFR, 4.5.77)c
The 1977 Policy Statements
In August 1977, three months after the publication of the 
Second Report of the Ranger Inquiry, the government announced its 
uranium policy in a series of Ministerial Statements in parliament. 
Extensive documentation explaining and justifying the government's 
decisions was made available to the public, demonstrating the 
importance and political sensitivity attached to the issue by the 
government.
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The statements claimed that the Inquiry's recommendations had 
almost all been accepted and that where they had been varied, 'every 
variation meets the Inquiry's request that it should 'just as 
satisfactorily achieve the same purposes and satisfy the same 
principles' as the Inquiry's proposal' (Fraser, 1977b, p. 1).
Of central interest was the government's justification of its 
decision to allow uranium mining and export to proceed. The Inquiry, 
as we have seen, did not make a recommendation on this point. It 
concluded that the 'total renunciation of intention to supply is 
undesirable' First Report, 1976, p. 180) but that it had not 'found 
a compelling basis' for choosing between the options of proceeding 
'with carefully planned development of the industry' or delaying the 
decision for several years0 In the Inquiry's view, in choosing 
between these two options Australia should take the course 'which 
is determined to be the most effective and most practical in order 
to bring a favourable response from other states in relation to 
the proliferation problem' (First Report, 1976, p D 181)„ The Inquiry 
recommended that the choice between these options should be resolved 
by Parliament, because it would require assessment of 'masters of 
national security and international relations which are beyond the 
ambit of the Inquiry' (First Report, 1976, p. 185)„
According to the Prime Minister:
The Government, having considered the Inquiry's Report 
and all the other evidence before it, has decided that the 
goals of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
and alleviating the world's energy problems are best served 
by Australia agreeing now to the export of uranium,,
And further:
The Government has taken its decisions with a deep 
sense of international responsibility,, I venture to say 
that were it not for that sense of responsibility, were 
it not for our wish to strengthen Australia's voice in 
the moves against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
were it not for our obligation to provide energy to an 
energy deficient world, we would not have decided to 
export uranium. Commercial considerations were not the 
dominant motive in our decision. (Fraser, 1977b, p. 3).
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The question of whether commercial or altruistic motives 
proved to be dominant in the government's implementation of its policy 
will be examined in subsequent sections.
In its First Report the Commission concluded that neither the 
hazards of mining or milling uranium, nor those involved in the 
ordinary operations of nuclear power reactors, if properly regulated 
and controlled, were such as to justify a decision not to mine and 
sell Australian uranium (First Report, 1976, pc 185); views with 
which the government found itself in agreement„ With regard to waste 
disposal, the Prime Minister in his statement quoted the Inquiry's 
conclusion:
While we do not think that the waste situation is at 
present such as to justify Australia wholly refusing to 
export uranium, it is plain that the situation demands 
careful watching, and, depending on developments, 
regular and frequent reassessment. (First Report, 1976, 
Po 178).
He went on to say 'The government is satisfied that the 
technology exists for the safe management and ultimate disposal of 
highly radioactive waste (Fraser, 1977b, p. 2). The Prime Minister, 
however, had indulged in selective quotation. In the sentence 
immediately following that quoted, the Commission had said:
If, even in a few years, satisfactory disposal methods 
have not been established, it may well be that supplies 
of uranium by Australia should be restricted, or even 
terminated. (First Report, 1976, p. 178).
The First Report had earlier stated:
High-level wastes constitute a serious potential problem ...
It is almost universally agreed by governments and by the 
nuclear industry that those wastes must be disposed of in 
such a way that they will remain isolated from the biosphere 
for hundreds of thousands of years. While experiments have 
been going on for many years, no method of disposal which 
clearly will satisfy this requirement has been proved (italics 
added) . Many scientists are satisfied that vitrification and
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geological disposal is a safe method, but this is still 
in the experimental stage. (First Report, 1976, p. 177).
Clearly the government and the Commission were at odds on this 
point. In developing his argument concerning Australia's 'obligation 
to the rest of the world' to supply its uranium, the Prime Minister 
said:
The oil crisis of 1973 precipitated the fundamental 
recognition that the world was facing an energy crisis ... 
the dwindling supply of petroleum has meant that many countries 
must change over to other sources of energy ... Nuclear 
energy is the only readily available alternative most 
countries have to meet their essential need for electrical energy 
in the wake of the oil crisis. (Fraser, 1977b, p. 4).
Or, as Mr. Anthony put it in his accompanying statement:
The world energy crisis has meant that adjustment must 
be made to other sources of energy in the wake of dwindling 
world supplies of petroleum ... Nuclear energy is the 
only viable alternative most countries have available to 
meet their essential need for electrical energy in the wake 
of the oil crisis (Anthony, 1977, p. 15).
Apart from suggesting that both speechwriters were using the 
same set of notes, the quotations illustrate a very real point; that 
at this time the government was determined to sell its uranium policy 
with only selective regard for the realities of the situation. The 
above statements were in contradiction with the findings of the Inquiry 
on the 'energy crisis':
We conclude that, while the economies of countries heavily 
dependent on imported oil have been adversely affected by 
increases in world oil prices, it is incorrect to say that 
there is a presently existing world energy crisis which will 
create disastrous economic effects ... it is incorrect to 
suggest that there are energy impoverished nations which 
need Australian uranium for survival.
The major immediate world problem in the energy field is 
the availability of liquid fuels, and the provision of Australia's 
uranium will not do much to improve the situation. If Australia 
is to assist in the amelioration of this problem, concentration 
on the rapid development of alternatives to the world's 
diminishing petroleum resources appears desirable. Alternatives 
which have been suggested are the production of liquid fuels 
from coal and the provision of coal at economic prices to 
replace oil in existing and proposed electrical generating 
stations. In the longer term, further development of the 
technology to utilise solar energy ... appears desirable.
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We are not suggesting that the existing nuclear industry 
be abandoned ... We do conclude, however, that it is in 
Australia's best interests to encourage and assist the world 
community to do whatever is practicable to avoid, or where 
unavoidable to control, the development of inescapable reliance 
on nuclear power. (First Report, 1976, p. 164).
The other string to the government's bow was the non-proliferation 
argument: 'Only as a producer and supplier of uranium can Australia
be an effective force in achieving improved international safeguards and 
controls' (Fraser, 1977b, p. 5). The Commission was far less certain 
on this point:
We cannot be sure that an announced intention not to mine 
or export for a period of, say, two to five years will not have 
an impact leading to a more vigorous international action than 
might otherwise have taken place ...
Australia, as a country which had no stated intention to 
withhold permanently its uranium might be able to exert its 
influence to improve matters ... (First Report, 1976, p. 180).
The government's belief that Australia could best influence 
improved safeguards as a supplier was based largely on the view that 
customer countries would accept stringent safeguards in exchange for 
assured low-cost supplies of uranium. This argument depended on the 
demand and supply situation being such that customers woulcf be 
constrained to accept strict safeguards rather than turn to other 
suppliers. In this respect Australia's policymakers were relying on 
demand forecasts which have proved to be much too high. (See discussion 
of demand forecasts under 'External Influences' below).
The Commission summarised its concerns regarding safeguards as 
follows:
The main limitations and weaknesses of the present safeguards 
arrangements can be summarised as follows: the failure of
many states to become parties to the NPT; the inability of 
safeguards to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology 
from nuclear power production to the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons competence; the fact that many nuclear facilities 
are covered by no safeguards; the existence of a number of 
loopholes in safeguards agreements regarding their application 
to peaceful nuclear explosions, to materials intended for non­
explosive military uses, and to the retransfer of materials 
to a third state; the absence, in practice, of safeguards 
for source materials; the practical problems of maintaining 
effective checks on nuclear inventories; the ease with which 
states can withdraw from the NPT and from most non-NPT 
safeguards agreements; deficiencies in accounting and warning 
procedures; and the absence of reliable sanctions to deter
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diversion of safeguarded material.
The Commission recognises that these defects, taken 
together, are so serious that existing safeguards may provide 
only an illusion of protection. However we do not conclude 
that they render valueless the concept of international 
safeguards. We believe it is both essential and possible to 
make safeguards arrangements more effective. (First Report, 
1976, p. 147).
The government's policy on nuclear safeguards was described by the Prime 
Minister in a Ministerial Statement in May 1977 (Fraser, 1977a) and 
further by the then Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in August 1977 
(Sinclair, 1977). While avoiding any exposition of the weaknesses in 
existing systems of nuclear safeguards as indicated by the Inquiry, the 
government's safeguards requirements were closely modelled on the 
recommendations of the Inquiry together with some additional requirements. 
The main points (based on Fraser, 1977a) were:
-Mr. Justice Fox was to be appointed as special adviser to 
the Prime Minister on nuclear safeguards.
-The Australian government would retain the right to be 
selective in the countries to whom uranium export will 
be permitted.
-In the case of non-nuclear weapons states, uranium $ales 
are not to be made to non-NPT countries. [All nuclear 
material in NPT countries is subject to IAEA safeguards 
and such countries have renounced nuclear weapons].
-Nuclear weapons states are to be supplied only if the 
material is not to be used for military or explosive 
purposes and if it is subject to IAEA safeguards.
-Uranium sold should not leave Australian ownership until it 
is in a form which attracts full IAEA safeguards. [Full 
safeguards do not apply until uranium is converted to 
uranium hexafluoride].
-Prior conclusion of bilateral agreements would be required 
between the Australian government and countries wishing to 
import Australian uranium. [These would constitute 
assurances additional to those arising from membership 
of the NPT and provide a fullback position should a customer 
country unilaterally withdraw from the NPT]. The bilateral 
agreements should include undertakings that:
'nuclear material supplied by Australia will not be 
used for military or explosive purposes and IAEA 
safeguards will apply
These requirements were claimed to be additional to those recommended 
by the Ranger Inquiry.
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if safeguards under the NPT cease to apply, international 
safeguards should continue to apply to all nuclear material 
in the country, not just that supplied by Australia
if international safeguards cease to operate, Australia may 
make alternative safeguards arrangements
prior Australian consent will be required for enrichment 
beyond 20 per cent uranium-235 [to weapons-grade] of 
uranium supplied by Australia
prior Australian consent will be required for any transfer 
to a third party of nuclear material supplied by Australia 
[because of the separation in reprocessing of plutonium usable 
for nuclear weapons]
assurance of standards of physical security in the purchasing 
country's nuclear industry not less than those recommended by 
the IAEA
a clause would be inserted in any commercial contract for the 
export of uranium from Australia [where private organisations 
may be involved] noting that the transaction is subject to 
safeguards as agreed between the importing country and the 
Australian government.
The government repeatedly said that it had accepted all the 
safeguards recommendations of the Inquiry. This claim was not as 
impressive as it might appear, because the Inquiry seems not to have 
attempted to set out comprehensively all the safeguards it considered 
desirable. Some appear on pages 147-149 and some on page 182 of the 
First Report. Also, in at least one respect the government's stated 
safeguards policy differed from the Inquiry's recommendations. The 
Commissioners clearly stated more than once that 'no country which is 
not party to the NPT should be supplied' (e.g. First Report, 1976, 
p. 182). The government applied this requirement only to non-nuclear 
countries, thus leaving the way open for sales to France, a nuclear 
weapons state not party to the NPT.
The government also made little of the accompanying suggestions 
of the Inquiry for broader-based initiatives (that is, beyond the 
attachment of safeguards to the sale of Australian uranium) to reduce 
proliferation risks by working to reduce future dependence on nuclear 
energy (First Report, 1976, p. 164) and by improvements in the existing 
non-proliferation machinery (First Report, 1976, p. 168 and Appendix 
'D'). Nevertheless the government's stated safeguards policy appeared
•k
These requirements were claimed to be additional to those recommended 
by the Ranger Inquiry.
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to be about as stringent and thorough as could be expected, given the 
inherent limitations of such systems. The main weakness in the 
government's approach was its apparent lack of recognition of these 
limitations. It remained to be seen, of course, whether the proposed 
safeguards would be preserved under the pressures of implementation.
The Parliamentary Statements made by the relevant Ministers in 
August 1977 also covered the domestic aspects of uranium policy. The 
Inquiry had recommended that the development of uranium mines in the 
Region should proceed sequentially. This was firstly to avoid a 
situation where 'industry pressure based on existing investment or 
commitment is allowed to be a factor in determining the course to be 
followed' (First Report, 1976, p. 182) with respect to controls and 
regulations designed to reduce nuclear hazards such as proliferation. 
Secondly, sequential development would avoid unnecessary economic and 
social pressures; for example the likely increase in production costs 
of mines working at less than full capacity, or the effects on 
Aborigines in the region of a large and rapid influx of whites.
The government, however, found specification of a sequence of 
mining, according to the Prime Minister, impossible 'in view of the 
complexity of the further development of each of the projects' (Fraser, 
1977b, p. 7) and according to the Deputy Prime Minister, unnecessary, 
because the different stages of investigation and preparation reached by 
each mine 'will result, in practice, in mines coming into production 
at different times' (Anthony, 1977, p. 77). The latter point, of course, 
begs the question of whether there might have been a desirable order 
and timing of development, rather than a fortuitous one.
The government's policy on this point may have arisen from 
its dislike of having to make a choice which would favour some mining 
interests at the expense of others; and such action would also have 
conflicted with its ideological bias against government intervention in 
private sector activities.
This aspect of LNCP ideology was referred to by the Deputy Prime 
Minister in relation to another aspect of uranium policy. 'The direct 
financial participation of the Commonwealth in a mining project is, of 
course, contrary to the political philosophy of our Government'
(Anthony, 1977, p. 19). Nevertheless, the government allowed the Ranger
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project to proceed on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding 
concluded between the Whitlam government and Peko/EZ, because 'we 
believe, as a matter of principle, that the repudiation by one 
Government of contracts entered into by a previous Government would be 
quite wrong' (Fraser, 1977b, p. 10). Principle or not, it was necessary 
for the government to take this position in order to be consistent with 
its attack on the Labor Party's then recently adopted policy of 
repudiating non-Labor commitments to uranium mining and export.
Continuation of the arrangements existing under the Memorandum of 
Understanding was given by the government (Fraser, 1977b, p. 10) as the 
reason for excluding the entire Ranger Project Area of 83 square 
kilometres from the surrounding National Park, rather than the much 
smaller Ranger Special Mineral Lease Areas as recommended by the 
Commission. The same reason was given for the use of the Atomic Energy 
Act to grant authority to Ranger to mine uranium, contrary to the 
recommendation of the Commission.
In itself, this reason seems inadequate. The government was 
willing to adjust the boundary of the Project Area in order to move 
it further from Aboriginal sacred sites at Mount Brockman, as recommended 
by the Inquiry, and further changes should not have been tqo burdensome.
The Inquiry had strongly recommended against the use of the Atomic 
Energy Act, for several reasons. It noted 'a widespread lack of 
confidence in the AAEC (Second Report, 1977, p. 249) as arbiter and 
monitor of the proposed mining operations. This was in part because 
of its role as an entrepreneur in uranium mining, and because of its 
statutory function under the Atomic Energy Act of promoting uranium 
mining and nuclear development. It seemed to the Commission that 
'ordinary principles' should lead the AAEC 'to decline a role in 
deciding what is best to be done as between the mining operations and 
the environment' (Second Report, 1977, p. 250).
The Inquiry also suggested that the AAEC is associated in many 
people's minds with the widespread environmental damage caused by the 
Rum Jungle uranium mine developed in the 1950's. Further, the security 
provisions in the Atomic Energy Act, enacted with defence considerations 
in mind, could curtail public access to information.
The government did accept the related recommendation of the 
Inquiry that an independent Uranium Advisory Council should be 
established, in order to inform the public and advise the government.
The Inquiry had stated that the establishment of such a Council could 
give its objections to the use of the Atomic Energy Act less force.
The Inquiry recommended that exploitation of the Koongarra 
deposit ’should not be permitted, at least for the present'. It gave 
a number of reasons for this, including the view that mining should be 
restricted to one major drainage basin, so that environmental damage 
could be geographically contained; and that the Koongarra deposit was 
upstream of the 'extremely valuable' Woolwonga Wildlife Sanctuary.
From the Deputy Prime Minister's statement that decisions on the 
development of the Jabiluka and Koongarra deposit would be taken 
'following the completion of necessary environmental requirements and 
conclusion of arrangements with the Aboriginal people' (Anthony, 1977, 
p. 20) it seemed probable that mining at Koongarra would eventually 
proceed.
With regard to health and safety aspects of uranium mining and 
milling, the Inquiry commended the Code of Practice on Radiation 
Protection in the Mining and Milling of Radioactive Ores prepared by 
the Australian Department of Health and recommended that it should be 
incorporated in legislation. The government went considerably beyond 
this in proposing that the Code of Practice on Radiation Protection 
would form part of a wider uniform national code of practice which 
would be embodied in legislation. It appeared that the uniform national 
code was intended to cover all aspects of mining and milling uranium,
'to protect the health and safety of citizens of this country by 
ensuring protection of their environment'; and it would specify 
environmental standards, procedures and practices (Newman, 1977, 
pp. 53-4).
The government's health policies also dealt with a range of 
other matters including a screening system to identify and treat 
possible carriers of malaria and prevent its reintroduction into the 
area, expansion of health services, and monitoring of radioactivity, 
air, water and effluent.
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The health policies necessarily overlapped with those concerning 
environmental protection and Aborigines: The government accepted the
Commission's recommendations concerning environmental controls. These 
included the appointment of a Co-ordinating Committee to coordinate and 
review environmental control measures, and a Supervising Scientist to 
act as Chairman of the Committee and to supervise the environmental 
research and monitoring programmes agreed by it. The Supervising 
Scientist would be legally empowered to require information from mining 
companies and government agencies participating in research and 
monitoring, to inspect sites and operations, and to make a public report 
annually. He would be directly responsible to the Commonwealth Minister 
for Environment, Housing and Community Development, and would head a 
Research Institute 'with a small number of highly qualified staff'
(Newman, 1977, p. 57).
The Inquiry made many recommendations concerning the detailed 
workings of the Ranger mine designed to increase safety and reduce 
environmental damage. These included the recommendation accepted by the 
government:
That the best practicable technology (developed anywhere, 
which can be applied to the uranium industry in Australia) 
to prevent environmental pollution and degradation be 
adopted from the outset. (Second Report, 1977, p. 327).
Because of its outstanding scenic and environmental qualities, 
proposals for a National Park in the Region had been in existence for 
some time. The Inquiry concluded that the proposed boundaries of the 
Park gazetted in 1975 did not include ecosystems fully representative 
of the Region. It recommended a much larger Park area, and proposed 
that there should be no further mining exploration in the Park 'for 
the time being'. The government accepted the extended Park area but 
decided to declare it in stages, with an interim prohibition of 
exploration applying only to the area declared in the first stage. The 
remainder of the proposed Park area was in the meantime to be placed 
under the joint control of several government departments whose 
approval would be required for further exploration.
The Inquiry had found in favour of Aboriginal claims to traditional 
ownership of large areas of Crown land in the Region. This was the 
first such finding in Australia outside Aboriginal Reserves. It was 
proposed by the Northern Land Council, representing the traditional
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owners, that these lands should be leased by the Aboriginal Land 
Trusts to become part of the National Park. The Inquiry accepted 
this proposal, having concluded that Aboriginal interests in the use 
of their land as a National Park were largely compatible (Second Report, 
1977, p. 288). Some small areas within the Park were to be excluded 
from it for mining or commercial activities. The proposed mining 
town site was to be included within the Park but excluded from 
Aboriginal ownership. The town was to be a 'closed' one, with no 
accommodation for tourists.
The Inquiry also proposed that the Mudginberri and Munmalary 
pastoral leases (the former containing Pancontinental's Jabiluka deposit) 
should be resumed by government so that Aboriginal claims to traditional 
ownership could be determined. All the above recommendations concerning 
Aborigines were incorporated into government policy (Newman, 1977, 
pp. 54-57).
The Inquiry found that the traditional Aboriginal owners and the 
Northern Land Council did not want uranium mining on the Ranger site or 
in the Region. But with considerable regret, one senses from the Report, 
the Commissioners decided that the Aboriginal view should not be allowed 
to prevail (Second Report, 1977, p. 9). At the same time they expressed 
great concern at the likely adverse effects on Aboriginal welfare of the 
influx of large numbers of white people into the Region, noting that 
this was also the Aborigines greatest concern. Similar circumstances 
have in the past 'always caused the breakdown of the traditional culture 
and the generation of intense social and psychological stresses within 
the Aboriginals' (Second Report, 1977, p. 233); although the Inquiry 
saw the granting of land rights as a 'uniquely favourable factor' 
which would help to restore Aboriginal self-respect.
Many of the Inquiry's recommendations were designed to lessen the 
impact of mining on Aborigines: the sequential development of mines,
the restrictions on tourism and mineral exploration, a program (Second 
Report, 1977, pp. 230-232) designed to reduce dependence on alcohol, 
and the creation of job opportunities, particularly in the management of 
the National Park. The government accepted these recommendations, with 
the important exception of sequential development.
346
The grant of Aboriginal land claims meant that they would be 
entitled under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
to receive royalties from mining on their land. The Land Rights Act 
provides that such royalties are to be paid into a Trust Account.
Thirty percent of these payments would go to local Aboriginal 
communities affected by mining development, a further 30 percent to 
advancing the wellbeing of Aborigines throughout the Northern Territory 
on the advice of an all-Aboriginal committee, and 40 percent to meet 
the expenses of Land Councils, any surplus being available for 
distribution to Aboriginal communities (Viner, 1977, p. 47).
The question of whether mining could go ahead without Aboriginal 
consent on Aboriginal land, in the case of the Jabiru and Jabiluka 
deposits, was unclear for reasons too complex to review here (Second 
Report, 1977, pp. 235-238 and 246-247)„ In the case of Koongarra, 
Aboriginal consent would be required (p0 247)0
From the foregoing it should be apparent that while the government 
had accepted a high proportion of the Inquiry's recommendations, there 
were some important exceptions, and in some cases fundamental 
disagreement - for example concerning the sequential development of 
mines, the government's far more sanguine attitude to the«disposal of 
high level waste and the efficacy of proliferation safeguards, and the 
urgency of the need for Australia's uranium to solve the 'energy crisis'. 
Such instances undermine the government's claims that almost all the 
Inquiry's recommendations had been accepted and that the variations 
would satisfy the same purposes„
Moreover, as was noted in the earlier part of this section, it 
was clear from the government's actions and statements during the Inquiry 
that it had already effectively made up its collective mind that it would 
proceed with the export of uranium. While the government's disclaimers 
about not making decisions pending the completion of the Inquiry might 
have brought it within the letter of the law, in practical terms it was 
in conflict with the fundamental principle expressed in the Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974-5 under which the Inquiry was 
held, that the environmental implications of proposals should be 'fully 
examined and taken into account before decisions are made»'
The evolution of government policy following the 1977 policy 
statements is discussed in subsequent sections.
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
Introduction
Here the factors which influenced world markets for uranium 
during the 1970's and their effects on Australian uranium policy are 
examined. In particular the effects of the downturn in demand, 
international anti-proliferation regimes, and the recommendations of 
the Inquiry, on Australia's safeguards requirements for the sale of its 
uranium are considered. The anti-nuclear movement overseas and its 
consequences for Australian uranium policy are also discussed.
It should first be recognised that the effect of external factors 
on Australian uranium policy extends beyond the more immediate 
influences noted above to those which fostered the growth of the nuclear 
power industry with government involvement and support, and led to 
its present levels of institutionalisation and political influence.
Such underlying influences include the forced growth of nuclear 
technology arising from its weapons uses, and the secrecy of its war­
time birth which still clings to its peaceful applications; the appeal 
of nuclear power to national pride, the vision of national energy self- 
sufficiency, and the darker promise of its accompanying potential for 
a nuclear weapons capability; the position of nuclear power close to 
the frontiers of technology, breeding a scientific elite whose 
expertise can incline them to the belief that 'only a small proportion 
of the population is capable of understanding issues of this sort'
(Baxter, 1975, p. 456); and the capital-intensive nature of the 
industry, with its wide range of interlocking operations, which 
attracts large corporations with commensurate political influence.
The nuclear power industry is thus the product of some inter­
locking characteristics of industrial society, political institutions 
and nuclear technology: the high energy demands of industrial society;
the values of decisionmakers which place the benefits of the nuclear 
power industry above the risks and problems associated with it; and 
the international insecurity which leads nations to seek the capacity 
to produce nuclear weapons. The arcane, complex and large scale 
character of nuclear power technology, together with its military 
linkages, have made it an outstanding example of the institutionalisation 
of technology discussed in Chapter Three, where governments, large 
corporations and their technological and administrative elites develop
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and promote the technology under conditions which make adequate public 
knowledge and control highly problematical.
Such features of the character and dynamics of the nuclear power 
industry have been described extensively elsewhere (e.g. Falk, 1982, 
Pringle and Spigelman, 1982; and with reference to their future 
implications for Australia by Smith, 1983) and need not be elaborated 
further here. Their result was that Australia found itself part of a 
world with a well-established and institutionalised nuclear power 
industry with considerable support from governments. Such a situation 
placed considerable political as well as economic pressures on 
Australia to participate in the system by selling its uranium, as will 
be shown in the course of this chapter.
The uranium market
Table 7.1 shows uranium prices in constant dollars from 1972 to 
1981. Prior to 1973, prices had undergone a long, steady decline from 
$37.66 per kg in 1954 to $13.19 in 1972. From 1973 prices rose rapidly 
to $56.87 in 1976, and remained above $50 until 1979, when they fell to 
$20.78 per kg by 1981. Although the prices shown are not necessarily 
close indicators of overall prices, since much of the uranium market 
depends on long-term contracts, they are adequate for the present 
purpose of indicating broad price movements.
TABLE 7.1: URANIUM PRICES 1972-1981
(In constant $ per kilogram, yearly averages)
Year Price Year Price
1972 13.19 1977 56.51
1973 13.30 1978 53.94
1974 19.45 1979 47.03
1975 36.08 1980 30.26
1976 56.87 1981 20.78
Source: Owen, A.D., 1982, The Market for Australian Uranium, p. 6.
Working Paper, University of New South Wales, Institute for 
Applied Economic and Social Research, ISBN 85823 266 9;
ISSN 0157 4701.
Note: Prices based on the Nuclear Exchange Corporation's exchange
values and deflated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index 
(industrial) base 1967.
When Labor took office in 1972, the price of uranium was it its 
lowest point for many years, but rose substantially in 1974 and more
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rapidly in 1975. As previously noted, for most of Labor's term in 
office its Minister for Mines and Energy, Rex Connor, pursued a policy 
of leaving uranium in the ground in anticipation of future price rises. 
The Labor government's change in 1975 to a policy of pushing ahead with 
uranium mining was undoubtedly influenced by rising prices, although as 
previously discussed there were other contributing factors.
For the LNCP government's first four years in office after 1975, 
well beyond the presentation of the Ranger Inquiry's Reports and the 
subsequent articulation of government policy, uranium prices remained 
four times as high in real terms as they had been in 1972. These prices 
contributed to the government's anxiety to proceed with uranium 
development, and to its attitude that stringent safeguards would be 
accepted by eager purchasers.
But there were other, less favourable indicators of future demand 
for uranium. In the wake of the oil crisis and with the world 
recession, the rate of growth of energy consumption decreased markedly, 
from an average of 5.2 percent per annum in 1960-73 to 0.6 percent in 
1973-80 in OECD countries (IEA, 1982, p. 67). Affected by the result­
ant reduction in energy demand forecasts, by an increase in the costs 
and lead times of nuclear power relative to other sources o'f energy 
(IEA, 1982, pp. 353-355), and by environmental and regulatory problems, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Three-Mile Island nuclear reactor 
accident in early 1979, new orders for reactors declined substantially 
after 1974 (Table 7.2).
TABLE 7.2: OECD COUNTRIES: NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR ORDERS/
LETTERS OF INTENT, 1965-1981
Year Units Year Units
1965 17 1974 62
1966 26 1975 29
1967 45 1976 12
1968 21 1977 12
1969 24 1978 22
1970 23 1979 9
1971 39 1980 16
1972 50 1981 10
1973 48
Source: International Energy Agency, 1982, World Energy Outlook, OECD,
Paris.
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Consequently, forecast demand for uranium also decreased consider­
ably. Table 7.3 shows the AAEC forecasts of uranium demand in 1985, 
1990 and 2000 made each year from 1974 to 1981.
TABLE 7.3: URANIUM DEMAND FORECASTS
1974-1981 FOR 1985, 1990, 2000 
(Western World, thousand tonnes)
Year
Forecast
Made
1985 1990 2000
1974 115 185 285
1975 108* 158* 245*
1976 90* 140* 270*
1977 70 106 n . a.
1978 54 79 n . a.
1979 44 59 n . a.
1980 39 54 73
1981 39 48 79
Source: Australian Atomic Energy Commission Annual Reports.
*Figure is average of high and low estimates.
/
On the face of it, these figures, even in the mid- to late 1970's, 
seemed to conflict with government and mining industry optimism at 
that time about the market for Australian uranium. However, it might 
be argued that despite falling demand forecasts, some optimism could 
still have been justified given that certain other expectations were 
held: firstly, if it was believed at that time that the decline in
forecast demand would not continue, perhaps because the decline was 
thought largely to represent a deferral for a few years rather than a 
long-term lowering of nuclear power production targets. Secondly, if 
it was expected that after forecast demand had stabilised at lower 
levels, the rate of increase of demand would still keep pace with or 
outstrip the growth of uranium production.
The latter expectation, however, was not supported by the figures. 
From Table 7.4, column 3, it can be seen that while production in 1970 
was double the actual reactor requirements in that year, by 1975 produc­
tion was only 10 percent in excess of requirements. Similarly production 
capability in 1970 had exceeded requirements by 172 percent (column 5), 
but by 1975 the excess had declined to 33 percent. Column 7 shows the
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TABLE 7.4: URANIUM PRODUCTION, PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES AND
ACTUAL AND FORECAST REQUIREMENTS 1970, 1973, 1975, 1977
(Western World, in thousand tonnes)
Column
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Year Actual 
reactor 
requ'ts
Prod­
uction
Excess
of
Prod­
uction 
over 
Requ'ts
Existing
Prod­
uction
Capa­
bility
Excess
of
Capa­
bility 
over 
Requ'ts
Forecast 
Reactor 
Requ'ts 
4 years 
ahead
Increase in
Existing
Production
Capability
Needed to
Meet 4-year
Forecast
1970 11 22 100% 30 172% (1974) 27 -10%
1973 20 24 20% 32 60% (1977) 42 31%
1975 21 23 10% 30 33% (1979) 52* 73%
1977 27 33 22% 39 44% (1981) 60* 54*
Source>: Adapted from Radetzki, M., 1981, p. 56, UraniumA Strategic
Source of Energy, Croom Helm, London. 
*'high' estimates.
increase in the existing production capacity in each of the years shown 
which would be needed to meet the demand forecast at that time for 
four years ahead. In 1970 production capability was actually in 
advance of forecast demand for 1974, but by 1975 a 73 percent increase 
was needed to meet forecast 1979 demand.
Thus between 1970 and 1975 actual uranium requirements and four- 
year forecast requirements grew more rapidly than production or 
production capability. Nevertheless, production and production 
capability always remained comfortably ahead of current requirements. 
Most significantly, between 1975 and 1977 both production and 
production capability again began to increase more rapidly than 
existing and four-year forecast requirements.
Therefore, despite the temporary narrowing of the gap between 
production and requirements from 1970 and 1975, there seems to be 
little justification in terms of the relationship between uranium 
production capability and forecast reactor demand for the inflated 
expectations concerning the prospects for sales of Australian uranium
maintained by government and miners for much of the mid- to late 1970's. 
Both the price rises between 1973 and 1976 and the ensuing euphoria 
about future uranium demand therefore require some further explanation.
Perhaps the most obvious such explanation stems from the oil 
crisis of 1973. The subsequent desire to secure alternative sources 
of energy seems likely to have increased the propensity of nuclear 
power utilities to seek long-term supply contracts and increase uranium 
inventories. Certainly, uranium inventories did increase, at least 
in the U.S., particularly those of the utilities, which rose 
by 35 percent between Jan. 1973 and Jan. 1975 and by a further 50 percent 
between Jan. 1975 and Jan. 1977 to a total of 26575 tonnes (derived 
from Radetzki, 1981, p. 76, Table 4.8).
At the same time the increase in oil prices affected uranium 
prices, although Radetzki (1981, pp. 104-106) argues that the uranium 
price rose far beyond what might have been expected from the effects of 
the oil price rise alone. She notes also that although the increased 
competitiveness of nuclear power due to the rise in oil prices might 
have been expected to increase the rate of expansion of nuclear power, 
in fact this did not occur due to the long construction times, 
increased costs, and public opposition which were affecting its growth.
Another factor contributing to the uranium price rise was the 
delay in the introduction of spent fuel reprocessing, due to technical, 
environmental and regulatory problems in the early 1970's (Radetzki,
1981, p. 82) and then to President Carter's April 1977 non-proliferation 
policy, which embodied a deferral of commercial reprocessing and fast 
breeder reactors in the U.S. and an embargo on exports of the relevant 
technology. If reprocessing had been introduced in 1973/4, Radetzki 
(1981, p. 82) estimates that natural uranium requirements would have 
been reduced by about 20 percent from 1978 to 1982.
As we have seen, the Carter policy also provided the Australian 
government with a very timely argument for exporting Australian uranium: 
to make reprocessing less attractive by helping to ensure a 
plentiful and reliable supply of natural uranium, which at the same 
time would be subject to strict safeguards.
Among other causes of the price increases was the 'split tails' 
policy of the U.S. authorities between 1973 and 1978, adopted initially
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to absorb surplus uranium stock without depressing the market, but 
maintained after 1975 despite the rise in prices (Radetzki, 1981, 
pp. 83-87). Also in 1973 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission introduced 
a new enrichment contracting policy, which required long-term 
commitments by customers. At the same time, anticipation of increased 
nuclear power demands after the oil crisis and fears about insufficient 
future enrichment capacity led nuclear power utilities to place 
enrichment orders - simultaneously committing themselves to supplying 
quantities of uranium to the U.S. AEC for enrichment - well above 
their expected needs as then perceived and even further above their 
needs as perceived in later years as forecasts of reactor demand 
declined (Radetzki, 1981, ppD 87-91)„
One further influence on prices which should be mentioned was 
the uranium cartel, an organisation set up in 1972 with members from 
Australia, Canada, France, South Africa and the Riotinto Zinc 
Corporation. The cartel set prices and quotas and possibly restricted 
production, although opinions differ on the extent to which it affected 
prices (Owen, 1982, p. 11; Radetzki, 1981, pp. 116-123).
Australian governments and uranium mining companies should have 
been aware of the short-term nature of most of the factor^ which 
combined to push up prices from 1973 to 1977, and of the shadows on 
the future market cast by rising uranium inventories, declining reactor 
orders and construction delays. Yet both government and the uranium 
mining industry persisted with exaggerated estimates of future demand. 
The Australian Uranium Producers' Forum in evidence to the Ranger 
Inquiry in 1976 suggested world uranium requirements in 1985 would be 
120,000 tonnes, at a time when most estimates averaged about 90,000 
tonnes (First Report, 1976, p. 63).
In part such overoptimism reflected views expressed by external 
sources - representatives of U.S. power utilities visiting Australia 
in 1977 apparently insisted that the U.S. market for Australian uranium 
might be up to twice that suggested by the Ranger Inquiry (Camilleri, 
1980, p. 98). It arose also from the idea that Australia's political 
stability would give it substantial markets with countries wishing to 
diversify and assure their sources of supply. Further, given the 
controversial nature of the issue, overstatement inevitably arose from 
the desire of government and miners to present the prospects for 
uranium sales in a favourable light.
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Safeguards
By the late 1970's, however, with Australia's efforts to sell 
its uranium well under way, the chickens had well and truly come home 
to roost. Most of the influences which had led to increased prices 
up to 1976 were no longer present, and the slowdown in the growth of 
energy use and in nuclear energy programmes continued. Faced with 
buyers unwilling to accept various aspects of its safeguards require­
ments, the government was forced to make choices between losing sales 
or making concessions on safeguards.
The model safeguards agreement published in May 1978 by the 
Australian government (reproduced in Gilpin, 1980, pp. 133-137) and the 
bilateral safeguards agreements concluded with Finland and the 
Philippines in July and August 1978 contained some modifications and 
amplifications of the LNCP government's May 1977 safeguards policy.
Even at that early stage these tended to limit the discretion of the 
Australian government in favour of the importing country. For example 
the model agreement added to the original policy a range of matters to 
be 'taken into account' by the Australian government when considering 
approval to transfer, enrich beyond 20 percent U235, or reprocess.
These were the relationship of the request to legitimate enprgy needs, 
the applicable controls and safeguards, and the need to avoid the 
stockpiling of strategic nuclear material.
The letter of clarification accompanying the agreement with 
Finland stated that where bilateral agreements have not been made 
between Australia and any third party upgrading Australian uranium:
The Australian government expects that it will nevertheless be 
able to make satisfactory arrangements. These arrangements will 
have to include the return to Finland, or to another of the 
countries mentioned with which Australia has at that time a 
bilateral safeguards agreement, of quantities of nuclear material 
equivalent to the supplied nuclear material. (Dept, of Foreign 
Affairs, 1980, p. 6).
In an article entitled 'To Russia with Love', Milliken (NT, 7-13.2.82) 
noted that Australian uranium destined for Finland is enriched in the 
USSR, which is not subject to IAEA inspection. Yet the May 1977 safe­
guards policy had emphasised the key role of IAEA safeguards, and noted 
that the prior consent provision would 'give Australia a means of 
ensuring that our safeguards are met despite any onward transfers of 
Australian uranium' (Fraser, 1977a, p. 88).
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In January 1979 the government announced that it would allow 
mining companies to sell uranium overseas directly, rather than through 
the AAEC as had been the original policy (AFR, 10.1.79). Shortly 
afterwards, the government announced that it would allow mining 
companies to sign conditional contracts before bilateral safeguards 
agreements had been signed (AFR, 16.1.79), thus discarding the original 
May 1977 policy of requiring prior conclusion of safeguards agreements 
with potential customers. In the buyer's market by then prevalent, the 
pre-existence of a conditional contract would place greater pressure 
on the Australian government to make concessions on safeguards. At 
that time mining was beginning at the Ranger deposit and still only 
Finland and the Philippines had signed safeguards agreements with 
Australia. Clearly the policy change was designed to give the mining 
companies a freer hand in finding buyers.
Australia initiated safeguards negotiations with both South Korea 
and Iran. The revolution in Iran caused negotiations to be abandoned, 
but an agreement was concluded with South Korea in May 1979. In his 
May 1977 safeguards statement, the Prime Minister repeatedly pointed 
out the need for careful selection of customers in addition to the more 
specific safeguards measures. Yet there were good grounds, for 
considering that both South Korea and Iran might under some 
circumstances wish to develop nuclear weapons, given the political 
instability of their respective regions. As Indyck (1980, p. 135) 
notes, in an extreme situation, fear of a uranium embargo might 
be outweighed by the desire to possess nuclear weapons. In any case, 
given the resumption of military aid by the U.S. to Pakistan after the 
Afghanistan crisis despite Pakistan's moves towards acquiring a nuclear 
weapons capability, South Korea might consider that a uranium embargo 
would not be effective.
Following the operations of the uranium cartel discussed 
previously, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1976 brought a 
price-fixing suit against 29 companies, including four companies 
operating in Australia (Pancontinental, Conzinc Riotinto of Australia 
Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium and Queensland Mines). The execution of 
judgement could have involved seizure of these companies' assets, 
including uranium, in the U.S. (Indyck, 1980, p. 132).
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IAEA safeguards do not fully apply to uranium until it is 
converted to uranium hexafluoride. The May 1977 safeguards policy 
statement therefore included the proviso that uranium should remain 
under Australian ownership until conversion. Where conversion was to 
take place in the U.S., this would have left Australian-owned uranium 
subject to seizure. It was therefore necessary to abandon this 
requirement and allow earlier transfer of ownership.
In 1978 the U.S. government proposed that spent fuel from Pacific 
basin countries should be stored on an interim basis on a remote and 
uninhabited Pacific island, thereby removing any need for reprocessing 
to reduce spent fuel storage problems. The plan had substantial anti­
proliferation advantages, but the Australian government strongly 
opposed the scheme. Indyck (1980, p. 137) cites this as a further 
example of the government placing the commercial objective of selling 
uranium before its concern for improved safeguards. The government, 
Indyck contends, did not wish to risk revitalising public opposition to 
uranium exports by suggestions that highly radioactive spent fuel 
could be stored in the Pacific. But although the issue may say 
something about Australia’s priorities as between safeguards and selling 
uranium, it seems predominantly a matter of a government recognising a 
highly disadvantageous issue in domestic political terms. Even if the 
government had possessed a genuinely high level of concern with nuclear 
safeguards, it was most unlikely to embark on a course which would have 
been politically highly adverse, as indicated by public opinion polls 
at the time (Indyck, 1980, p. 138 has poll figures). Nevertheless, one 
example more or less does not make the tenor of the government’s 
priorities as between safeguards and uranium sales less apparent.
The EEC's nuclear fuel organisation, Euratom, requires that 
there should be no restrictions on transfer of nuclear fuel among its 
members, many of whom are involved in the development of reprocessing 
and fast breeder technologies. In the safeguards agreement with 
Britain signed in July 1979, Australia waived its requirement for prior 
consent to retransfer within the EEC. An agreement between Australia 
and Euratom was proposed to cover such retransfers of Australian 
uranium, but no restrictions were to be placed on them prior to 
conclusion of the agreement (Indyck, 1980, p. 139). Once again, a 
concession had been made on safeguards in order to sell uranium.
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Criticism of President Carter's 1977 non-proliferation initiatives, 
particularly from Europe and Japan, led to participation by 46 countries 
in a further U.S. initiative, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation, which commenced meetings in October 1977 and produced its 
final report in February 1980. The report embodied conflicting views, 
but it did not endorse the Carter policy of deferral of reprocessing 
and the use of plutonium for nuclear power generation. While noting 
that fuel cycles involving the recycling of plutonium increase the 
possibility of proliferation, the report concluded that no one fuel 
cycle has an economic advantage in all cases, no fuel cycle should be 
avoided on proliferation grounds alone, and that there will be great 
quantities of spent fuel in storage if reprocessing is not undertaken. 
INFCE also found that technical measures alone could not eliminate 
proliferation dangers, which are ultimately a political problem, but 
that nevertheless new safeguard techniques need to be developed to 
deal with the increased dangers associated with reprocessing and the 
use of plutonium. (See generally Warnecke, 1980; Smith, 1980;
Indyck, 1980).
Following INFCE the Australian government moved quite quickly to
allow reprocessing of its uranium, under what the Minister for Foreign
#
Affairs called a 'program approach', where consent in advance would be 
given to reprocessing if the country establishes its need to do so for 
a number of possible purposes. These include energy use, materials 
management, other peaceful non-explosive purposes, and storage and use 
of plutonium 'in ways that do not cause proliferation dangers' (Street, 
1980, p. 7).
In response to this policy change, Labor's Deputy Opposition 
Leader, Mr. Bowen, noted that in 1977 the Prime Minister had recognised 
the proliferation risks of plutonium use, and had claimed that the 
decision to export uranium would slow the movement towards the use of 
plutonium as fuel, yet Australia was now 'the first cab off the rank 
among responsible producers in endorsing the extraction of plutonium' 
(AFR, 28.11.80).
In early 1982 a safeguards agreement between Australia and Japan 
was concluded. Negotiations had continued for years because the 
Japanese were unwilling to accept some of the requirements of the 
original 1977 safeguards policy, and felt that subsequently Australia 
had not sufficiently modified its position. The final agreement,
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however, embodied the major concessions which Australia had made 
in the intervening years, including agreement in advance to 
reprocessing under the program approach, the right for further 
processing to be done outside Japan, and enrichment beyond 20 percent 
U-235. It appeared, however, that Japan had sought still further 
concessions which were not forthcoming (AFR, 17.9.81, 22.1.82, 26.1.82).
In 1977 the Prime Minister had said that commercial considerations 
were not the government's dominant motive, that except for the wish to 
strengthen non-proliferation and the obligation to supply an energy- 
deficient world Australia would not have decided to export uranium 
(Fraser, 1977b, p c 3); and that 'it is not the Government's view that 
safeguards should be regarded as something to be balanced against 
commercial considerations' (Fraser, 1977a, p0 86)„
In practice, however, where safeguards requirements seriously 
threatened commercial considerations, safeguards were repeatedly 
required to give way. Contrary to the government's policy statements, 
safeguards were in fact balanced against commercial considerations. In 
view of its public commitment to them, the government could not and 
did not wish to abandon safeguards altogether,, But its actions virtually 
amounted to maintaining the level of safeguards that the mafket would 
bear; that is, those that were consistent with selling sufficient 
quantities of uranium»
The government's retreat on safeguards might be justified on the 
grounds that with producing mines, others moving towards production, and 
a weakening market, some concessions on safeguards had to be made in 
order to avoid losses on the funds now tied up in mining operations. But 
the likely decline in forecast demand should have been apparent in 1977; 
it seemed rather that the government wished to discount any such 
indications in its efforts to present the case for mining in as 
favourable a light as possible. Similarly, because it arrived at 
precisely the right time to provide an altruistic rationale for selling 
uranium, the government rushed to embrace the Carter non-proliferation 
policy without too critical an examination of its staying power. The 
resultant circumstance of having producing mines and therefore being 
governed by the need to find markets for them was one which the Inquiry 
had specifically and repeatedly warned against:
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. .. the situation must be scrupulously avoided in which industry 
pressure based on existing investment or commitment is allowed 
to be a factor in determining the course to be followed in 
relation to the more serious of the hazards mentioned. (First 
Report, 1976, p. 182).
Yet the government had helped place itself in this very position by 
rejecting the Inquiry's recommendation that uranium mines should be 
developed sequentially.
At the same time, with the changing circumstances the twin justif­
ications for selling Australian uranium put forward by the government 
in 1977 had lost their force. With the oversupply of uranium, any 
obligation on Australia to supply it to 'an energy-hungry world' no 
longer existed. Largely vanished also was the rationale of reducing 
proliferation, since Australia no longer had the bargaining power to 
impose strict safeguards; and the objective of delaying reprocessing 
and the plutonium economy by providing assured supplies of natural 
uranium no longer applied, since those countries who wished to develop 
reprocessing were going ahead with it, and there were in any case no 
supply shortages of natural uranium. If preventing proliferation and 
meeting an urgent need for uranium had been the government's motives 
for exporting it, and if it would not have otherwise done so, as 
claimed in 1977, then in the absence of these imperatives ohe might 
have expected the government to at least prevent further investment in 
uranium mining operations. But of course this has not happened.
It is clear that the government misled the public as to its 
priorities as between safeguards and sales of uranium, or to make the 
most charitable interpretation, when the government had to make actual 
rather than theoretical choices between the two, it was forced to 
reassess its priorities in favour of selling uranium.
The international anti-nuclear movement
The discussion so far has concerned the effect on Australian 
uranium policy of world prices and markets for uranium and of inter­
national anti-proliferation procedures and proposals. We will now briefly 
turn to the effects of the international anti-nuclear movement on 
Australian policy. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in 
any detail the movement itself or the countervailing efforts by nuclear 
proponents; the subject has been well covered by Falk (1982) and others.
The movement has been able to attract considerable public support 
in many countries, as shown by the large numbers involved in street
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marches and occupations of proposed sites for nuclear power plants, and 
by the results of various referenda. For example, in 1974 28,000 people 
occupied the proposed Wyhl reactor site in West Germany; in 1977 60,000 
people attempted to occupy a site in Creys-Malville in France and in the 
same year 50,000 marched on the Kalkar prototype fast-breeder reactor 
site in West Germany. In May 1979, a month after the Three Mile Island 
incident, a crowd variously estimated at 65,000 to 120,000 assembled 
outside the White House in Washington. This was said to be the largest 
demonstration since the Vietnam War (Falk, 1982, pp. 105, 182, 127, 59 
respectively, and AFR, 25.1.77).
In a referendum held in Austria in November 1978, 50.5 percent 
voted against the use of a completed but inert reactor at Zwentendorf.
In Switzerland, a referendum in February 1979 based on a 'citizenfs 
initiative' which would in effect have halted nuclear power development 
was lost by less than one percent. A second referendum imposing much 
stricter conditions on nuclear plant construction was won with 70 percent 
of the vote. In the Swedish referendum in March 1980, which was confused 
by the provision of three options, 18.7 percent voted for 'no more than 
twelve reactors', 39.3 percent for 'no more than twelve reactors, which 
must be owned by the state' and 38.6 percent for 'no more than six 
reactors'. Sweden at that time had 10 completed reactors, four of which 
were still inert (Falk, 1982, pp. 156-166, AFR, 28.3.80).
Information about the anti-nuclear power movement overseas 
probably had only a minor direct effect on the Australian government. It 
would have played a part, together with the activities of local anti­
uranium groups and the Ranger Inquiry itself, in alerting the government 
to the political potential of such protest, thereby contributing to the 
government's newfound emphasis on safeguards.
Information about the movement overseas also encouraged the 
Australian nuclear opposition; the overseas anti-nuclear power literature 
was drawn on for local campaigns, and some of the more prominent scientists 
associated with anti-nuclear campaigns overseas were brought to Australia.
But the most powerful effects of the overseas movement on 
Australian policy came indirectly by way of its part in reducing the rate 
of growth of demand for uranium. In this it was aided by the world
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r e c e s s i o n ,  by th e  economies in  energy use fo l lowing  the  1974 o i l  c r i s i s ,  
and by problems with  t h e  te chno logy  i t s e l f  such as th e  Three Mile I s l a n d  
n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r  a c c i d e n t „ As a r e s u l t ,  some r e a c t o r s  were p re v e n te d  
from be ing  b u i l t ,  o t h e r s  were slowed down, and t h e r e  were a l s o  
c a n c e l l a t i o n s  and a marked r e d u c t i o n  in  new r e a c t o r  orders»
Some o f  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  were ach ieved  by d i r e c t  a c t i o n  such as s i t e  
o c c u p a t io n ;  in  o t h e r  cases  t h e  p r e s s u r e  by environmenta l  groups r e s u l t e d  
in  a d d i t i o n a l  s a f e t y  re q u i re m e n t s  and more e x t e n s iv e  l i c e n s i n g  
procedures»  These in  t u r n  i n c r e a s e d  p lann ing  and c o n s t r u c t i o n  t im es  and 
hence cos ts»  C o n s t r u c t io n  lead  t imes  in  th e  United S t a t e s  doubled 
between 1968 and 1977 to  twelve t o  f i f t e e n  y e a r s ,  and by 1977 a n u c l e a r  
power p l a n t  c o s t  f o u r  t imes  as much as in  1972» This was t h r e e  t imes  
th e  gene ra l  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and one and a h a l f  t imes  the  i n c r e a s e  in  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o s t s  o f  c o a l - f i r e d  g e n e r a to r s  (Komanoff, 1977, c i t e d  in  
Smith,  1982, p» 7 ) »
The l i n k s  between governments and th e  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  have been 
c l o s e  s in c e  i t s  m i l i t a r y  in c ep t io n »  Governmental n u c l e a r  a g en c ie s  o f t e n  
promote as w e l l  as  r e g u l a t e  t h e  indus t ry»  The i n d u s t r y  i s  h i g h l y  
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  and dominated by a few major o r g a n i s a t i o n s p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in  r e a c t o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  where t h e r e  a re  only  twelve companies i n  t h e  
Western World (F a lk ,  1982, p» 111)» The i n d u s t r y  i s  a l s o  commonly 
i d e n t i f i e d  w i th  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  n a t i o n a l  energy s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  and 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  wi th  t h e i r  accompanying p o l i t i c a l  and t r a d e  
a d v a n t a g e s »
I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  th e  o p p o s i t i o n  to  n u c l e a r  
power has  o f t e n  been met by government i n t r a n s i g e n c e  and a t  t im es  by 
r e p r e s s i v e  a c t i o n .  In France on 31 J u l y  1977 t e a r  gas and p e r c u s s i o n  
grenades  were f i r e d  a t  dem o n s t r a to r s  a t t e m p t in g  t o  occupy th e  
C re y s -M a lv i l l e  s i t e ,  r e s u l t i n g  in  one dea th  and more than 100 i n j u r i e s .
The e f f e c t  on t h e  n u c l e a r  o p p o s i t i o n  in  France and s e v e r a l  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  was ’p ro fo u n d ly  d i s h e a r t e n i n g '  (Fa lk ,  1982, p.  183) and in  
France i t  took s e v e r a l  y e a r s  f o r  th e  movement to  r eco v e r .
The s u c c e s s  o f  th e  a n t i - n u c l e a r  movement has been uneven -  i t  has 
had c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f e c t  in  some c o u n t r i e s  such as th e  U.S» and West 
Germany and markedly l e s s  in  o t h e r s  such as France and th e  U.K..
In Japan  o p p o s i t i o n  to  n u c l e a r  power - except  f o r  s t r o n g  r e s i s t a n c e  to  
some s p e c i f i c  s i t i n g s  - has been r e l a t i v e l y  muted (H a r r i s  and Oshima, 1980) .
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In some countries such as South Korea there has not been much apparent 
opposition to nuclear programmes. But together with other factors the 
nuclear opposition has helped to place Australia in a position of 
having to adapt its policies to a weak uranium market.
The uranium cartel
The uranium supplier’s cartel, mentioned earlier, was active in 
setting minimum prices and manipulating supply from 1972 until at least 
1975. From an Australian perspective, the issue was remarkable in a 
number of ways, including the approval given to the cartel’s operations 
by the Commonwealth Liberal-Country Party government, the participation 
of Commonwealth government officials in meetings of the cartel together 
with the uranium mining companies, and the secrecy which veiled 
government involvement. Venturini (1982) provides extensive evidence 
on such matters, including the participation of officials from the 
Department of National Development and the AAEC in meetings of the 
cartel (Venturini, 1982, pp. 21, 24, 83).
Subsequently the Australian government went to great lengths to 
prevent Australian companies being involved in United States anti-trust 
litigation. The Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) 
Act 1976 was rushed through both Houses of Parliament in less than 
three hours. The Act (as amended) allowed the Attorney-General to 
prohibit the release of documentary evidence to a foreign tribunal, 
if the tribunal proposes to exercise jurisdiction inconsistent with 
international law or comity between nations (s.4(l) (a)), or to 
protect the national interest (s.4(l)(b)).
Following a request from the United States government in October 
1977 for a relaxation of orders which had been made under the Act, the 
Australian government replied:
... the arrangements which were made by Australian uranium
producers for the marketing of Australian uranium were made with
the approval of the Australian government ...
The Note also expressed the hope that the U.S. government would 
take account of Australian law and 'not institute any proceedings in 
respect of the arrangements' (Australian Embassy, 1978, quoted in 
Venturini, 1982, p. 95).
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Australia's involvement with the cartel is in a sense a side­
show to the main events of the government's uranium policy. But it 
provides a clear example of the linkages between government, 
government officials and the mining companies. Such linkages provide 
the industry with special access to government which is not available 
to anti-uranium groups and increase the possibility that officials will 
begin to identify the interests of the industry with the national 
interest. Parliament was unable to effectively review the government's 
involvement in the cartel because of the secrecy attached to it.
Concluding comments: external influences
The aim of the foregoing has been to examine both the effects of 
factors external to Australia on the course of Australian government 
policy with respect to the mining and export of uranium, and the 
extent to which the external aspects of such policy continued to be 
influenced by the relevant recommendations of the Ranger Inquiry.
With regard to the key decision as to whether to export Australian 
uranium, despite the international anti-nuclear movement, at inter­
government level by far the bulk of political and economic pressures 
favoured exporting Australian uranium. The Carter non-proliferation 
policy would have been assisted by plentiful supplies of cheap uranium 
to reduce the incentive to develop reprocessing. Other countries would 
supply uranium whether or not Australia did, so that by selling its 
own subject to stricter safeguards Australia could contribute to 
reducing the risks of proliferation; Australia's relations with 
established and emerging trading partners would be improved by making 
uranium available to them; and Australia's participation and influence 
in many international activities concerning nuclear power would be 
increased by its active involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle. A 
decision not to export uranium would have placed the Australian 
government in an isolated position on the issue and subjected it to 
strong international pressure. This is not to argue the merits of the 
decision to export uranium, but to illustrate the argument in Chapter 
Three concerning the effect of the web of international relationships 
in restricting the capacity of nations for independent policy change. 
Such international pressures did not make a decision to export uranium 
inevitable, but they made the task of internal opposition to the export 
of uranium a far more difficult one.
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The uranium issue also leaves a strong impression of the virtual 
inexorability, from Australia's point of view, of world events in 
relation to the rate and form of development of nuclear energy. These 
things were determined outside Australia. Whether Australia sells or 
withholds its uranium, despite its large reserves and political 
stability, however stringent its safeguards and however intense its 
diplomatic efforts, it will only be one small influence among many in 
deciding how quickly nuclear energy sources will develop, the extent 
to which there will be reliance on reprocessing, and the adequacy of 
anti-proliferation and other measures which will be adopted. In this 
larger sense Australia is hostage to the rest of the world in relation 
to the benefits and dangers of nuclear power development. But this is 
not to say that Australia does not have a responsibility to make its 
own decision on moral as well as political and economic grounds as to 
whether or not to sell uranium and under what conditions.
With regard to the effect of the Ranger Inquiry on uranium export
policy, insofar as the 1977 government safeguards policy largely
reflected the Inquiry's recommendations, the subsequent dilution of the
requirements was a move away from these recommendations. Nevertheless,
even the resultant diluted safeguards were probably stronger than they
<would have been if the Inquiry had not taken place. Prior to the 
Inquiry, safeguards were hardly mentioned by LNCP leaders. Without the 
Inquiry, public awareness of proliferation issues would still have 
increased, but they would not have had the focus and clear expression 
which the Inquiry and its Reports provided. Nevertheless, the progress­
ive weakening of safeguards in ensuing years took them far from the 
standards recommended by the Inquriy.
As has been shown, the government also disregarded other recommen­
dations of the Inquiry related to the safeguards issue, for instance 
that of avoiding the creation of a position where industry pressure 
based on existing commitment becomes an influential factor. In another 
neglected recommendation, the Inquiry concluded that 'it is in 
Australia's best interests to encourage and assist the world community 
to do whatever is practicable to avoid, or where unavoidable to control, 
the development of inescapable reliance on nuclear power' (First 
Report, 1976, p. 164).
As it had in its 1977 policy statements, the government continued 
largely to ignore the Inquiry's findings concerning the weaknesses of
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world safeguard regimes, and to contradict the finding that no safe 
method of disposal for high level wastes had been proved. The Inquiry's 
emphasis on the increased risk of nuclear war 'as the most serious 
hazard associated with the industry' (p. 185) was not given nearly the 
same weight in government policy as it evolved after 1977. In general, 
government policy did not embody the spirit of great caution which 
pervaded the Inquiry's Report in relation to the various risks of the 
nuclear fuel cycle.
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
This section and those following examine the relationship between 
Australian uranium policies and various interests - environmental 
groups, mining companies, trade unions, the public, and Aborigines; and 
they review the extent to which the domestic aspects of uranium policy, 
as they have evolved, conform with the Inquiry's recommendations.
Environmental groups in Australia saw an upsurge in numbers and 
membership in the early 1970's. Figure 7.2 shows the number of new local 
environmental groups formed in NSW during the period 1960-1978.
Membership of national organisations showed a similar growth pattern 
(Figure 7.3). The two dips in membership of the Australian Conservation 
Foundation (ACF) in 1973 and 1976 appear to have been due lärgely to 
internal dissension between more radical and more conservative groups, 
although there was a more general slowdown in membership growth in 
1975-77.
It is interesting that the National Trust, a fairly conservative 
organisation concerned centrally but not exclusively with the preserva­
tion of historic buildings, has a national membership of about 75,000, 
as compared with the ACF, which is less conservative but far from 
radical, concerns itself largely with the natural environment, and has 
a national membership of about 10,000. However, there are more radical 
national groups such as Friends of the Earth (FOE) with a membership of 
about 6,000. There are also numerous specific-issue groups whose 
existence and membership fluctuate with the salience of the relevant 
issue, as witness the rapid growth of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society 
nationally in 1982 in response to the proposed flooding of the Franklin 
River in Tasmania for a hydroelectric scheme.
Estimates of the total national membership of environmental groups 
vary. Craney (1980, p.148) estimated the total membership of local
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FIGURE 7 . 2 :
NEW LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS FORMED IN NEW SOUTH WALES, 
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FIGURE 7.3:
MEMBERSHIP OF NATIONAL TRUST (NEW SOUTH WALES) AND AUSTRALIAN 
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groups in NSW in 1973-4 as 20,000. If this figure is extrapolated to 
Australia as a whole it gives a total of about 55,000 members of local 
groups (assuming that membership numbers have not changed much since 
1973/4, which was a peak period for the formation of such groups). If 
one adds to this an estimate of about 90,000 for non-overlapping member­
ship of national groups, the overall total for local plus national groups 
appears tobe about 150,000. The ACF, however, has estimated a total of 
about 250,000 as has McDonald (1982, Appendix). These estimates lie 
between one and two percent of Australia's population.
The French atmospheric nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific in 
1972/3 provided an early catalyst for the subsequent development of the 
Australian 'anti-uranium' movement, as it came to be called. In 1974 
some of those involved in opposing the tests began turning their atten­
tion to the uranium issue. Prominent among these were FOE groups, some 
of which grew from Greenpeace groups opposed to the nuclear tests 
(Martin, 1982, p.27). Other organisations began to take up the issue, 
including the ACF, and new single-issue groups formed, including the 
Movement Against Uranium Mining (MAUM) which developed from FOE in early 
1977. Here the term 'environmental groups' is used to cover both 
single-issue anti-uranium groups and environmental groups with wider 
concerns but also opposed to uranium mining. The term also'distinguishes 
such groups within the broader anti-uranium movement, which included 
much of the union movement and the ALP.
As the campaign developed, individuals and groups originally con­
cerned with one or a few aspects of uranium mining began broadening 
their concerns to a whole range of problems associated with the nuclear 
fuel cycle. This process, similar to that which has occurred in other 
countries in the anti-nuclear movement, meant that the opposition to 
uranium mining was not just a conglomerate of groups each pursuing its 
own narrow interests, but a movement with overlapping and common 
concerns, if sometimes different emphases (Falk, 1981, pp.ll, 12).
In many instances, concern with uranium mining and export rested 
on matters beyond the specific environmental hazards of nuclear power. 
Martin (1982, p.29) notes that 'concern about such hazards has contrib­
uted relatively little to the strength of the Canberra anti-uranium 
movement.' These activists, he says, were more concerned with the 
centralisation of political and economic power which would characterise 
a society relying on nuclear energy. This was by no means always the 
main source of concern, however. For others the environmental dangers,
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particularly the enhanced risk of nuclear war, were the central 
issues.
Martin (1982) has described the nature of the campaign 
conducted by the anti-uranium groups. The main targets were the 
unions, the ALP, organisations such as schools, churches, and those 
of doctors and government employees, and the general public. The 
latter was considered the most important, on the conscious assumption 
(Martin, 1982, p. 32) that once aware of the issues, the majority 
would oppose uranium mining, and that public support was necessary 
to maintain the anti-uranium stance of the ALP„
Most of the activities available to environmental pressure 
group campaigns were used such as lecture programmes, leaflets, 
bumper and other stickers (these were particularly widespread), 
posters, demonstrations, picketing of wharves where uranium was being 
shipped, vigils, boycotts and bicycle 'rides against uranium'.
The environmental groups decided against direct action in the 
form of attempted occupation of mining sites, because of the remote 
location of the sites and possible resentment by the local Aborigines 
(Martin, 1982, p. 34). This is interesting in that during the dispute 
current in 1982/3 over the flooding of the Franklin River in South- 
West Tasmania, attempted obstruction at the site has been a major 
tactic, and mass arrests have followed. This too is a remote site, 
although there are no remaining local Aborigines. In the Franklin 
case it appears that the site activities by protesters 
were effective in keeping the matter before the public eye.
Both the pro- and anti-nuclear camps contained 'experts' 
qualified in various aspects of nuclear technology. According to 
Martin (1982, p. 33), the main approach of the environmentalists was 
not to organise counter-expertise and meet the nuclear experts on 
their own ground, but rather 'to emphasise the fundamental social, 
political and ethical features of the nuclear issue, and to point 
out the values underlying the views of the pro-nuclear "experts".’
Nevertheless, there were a number of anti-nuclear campaigners 
called on for their expertise. These included overseas visitors such 
as the consultant physicist Amory Lovins, who toured Australia and 
gave evidence to the Inquiry. His visit was organised by FOE and
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the Campaign Against Nuclear Power (SMH, 1.11.75, 5.11.75). Another 
was U.S. nuclear engineer Dale Bridenbaugh (NT, 11-16.10.76).
One aspect of the conflict was the sometimes illuminating but 
eventually tedious correspondence in the newspapers, where each side 
apparently felt bound to reply to anything said by the other. In one 
three-year period the most prolific pro-uranium writer, Sir Ernest 
Titterton, a professor of nuclear physics, had eight letters and 
eight articles on the subject published in the Canberra Times alone, 
a feat almost matched by anti-uranium activist Brian Martin with ten 
letters and five articles (Martin, 1980).
The environmental groups worked on slender budgets. In 
Melbourne the FOE headquarters employed eight full-time workers in 
1975, only two of whom were paid - $30 per week (Age, 21.11.75). In 
Canberra, with a population of about 250,000, the combined annual 
turnover of FOE and MAUM was about $10,000 (Martin, 1982, p. 31).
In mid-1976 FOE obtained and publicised leaked documents from 
the files of Mary Kathleen Uranium. These provided strong proof of 
the existence of the international uranium cartel (NT, 16-21.8.76). 
(Mary Kathleen Uranium was controlled by Conzinc Riotinto Australia 
which in turn is controlled by the British-based Riotinto Zinc 
Corporation, a member of the cartel).
For the 1977/8 financial year, the Commonwealth government 
withdrew its $10,000 per annum grant-in-aid to FOE. A number of 
reasons were given for this. The relevant Minister, Kevin Newman, 
said at the time that FOE had 'become pretty negative and fairly 
political' (!) (SMH, 18.8.77). He was also said to have referred to 
FOE's presence at a demonstration at Swanson Dock in Melbourne 
concerned with the export of uranium. The subsequent Minister,
Ray Groom, refused to renew the grant, apparently on the grounds that 
FOE had publicised leaked documents (HRSC, 1980, pc 107).
Both the ACF, FOE and other environmental groups made extensive 
submissions to the Inquiry. FOE also had one or two representatives 
(Wieslaw Lichacz and Stephen Myers) at nearly all the Inquiry's 121 
sitting days. They were allowed by the Presiding Commission to cross- 
examine witnesses quite extensively. As can be gauged from the
371
transcript, their contribution was an effective and important one, 
since unlike the mining companies, environmental groups were 
financially unable to hire representatives with legal and other 
qualifications to examine witnesses.
With the commencement of mining in early 1979 the anti-uranium 
campaign tended to lose direction. There was 'some feeling of not 
knowing what to do next' (Martin, 1982, p. 35), and much activity 
switched to other concerns. Nevertheless, both Falk (1981) and Martin 
argue that the anti-uranium movement in Australia has little cause to 
complain about lack of success, centrally because they achieved a delay 
in the commencement of uranium mining of several years, which brought 
the industry into a period of decreased demand. Also, the proportion 
of the public opposed to uranium mining and export has increased 
(see subsequent section) and there have been other gains such as the 
declaration of a large national park and stricter controls on uranium 
mining operations.
On the other hand, these can be considered rather limited 
achievements. As to the central issue, mining is going ahead, albeit 
more slowly, the safeguards provisions have been greatly diluted, and
f
it is not clear that an incoming Commonwealth Labor government will 
bring about a cessation of mining. Moreover, it took the support of 
large sections of the community, a rare conjunction of favourable 
circumstances, and a large-scale Inquiry for even these limited gains 
to be achieved.
Martin tends to identify the achievements of the anti-uranium 
movement too closely with the efforts of the voluntary environmental 
groups and their single-purpose offshoots such as MAUM, 
probably because he was closely associated with such groups. He 
sometimes writes as if these groups were the movement - for example: 
'the anti-uranium movement has focussed its efforts on (1) trade 
unions (2) the ALP ...' (Martin, 1982, pp. 31, 32). Yet much of the 
trade union movement and the ALP were part of the anti-uranium 
movement, and played a considerable part in its efforts. Nor can the 
environmental groups claim to have brought about the anti-uranium 
sentiments in the unions and the Labor Party, although they undoubtedly 
did much to contribute to them.
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The work of the anti-uranium movement was greatly assisted by 
an unusually advantageous concatenation of events. For the first 
time in 23 years, social, economic and political circumstances had 
allowed a national Labor government to gain office; and it was a 
government which considered that it had a mandate to carry out reforms 
in many areas, including environmental matters which had previously 
been largely left to the States. Had a LNCP government been in 
office, it is very unlikely that legislation equivalent to the Act 
under which the Inquiry was held would have been introduced. Even 
if such legislation had been in place, it is almost certain that under 
a LNCP government an Inquiry would not have been initiated. There 
have been only two such Inquiries in over eight years since the Act 
was passed, both initiated by the Labor government in its last year 
in office.
Even under the Labor government it was by no means a foregone 
conclusion that an Inquiry would be held or that it would have such 
broad terms of reference. It was fortunate also that the Commissioners 
had considerable sympathy for the anti-uranium viewpoint and possessed 
the necessary resolution to keep the Inquiry on course despite the 
incoming LNCP government's attempts to wind it up and pre-empt its
i
recommendations.
It is also difficult to conceive of an issue more suited to a 
campaign of public concern than that of nuclear power, with its wide 
range of questionable aspects. Martin (1982, p. 34) asserts that 
'the very lack of any direct threat by nuclear power to Australians 
has meant that attention has focussed on wider issues such as the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons ...' and that moral concern, rather 
than self interest, has been a strong point in the Australian anti­
uranium campaign. But it is clear that there may be considerable 
self-interest involved in concern that nuclear proliferation 
will increase the possibility of nuclear war, or that uranium mining 
may lead to the introduction of subsequent stages of the nuclear 
fuel cycle in Australia, or that Australia will be inescapably part 
of a world in which the nuclear power industry augments a trend 
towards the centralisation of economic and political power. Nor is 
the desire to see a national park unsullied by uranium mining, or 
for Aboriginals to continue the remnants of their traditional way of 
life with the minimum of disturbance, necessarily devoid of self-
373
interest, since it is always more pleasant to live in a world shaped 
to one's own liking.
Leaving questions of motivation aside, however, the main point to 
be made is that the anti-uranium movement was one with wide appeal and 
support, many other circumstances as enumerated above were favourable, 
and yet the movement achieved only limited success.
TRADE UNIONS
It may be helpful from the beginning to distinguish two broad types 
of union activity and two broad categories of union objectives. Union 
actions may be industrial (strikes, go-slows, bargaining with employers) 
or political (financial support for a political partv, organisation of 
street marches). Union objectives mav be industrial (better wages and 
conditions) or political (election of a Labor government, protection of 
the environment). Unions may take political action to gain industrial 
objectives and vice versa. Of course political and industrial objectives 
often overlap. But for present purposes the distinction is a useful one: 
the political and industrial objectives of trade unions may conflict, and 
this is to a considerable extent what occurred in the uranium case.
Australian trade unions are no strangers to industrial^action for 
political ends. Roddewig calls black bans 'political strikes' and states 
that there have been more than 30 of these 'over issues that could be 
termed national' since 1916 (Roddewig, 1978, p. 65). The union movement 
has also had a long-term involvement in political action for both 
political and industrial ends, the most obvious example being its 
foundation of the world's first successful labour party, following the 
failure of strike action in the depression of the 1890's. (The first 
Labor government in the world gained office briefly in Queensland in 1899, 
and a Labor government won federal office in 1910). The relationship of 
the unions and the ALP is still a close one, but about 40 percent of 
unionists belong to unions not affiliated with the ALP (Rawson, 1978, 
p. 84) .
Probably the best-known involvement of the unions in industrial 
action on an environmental issue, the 'green bans', began in Hunter's 
Hill in Sydney in 1971. A group mainly consisting of upper middle- 
class housewives, having exhausted all other avenues, sought trade 
union aid to prevent residential development in some local bushland.
The response was favourable. One of the unions involved in banning 
labour from the site was the NSW branch of the Australian Building
374
Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation (BLF).
The communist-led BLF was already predisposed to take action on 
environmental issues, and its secretary, Jack Mundey, coined the 
term 'green ban' for the withholding of labour on environmental 
grounds. Green bans were applied to about fifty proposals in Sydney 
in the next three years, about the same number in Melbourne and some 
in other major cities (Roddewig, 1978, pp. 30-33)0
When the uranium issue arose, therefore, industrial action by
unions on environmental issues was not a novel idea. The circumstances,
however, were vastly different from those which had applied to most of
the green bans.^ Much, although not all, of the initial opposition to
uranium mining came from outside the trade union movement, from sources
such as FOE. The Communist Party of Australia (one of the larger of
several relatively small communist parties in Australia) also took up
the issue early and transmitted its interest to its union members.
Among the unions involved in supplying labour at some stage of the
mining and export of uranium, those opposed to it have included
notably the Australian Railwaymen's Union (ARU), and the member unions
of the Northern Territory Trades and Labor Council. The branches of
the Waterside Workers' Federation (WWF) differed in their attitude
#
towards uranium. The ARU was one of the first unions to take a 
position on the issue, having decided by August 1975 not to handle the 
uranium from the Mary Kathleen mine, which was about to reopen. In 
April 1976 the ARU decided to place a ban on handling all material used 
in mining uranium, and later called a one-day national strike when one 
of its members was suspended for refusing to load such material. The 
WWF in Melbourne banned the handling of uranium in mid-1977 after 
mounted police were used against demonstrators who had broken into a 
terminal where uranium was being loaded, but the ban was opposed by 
some other branches as being at variance with federal WWF policy.
The Miscellaneous Workers' Union (MWU) in the Northern Territory 
was opposed to the mining of uranium, but at the same time it wished 
to compete with the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) and also the
1 Much of the following account is based, up to early 1978, on 
Walker (1978). Other sources are noted in the text.
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Federated Ironworkers Association of Australia for coverage of the 
workers involved if uranium were to be mined» The AWU, Australia’s 
second largest union and predominantly rural-based, had always been 
staunchly anti-communist, its membership included a large proportion 
of miners, it faced a declining membership, and it had a history of 
rejecting environmental causes. All these factors inclined it to 
support uranium mining» Thus concerted bans by the unions covering 
uranium mining and export were improbable.
The peak union association, the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) was unlikely to try to impose a policy of banning the 
handling of uranium on its members, partly because its authority 
relies on influence rather than coercion (Martin, 1975, p. 121) and 
partly because it tends to see its role as one of promoting unity 
where its affiliates disagree»
The ACTU’s uranium policy arose in unusual circumstances at the 
1975 Congress. Towards the end, when some executive members and some 
of their supporters were absent, an amendment introduced by the 
federal president of the ARU and another delegate was passed which 
stated that Australia should halt all uranium mining operations 
pending a public inquiry and that existing contracts for the supply 
of uranium other than for medical purposes should be abrogated.
By mid-1976, a meeting organised by the ACTU of unions involved 
with the uranium industry agreed to allow mining to continue at Mary 
Kathleen but not to allow export until the Ranger Inquiry had reported 
(Aust., 29.6.76). Following the release of the First Report and the 
government’s subsequent announcement of its interim decision to allow 
the export of sufficient uranium to meet existing contracts, another 
meeting of the relevant unions decided to accept this limited approach. 
In December 1976 the ACTU executive recommended that following public 
debate, the government should hold a referendum on uranium mining and 
export, and if the government did not do so, then subject to rank and 
file consultation and endorsement by the unions involved, the unions 
should not mine or handle uranium or supply uranium mines. Since the 
government was highly unlikely to agree to a referendum, this move can 
be seen largely as a device to gain time and defuse the issue within 
the ACTU.
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At the September 1977 ACTU Congress the unions opposed to 
uranium mining moved an amendment to the above recommendation, 
proposing a moratorium on uranium mining to be reviewed by the 1979 
Congress. This amendment was defeated 493 to 371 in favour of the 
original executive recommendation plus an addendum which provided 
for a 12 month moratorium for public debate before the proposed 
referendum.
The government quickly made it clear that no referendum would 
be held, and the attempt at rank and file consultation ran into 
difficulties, with some unions reporting that a rank and file ballot 
would be too difficult. Because of the inconclusive result, a special 
meeting of ACTU-affiliated unions was held in February 1978. The 
meeting adopted a recommendation requesting government consultation 
with the ACTU and the Aboriginal people concerning nuclear safeguards 
and Aboriginal demands, and stated that until the ACTU was satisfied 
as to these matters labour was not to be made available for new mines 
(AFR, 15.2.78). This was in effect another weakening of the ACTU 
policy, since it left considerable room for choice as to the level 
at which the ACTU could pronounce itself satisfied.
At a meeting of unions involved in the uranium industry held in 
March 1978, four unions said that they would continue to participate 
in mining and others said that their members had chosen to ignore their 
union's anti-uranium policy. In August 1979 the ACTU executive revised 
its policy to allow mining at Ranger and Nabarlek. The ACTU's secretary, 
Mr. Nolan, said that the new recommendation simply recognised the 
existing situation (AFR, 7.9.79).
At this point one could have been excused for assuming that the 
ACTU's anti-uranium policy was effectively at an end. At the 
September 1979 Congress, however, there was a swing to the left, with 
two of ACTU president Bob Hawke's closer allies (Fitzgibbon and Crean) 
failing to gain seats on the executive. Hawke spoke passionately in 
favour of the adoption of the executive's August resolution, referring 
to those supporting uranium bans as 'wankers', to 'the futility of a 
moral decision you know you can do bugger all about', and suggested 
that the ACTU 'should not make up its mind in terms of what the Labor 
Party is doing.' (AFR, 14.4.79)
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In the event, the executive’s resolution was defeated in favour 
of continuing the ban on uranium mining by 512 votes to 318 (NT,
11-17.5„80), a large and unusual defeat for Hawke. The following 
month the WWF called for a meeting of all the unions engaged in the 
uranium industry, and indicated that it was not prepared to act 
alone on the ACTU policy. Despite subsequent efforts to enforce the 
ban, however, by May 1980, six months later, it was clear that the 
unions were having great difficulty in doing so. The Transport 
Workers' Union, for instance, had been unable to stop some of its 
members from delivering supplies, and was not planning any expulsion 
moves against them. TWU workers could join the Miscellaneous Workers' 
Union if expelled. The ARU bans could be defeated in most cases by 
the use of other forms of transport. High wages ($600-700 per week) 
paid by the mining companies were also an incentive to ignore threats 
of expulsion such as those made by the Electrical Trades Union 
(NT, 11-17,5,78).
By the end of 1980 the new president of the ACTU, Mr, Dolan, 
was conceding that the bans were 'just not working' and that the 
unions were about two years too late to take effective action (Age, 
20.11.80). Nevertheless, with Dolan as president, efforts to enforce 
the bans gained a new impetus in 1981, with the ARU enforcing its ban 
on the carriage of uranium (AFR, 20,2,81) and the Seamen's Union 
refusing to load uranium at Darwin on barges bound for Singapore 
(AFR, 9.4.81).
The Seamen's Union ban held through most of 1981 and began to 
have serious effects. In November, Mary Kathleen Uranium, which had 
incurred losses 'running into hundreds of thousands of dollars' due 
to the ban, successfully applied for an injunction against further 
hindrance by the Seamen's Union under the secondary boycott provision 
of the Trade Practices Act. If MKU failed to supply the uranium by 
December 31 it faced the possibility of cancellation of its contracts
The Northern Territory Chief Minister, Mr. Everingham, had been 
pressing the ACTU for some time to lift the bans. According to one 
source, the ACTU's secretary, Mr, Nolan, contacted Everingham in 
mid-November and said that the ACTU was ready to talk (AFR, 12.12.81) 
Everingham met Nolan and officials of the Seamen's Union and the
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WWF in Sydney on November 18, and there was a further meeting in 
Darwin on December 2 (Aust., 3.12.81). On December 9 the ACTU 
executive voted to lift the bans on the export of uranium. The 
executive was faced with the difficult task of explaining that the 
decision did not represent a retreat or change from the 1979 Congress 
resolution opposing uranium mining, which the executive did not have the 
power to alter, but was 'merely a realistic attempt to come to grips 
with a difficult problem' (CT, 9.12.81).
Several factors influenced the ACTU's decision. There was the 
threat of severe penalties under the Trade Practices Act if the uranium 
was not moved. There was some talk of unions having to bear the 
financial costs if uranium contracts were repudiated for non-delivery. 
The Northern Land Council had apparently complained to the ACTU that 
the bans were depriving Aborigines of funds from royalties. The 
Northern Territory government had constructed a concrete slipway at a 
remote beach ready to ship uranium using non-union labour. Also, the 
bans had continued to be implemented by only a small number of unions 
and unionists, with most disregarding them (AFR, 12.12.81). In mid- 
May 1982 the ACTU executive, while emphasising that the policy of 
opposition to uranium was unchanged, decided to switch its tactics to
4
a publicity campaign against uranium mining (AFR, 29.4.82).
The failure of the uranium bans makes an interesting comparison 
with the success of the green bans over a considerable period. Unlike 
the uranium bans, most of the green bans were introduced at a time 
when there was a high level of economic activity, particularly in the 
building industry, and there was therefore no great difficulty in 
finding work elsewhere. Again unlike the uranium case, there was at 
first no other strong union opposing the bans and competing with the 
BLF for coverage of the workers involved.
But by 1975 conditions had changed and building work was much 
harder to get. Following an application by the Master Builders' 
Association, the NSW branch of the BLF was deregistered. The federal 
council of the BLF, with Norm Gallagher as president, expelled Mundey 
and others from the union, and set up a new BLF branch in NSW. In 
subsequent struggle for membership, the new branch emphasised the 
'jobs or green bans' issue. The contest was eventually won with the 
aid of the Master Builders' Association, which gave members of the new 
branch employment preference (Roddewig, 1978, p. 106) .
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Both the green bans and the uranium issue showed that where 
political objectives seriously conflicted with the bread-and-butter 
industrial issues of union competition for membership and the 
employment and high wages incentives offered by the industry, the 
industrial objectives ultimately won out. The uranium issue also 
illustrated the very limited powers of the ACTU to pursue even a policy 
adopted by a large majority of Congress when some of the unions and 
many of the unionists involved in the affected industry are prepared 
to oppose or disregard it.
The preceding conclusions are not particularly surprising, but 
they seem at odds with the view, which many polls have shown is held 
by the public, of unions as having too much power. The potential 
power may exist, but clearly there are limited circumstances in which 
it both can and will be exercised.
Another reason for the public view of union power is that in the 
context of Australian society there is a tendency to see the power 
exercised by business (taking decisions which affect third parties, 
hiring and firing, setting prices) as legitimate, and that of the 
unions (taking decisions affecting third parties, intervening in hiring 
and firing, trying to set the price of its labour) as of dopbtful 
legitimacy.
Although they were not total defeats (the green bans, in 
particular, saved some areas of great aesthetic and historic value 
from development), in the cases of both green bans and uranium bans 
the forces for change in the unions were overcome by adverse economic 
conditions, employer and government action, and inter- or intra­
union divisions. But they were defeated by more than these. The 
unions were attempting, by withholding labour, to change a few 
discrete outcomes of the operations of society, while leaving its 
fabric and nature unchanged. But without more fundamental social 
changes, unions and environmentalists will continue to be condemned 
to the essentially negative task of fighting brushfires - expending 
their resources reacting to specific issues as they arise.
It is not fundamentally because the unions failed to impose 
lasting bans that uranium is being mined. It is because those opposing 
uranium mining are enmeshed in a network of social, economic and
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institutional forces which largely work in favour of mining. These 
include the high energy demand associated with materialism and 
capital-intensive economic development, the desire of nations for 
energy independence, the values which place economic development above 
the various risks of the nuclear industry, to name just a few.
In the face of such forces one could not expect union bans to 
be effective. But it is not necessary to accept as a corollary the 
Hawke philosophy that unenforceable moral decisions are futile. Such 
decisions can affect opinion by drawing attention to an issue and 
making clear the degree of concern of those making the gesture, and 
in some instances marginal changes in opinion can cumulatively lead to 
substantive change.
THE MINING COMPANIES
Here we will examine the uranium mining companies’ efforts to 
influence public opinion, and the Commonwealth government’s implementation 
of its environmental requirements for mining operations. This excludes 
policy concerning Aborigines and uranium mining, which is reviewed 
separately.
The Uranium Producers * Forum
The Uranium Producers' Forum (UPF) was formed in April 1972.
Its members were Peko-Wallsend and EZ Industries (Ranger), Western 
Mining Corporation (Yeelirrie, Western Australia), Queensland Mines 
(Nabarlek) and Noranda Australia (Koongarra). Pancontinental 
Mining (Jabiluka) joined in September 1974 (Orford, 1978, p„ 19).
These were all owners of large deposits which appeared to have the 
earliest likelihood of proceeding. (Noranda later sold its interest 
in Koongarra to Denison Australia, wholly owned by Denison Mines of 
Canada).
The UPF distributed large quantities of pro-nuclear energy 
material, particularly during 1976 and 1977, some of which was 
obtained from the U.S. Atomic Industrial Forum. In August 1976 it 
hired professional lobby group International Public Relations to put 
its case to government. The industry at that time was concerned 
that it was losing ground in the public debate. The former general
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manager of Mary Kathleen Uranium, Mr. H. Melouney, wrote to a 
colleague in June 1976, 'the industry has been doing far too little 
in the area of public relations. We are being beaten by the 
opposition and I find this both disappointing and frustrating '(NT, 
16-21.8.76). Hiring International Public Relations was said to cost 
UPF $72,000 per year, but UPF was reported as being 'delighted with 
the results' particularly when the government approved mining (NT, 
13.1.79).
In the period May to July 1977, UPF undertook a heavy programme 
of television and press advertising. The cost of the programme was 
variously estimated at between half a million and one million dollars. 
The UPF was assisted in its efforts by the Australian Mining Industry 
Council and by a small but active number of pro-uranium publicists, 
mainly nuclear scientists and uranium mining industry management 
(Martin, 1980, pp. 17, 18 lists the most prominent of these).
In April 1978 the UPF disbanded. This has been attributed by 
some to UPF's recognition that its media campaign had failed to 
influence public opinion in favour of uranium mining. But with the 
government's decision to allow mining to proceed UPF's major aim had 
been achieved, and its members now had conflicting interests as 
competitors in the production and sale of uranium. For example, 
Peko-EZ favoured sequential development, as the Ranger project was 
the furthest advanced, while most of the other UPF members favoured 
open competition (Age, 21.5.77).
Also, as the Financial Review pointed out at the time: 'before
the greenies break out the champagne (or perhaps carrot juice)', it 
should be kept in mind that the voluntary liquidation of UPF could 
be politically astute, on the grounds that it was an identifiable 
target and 'it is harder to stir up public opposition to individual 
miners than to a lobby group such as the Forum' (AFR, 7.4.78).
This view proved to be correct. Martin (1982, pp. 29, 30) later 
wrote that the 'strategy of silence' adopted by the pro-uranium forces 
from 1978 'posed problems for the anti-uranium movement, especially 
since participation in anti-uranium groups depends to some extent on 
the visibility of the uranium issue.' Orford (1978, pp. 7, 8) lists 
several groups which were formed specifically to respond to the UPF 
campaign „
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Implementation
In June 1978 the government passed a package of legislation to 
implement its decisions concerning uranium mining. This legislation 
will be discussed below in relation to the environmental regulation 
of mining activities. It took almost a year after the government’s 
1977 policy statements for these Acts to be framed, leading to 
complaints from the mining industry about further delays to mining 
development (AFR, 7.2.78).
On 3 November 1978 an Agreement was signed by the Northern Land 
Council (NLC) and the Commonwealth. This agreement was required under 
the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 before the 
Ranger project could proceed. On 9 January 1979 an Authority to 
commence operations was issued by the Commonwealth government to the 
Ranger Joint Venturers under s.41 of the Atomic Energy Act 1953. Use 
of the Atomic Energy Act for this purpose was contrary to the Inquiry's 
recommendation (Second Report, 1977, p. 330), for reasons discussed 
previously.
The Agreement between the NLC and Queensland Mines was effected 
on 22 March 1979 and on the following day a Special Mineral Lease was 
issued to Queensland Mines by the Northern Territory Minister for 
Mines and Energy to allow commencement of operations at Nabarlek.
In its August 1977 policy statements the LNCP government, as we 
have seen, noted that direct governmental participation in a mining 
project is contrary to its political philosophy. Nevertheless, 
because 'repudiation by one Government of contracts entered into by 
a previous Government would be quite wrong’ (Fraser, 1977b, p. 10), 
the government intended to maintain its interest in the Ranger 
project through the AAEC.
By July 1979, however, the government had decided the time was 
right 'to examine disvestment’ and invited proposals for the 
acquisition of its share in Ranger. Mr. Anthony gave three reasons 
for this (AFR, 7.7.79). The first was the government's 
'philosophical objection' to participating in commercial enterprises 
which meant competing with private companies (although the government 
does this in other areas). The second reason was that the project 
would require a capital outlay of $240 million by government because
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of the requirement on it to contribute 72.5 percent of the capital 
costs. Thirdly, the government could not delay disvestment further, 
since at a later stage the number of interested buyers would be 
reduced because the uranium would already be committed to sale. Here 
Anthony presumably referred to nuclear power utilities who might wish 
to hold shares in the organisation they would be buying from. (On 
the other hand, for many buyers committed contracts would be a 
very positive factor in a weak market).
The government's partners in Ranger, Peko-Wallsend Operations 
Ltd. and Electrolytic Zinc Co. of Australasia Ltd., were strongly 
opposed to the government's sale of its share. There were apparently 
more than 20 bidders (AFR, 28.8.79) but many of the overseas bidders 
were virtually disqualified by the government's restrictions on foreign 
ownership. Peko-EZ in any case under the original partnership 
Agreement had the right of first refusal of the government's share 
(AFR, 7.7.79).
Peko-Wallsend put together a proposal under which its share, 
plus the government's share, would be floated as a public company, 
Energy Resources of Australia Ltd. (ERA). Peko was to hold 50 
percent of ERA (thus giving it 37.5 percent of the whole'-project) ,
25 percent was to be sold to the public and 25 percent to overseas 
utilities (AFR, 16.10.79).
The government accepted Peko's offer, through ERA, of $125 
million for its interest in Ranger (AFR, 19.12.79). It was said 
that the highest bidder had been Denison Mines of Canada at $150 
million (AFR, 3.10.79). Electrolytic Zinc Co. ultimately took an 
equal share with Peko-Wallsend, so that eventual ownership of ERA 
became 30.49 percent each held by Peko-Wallsend and Electrolytic 
Zinc Co., 14.02 percent held by the public, and 25 percent by overseas 
interests (Owen, 1982, p. 20).
One other aspect of government policy which should be mentioned 
is the Australian equity requirement. Surprisingly, in April 1976 
the LNCP government announced that a minimum 75 percent Australian 
ownership would be required for uranium mining projects, as 
compared with 50 percent for other mining ventures. The LNCP's 
pre-election policy had required only 50 percent for uranium as well 
as other mining projects (CT, 2.4.76). However, apparently the
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government was prepared to vary these guidelines in the case of the 
Yeelirrie project in Western Australia and Roxby Downs in South 
Australia, the latter owned 51 percent by Western Mining Corporation 
and 49 percent by British Petroleum (Camilleri, 1980, p. 103). More 
recently the LNCP government said that it would allow 50 percent 
foreign equity in a uranium enrichment plant built in Australia 
(AFR, 7.10.82).
Environmental regulation
The Acts passed by the government in June 1978 as a basis for 
implementation of its uranium mining policies are as follows. The 
Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Act 1978 provided for 
a Supervising Scientist, a Co-ordinating Committee and a Research 
Institute. The Act requires the Supervising Scientist, in relation to 
the effects of uranium mining operations on the environment of the 
Region, to coordinate and supervise the implementation of relevant laws 
and instruments, to develop standards and other measures for the 
protection of the environment, and to undertake programmes of research. 
The words ’uranium mining operations’ are defined in the Act to exclude 
towns and camps and their ancillary services. This has been
f
interpreted as excluding from the Supervising Scientist's concerns the 
social impact on Aborigines arising from the influx of people 
associated with mining into the Region (Supervising Scientist, 1982, 
p.l) .
The Supervising Scientist does not impose conditions on the 
mining companies. This is done by the Northern Territory authorities. 
Nor does he have powers of enforcement. The Co-ordinating Committee, 
of which the Supervising Scientist is Chairman, would consider the 
need for any such enforcement. Under the Environment Protection 
(Northern Territory Supreme Court) Act 1978 two members of the 
Committee, the Director of National Parks and Wildlife and the Northern 
Land Council, may seek an enforcement order from the Northern Territory 
Supreme Court.
Other legislation passed in the same package was the National 
Parks and Wildlife Conservation Amendment Act 1978, which provides for 
the declaration of the Kakadu National Park; the Environment 
Protection (Nuclear Codes) Act, providing for the development of
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health, safety and environment protection codes related to nuclear 
activities; the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment 
Act 1978, to allow the granting of unalienated Crown Land in the 
Region to traditional owners and the leasing of that land to the 
Director of the Australian Parks and Wildlife Service as part of the 
National Park; and the Atomic Energy Amendment Act 1978, which enabled 
the AAEC to participate on behalf of the Commonwealth government as a 
joint venturer in the Ranger project. As noted earlier, the use of 
the Atomic Energy Act conflicted with a recommendation of the Inquiry.
Under the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 the 
Territory became to a considerable extent self-governing, but with 
lesser powers than those of the Australian States0 Although the 
Federal Government did not transfer its powers relating to uranium to 
the Territory, it was agreed between the two governments that as far 
as possible uranium mining in the Region would be regulated under the 
Territory's laws.
Formal working arrangements were agreed in September 1979 
between the Supervising Scientist and the Northern Territory authorities, 
but some problems still arose in coordination between them. At the 
request of the Cabinet Committee on Review of Commonwealth Functions 
(the 'Razor Gang') a further review was carried out in 1981, resulting 
in a document with the odd title of the Philosophy of Compliance. In 
short, this states that the mining companies are obliged to operate in 
compliance with the regulatory regime and to demonstrate their 
compliance; the Northern Territory Supervising Authorities are 
responsible for issuing regulations and authorisations which comprise 
the regulatory regime, and for verifying compliance with it; and the 
Supervising Scientist promotes and assists in the establishment of a 
regulatory regime which meets Commonwealth requirements.
The review found that there was little overlap between the 
Supervising Scientist and the Northern Territory authorities except in 
surveillance and assessment. But the Supervising Scientist maintained 
that his work in these areas is carried out for different purposes:
The objective of the Supervising Scientist in these 
activities ... is to provide the Commonwealth with an 
independent assessment of the effectiveness of the 
regulatory regime established by the Northern Territory;
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the objective of the Supervising Authorities is to
regulate.(Supervising Scientist, 1982, p. 16).
This two-tiered system of regulation and supervision means 
that some Commonwealth as well as Northern Territory legislation 
applies to the mining operations. In the terminology of the 
Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Act 1978 any such 
legislation is a 'prescribed instrument'. In 1982 there were 43 
Commonwealth and 101 Northern Territory Acts, Amendments, and 
Regulations and Procedures under these Acts listed as prescribed 
instruments (Supervising Scientist, 1982, pp. 97-103).
Other prescribed instruments include the Agreements between the 
Commonwealth and the Northern Land Council and between Queensland 
Mines and the Northern Land Council. The Environmental Requirements 
for the two projects were important in the negotiations leading to 
the Agreements.
The Environmental Requirements are prescribed instruments of 
central importance. They are set out in Schedule 2 to the Authority 
to Mine issued by the Commonwealth government to the Ranger Joint 
Venturers and in the Third Schedule to the Special Mineral Lease issued 
by the Northern Territory Minister for Mines to Queensland Mines Ltd. 
There are over 40 Environmental Requirements (excluding sub-sections) 
for each of the mining projects. Also, each year many specific 
aspects of the mining activities have been authorised under 
Commonwealth or Northern Territory legislation (25 for Ranger and 14 
for Nabarlek in 1981/2 alone), and such authorisations also become 
prescribed instruments. (Supervising Scientist, 1982, pp. 96-158 
lists the prescribed instruments including the Environmental 
Requirements for Ranger and Nabarlek).
The foregoing illustrates some of the complexity of the 
provisions for environmental regulation of the uranium mining 
operations. The mining companies, not surprisingly, have criticised 
these provisions and the supporting administrative structure. At an 
early stage the chairman of Pancontinental Mining, Mr. Tony Grey, 
commented that the range of legislation and administrative bodies 
'appears ... to be a guarantee of something about as co-ordinated and 
fast moving as a traffic jam in Rome.' (AFR, 7.2.78).
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Both the Northern Territory authorities and the Supervising 
Scientist have complained that they have insufficient resources to 
carry out their responsibilities properly. The Supervising Scientist 
had a total expenditure of just over four million dollars in 1981/2, 
of which $1,654,000 was spent on capital works (Supervising Scientist, 
1982, p. 94). His staff ceiling for 1981/2 was 44, a level which had 
applied since December 1980, and which was in the view of the 
Supervising Scientist, 'totally inadequate and unrealistic'. He also 
considered the temporary laboratory facilities to be cramped and 
inadequate, and the temporary housing for staff at East Jabiru to be 
inadequate in quality and number (Supervising Scientist, 1982, p. 5).
The government's failure to grant staff increases, and various 
governmental reviews of the functions of the Supervising Scientist and 
the resources required to carry them out, led to doubts about the 
future of the Office of the Supervising Scientist. In May 1982, 
however, after a major review, the government agreed that the 
institutional arrangements for the Supervising Scientist should 
continue, that permanent laboratory facilities should be constructed 
in the Northern Territory, and in principle that 30 additional staff 
should be provided over two years.
<
Government approval on these matters appears to have resulted 
mainly from a report to the Prime Minister in March 1982 by the 
Australian Science and Technology Council on the scientific programme 
of the Office of the Supervising Scientist. The report confirmed the 
staff, laboratory and housing facilities that had been proposed over 
the years by the Supervising Scientist. The government also agreed in 
principle to the relocation of the Sydney office of the Supervising 
Scientist to the Northern Territory. (One must wonder why it was 
located in Sydney, several thousand miles from the scene of 
operations, in the first place).
Each year only a few infringements by the mining companies of 
environmental requirements have been reported. There were two 
incidents in 1981 which drew some public attention. In the first of 
these there was an unauthorised release of water from a Restricted 
Release Zone at Nabarlek on 7 March 1981 which was not reported by 
Queensland Mines until July. The release took the form of an overflow 
of feeder drains to the plant run-off pond during heavy rain. It is
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possible that water which had already entered the plant run-off 
pond, and would therefore be more contaminated than direct rainfall 
run-off, was also swept out via the overflowing drains. According 
to the Supervising Scientist, while 'no unequivocal conclusions can 
be made ... from the information gathered to date there is however no 
evidence of, or expectation of, any significant environmental effects.' 
(Supervising Scientist, 1980, p. 164).
The failure of Queensland Mines to report the incident at the 
time, and some shortcomings in the report on the incident prepared by 
the Northern Territory authorities in collaboration with the 
Supervising Scientist, drew considerable public criticism. The 
Uranium Advisory Council, a body established in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Inquiry to provide an independent source of 
advice to government, was understandably put out since it had 
recently commended 'the satisfactory experience of Nabarlek in relation 
to the no-release of water contaminants'. The Council, in a letter to 
the Minister for Trade and Resources, commented that the incident had 
had 'an adverse effect on public confidence in the uranium mining 
regulatory regime' and that this 'arose in part due to a lack of 
authoritative comment in the early stages, directly addressing the 
issues of public concern' (Uranium Advisory Council, 1982, 
pp. 35, 36).
The incident led to yet another round of discussions between 
the Supervising Scientist and the Northern Territory Supervising 
Authorities, partly in relation to the Supervising Scientist’s concern 
that the Northern Territory Supervising Authorities 'should slant 
their own check monitoring and reporting more towards being able to 
provide him with assurances that the companies are complying with all 
requirements under prescribed instruments' (Supervising Scientist, 
1982, p. 165).
Despite these and other discussions between the Supervising 
parties, the second significant incident in 1981/82 also indicated a 
lack of liaison between them. Authorisations for the Ranger mine 
required tailings deposited in the tailings dam to be covered with 
at least two metres of water. Tailings are distributed as a slurry 
from a floating pontoon. Because water level in the dam was low and
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t h e r e  were d i f f i c u l t i e s  in moving the  pontoon,  i t  became s t r a n d e d  
on an i s l a n d  o f  t a i l i n g s  o f  i t s  own making which became exposed.
On 23 November 1981 the  Northern  T e r r i t o r y  Department o f  Mines and 
Energy shu t  down the  mine f o r  s e v e r a l  days f o r  o p e r a t i n g  c o n t r a r y  
t o  a u t h o r i s a t i o n .  The S u p e r v i s in g  S c i e n t i s t  no ted  t h a t  he was not  
c o n s u l t e d  on t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  and t h a t  ' t h e  exposure o f  small  a r e a s  o f  
s a t u r a t e d  t a i l i n g s  f o r  s h o r t  p e r i o d s  was no t  cons ide red  . . .  t o  pose 
an envi ronmenta l  o r  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  p rob lem . ' (Superv is ing  S c i e n t i s t ,
1982, p.  32) .  The requ i re m en t  t h a t  t a i l i n g s  should be covered by 
a t  l e a s t  two metres  o f  w a te r  was subsequen t ly  a l t e r e d  t o  r e q u i r e  
t a i l i n g s  t o  be covered  by w a te r  w i th  no minimum s p e c i f i e d  dep th .
An a r e a  o f  concern f o r  bo th  mines has been the  l e v e l  o f  a i rb o r n e
r a d i o a c t i v e  dus t  in  p roduc t  packing  and sample p r e p a r a t i o n  a r e a s ,
where measurements were a t  t im es  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h ig h e r  than d e s i r a b l e
l e v e l s  (S u p e rv i s in g  S c i e n t i s t ,  1982, pp. 23-25,  33-35) .  Another
problem has been the  ca sua l  a t t i t u d e  o f  workers to  pe r s o n a l
p r o t e c t i v e  measures.  According to  one r e p o r t ,  ' a t  l e a s t  90 p e r  c e n t '
o f  workers ignored  th e  use  o f  the  r a d i a t i o n  moni tor  to  check fo r
r a d i o a c t i v e  dus t  on t h e i r  hands b e fo re  e a t i n g  (NT, 28.9 to  4 . 1 0 . 8 0 ) .
In a no the r  i n c i d e n t ,  a worker  was found wading in  th e  t a i l i n g s  pond
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in  bare  f e e t  (S u p e rv is in g  S c i e n t i s t ,  1982, p.  160).  One o f  th e  
Commissioners,  P r o f e s s o r  C har les  Ker r ,  has argued t h a t  the  In q u i ry  
should  have p l a c e d  much g r e a t e r  emphasis on worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  
r e g u l a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s  (Kerr ,  1980, p .  110).
There seems l i t t l e  doubt  from the  a v a i l a b l e  in fo rm a t io n  t h a t  
t h e  mining companies a r e ,  excep t  in  a few r e l a t i v e l y  minor i n s t a n c e s ,  
conforming w i th  t h e  env i ronm enta l  r equ i rem en ts  o f  government.  But 
t h e r e  have been r e c u r r i n g  problems in  l i a i s o n  between th e  S u p e rv i s in g  
S c i e n t i s t  and t h e  Nor thern  T e r r i t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and the  s t r u c t u r e s  
and p ro c e s s e s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  a re  complex and cumbersome. I t  may be 
t h a t  such problems a re  i n e v i t a b l e  g iven th e  t w o - t i e r  system o f  
r e g u l a t i o n .  That system i s  in  t u r n  a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the  i n t e r i m  s t a t u s  
o f  s e l f -gove rnm en t  in t h e  N orthern  T e r r i t o r y ,  and o f  course  o f  the  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  n a t u r e  o f  uranium mining,  which has in f l u e n c e d  th e  
Commonwealth government to  i n t r o d u c e  and m ain ta in  a s t r o n g  i n t e r e s t  
in  th e  conduct  o f  mining o p e r a t i o n s .
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It is not within the purposes of this study to examine the 
efficacy of the existing arrangements for environmental regulation 
of uranium mining in the Alligator Rivers Region. But difficulties 
of coordination between single-purpose government agencies where a 
number of them are involved in regulating a specific activity are 
not an unusual phenomenon. Nor are problems of Commonwealth/State 
coordination. Such difficulties reflect the increasingly varied 
and often conflicting objectives with which governments are faced, 
and which the old-style line department structure finds increasingly 
difficult to meet.
An alternative in the case under discussion would be to create 
a single organisation responsible for the regulation of uranium 
mining, embodying all the functions carried out by the various 
Northern Territory Supervising Authorities and the Supervising 
Scientist and his Office, and staffed largely by those at present 
carrying out these functions. The Commonwealth interest in the 
conduct of uranium mining could be retained to whatever extent 
desired by having a Board of Directors consisting of an appropriate 
number of Commonwealth representatives, together with representatives 
of the Northern Territory and other relevant interests. <
In general, it has been in the area of environmental controls 
on uranium mining operations and their accompanying administrative 
structure that the government has probably followed most closely the 
recommendations of the Inquiry. This is easily demonstrated in the 
case of environmental controls by a comparison of the Environmental 
Requirements for the Ranger project (Supervising Scientist, 1982, 
pp. 109-133) with the relevant recommendations of the Inquiry (Second 
Report, 1977, pp. 325-328). Close adherence to the Inquiry’s 
recommendations was politically desirable initially, in order to 
lend credibility to the government’s decision to proceed with mining 
and export.
Although the government subsequently wavered in its commitment 
to the level of supervision originally envisaged (as witness the 
restrictive staff ceilings and the various reviews of the Supervising 
Scientist's functions), it did not retreat substantially from its 
initial proposals as it has in other areas such as safeguards policy.
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Unlike the safeguards issue, where continuation of the original 
policy would have endangered uranium sales, there were insufficiently 
strong pressures to reduce the environmental controls. The pressures 
here to some extent tended to work the other way, with the traditional 
Aboriginal owners through the NLC being in a position to delay the 
commencement of mining unless adequate environmental controls were 
agreed.
Operating and proposed uranium mines
To place the mining operations in the Region in a wider context, 
Table 7.6 shows the main operating and proposed uranium mines in 
Australia by early 1983. There are also other probably less significant 
known deposits. Potential Australian reserves may be five to ten times 
known reserves (Battey, 1978)„ If all the mines listed were to be in 
full production by the mid- to late 1980's they would be producing 
about 20,000 tonnes of U^Og per annum, more than half the likely 
Western World demand. Since much of that demand is already under 
contract, and since Australia's reserves are only about 15 percent of 
Western World reasonably assured resources, clearly some of the 
proposed Australian mines will have to fall by the wayside.
Of the two operating mines in the Alligator Rivers region,
Ranger has contracts for about 3000 tonnes per annum until 1996, and 
is seeking outlets for a further 3000 tonnes per annum (AFR, 26.7.82). 
The much smaller Nabarlek mine had contracts for 60 percent of its 
output by 1982.
Pancontinental had only one contract by March 1983 (NT, 
25-31.3.83). A confidential report by the Secretary of the Northern 
Territory Department of Mines and Energy said that the prospects for 
large-scale sales from Jabiluka 'appear gloomy' unless the Commonwealth 
government drastically lowers or abandons its minimum price (AFR, 
2.8.82). The minimum price was then about $A37 lb. compared with a 
world spot price of $A21 lb.
By January 1983 Australia had failed to obtain unanimous 
agreement from the traditional Aboriginal landholders to allow it to 
mine the Koongarra deposit. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Anthony, 
was backing a plan to mine those parts of its leases not subject to 
Aboriginal ownership (Aust., 13.1.83).
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TABLE 7,,5: OPERATING AND PROPOSED URANIUM
MINES IN AUSTRALIA JUNE 1982
Mine, 
Location, 
Discovery 
Date
Reserves
Tonnes
U3°8
Average
Ore
Grades 
' U3°8
Production 
Capacity 
Tonnes/ 
Annum U^Og
Status Ownership
Alligator Rivers 
Region, NT
Jabiluka 1971 207,400 0.39 4,500 Approved. Operation in 
1986 possible
65% Pancontinental 
Mining
35% Getty Oil
Koongarra 1970 13,300 0.27 1,000 Agreement not reached 
with Aboriginal land 
owners
Denison Australia - 
wholly owned by 
Denison Mines of 
Canada
Nabarlek 1970 12,000 1.84 1,500 Operating (commenced 
1980)
Queensland Mines - 
50% Pioneer Concrete 
Services 
50% Ampol
Ranger 1970 125,800 0.25 3,000
additional 
3000 possible
Operating (commenced 
1981)
Energy Resources of 
Australia - 
30.49% Electrolytic 
Zinc Co.
30.49% Peko-Wal1 send 
14.02% public 
25.00% overseas 
investors
Other Areas
-Western Aust.
Lake Way 1977 6,800 0.06 500 Approved. Operation in 
1984 possible
53.5% Delhi 
International Oil 
46.5% Vam Ltd.
Yeelirrie 1972 46,000 0.18 2,500 Approved. Operation in 
1985 possible.
Previously - 
75% Western Mining 
'• Corp.
15% Esso
10% Urangessell- 
schaft. Esso 
withdrew 1982.
-South Aust.
Roxby Downs 1975 500 million 
tonne copper/ 
uranium/goId 
orebody
Up to 
0.11
2,400 Feasibility studies. 
Possible 1987 operation.
51% Western Mining
Corporation
49% BP Australia
Honeymoon 1972 3,400 0.14 450 Rejected by S.A. govt. 
March 1983
51% CSR 
49% MIM
Beverley 1969 15,900 0.27 600-700 Rejected by S.A. govt. 
March 1983
50% Western Uranium 
16.66% Transoil 
16.66% Oilmin 
16.66% Petromin
-Queensland
Mary Kathleen 
1954
2,700 0.10 600 Operated 1958-63 6 
1976-82. Now closed.
Mary Kathleen 
Uranium (part-owned 
by CRA)
Ben Lomond 1975 2,500 0.14-
0.18
200-400 Approval required. Final 
feasibility stage
Minatome Australia 
50% Pechinery 
50% Total Oil
Westmoreland 11,000 0.21 n.a. Insufficient reserves for 
development Dec. 1982
40% Queensland 
Mines
12.75% CSR 
9.75% IOL 
37.5% Urangessell- 
schaft
Maureen 2,500 0.12 n.a. n.a. Getty Oil
Sources: Based on D. Perkins, Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources, pers. comm., Current operating and
proposed uranium mines in Australia, as at June 1982.
Supplemented by G.C. Battey and C.J. Hardy, 1981, Uranium Resources, Exploration and Production in 
Australia. Paper presented to the American Nuclear Society, Third Pacific Basin Conference, 
Acapulco. Updated to March 1983 from press reports where available.
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The government's desire to proceed with the Koongarra mine was 
contrary to the Inquiry's recommendation 'that the Noranda mine not 
be developed, at least for the time being.' (Second Report, 1977, 
p. 335), prompting the comment by the Australian Financial Review 
that 'it is now obvious that Noranda is proceeding as though the 
Fox recommendations were never made' (AFR, 24.1.79).
To conclude: while the LNCP government generally stuck quite
closely to the Inquiry's recommendations concerning the environmental 
regulation of mining operations, it made important departures from 
them with respect to sequential development and in encouraging the 
Koongarra mine. In short, the government has not been willing to 
prevent any uranium mines from going ahead in any order, although it 
has felt it necessary to maintain quite thorough environmental 
controls over those in operation. It has also countenanced 
considerable delays while the Inquiry was completed and the necessary 
legislation and agreements implemented. To a considerable extent, 
however, both these delays and the environmental control regime were 
legacies of the previous Labor government which the LNCP government 
would have found difficult to repudiate.
<
PUBLIC OPINION
Several public opinion polls were taken during the period when 
the uranium issue was at its most controversial. Table 7.7 shows 
the main findings of several of these. It has been said that the 
results of these polls are inconsistent. But a closer examination 
helps to resolve much of the inconsistency, principally by making it 
clear that some of the poll results must be heavily discounted because 
of the way the questions were worded. In other cases, while the 
wording of the questions was reasonably acceptable, it varied 
sufficiently between the different polls to render direct comparisons 
of uncertain value.
In June 1975, June 1976 and July 1977, the Morgan Gallup poll 
asked: 'Should Australia develop its uranium resources for use in
nuclear power, or should it leave uranium in the ground?' In the 
survey conducted by Morgan Gallup for the UPF in August 1977, the 
corresponding question was 'Do you think Australia should or should 
not develop and export uranium for peaceful purposes'?' (italics 
added). This wording of course prejudges the issue, because one of
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the arguments against exporting uranium is that such a guarantee 
cannot be given. The changed question resulted in a jump in pro­
development responses, which was maintained in the 1978 Morgan Gallup 
Poll, in which the peaceful purposes' wording was retained. The 
report of the poll's findings notes that the UPF played a part in the 
framing of the questions (AFR, 23.8.77). For the purposes of 
comparative analysis, therefore, the Morgan Gallup results for 
August 1977 and July 1978 should be ignored.
Similarly, the McNair Anderson poll commissioned by the UPF was 
also worded in a way which muddied the waters. The first question was 
'Is the Federal government right or wrong in encouraging the sale of 
Australian uranium overseas?' The word 'encourage' is misleading, 
because the real question is whether the Australian government should 
allow the sale of uranium overseas. To speak of encouragement would 
imply to someone not well acquainted with the issue that it is a 
question of whether or not the Australian government should be helpful 
is an activity which may or will nevertheless take place.
The second question in the McNair survey (responses not 
reproduced in the Table) perpetrated the same piece of question-begging 
that UPF had introduced into the later Morgan-Gallup surveys. It 
asked: 'Do you think that Australia should or should not be developing
nuclear power for peaceful purposes?' The presumption about peaceful 
purposes preconditions the respondent for the third question: 'Should
the uranium mining projects in the Northern Territory, Western 
Australia and South Australia go ahead or be stopped?'
One can also object to the wording 'be stopped'. As well as 
the fact that mining had not started at that time and therefore did 
not need to 'be stopped', the words are not neutral and to some 
would engender a picture of authoritarian governmental interference. 
Also, by listing Western Australia, the Northern Territory and South 
Australia, the respondent is made aware of the large number of projects 
that would 'be stopped', with the obvious connotations of the 
economic losses which would follow. But the respondent is not 
provided with any counterbalancing information about the reasons for 
stopping them. Neutral terminology could easily have been used, for 
example: 'Do you think Australia should, or should not, mine
uranium?'
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Whatever the motives of those responsible for introducing these 
biased questions, the results of such polls, when published, may have 
had the effect of misleading the public as to the state of public 
opinion on uranium. If these polls are disregarded, there is reason­
able agreement between the others, especially given that somewhat 
different questions, the small size of the sample and different sampling 
techniques, are bound to produce variations in results.
It should be apparent from the Table that variations of three 
related questions were asked. The Morgan Gallup question one, the 
ANOP question and the McNair question three all sought opinion about 
whether mining should proceed. The Morgan Gallup question two and 
the McNair Anderson question one were asking whether or not uranium 
should be exported, and the SMH question combined both.
However, even where the intent of the question was similar, the 
differences in wording would have brought about somewhat different 
responses. The full wording of the questions concerning mining 
(excluding the biased McNair Anderson and later Morgan Gallup questions) 
was:
Morgan Gallup: Should Australia develop its uranium'resources
for use in nuclear power or leave uranium in the ground?
ANOP: Do you think we should mine uranium in Australia or not?
These questions appear reasonably comparable but the ANOP version 
breaks a rule of such surveys by not stating each possibility in full. 
For example the SMH question was: [do you think that] 'Australia
should mine and export uranium or should not mine and export uranium?' 
The wording of the ANOP question may only be a minor point but it 
does add some uncertainty to its results.
The questions about export alone were:
Morgan-Gallup question two: If Australia does develop its
uranium resources, should we sell to some other countries - 
or use the uranium only in Australia?
McNair Anderson question one: Is the Federal Government right
or wrong in encouraging the sale of Australian uranium overseas?
396
These two questions are not directly comparable, since the Morgan-Gallup
question asks the respondent to assume that mining is going ahead, but the 
McNair question provides no assumption on this. Therefore, in answer 
to the Morgan-Gallup question, someone opposed to mining might 
nevertheless agree that if mining is to proceed anyway, uranium should 
be sold overseas (for example, because this would be better than using 
it in a nuclear industry in Australia). But with the McNair question 
one, someone opposed to mining might say that the government is wrong 
in encouraging the sale of uranium overseas, in the belief that with 
no overseas sales, mining would not take place.
The response to the SMH question about mining and export taken 
together is clearly not comparable with the responses to the questions 
about mining alone, since a proponent of mining will probably, but 
not necessarily, be in favour of export.
Nor is the SMH question comparable with the questions about 
export alone. It might appear at first that it is, since if one is 
in favour of export one should also be in favour of*mining and export 
taken together. But this depends on the assumption one makes about 
mining. If it is assumed that mining will go ahead whether or not 
uranium is exported (recalling that the Morgan Gallup question on 
exporting uranium makes this assumption and the McNair question leaves 
it open) then, as noted previously, one might agree to the export of 
uranium as an alternative to its use in an Australian nuclear industry,
while still being opposed to the mining and export of uranium taken
together. Conversely, to be opposed to the export of uranium might
seem to imply being opposed to the mining and export of uranium taken 
together. That is, if one favoured mining for use in Australia but 
not for export, it would seem logical to oppose mining and export 
taken together. But the respondent's support for mining might be 
sufficiently strong that despite his opposition to export, he would 
prefer mining and export to no mining at all.
The main conclusion from the above is that, at least in this 
case, comparison between the polls run by different organisations can 
only be made in terms of broad approximations and general trends.
The most obvious of such trends (leaving aside the two questions 
dealing with export only) is that there was a pronounced decline over 
the period in the numbers supporting uranium mining, even though they
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TABLE 7o6: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT URANIUM MINING AND EXPORT, 1975-78
(Figures are rounded percentages. Sample :sizes approximately 2000)
1975 1976 1977 1978
Morgan Gallup,
Q.l: June June July Aug. JulyDevelop 62 58 47 (59) (59)
Leave in ground 25 29 36 (28) (27)
Undecided 13 13 17 (13) (14)
Q° 2:
If mined: June June July
Sell some overseas 46 47 59
Use in Australia 41 37 28
Undecided 13 13 13
ANOP: Mar. Oct.
Mine 64* 51* 50
Don’t mine 24* 36* 35
Don’t know 12* 13* 13
*Major cities only
SMH: June Sept. Mar.
Mine § export 58 53 50
Don’t mine § export 34 42 40
Don’t know 9 6 8
McNair Anderson: July Sept. Mar.
Q.l:Govt, right to
encourage export 50 50 55 4
Govt, wrong to
encourage export 29 32 35
Don’t know 21 8 10
Q. 2:
Not included here
Q.3:
Mining should go ahead (70) (70)
Mining should be
stopped (17) (23)
Don’t know (13) ( 7)
Sources: Morgan Gallup Polls Nos. 74, June 1975; 123, June 1976,
174, July 1977; 223, July 1978; and August 1977 as reported 
in AFR 23.8.77.
ANOP Polls for March and October 1977 as reported in NT 
17-22.9.77.
Herald Surveys, June and September 1977, March 1978, as 
reported in SMH 1.5.78.
McNarr Anderson surveys, July 1975, Sept. 1976, March 1977, 
as reported in UPF press release, April 1977.
Note: The figures in brackets are considered to be biased for
reasons given in the text.
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continued to outnumber those who opposed it. The decline appears to 
have gathered pace in the period from mid-1976 to the latter part of 
1977, and (from the figures available) seems to have been most marked 
in the middle part of 1977.
During the period there were several events likely to have 
influenced public opinion. The Inquiry’s First Report was released 
on October 28, 1976, and the Second Report (almost certainly of a 
lesser impact) on May 17, 1977. In May to July 1977 the UPF television 
campaign was running, and on August 25, 1977, the government made the 
major statements concerning its uranium policy.
It might at first appear that all these events should have 
increased the pro-uranium response in the opinion polls. The Inquiry's 
First Report had been hailed by much of the press and the government 
as giving a 'green light' for mining, and had certainly not recommended 
against it; the UPF had spent large sums putting its case in television 
advertisements; and the government had, after conditioning the public 
for many months, announced its intention to allow mining to proceed, 
accompanied by an extensive package of provisions designed to placate 
those concerned about the various possible adverse consequences of 
uranium mining and the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet support for uranium 
mining declined.
Part of the reason lies in the point made previously: that the
anti-uranium movement needed a high level of issue salience in order 
to get its message across. It seems that the assumption consciously 
held by the anti-uranium movement (Martin, 1982, p. 31) that once 
aware of the issues involved, a majority of the public would oppose 
uranium mining, was well on the way to being proved correct. The 
First Report certainly contributed to the availability to the public 
of information about the uranium issue, and at the same time the 
deliberations of the Inquiry and the publicity attendant on the release 
of the Reports, provided the anti-uranium movement with the necessary 
public interest to get their message across.
The UPF campaign also seemed, on balance, to have an effect 
opposite to that intended. The UPF provided the anti-uranium movement 
with an identifiable target. Its television advertising could easily 
be represented as the wealthy mining companies trying to buy public 
support. Many people were inspired to counter-activity by the weight
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of the UPF campaign and the one-sided nature of its publicity 
material. The Teachers' Uranium Forum and the Library Workers Against 
Uranium Mining were both formed to counter the activities of the UPF, 
the Library Workers stating that 'Librarians have a particular 
responsibility to balance the wealth of information provided to 
schools, libraries and the general public by the UPF' (Orford, 1978, 
p. 8).
The government's August policy statements further stimulated the 
debate. However, in the face of the government's obvious 
determination to allow mining to proceed, the controversy might have 
subsided more quickly had it not been for the prospect of an early 
Federal election.
In an ANOP survey carried out in October 1977, respondents were 
asked to rank the campaign issues which they considered would be most 
important in the event of an early Federal election. The results are 
shown in the following Table:
TABLE 7.7: PUBLIC OPINION AS TO THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES IN 
AN EARLY FEDERAL ELECTION, 1977
(figures are rounded percentages) <.
Most Important Most or Second Most
Issue Important Issue
Uranium 35 58
Unemployment 28 49
Inflation 15 35
Other 10 27
Source: ANOP poll , reported in the National Times,
October 17-22, 1977.
The election was held in December 1977. The importance placed 
on the uranium issue by the public, and the growing proportion of 
people opposed to mining, helped influence the ALP to feature the 
issue in its campaign. But as discussed in a previous section, the 
uranium issue did not play as large a part in the campaigns of either 
party as some expected.
400
The way in which various matters maintained public interest in 
the uranium issue throughout 1976 and 1977 also provides a reasonable 
explanation for an apparent anomaly in Table 7.7; that while 
opposition to mining, or to mining and export taken together, increased 
over the period, support for export also increased when this question 
was asked separately, as in the case of the Morgan-Gallup question two. 
These responses are not necessarily inconsistent, however. Having 
been asked to assume that mining was proceeding, the increasing 
numbers opposed to mining would probably then consider, as suggested 
earlier, that this implied either a nuclear industry in Australia or 
sales of uranium overseas. Therefore, selling overseas might have 
seemed the lesser of two evils, given the rather peculiar assumption 
that uranium resources were in any case to be developed. This 
explanation is supported by the finding under the Morgan-Gallup question 
two that the proportion of respondents in favour of using uranium in 
Australia if developed was decreasing at the same time as the 
proportion in favour of selling it overseas was increasing.
The Morgan Gallup poll results showed considerable internal 
consistency. Table 7.9 shows the results of the June 1975, June 1976, 
and July 1977 Morgan Gallup Polls in more detail for selected 
categories. A feature is the widespread nature of the decline in 
support for uranium mining among the different categories. LNCP 
voters were an exception to this, their views remaining virtually 
unchanged over the period. Perhaps surprisingly, support for mining 
declined more slowly in the cities than in the country. With the 
exception of the 70 years and over category, support for mining tended 
to decrease with decreasing age. The decline in support for mining over 
the period was also greatest in the lower age groups. There was a 
similar downward gradient in support for mining from managers through 
to unskilled workers, with the latter also registering the biggest 
decline in support over time.
A gradient in opinion was also apparent between lower and higher 
levels of education, with higher levels tending to be more favourable 
to mining, although other than in 1977 those with tertiary education 
were an exception to this. The striking difference between male and 
female attitudes to uranium mining leads to a range of conjectures 
(for example, concerning differential socialisation) which are 
beyond the scope of this study.
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TABLE 7.8: PERCENTAGES FOR AND AGAINST AUSTRALIA DEVELOPING
ITS URANIUM RESOURCES - BY CATEGORIES, 1975-1977
(Figures are rounded percentages. 2000)
DEVELOP LEAVE IN 
GROUND
UNDECIDED
Year: 75 76 77 75 76 77 75 76 77
Total Australia 62 58 47 25 29 36 13 13 17
Voting ALP 60 49 33 27 37 48 14 14 19
Intention LNCP 67 67 66 22 22 21 11 11 13
Male 71 66 56 22 27 33 8 7 11
Female 54 50 39 28 32 39 18 18 22
Cities 62 57 50 26 31 36 12 12 15
Country 63 60 43 23 26 36 14 14 21
14-19 56 47 29 32 39 56 12 14 14
20-29 61 51 42 28 39 44 11 10 14
Age 30-49 65 63 53 22 24 29 13 13 17
50-69 66 64 52 20 24 30 14 12 18
70+ 50 59 54 34 20 24 17 21 22
Professional 64 69 59 27 27 40 9 4 2
Managers 78 76 63 11 16 22 11 8 15
White Collar
Selected Clerks 64 61 50 24 28 34 12 11 16
Occupations Skilled 62 57 48 24 29 33 14 14 19Workers
Unskilled 54 39 37 34 37 42 12 24 21Workers
Selected Primary only 55 54 40 27 26 37 18 20 23
Education Some 60 54 46 25 31 36 15 15 18
T,ov<^ l ^ Secondary5th-6th Form 69 65 47 22 26 36 9 10 17
Tertiary 67 59 50 25 34 39 7 7 12
Sources: Morgan Gallup Polls , No .74, June 1975 y
No.123, June 1976; 
No.174, July 1977.
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In the two year period to July 1977, while overall there were 
still substantially more in favour of mining than against it, ALP 
voters, those under 30 years old, and unskilled workers had all 
moved from a substantial majority in favour of mining to a substantial 
majority against it, and women had become evenly divided on the issue.
Here cause and effect are intertwined, but one can say that the 
under-thirties were in sympathy with the predominantly youthful anti­
uranium movement, and skilled and unskilled workers and those with 
less formal education were attuned to the increasingly anti-uranium 
stance of the ALP and much of the union movement from 1975. The 
most impressive feature of the Table, however, is that in nearly 
every subgrouping shown, there was a substantial decline in support 
for mining over the period.
ABORIGINES
We see white men as always pushing. We know white 
men think differently from us, and they are not all 
bad. But even this Commission is pushing in its own 
way. (Mr. Silas Roberts, former chairman of the 
Northern Land Council. Second Report, 1977, p. 47).
An aid to understanding the relationship between uranium mining 
and its associated institutional trappings, and the Aboriginal people, 
is recognition of the extent of the differences between Aboriginal 
and white societies. Aborigines are not just underprivileged 
'whites under the skin' and predictions based on the way white 
Australians would behave in a given situation can lead to conclusions 
which are sadly astray.
Two such differences which became crucial in the negotiations 
between Aborigines and the government over the Ranger mine in 
particular, are the contrasts between Western and Aboriginal 
decisionmaking processes, and between their respective relationships 
with the land. The quotation at the head of this section continues 
as follows:
I must explain this because it is very important that 
our difficulty in this is understood. The trouble is 
the Aborigines did not run their business the same as 
the white men. We did not and do not reach decisions 
in the same way. Our people are not as free to make
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decisions and give evidence as white men seem to be.
If you add to this that most Aborigines are very 
frightened of white men you will have a lot of trouble 
getting much straight talk from Aboriginal people and 
you will have a lot of trouble getting them to come 
back to give evidence more than once. These problems 
are always faced by our field officers. Let me explain 
a little bit more. We have got to make decisions in 
respect to land our own way.
It is a long hard road to final answer. Sometimes 
a person or group will say 'yes' then talk a little bit 
more and then say ’no'. Then more talk might take place 
after a few months and still no final answer. Then all 
the people who really belong to that country will go 
over it all again until everyone is sure of his answer 
and then the answer is given. That may be years after 
the first talks if the question is a hard one.
Concerning the Aborigines' relationship with the land, 
Mr. Roberts said:
It is true that the people who are belonging to a 
particular area are really part of that area and if 
that area is destroyed they are also destroyed. In my 
travels throughout Australia I have met many Aborigines 
from other parts who have lost their culture. They have 
always lost their land and by losing their land they 
have lost part of themselves. By way of example, they 
are like Christians who have lost their soul and dbn't 
know where they are - just wandering. We in the Northern 
Territory seem to be the only ones who have kept our 
culture.
We are worried that we are losing a little bit, a 
little bit, all of the time. We keep our ceremony, our 
culture, but we are always worried. We still perform 
our ceremonies. (Second Report, 1977, p. 47).
The Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, established in 1973 
by the Whitlam government, with Mr. Justice Woodward as sole 
Commissioner, said:
I believe that to deny the Aborigines the right to 
prevent mining on their land is to deny the reality of 
their land rights ... I think it is likely, particularly 
in the longer term, that consent will generally be given. 
But this should be for Aborigines to decide - with the 
one qualification that their views could be over-ridden 
if the government of the day were to resolve that the 
national interest required it. In this context I use 
the word 'required' deliberately so that such an issue 
would, not he determined on a mere balance of convenience 
or desirability hut only as a matter of necessity (italics 
added). (Woodward, 1974, p. 108).
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The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
provided for much of what Woodward had recommended. The Act grants 
freehold tenure to Aborigines for what formerly were Aboriginal 
Reserves, and gives them the right to claim unalienated Crown lands 
for which they could establish traditional ownership. As we have 
seen the Ranger Inquiry was empowered to make such findings, and did 
so, for much of the Alligator Rivers Region. The Act also provides 
for the establishment of Land Councils with a range of functions 
including that of negotiating on behalf of traditional Aboriginal 
owners of land with persons desiring to use it (s. 23(1)(e)).
The Act also requires (s. 23(3)) that a Land Council 'shall 
not take any action' in carrying out its functions with respect to 
any Aboriginal land in its area unless it is satisfied that:
(a) the traditional Aboriginal owners (if any) of that 
land understand the nature and purpose of the proposed 
action and, as a group, consent to it
(b) any Aboriginal community or group that may be 
affected by the proposed action has been consulted 
and has had adequate opportunity to express its view 
to the Land Council.
#
These provisions were relevant to the negotiations between the 
Northern Land Council and the government concerning the proposed 
Ranger mine.
The Woodward recommendation that Aborigines should be able 
to prevent mining on their land, except where the national interest 
requires it, was incorporated in the Act (s. 40(1)). However, 
there is no provision for the phrase 'the national interest requires' 
to be interpreted in the way that Woodward suggested it should be.
But in any case the Act specifically exempted the Ranger project 
area from the requirement of s.40(l). This left the NLC on behalf 
of the Aborigines concerned with only the power under s.43(l) to 
negotiate terms and conditions of any mining development. S. 46 
provides for the Minister to appoint an arbitrator if the Land 
Council and the relevant mining interest cannot reach agreement on 
terms and conditions.
The NLC held its first talks with Ranger representatives on 
October 5, 1977. The NLC put forward a draft agreement prepared
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in consultation with Stephen Zorn, who had negotiated similar 
agreements on behalf of American Indians and had advised on the 
Bougainville and Ok Tedi agreements in Papua New Guinea.
At the same time the Ranger joint venturers advised their 
intention to begin dam and road construction in the month remaining 
before the beginning of the wet season. This proposal drew a strong 
reaction from the NLC and traditional owners, who claimed that work 
should not start until negotiations had been completed (CT, 6.10.77).
In February 1978 the Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC) 
released a paper attacking the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 on the grounds that it would discourage mining 
investment and cause costly delays to an unnamed project. The AMIC 
clearly had in mind the NLC's draft agreement for Ranger. AMIC 
criticised the compensation required by the NLC (apparently amounting 
to 36 per cent of gross profits) as disproportionate and unreasonable. 
The executive director of AMIC, Mr. Phillips, said that the Act:
... has permitted the Northern Lands Council to seek 
powers which would effectively override governmental 
authority in respect of all aspects of mineral activity 
in the Northern Territory, to invade normal business 
privacy and to impose conditions on mining projects 
which would override management authorities and 
responsibilities. (AFR, 17.2.78)
These complaints apparently arose from the NLC's proposals that 
Ranger should disclose its projected cash flows and allow inspection 
of its accounts; that the project should adopt improved pollution 
control equipment as it becomes available, even if environmental 
damage has not been detected; and that a stated proportion of 
employees should be local Aborigines. AMIC also objected to the 
NLC's proposed withdrawal of access by mining employees to 
recognised recreation areas, saying:
There is a real danger that the affected mining 
communities can find themselves in a disadvantaged minority 
situation in areas of Aboriginal land with restrictions 
unparalleled in a democratic society able to be placed 
on them at a whim of an individual or group of individuals.
(AFR, 17.2.78)
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AMIC also expressed concern about ’enormous racial 
confrontation’ and ’unauthorised totalitarian control by a minority'.
It suggested (incorrectly) that the Aboriginal Land Commissioner 'has 
no one to advise him as to the authority or accuracy of the evidence 
submitted to him' by the NLC concerning land claims. By March 6 1978 the 
NLC had released copies of its proposals to the press because the Ranger 
partners 'had committed a serious breach of confidentiality by 
giving copies of the draft agreement to the other miners and to the 
Australian Mining Industry Council.' (AFR, 6.3.78)
In April the NLC altered the thrust of its proposals. At a 
meeting during a visit by Mr. Fraser to the Northern Territory, it 
told him that it wished to see the Ranger project delayed but the 
Nabarlek mine to begin as soon as possible, so that Aborigines could 
'see what a small uranium mine is like before the big ones start.'
(AFR, 28.4.78). At the same time the NLC stated its intention to 
block the Pancontinental mine at Jabiluka until Pancontinental had 
revised its environmental studies. The NLC was concerned that in its 
planned form the mine would endanger sacred sites (CT, 27.4.78). 
Nevertheless, in mid-May the government allowed Pancontinental to 
extend the Arnhem Highway to Jabiluka, subject to an EIS. <.
By July 1978 the government was offering 3.75 per cent royalties 
plus $1.6 million bonus payments for the Ranger mine, and discussions 
were still continuing with the NLC on the environmental provisions of 
the proposed agreement. The NLC requirement that all tailings should 
be returned to the pit, at an estimated cost of about $40 million, 
when mining operations cease (as recommended by the Inquiry) was said 
to be delaying agreement (AFR, 17.7.78). In early August negotiations 
were reported to be stalled on the question of royalties, but by the 
end of the month there were expectations that the agreement would be 
signed on September 8 (AFR, 25.8.78).
In an ill-timed decision, however, the government gave approval 
to Pancontinental to go ahead with its extension to the Arnhem 
Highway. The NLC threatened not to sign the agreement, and the 
government was forced to defer the highway construction until a 
final decision was made on whether the Pancontinental mine should 
proceed (CT, 9.9.78).
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The NLC agreed on September 15 1978 that the Ranger agreement
should be signed. However, there were immediate allegations by 
members of the NLC that its chairman, Mr. Gallarrwuy Yunupingu, had 
been 'bullied' into agreement at a meeting with Mr„ Fraser,
Mr. Anthony, and Mr. Viner, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs. A 
transcript of the September 15 NLC meeting was made public by 
Mr. Bob Collins, the Labor member for Arnhem in the NT Legislative 
Assembly. According to the transcript, Yunupingu told the meeting 
that the Prime Minister had said 'There are laws to say you must 
sign The Government will never give up until it is mined ...
I have the power to block any law in the Northern Territory 0O.
It doesn't matter if you don't want it, we're still going to do it'
(CT, 1909.78). Whether Yunupingu was exaggerating to make his point 
is a matter for judgement.
Following the release of the transcript Yunupingu sacked the 
NLC's lawyer, Stuart McGill, and attacked the Northern Territory 
Labor Party for 'using' the NLC. Yunupingu also said in a telephone 
interview that Fraser had 'indirectly' threatened legislation to 
destroy the NLC's power to negotiate. Yunupingu said 'I wish people 
would realise that if we didn't agree they would go ahead [with 
Ranger mining] anyway by changing the legislation.' (CT, 2D.9.78).
The day after the release of the transcript Bob Collins, on 
behalf of several Aboriginal communities, took out an interim 
injunction in the Northern Territory Supreme Court preventing the 
NLC from signing the Ranger agreement» After further discussions, 
the NLC made an out-of-court agreement to the demands of the 
dissident communities that further consultations should be held with 
all the Aboriginal communities involved, to allow them to decide their 
stance on the issue in their own time. A full explanation qf the 
agreement in simple language was to be provided, translated into the 
various tribal languages. Mr. Yunupingu said that no time limit 
could be placed on these discussions. The Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs, Mr. Viner, gave an undertaking to the NLC that an arbitrator 
would not be called upon by the government to intervene (CT, 23.9.78).
The following week the NLC met for four hours and decided on a 
lengthy 21 point process for consulting all the Aboriginal communities
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in the NLC area (AFR, 3.10.78). The next day, however, Mr. Yunupingu, 
who had been absent from the meeting, said that the 21 points 'had 
been put in the rubbish bin'. Instead, the Oenpelli people (the 
largest Aboriginal settlement close to the proposed mining area) would 
be asked to nominate which communities should be considering the 
Ranger agreement. These would then be visited by lawyers and 
linguists to explain the agreement. Immediately afterwards the NLC 
would meet to decide whether ratification of the agreement would 
stand (AFR, 4.10.78).
Before this consultation process could get under way, however, 
a meeting at Oenpelli which included 40 traditional owners rejected the 
proposed agreement. The meeting was the one which had been intended 
to decide who should be consulted about the agreement. A resolution 
carried at the meeting said that the chairman of the NLC should 
inform the government of the meeting's decision not to accept the 
Ranger agreement 'at this time' and that consultation with all the 
communities represented on the NLC should take place. 'The Oenpelli 
meeting considers that the Crocker Island and Goulburn Island people 
are their relatives, and have to be consulted on future decisions to 
be taken'.
The journalist reporting the meeting, John Loizou, went on to 
say that the assertion by Mr. Yunipingu that the opposition to signing 
the agreement was orchestrated by the anti-uranium movement was not 
true, and that there was widespread hostility throughout Arnhem Land 
to signing the agreement (AFR, 13.10.78).
Nevertheless the government blamed the ALP for 'weaving a web 
of intrigue through Arnhem land' (Viner, AFR, 13.10.78, Fraser, AFR, 
16.10.78). Viner produced in parliament a letter written by the 
ALP's spokesman on Aboriginal affairs, Dr. Everingham, to Yunupingu 
in which Everingham said 'some people, most of them on the Labor 
side, care more about stopping uranium mining or changing the 
government in Darwin or Canberra than they do about Aboriginal land 
rights.' (CT, 13.10.78). In itself this statement was hardly 
evidence of ALP involvement in the refusal to accept the agreement.
As Mr. Hayden pointed out in parliament, it would be equally true to 
say that some people on the Liberal side cared more about uranium 
mining than Aboriginal land rights. The rest of the letter was of a
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personal nature, earning Viner few friends for making it public. 
Further, by revealing that Yunupingu had given him approval to 
use the letter, Viner, together with Mr. Fraser's public statements of 
high praise for Yunupingu, almost certainly decreased the latter's 
effectiveness with his own people by aligning him with the government.
At the same time the government began to harden its attitude, 
with Anthony saying that the situation was rapidly drawing to the 
point where the government would have to exercise the option provided 
in the Land Rights Act of appointing an arbitrator. This statement 
was made less than four weeks after the reported undertaking by Viner 
to the NLC that an arbitrator would not be called upon. Anthony said 
'We have to consider now to what extent we can allow a small group of 
people ... to stand in the way of a development of tremendous 
national and international significance.' (AFR, 7.10.78).
The government was also considering other options, including 
amendments to the Land Rights Act to reduce the negotiating powers 
of the NLC. By mid-October the government had decided that Viner 
should inform the NLC of the support within the government for these 
options (AFR, 18.10.78). The government became subject to increasing 
pressure from its backbench and the National Country Party to amend 
the Land Rights legislation, on the grounds that the appointment of 
an arbitrator would further delay the Ranger project (AFR, 27.10.78).
At this time a long letter from the NLC's adviser, Stephen Zorn, 
to Yunupingu was published by the Age. Zorn put forward a number of 
reasons for concluding that:
... the NLC leadership and staff pushed, it is clear, 
by the Commonwealth Government, have created a situation 
in which many Aborigines are not satisfied that they 
have had adequate time to discuss the Ranger agreement 
or adequate opportunity even to learn what is in the 
agreement.
Zorn asserted that Yunupingu and the NLC staff:
... appear not to have complied with the out-of-court 
agreements about consultation ... In particular further 
meetings to discuss the Ranger agreement have not yet been 
held in most communities, and very little material has 
been made available to the Aboriginal people.
410
Zorn also pointed to what he saw as weaknesses in the proposed 
agreement. He considered, for instance, that the royalty payable of 
4^ per cent was too low (Age, 30.10.78).
In response, Yunupingu said that Zorn had initialled the 
agreement, and had previously had adequate opportunities to voice any 
thoughts he may have had about possible inadequate consultation. 
Further, 'Zorn has never been in doubt about the fact that the 
traditional owners of the Ranger site opposed, and still oppose, 
mining on their land.' (AFR, 31.10.78).
The last statement may provide a key to Yunupingu's attitude
throughout. Because he believed that mining would go ahead whatever
the NLC did and that the government's patience would soon expire
(views heavily reinforced by the government) it seems reasonable to
suppose that he saw his task as obtaining the best possible deal for
his people rather than trying to prevent mining. From this point of
view, lengthy consultations to find out whether the relevant
communities wanted the mine or not were substantially irrelevant,
since it would go ahead anyway. And consultations to explain to the
communities what would happen with mining and to find out their
#
concerns so that they could be mitigated as far as possible by the 
terms of the agreement, may have seemed less important than ensuring 
that the known problems were met in the agreement before the 
government's patience ran out.
With the government preparing to take action, and the NLC 
apparently committed to a process of consultation with the Aboriginal 
communities over an indeterminate period of time, prospects of a 
negotiated settlement seemed to be retreating. But surprisingly, on 
November 3, 1978, almost a year after negotiations had begun, the NLC 
signed the agreement. The NLC had voted 42 to 2 to sign, on the 
condition that the agreement was taken to the traditional owners at 
Oenpelli for final consultation. The traditional owners present had 
agreed to sign after some discussion. There were reports that some 
Aboriginal communities were appalled when they heard that the 
agreement had been signed by the NLC, and that further injunctions 
might be taken out. This time, however, the signing was a fait 
accompli, and the injunctions did not materialise.
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In a letter to Mr. Viner, Dr. H.C. Coombs, a former chairman 
of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs, said 'no anthropologist or 
other person familiar with Aboriginal society believes that this is 
a voluntary decision of the Aboriginal people concerned or that they 
feel morally committed to what the document contains'(CT, 30.11.78).
In December 1978 an Australia-wide public opinion poll was 
taken, on the question of whether Aboriginal communites should have 
the right to refuse mining on their traditional land. The results 
(Table 7.10) show a substantial majority in favour of Aborigines 
having such a right. Although the question was not specific to 
uranium mining, it still appears reasonable to conclude that the 
pressure placed on the Aborigines by the government to allow uranium 
mining was applied against the weight of public opinion.
TABLE 7.9: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO ABORIGINAL POLICIES, 1979
Total Men Women University Primary ALP Liberal 
Educated Educated Voters Voters
Aboriginal (N=)2000 1003
communities should
have the right to
refuse mining on
their traditional
land*
Yes 58 55
No 38 43
Don't know 4 2
Aborigines should 
be:
Left to fit into the
Australian white
community at their
own pace 32 31
Encouraged and 
assisted to fit into 
the white Australian 
community as soon as 
possible 24 25
Encouraged and 
assisted to maintain 
their own way of 
life 41 42
Don't know 3 2
997
61
33
6
33
24
40
3
128
65
34
1
30
22
45
3
275
51
44
5
30
31
37
2
(Percentages rounded)
932
70
27
3
30
25
43
2
Source: Herald Survey, Sydney Morning Herald, January 2, 1979.
662
42
53
5
36
24
38
1
*wording abbreviated here.
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The preceding account needs little summing up. It seems very 
doubtful if processes of consultation of the NLC with traditional 
owners and affected communities fully conformed with the requirements 
of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 that the 
traditional Aboriginal owners *understand the nature and purpose of the 
proposed action and as a group consent to it' and that any affected 
Aboriginal community or group 'has been consulted and has had adequate 
opportunity to express its view to the Land Council' (s. 23(3)). This 
outcome was partly the result of government pressure which would not 
allow the Aborigines time to reach a decision in their own way and 
partly because the NLC's approach to consultation was a slipshod one.
With regard to the latter, one must note the great difficulties 
of consulting with geographically dispersed groups, across language 
barriers, presenting information about mining in a comprehensible 
form, and ensuring that the diffuse processes of Aboriginal consensus 
decisionmaking had been satisfied. The NLC was a white-style 
organisation trying to fit Aboriginal decisionmaking into a white 
institutional framework.
In summary, there was a retreat from the Woodward recommendations 
on at least two levels. First, because the Land Rights Act 
specifically exempted the Ranger project area from the requirement 
for Aboriginal consent which Woodward saw as essential to the reality 
of Aboriginal land rights, and second, because the processes of 
consultation with traditional owners and affected groups were 
inadequate.
We now turn to the subject of the consequences of mining and 
its ancillary activities for the Aborigines of the Region. In 
considering the implications for Aboriginal welfare if mining should 
proceed, the Inquiry was faced with at least three major and inter­
related problems. There was a need 'to restore the confidence and 
morale of Aboriginals living within the Region' (Second Report, 1977, 
p. 231) whether or not mining took place. There was a need to 
'reduce the excessive drinking of alcohol by the Aboriginal people' 
already prevalent in the Region. And there would be a need to 
ameliorate the adverse effects on Aboriginal welfare of the influx 
of whites which mining would bring. Clearly this was a tall order, 
since alcoholism and low morale among Aborigines are generally held
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to be the result of the pressures of white society, pressures which 
would inevitably be greatly increased by the advent of mining. The 
Inquiry referred to evidence to this effect, including that of the 
Laverton Joint Study Group concerning Aborigines and the new mining 
town of Laverton in Western Australia:
The disintegration of tribal rules particularly amongst 
fringe dwellers and transient Aborigines, and their 
inability to pass into the European society, save only 
as unwanted intruders, produces an immense strain which 
affects all but the most resourceful and resilient.
Frequent and extended escape from reality becomes to 
them not so much a desirable condition but a necessary 
state.(Second Report, 1977, p. 230).
Increased contact with white society increases both the pressures 
themselves and, generally speaking, the availability of alcohol with 
which to assuage them. Despite these problems, the Inquiry saw 'a 
unique opportunity to establish a program designed to reduce 
dependence on alcohol among the Aboriginal people in the Region.' 
(Second Report, 1977, p. 231). The gaining of Aboriginal title to 
land would be 'a considerable boost to morale'. The proposed 
national park would provide job opportunities and a degree of 
protection from European intrusion, and the mining town», at Jabiru 
would be a 'closed' one. The mining industry would also in due 
course be the source of large sums of money over which the Aborigines 
would have a large degree of control. The Inquiry also listed a 
number of proposals for limiting the consumption of alcohol, in part 
by favouring consumption on licenced premises and preventing the 
sale of bulk supplies of liquor to be taken onto Aboriginal land 
(Second Report, 1977, p. 232).
Here arose one of the few important failings of the Reports.
In relation to the physical impacts of mining on the environment, 
the Inquiry had provided specific institutional arrangements in the 
shape of the Supervising Scientist, the Coordinating Committee and 
the Research Institute for monitoring such impacts, developing 
standards and supervising their implementation. But in the case of 
social impacts no such provision was made.
Following the government's decision to allow mining to proceed, 
the NLC and others approached the government on the need for social
414
impact monitoring (e.g. H.C. Coombs, letter to Mr. Viner, 13.9.77).
The Minister in turn approached the Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
Studies (AIAS) which accepted the task, on a pathetically 
inadequate initial budget of $114,000 annually, which has not greatly 
increased (Tatz, 1982, p. 125). Compare the Supervising Scientist's 
staff level of more than 70 now approved and his annual budget of 
over $4 million.
The Uranium Impact Project within the Institute is at present 
engaged in producing a consolidated report and a series of monographs 
to mark the end of its initial 5-year project. Most of the information 
so far available from its six-monthly reports to the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs and other papers has been descriptive rather than 
quantitative, partly due to long delays in obtaining computer 
facilities. Because the Project only got under way at about the time 
the Ranger agreement was signed by the NLC, and given the problems 
of becoming acquainted with the area, the essential comparisons of 
the situation before and after mining could not be fully made. The 
following comments on the consequences of mining are made within 
these limitations.
There has been Aboriginal concern that food and water might be 
contaminated, but progress in meeting this concern has been poor. A 
symposium was convened by the Office of the Supervising Scientist on 
29 April 1982 in response to representations by the Northern Land 
Council, and a study group was formed, but the results have been 
limited and 'responsibility for monitoring possible contaminants in 
the Aboriginal diet and getting information about this matter out to 
Aboriginal people should be resolved once and for all'
(AIAS, 1983, p. 26).
There was a dispute in 1979 over the heavy use of the 
Nabarlek-Oenpelli-Cahil1's Crossing road by Queensland Mines. Groups 
of traditional owners revoked permits to enter Aboriginal Land and 
issued a writ to prevent Queensland Mines from using the road. In 
response the government proposed amendments to the Land Rights Act 
to ensure that agreements between Land Councils and mining companies 
could be enforced, and to protect such agreements from legal challenge 
by third parties. Counsel for the traditional owners did not proceed 
with the case on the ground that the Land Rights Act was to be 
changed. Ultimately Queensland Mines offered to reduce traffic
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volumes considerably, an offer apparently accepted by the two 
traditional owners most affected although not by some others. (For 
more detail see Tatz, 1982, pp. 140-142).
Employment and training of Aborigines directly by the mining 
companies or in supplying contracting and other services to them has 
not met the provisions of the Agreements between the mining companies 
and the NLC. This has in part been due to an unwillingness of some 
Aborigines to accept employment, or at least employment of the 
types offered (AIAS, 1983, p. 23). Jobs offered tend 
to be menial in nature, but there is a further factor involved in that 
Aboriginal traditional owners perceive that such jobs would make them 
into servants on their own land. As an AIAS report (1983, p. 39) 
puts it, ’why would the landlords want to be janitors?’
The flow of money in the form of ’up front' money and royalty 
payments to the Aborigines from mining operations has had a number of 
effects. The arrangements for distributing money are extremely 
complex and need not be fully detailed here. The Nabarlek and Ranger 
Agreements with the NLC differ considerably in their financial 
arrangements.
In the case of Ranger, 'up front' monies (lump sum payments 
distinct from royalties and paid largely before production commences) 
totalling $1,300,000 were paid to the NLC, which in accordance with 
s. 35(3) of the Land Rights Act paid them to the Gagudju Association, 
whose members are the adult land owners of the Kakadu Region.
Unlike the Ranger Agreement the Nabarlek Agreement made 
specific provisions for the distribution of 'up front' monies to be 
divided equally between traditional owners and affected communities. 
However, the arrangements as to who was included in these categories, 
and the proportions in which the money was to be distributed to 
different sub-groups within each category, went through a complex 
process of change. (See Kesteven, 1981, pp. 11-20 for details).
Royalties are handled differently from 'up front' monies. In 
accordance with sections 62-65 of the Land Rights Act, royalties are 
paid into the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account. Forty per cent is 
passed on to the three Land Councils on a population basis, 30 per cent 
to the Land Council for the affected area, and 30 per cent is available
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to Northern Territory communities for specific undertakings.
These arrangements have led to uncertainty, acrimony and 
stress. The first Nabarlek money was distributed well before the 
first Ranger money, and the amounts of Ranger money received by 
individuals were smaller because the number of recipients was much 
larger than in the case of Nabarlek. With Ranger, the timetabling 
of payments is complex and not understood by many recipients. Dates 
for payments are not fixed, but rather relate to certain stages in 
the authorisation and development of the mine. There was protracted 
wrangling over the distribution of the Nabarlek money and in one 
instance ’a handful of individuals, most of them not traditional 
owners of Wunyu Beach, made off with the lion's share of the Wunyu 
Beach money.' (Kesteven, 1981, p. 17). There were many other 
irregularities.
There is jealousy between recipients and non-recipients, and 
between recipients of different amounts. Uncertainty leads to stress 
because people have to spend disproportionate amounts of time 
ensuring that they receive their entitlement, and that others not 
entitled to receive money do not get it. Stress also results from 
insufficient understanding of the rules established by the white 
bureaucracy, and from the use of public meetings to clear up 
contentious issues, since 'to air publicly a person's claim to land 
is to shame them.' (Kesteven, 1981, p. 27).
That much of the money is received by individuals might be 
considered surprising. Kesteven (1981, p. 40) considers that 
Woodward did not intend this, and supplies a quote from his Reports 
which may or may not be read as supporting this view. Stephen Zorn 
however was quite emphatic that none of the revenue from mining 
projects would go to individual Aborigines (AFR, 11.8.78).
Von Sturmer (1982, p. 80) suggests that:
It might have been argued - with force - that 'up-front 
moneys' should have been much higher, guaranteeing a high 
level of initial capital to the associations, and 'tied' - 
that is, the purposes for which income was to be expended 
should have been carefully specified in advance. The 
latter would have been an interesting requirement for it 
would have demonstrated to everyone that agreement to the 
mining was not just a bowing to inexorable pressure but
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simply one component o f  a s o c i a l  s t r a t e g y ,  a 'development 
p a c k a g e ' , c a r e f u l y  des igned  and agreed to  by the  A bor ig ina l  
s o c i e t y  as a whole.  In s h o r t ,  i t  would have meant t h a t  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a s t r u c t u r e  with  c l e a r  g o a l s ,  
would have been a p r e - c o n d i t i o n  o f  the  agreements .  The 
mining would then  have been an enab l ing  mechanism, th e  
' f i n a n c i e r ' .  In r e a l i t y ,  th e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n s  were l a t e  
s t a r t e r s .  By th e  t ime they  got  o f f  the  ground,  much ( in  
th e  case  o f  N abar lek ,  most) o f  the  money had gone.
On th e  o t h e r  hand,  the  Gagudju A s s o c i a t i o n ,  u s ing  some o f  th e  money 
from Ranger, has o p e ra t e d  q u i t e  s u c c e s s f u l l y .  I t  purchased  v e h i c l e s  
f o r  o u t s t a t i o n s ,  bought th e  Cooinda Motor Inn and imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on a l c o h o l  s a l e s  to  i t s  members, e s t a b l i s h e d  a school  and a s s i s t e d  in 
o t h e r  community needs (Von S turmer ,  1982, p.  78),  and t h e r e  has been 
growing A b o r ig in a l  conf idence  in th e  A ss o c i a t i o n  (Kesteven,  1981, 
p. I D -
One o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  impacts  on A bor ig ina l  s o c i e t y  has been the  
p l e t h o r a  o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and b u r e a u c r a t s  fo rced  on i t  as  a d i r e c t  or  
i n d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  mining:
A bor ig ines  . . .  f r e q u e n t l y  complain o f  t h e  t i r e s o m e  
n a t u r e  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s :  t h e  amount o f  t ime the y  t a k e ,
the  way A b o r ig in e s '  s t a t e d  wishes never  heeded,  and t h e i r  
e x h a u s t in g  n a t u r e .  I t  i s  not  uncommon f o r  people t o  have 
spen t  two o r  t h r e e  days a t  a meet ing ,  and no t  have 
unde r s to o d  what went on (AIAS, 1983, p.  47 ) .
Or, as  Von Sturmer (1982,  p.  88) p u t s  i t :  "'No" answers a re
igno red  ( they  simply o cca s io n  a f u r t h e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n )  and s i l e n c e  i s  
r e g a rd e d  as a s s e n t . '
F u r th e r  e x p l o r a t i o n  l i c e n c e s  a r e  now be ing  sought in  th e  
Region,  and th e  AIAS (1983, p.  69) r e p o r t s  t h a t  ' t h e  
r e sp o n se  a t  O en p e l l i  to th e  news t h a t  i t  i s  going to  be n e c e s s a r y  
t o  n e g o t i a t e  w i th  mining companies w i th  r e s p e c t  to  e x p l o r a t i o n  has 
been one o f  d e s p e r a t i o n  a t  t h e r e  be ing  no end to  th e s e  p r e s s u r e s  and 
i n t r u s i o n s . '
R e l a t i o n s  between w hi te  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and A bor ig ines  p rov ide  
many o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  c u l t u r a l  m isunde rs t and ing .  Abor ig ines  tend  
to  r e l a t e  t o  p e o p le ,  no t  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  and so th e  f r e q u e n t  t u rn o v e r  
o f  p e rsonne l  in w hite  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  causes  obvious  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  On 
th e  o t h e r  hand A bor ig ina l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  charged with  han d l in g  money 
a r e  expec ted  to  behave l i k e  white  ones ,  keeping d e t a i l e d  reco rds  and
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maintaining office procedures.
White organisations tend 'to seek out people with traditional 
authority ... and think that they are bestowing power positions on them - 
in white terms - in accordance with their traditional positions.' But 
'there are no "chiefs" who assume responsibility in toto for a community 
or tribe,,' (AIAS, 1983, p„ 38). Aboriginal 'power brokers' arise who act 
as intermediaries with white society, but who often have little 
independent standing in their own communities. Whites may wrongly assume 
that such brokers are acting unselfishly as representatives of their 
community (Von Sturmer, 1982, pp„ 92-99 examines 'brokers' in more detail).
The foregoing has barely touched the edges of the multi-faceted 
problem of the relationship between Aborigines and uranium mining. The 
purpose has been only to show that Aborigines are being affected by 
mining in some ways which are beyond their capacity to control; and that, 
as in other areas of uranium policy, there has been a retreat from some of 
the undertakings of the government in its 1977 Ministerial Statements and 
the recommendations of the Ranger Inquiry and the Woodward Commission.
In 1977 the Prime Minister said 'the government must be satisfied 
as to the acceptability of the development ... on the Aboriginal people' 
(Fraser, 1977b, p„ 7). But the government has not devoted sufficient
f
resources to be in a position to know what the impact of the development 
on Aborigines has been. The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (Viner,
1977, p. 44) said that 'the government's decision to accept all these 
[Ranger Inquiry] recommendations will ensure that the Aboriginals (sic) 
themselves can exercise effective controls over their own interests.'
This is not a claim that the Ranger Inquiry would have made about its 
own recommendations, and events, including the pressure exerted by the 
government on the NLC during the Ranger negotiations, have shown the 
claim to be wrong,, But even at the time it was made the statement 
simply glossed over the differences between Aboriginal and white 
societies which make the exercise of control by Aborigines over their 
own interests so difficult. And it failed to comprehend the inequality 
of the relationship between the weight and variety of pressures which 
mining would bring and the limited capacity of Aboriginal society to 
deal with such pressures in addition to those which it already faces.
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OTHER INFLUENCES
The following briefly reviews the respective roles of the media 
and the parliament concerning uranium policy. The Australian media 
are tightly controlled, mainly by four major groups (Symonds, 1981). 
There is therefore potential for both deliberate and unplanned bias 
in the presentation of news and comment. In the broadest sense, it 
may be argued that if by biased coverage the media contributed to the 
downfall of the Whit lam government, then the media indirectly 
influenced uranium policy by helping to install a government more 
strongly committed to the mining and export of uranium. A study of 
three major Melbourne newspapers (the Age, the Sun and the Herald) 
plus the national daily, the Australian, throughout the 1975 Federal 
election campaign concluded that these newspapers, and particularly 
the Australian, showed serious bias against the Labor Party during 
the campaign (Edgar and Smith, 1979). The study was based on measure­
ment and analysis by a research team of space allocated to news and 
comment favourable, unfavourable and neutral with respect to each 
major party throughout the campaign. This was supplemented by a more 
detailed study of the space and placement allocated to major campaign 
issues in the Sun and the Age.
To investigate thoroughly the question of media bias concerning 
uranium it would be desirable, given the resources, to carry out a 
survey similar to the above of coverage by print and electronic media 
during the uranium debate. (The latter medium unfortunately not 
being available in retrospect). Short of such a study, one can 
provide a selective review of media treatment of the issue, as have 
Craney (1980, pp. 244-255), Houghton (1981) and Torbett (1981), an 
approach which is open to the charge of biased selection of instances.
Here, comment will be confined largely to press reaction to one 
event, the release of the Inquiry's First Report; but most of the major 
daily newspapers will be examined. Because of its significance, this 
event tended to bring out the underlying attitudes of the media to 
uranium mining and export.
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A review of seven morning and three evening newspapers throughout 
Australia following the release of the First Report showed overwhelming 
support for uranium mining and export. In their front page news the 
seven morning newspapers all interpreted the Report as giving 
qualified approval to mining and export. (The evening newspapers 
confined themselves to follow-up stories). Similarly all the 
editorials, with the exception of a neutrally-worded comment in the Age, 
favoured mining and export with appropriate safeguards (Table 7.11).
The newspapers were noteworthy for their misreporting of the 
Inquiry’s findings. The Inquiry did not give uranium mining and 
export a ’green light in principle', ’a cautious yes' or an 'OK with 
provisos'. Such interpretations were in nearly all cases supported 
by selective emphasis on certain of the Inquiry's conclusions.
Almost uniformly, the Inquiry's first two findings, that the hazards 
of mining and milling uranium and of operating nuclear reactors, if 
properly controlled, are not such as to justify a decision not to 
mine and sell uranium, were given great prominence. In some'cases they 
were quoted as 'the conclusion' of the Inquiry (SMH, 30.10.76), or 
as its 'principal recommendation' (CT, 29.10.76). The third finding, 
however, that 'The nuclear power industry is unintentionally 
contributing to an increased risk of nuclear war. This is the most 
serious hazard associated with the industry ... the questions involved 
are of such importance that they should be resolved by parliament'
(First Report, 1976, p. 185) was almost universally relegated to a 
position well down in the news, and was generally disregarded when 
interpreting the Inquiry's findings as 'a go-ahead'. The papers also 
tended to think that the Inquiry believed that the 'risks, hazards 
and dangers ... can be overcome' (News, 29.10.76).
The Commissioners were unhappy with the way in which their 
findings were reported. On releasing the Second Report, the Presiding 
Commissioner said 'it does not lend itself to green and red light 
reporting any more than did the first report' (Craney, 1980, p. 245).
It must be said, however, that the Commissioners were not entirely
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TABLE 7.10. PRESS REPORTAGE AND EDITORIAL COMMENT ON RANGER FIRST
REPORT
(Headlines or selected comments, 29-30.10.1976)
Morning newspapers
The Age
news: 'Uranium - Cautious Yes.'
editorial: 'Amber Light on Uranium.'
Positive or negative 
towards uranium 
mining and export
mildly positive 
neutral
The Australian
news: 'Uranium Gets a Yes - with a But.'
editorial: 'As-You-Were on Uranium.'
The Canberra Times
news: 'No Case for Ban.'
editorial: 'A Sensible Beginning.'
positive
positive
positive
positive
The Sydney Morning Herald
news: 'Way Open for Uranium Sale.'
editorial: '... The conclusion ... will
no doubt be welcome to miners 
and politicians of all shades.'
positive 
mildly positive
The Advertiser
news: 'Uranium OK, with Provisos.' positive
editorial: 'A Pale Green Light.' positive
The West Australian
news: 'Fox Study Backs Mining of
Uranium.'
editorial: '... the report can be said
to give the go-ahead to 
uranium mining.'
The Courier-Mail
news: 'Mine Uranium - With Checks.'
editorial: '... approval ... but with
strings attached - is a 
common sense decision.'
positive 
mildly positive
positive
positive
422
TABLE 7.1Ü Continued. 
Evening newspapers
The News
news: 'Shares Leap: Uranium Boom.'
editorial: cautious need for
uranium mining ... we would 
be open to charges of 
selfishness by withholding 
supplies.'
The Mirror
news: 'Mini-Boom in Mining Shares.'
editorial: no editorial comment.
The Sun (Sydney)
news: 'Atomic Prices for Our Uranium.'
editorial: '... The Fox Report makes
out a cautious case for 
mining Australian uranium ...
Positive or negative 
towards uranium 
mining and export
positive
positive
positive
positive 
mildly positive
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blameless in this matter. They might have anticipated that a 
necessarily hasty reading of the Report, by journalists with deadlines 
to meet, and who would have been looking for a recommendation one way 
or the other, would result in the kind of interpretation which 
eventuated. Greater prominence in the Report could have been given to 
the statement made in the text of the concluding chapter, '... we 
have not found a compelling basis for a conclusion on the question 
whether it is preferable to delay coming to a decision about mining 
for a period of several years or alternatively to proceed with 
carefully planned development of the industry' (First Report, 1976, 
p. 181).
Conservationists attempted to redress the balance of the media 
reports, but the efforts were given little prominence. For example, 
'anti-nuclear organisations say Report did not give the green light', 
on page 24 of the Courier-Mail (30.10.76).
Editorial writers put forward a variety of reasons for supporting 
the export of uranium, some of which ignored the Inquiry's findings.
'To withhold Australia's 15 per cent share of the world's available 
uranium would make no difference to nuclear development' and 'uranium 
would give Australia's export earnings a welcome lift' (Sun, ^9.10.76). 
'Australia has about 30 percent of the free world's uranium resources 
and in an energy-hungry world cannot afford to leave them in the ground' 
(CM, 29.10.76). Most editorials did, however, recognise the need for 
tight controls on mining and export.
Press coverage during the whole of the uranium debate was not as 
badly balanced as the preceding examples would indicate. There was a 
notable lack of reporting on the day-to-day proceedings of the Inquiry, 
except where personalities were involved; such as the implied disagreement 
between the Presiding Commissioner and the government as to the 
termination of the Inquiry. But many articles by both protagonists and 
antagonists of uranium mining were run, as well as feature articles 
which canvassed both sides of the question. Nevertheless, editorials and 
comment were generally pro-mining, and overall there was certainly a 
media bias in favour of uranium mining and export (Craney, 1980, pp. 244- 
255, Houghton, 1981, and Torbett, 1981, reach a similar conclusion).
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Other than indirectly, through the Senate’s withholding of 
Supply leading to the dismissal of the Whit lam government, parliament 
as a whole had little effect on uranium policy. Parliament followed, 
rather than led, the evolution of each party's policy on the issue. 
Connor, Labor's Minister for Minerals and Energy,said little about 
uranium in parliament, and Opposition attacks on his secretiveness and 
lack of stated policy (Parliamentary Debates, 2.10.74, p.2057) may 
have helped to augment some unease within the Labor Party on these 
matters. During the period of Labor government, however, despite 
growing opposition to uranium mining within the ALP, both major 
political parties were still in favour of mining, and disagreement was 
largely on timing and method. Towards the end of Labor's time in office, 
the Opposition's priorities were with other matters such as the loans 
affair and economic management.
The Inquiry's First and Second Reports both called for public 
and parliamentary debate before decisions were made on uranium. The 
government initially seemed unenthusiastic about such debate. On 
30 November 1976, a month after the release of the First Report, there 
was a debate on uranium of only about two hours' duration, during 
which Mr. Chipp asserted that the uranium issue was the most important
f
since the Vietnam war, and drew attention to the absence of the Prime 
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and all but two Ministers 
(Parliamentary Debates, 30.11.76, p.2984). Similarly poor attendance 
usually occurred in subsequent debates (e.g. Parliamentary Debates,
29.3.77, p .663).
On 24 May 1977, just before the release of the Second Report, 
the Prime Minister made a parliamentary statement of government policy 
on nuclear safeguards, clearly indicating (if any further indications 
were needed) what the government's decision on uranium would be. In 
the course of his reply, Uren argued that parliamentary debates were 
no substitute for full public participation (Parliamentary Debates,
24.5.77, p.1705).
Three months after release of the Second Report, the government 
presented a major policy package in parliament in support of its 
decision to allow uranium mining and export. A lengthy debate then 
finally ensued, in which 56 Members took part (Wood, undated). The 
standard of debate, however, rapidly fell away. Towards the end of
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the debate the Labor Party, with less than half the numbers of the 
LNCP in the House, had difficulty mustering further speakers, and 
it was alleged that the government was deliberately prolonging the 
debate to embarrass the Opposition.
In general, the Labor Party was unable to develop the uranium 
issue as a major means of attacking the government in parliament.
The government avoided trouble by at least paying lip service to 
awaiting the Inquiry's recommendations. But at the same time, the 
conditioning carried out by Anthony and Fraser meant that the decision 
to allow mining and export was thoroughly expected. Given that 
decision, the policy package announced by the government appeared to 
be a responsible one, accepting most of the recommendations of the 
Inquiry.
Also, public opinion still showed larger, although declining, 
numbers in favour of uranium mining than against it, so the issue was 
not one where the Labor Party could play to a gallery of majority 
public support. And the ALP was itself somewhat vulnerable on the 
issue, because of divisions within the Party and because its change 
of stance on uranium left it open to charges of inconsistency. There 
were also persistent qualms as to the political and practical 
difficulties which the ALP would have to face in putting a stop to 
uranium mining if it was returned to office.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
External influences
The course of Australia's uranium policy illustrates the 
argument in Chapter Three concerning the strength of external 
influences in affecting national policies and restricting the latitude 
of governments to make independent policy changes. At the broadest 
level the demand for uranium was created by factors almost entirely 
beyond Australia's control: a combination of the characteristics of
industrial society, nuclear technology and institutions fostered the 
growth of the nuclear power industry and attracted the support of 
governments for it.
Turning to the more specific policy influences, changes in the 
market for uranium during the 1970's had major effects on Australian
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uranium policy. Uranium prices rose rapidly between 1972 and 1976, 
and declined almost as rapidly between 1977 and 1981. The price rise 
exceeded that which could be explained in terms of actual supply and 
demand. Other contributing factors included the effects of the 1973 
oil crisis, the delay in the introduction of spent fuel reprocessing, 
the change in 1973 to a longer-term enrichment contracting policy by 
the U.S. AEC, and the activities of the uranium cartel.
By the late 1970's, however, most of these factors were no 
longer effective. A number of influences, including the recession, 
rising construction costs of nuclear power stations, the Three Mile 
Island incident in 1979 and the activities of the anti-nuclear 
movement, had slowed the growth of nuclear power, particularly in the 
U.S. Production, which had risen in response to earlier price rises, 
began to outstrip demand, and prices fell.
The low uranium prices prevailing when the Whitlam government 
took office led to its policy of leaving uranium in the ground in 
anticipation of future price rises. The rapid price increases after 
1973 lent force to the efforts of the Fraser government and the 
mining companies to mine and export uranium. However, both, the 
government and the mining companies persisted with high estimates of 
uranium demand despite growing indications to the contrary. As will 
be discussed subsequently, declining demand contributed to a softening 
in Australia's safeguards requirements.
As well as the effects of overall uranium supply and demand, 
Australia's uranium policy has been strongly influenced by the wider 
pattern of international institutions and diplomatic and trading 
relations. Despite the marked slowdown in the growth of nuclear power, 
it remained an established major industry, and in a number of 
countries still a growing one, with strong links with governments, a 
central role in many national energy policies, and extensive inter­
national ramifications. Pressures on Australia to sell its uranium 
included the Carter non-proliferation policy, linked with Australia's 
'special relationship' with the U.S.; Australia's obligations under 
international treaties; the willingness of other countries to sell 
uranium, often with less adequate safeguards than those proposed by 
Australia; and concern as to the likely adverse effects of any refusal
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to sell on Australia's relations with important trading partners. 
Certainly there were also strong arguments for not exporting uranium. 
But looked at in terms of the balance of international political and 
economic pressures on Australia, rather than as a question of the 
balance of moral arguments, by far the greater weight was on the side 
of exporting uranium.
Internal influences
Those within the ALP opposed to uranium mining and export have 
not been able to bring about a Party policy preventing it while the 
ALP has been in Federal office. Despite increasing opposition to 
uranium mining and export during the life of the Whit lam government, 
a policy opposing it was not adopted until the 1977 ALP National 
Conference. At the 1982 Conference, the policy was amended 
sufficiently for the Hawke government elected in 1983 to be able to 
claim that its approvals for the Roxby Downs project and for new 
contracts for the Ranger mine are consistent with the Party's platform. 
Support for an anti-uranium policy among the rank and file of the 
party has been considerably stronger than among the Party's leaders.
f
The Ranger Inquiry, established by the ALP in 1975, was wide- 
ranging and thorough. It made many recommendations concerning the 
regional impacts of uranium mining and the possible dangers associated 
with the nuclear power industry. But it did not 'find a compelling 
basis for a conclusion on the question whether it is preferable to 
delay coming to a decision about mining for a period of several years 
or alternatively to proceed with carefully planned development of 
the industry' (First Report, 1976, p. 181). Nevertheless, by setting 
out clearly the hazards of the nuclear power industry it seems likely 
to have contributed to increasing the numbers of the public opposed to 
uranium mining and export, and it certainly had such an effect within 
the ALP.
The only political party clearly opposed to uranium mining and 
export has been the minority Australian Democrats. The parliament as 
a whole, as distinct from the governing party and its cabinet, had 
little effect on uranium policy, illustrating the comments in Chapter 
Three as to the limited role of the parliament in influencing specific 
policies in most circumstances.
Like the ALP, the trade union movement has been divided on the 
uranium issue. Bans on uranium mining and export were recommended at 
the 1977 and 1978 ACTU Congresses, but these could not be effectively 
implemented. Many of the unions involved with the uranium industry 
have refused to implement bans, and some unions in favour of the bans 
have not acted against members working in the industry. Contributing 
factors have been high unemployment and competition between unions for 
coverage of the workers involved.
Anti-uranium groups were numerous but somewhat fragmented, with 
very limited funds and little access to LNCP governments. Their main 
potential source of support in the bureaucracy, the Department of 
Environment, Housing and Community Development, was not influential.
The anti-uranium groups overlapped with the environmental movement but 
did not coincide with it. Although the bulk of the environmental 
movement was opposed to the mining and export of uranium, the proportion 
of their resources which they committed to the issue varied greatly 
between groups. Some, such as MAUM, were single-issue organisations, and 
some members of the multi-issue organisations such as the ACF were very 
active in opposition to uranium. Many environmental groups, however, 
did not give the issue a high priority in their own activities, although 
to some extent this was because anti-uranium views could be expressed 
through overlapping individual or organisational membership in the 
more strongly anti-uranium groups. Nevertheless, the movement was 
greatly assisted by the example of the anti-nuclear movement overseas, 
and by the slowdown in growth of the nuclear power industry. The 
movement played a large part in delaying mining for several years, and 
in bringing about substantial increases in the proportion of the public 
opposed to uranium mining and export and in the level of provisions for 
safeguards and environmental protection in government policy. But the 
anti-uranium movement has not been able to generate the degree of 
sustained support necessary to bring about government policy opposed 
to uranium mining. Nor, under the LNCP government, was this likely.
The movement eventually grew somewhat disheartened by the Fraser 
government's inflexible desire to proceed with uranium mining and 
export, and more so by the commencement of mining.
Allowing for their various idiosyncracies, the public opinion 
polls showed a considerable decline from mid-1975 to late 1977 in the
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numbers supporting uranium mining and export, although they continued 
to outnumber those who opposed it. The decline in support was evident 
in most age groups and occupational categories, but was confined to 
ALP voters, with LNCP voters' views in aggregate remaining virtually 
unchanged over the period.
The uranium mining companies had the active support of the 
influential mining industry lobby with its international affiliations. 
Although the mining industry and the Commonwealth LNCP government had 
their differences, the general similarity of their ideologies, and 
the potential economic importance of uranium mining, meant that the 
uranium mining companies had good access to both State and Commonwealth 
LNCP governments. Only New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania 
had Labor governments at that time. In particular, the major mining 
States of Western Australia and Queensland, and the Northern Territory 
government, where uranium mining would mean a large expansion of 
income, strongly supported uranium development.
The mining companies also had substantial contacts and support 
within relevant government agencies, notably the pro-uranium Department 
of Trade and Resources under the Commonwealth government's most vocal
4Tadvocate of uranium mining, Mr. Anthony. Another strong source of 
support was the AAEC, together with a group of nuclear scientists 
associated with it; illustrating the disposition noted in Chapter 
Three of such organisations and their staff to become strong advocates 
of their technology. Press coverage also appeared to be biased in 
favour of uranium mining and export in its reporting as well as its 
editorial comment, providing an example of the tendency towards a 
conservative bias in the media discussed in Chapter Three.
Despite delaying the announcement of its decision until after 
the Ranger Inquiry, it was clear that the Fraser government would 
approve the mining and export of uranium. Members of government made 
every effort, short of announcing the decision, to condition the public 
for it by publicising the benefits of uranium development. The 
government's rationale had evolved from an earlier preoccupation with 
economic benefits to a concern with strengthening Australia's voice in 
moves against nuclear weapons proliferation and providing energy to 
'an energy-deficient world.'
In its August 1977 uranium policy statements following the 
publication of the Inquiry's Second Report, the government initially 
accepted a high proportion of the Inquiry's recommendations. But 
there were important exceptions. For example the government did not 
accept the recommendation for the sequential development of mines, and 
it was far more optimistic about the safe disposal of highly radio­
active waste and the adequacy of safeguards against nuclear prolifera­
tion. In some instances the government ignored findings unfavourable 
to its case, such as those on the 'energy crisis'.
In accordance with the recommendations of the Inquiry, the 
government initially proposed strict safeguards requirements for the 
sale of Australian uranium. Despite its stated purpose of selling 
uranium only to help reduce nuclear proliferation, the government's 
actions in making a series of concessions on its safeguards requirements 
indicated that such considerations were secondary to achieving sales 
of uranium, together with the increased international political and 
trade influence which it hoped such sales would bring.
As recommended by the Inquiry, the government provided for the 
appointment of a Supervising Scientist to carry out research and
f
develop standards for the protection of the environment from the 
effects of uranium mining in the Alligator Rivers Region. There have 
been a few cases of non-compliance by mining companies with environ­
mental regulations, and there have been some problems in liaison 
between the Supervising Scientist and the Northern Territory authori­
ties responsible for issuing environmental regulations and ensuring 
compliance. But overall the provisions for environmental regulation 
have been satisfactory, if cumbersome.
The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
exempted the Ranger project from the Act's general requirement for 
Aboriginal consent to any mining on their land. The government, at 
that time still a principal in Ranger through the AAEC, placed pressure 
on the NLC to reach agreement on terms and conditions for mining.
This led to the short-circuiting of the consultative processes between 
the NLC and Aborigines affected by the mine.
The Inquiry's recommendations, and subsequently the government, 
made insufficient provision for monitoring the social impacts of mining.
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ln terms of its 1977 policy statements, the government has not been in 
a position to gauge the 'acceptability' of the effects of uranium 
mining on Aboriginal society, and Aborigines have not been able to 
exercise 'effective controls over their own interests.'
In summary, while the LNCP government accepted most of the 
recommendations of the Inquiry, there were some important exceptions, 
and in implementation there was a retreat from many of the government's 
1977 undertakings. Nevertheless, the Inquiry greatly improved the 
quality of decisionmaking on the issue. It provided a means of 
eliciting and analysing information about the various aspects of 
uranium mining and export in an open forum, at the same time involving 
and informing the public. It placed contending interests in the 
position of having to express their arguments in terms of the public 
interest.
The public inquiry process, however, involves costs, not only 
those of the inquiry itself, but in terms of project delays and 
sales foregone. Such inquiries are also liable to present findings 
which are not in accordance with the interests of government. It was 
clear that the LNCP government was unhappy with the existence of the 
Inquiry, a legacy of the Whitlam government, and with the delays of 
the commencement of mining which the Inquiry entailed. No further 
environmental inquiries under the Act have been held.
The propositions
This chapter has examined the composition, activities and 
comparative influence on uranium policy of the pro- and anti-uranium 
interests within Australia; the influence of external factors on 
Australia's uranium policy; the implementation of uranium policy by 
the Fraser government; and the role of the Ranger Inquiry and the 
extent to which its recommendations were implemented.
As previously noted, each chapter is intended to emphasise 
somewhat different aspects of the determinants of public policy, 
with the intention of drawing on both the literature review of Part 
One and the case studies of Part Two to draw conclusions about the 
determinants of public policy. Some of the implications of the
432
present case study are more usefully addressed in the context of 
such a review, which is carried out in the next and final chapter. 
However, it may be helpful to conclude this chapter by considering 
some of the propositions put forward in Chapter One in the light of 
the preceding case study.
It is convenient first to consider proposition three, concerning 
the significant pattern of important variables and linkages between 
them which, it is suggested, is a major factor in determining the 
character of public policy. The case study provides an illustration 
of this pattern, in the form of the nature and linkages of the major 
influences, both inside and outside Australia, which directly or 
indirectly helped bring about the mining and export of Australian 
uranium.
Externally, such a pattern is evident in the factors which have 
combined to create the growth and political influence of the nuclear 
power industry. Underlying the demand for nuclear power was the 
driving force of industrial economies, with their high energy demands, 
together with the ambitions of developing economies seeking the 
stimulus of increased energy supplies. The early development of the 
technology was greatly accelerated by its relationship with nuclear 
weapons technology, a relationship which has attracted a number of 
countries seeking the basis for a nuclear weapons capability.
Nuclear power also met the desire of governments to diversify their 
energy sources; and with spent fuel reprocessing and the future 
prospect of fast-breeder reactors, it promised a greater degree of 
national self-reliance in energy resources. Nuclear power shared the 
prestige, and the optimism about the likelihood of future improvements 
and increased benefits, which attaches to advanced technologies.
Because it is advanced, complex, and costly, the nuclear power 
industry is controlled by large corporate and government organisations. 
These organisations have inevitably developed linkages and common 
interests so that the government agencies have tended to become 
advocates for the industry. This, together with the perceived economic 
and political benefits of nuclear power, has contributed to the strong 
support for the industry by governments, extending in many instances to 
economic subsidies, and at times to repression of anti-nuclear
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activities. The complexity of the technology, and the secrecy 
attached to it, has made public understanding of the issues and 
involvement in decisionmaking more difficult. Consequently the 
industry has been able to develop with only belated public recognition 
of its risks and hidden costs, and with limited public control.
Thus the characteristics of nuclear power technology linked with 
the energy demands of industrialised or industrialising economies, 
the economic and political objectives of governments, and control by 
large organisations, to assist the growth of the industry. The 
result, for Australia, was that in developing its uranium policy, 
it was presented with the reality of a nuclear power industry well- 
established in many countries, usually with substantial government 
support and involvement. The industry had become part of the 
broader pattern of international commercial and diplomatic relation­
ships, and had generated international institutions for its promotion 
and control.
Such a situation provided substantial incentives for Australia 
to sell its uranium, over and above the potential income for such 
sales. Mr. Anthony's claims in 1976 that the sale of uranium would 
give Australia 'tremendous influence around the world' were highly 
exaggerated. But given the still healthy demand for uranium at that 
time, it appeared that to a degree such benefits would result.
Further, the negative effects which withholding uranium on moral 
grounds might have on Australia's relationships with those countries 
wishing to purchase it, or otherwise committed to the development of a 
nuclear power industry, could not be discounted. And while refusal 
to sell uranium would undoubtedly provide considerable symbolic support 
for the anti-nuclear movement, it would have a negligible direct 
effect on the industry, since there were other suppliers willing to 
sell. It also seemed likely that Australia's influence on the inter­
national institutions responsible for regulating the industry would 
be increased by its active participation in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Thus forces external to Australia had contributed to the growth 
and institutionalisation of the nuclear power industry to a point 
where Australia entangled in a web of international, commercial, 
diplomatic and institutional linkages which favoured the export of 
Australian uranium.
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Within Australia, there was a strong grouping of pro-uranium 
forces. The uranium mining companies had the assistance of the 
strong mining industry lobby, with its established access to State and 
Commonwealth LNCP governments, and the support of influential sections 
of the bureaucracy, together with the AAEC and the bulk of the media. 
Centrally, uranium mining and export had the strong and individual 
support of the Liberal and National Country Parties at State and 
Federal levels.
The strength of the Commonwealth LNCP government’s commitment 
to uranium mining and export was not conveyed by its public statements 
following the Inquiry. The government adopted a fairly moderate 
public position which became increasingly at odds with its subsequent 
actions. As has been shown, the government sidestepped some important 
conclusions of the Inquiry concerning the disposal of high level waste 
and the inadequacies of international safeguards arrangements which 
would have weakened its case; it acted virtually as a proxy for the 
mining companies in pressuring the NLC to reach agreement on mining, 
and it diluted its safeguards requirements to obtain sales of uranium. 
As demand for uranium fell, it became clear that the government’s prime 
motivation was not to supply 'essential sources of energy' or to 
reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, as claimed in its 1977 
policy statements, but to establish Australia as a supplier on the 
international uranium market.
Underlying community values were also predominantly in favour of 
the pro-uranium interests. The Presiding Commissioner of the Inquiry 
recognised the significance of values in influencing decisionmaking 
on the uranium issue, in seeking to adopt, as a basis for the Inquiry, 
accepted community standards and values. In pursuing public support 
the anti-uranium movement in Australia started with a considerable 
handicap in the form of the general predisposition in public values 
in favour of mining and economic development. This broad value 
position appeared to underlie the large majorities of the public in 
favour of uranium mining and export in polls taken in the early stages 
of the debate, since the public was not then well informed as to the 
specific issues. The subsequent decline in the size of the pro­
uranium majority represented the erosion of prevailing values by both 
the spread of information about the risks and problems of the nuclear
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power industry and the simultaneous promotion of a different set of 
values. However, there remained a substantial gap between the 
proportion of the public supporting uranium mining and export and 
those opposed to it.
The issue illustrates the capacity of governments under 
favourable conditions to ride out and reverse, rather than follow, 
trends in public opinion. After the commencement of mining the level 
of activity of the anti-uranium movement decreased and the proportion 
of the public opposed to uranium mining and export declined.
The preceding review has indicated the way in which the relation­
ships between the energy demands of industrial society, the 
characteristics of nuclear power technology, its control by large 
organisations, and the desire of governments for increased energy 
security, contributed to the growth and influence of the nuclear 
power industry. It has shown how the industry became part of the 
economic, political and institutional linkages between nations, and 
the incentives which this provided for Australia to sell its uranium; 
and it has shown the strong grouping of pro-uranium interests within 
Australia.
f
The case study has therefore demonstrated, in terms of proposi­
tion three, the pattern of important variables and linkages between 
them, both inside and outside Australia, which brought about its 
decision to mine and export uranium. At the same time it has shown, 
in relation to proposition four, how the characteristics of the 
pattern of variables and their mutually reinforcing linkages success­
fully resisted the change sought by the anti-uranium movement in 
Australia. The movement was faced with not only the pro-uranium 
interests within Australia, but the external inducements for Australia 
to sell its uranium, arising from the established position of the 
industry as an energy supplier and as part of the pattern of 
international trade and intergovernmental relationships. Overseas, 
the same linkages between technology, governments and corporations 
which accelerated the growth of the industry reinforced its resistance 
to the anti-nuclar movement. Once established, the industry represen­
ted to governments a commitment of political as well as financial
resources.
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Another vector for change was the Inquiry itself. The Act under 
which the Inquiry was instituted seeks to bring about change in a 
number of ways, as discussed in Chapter One. One such change is 
embodied in its objective of ensuring that matters affecting the 
environment are fully considered and taken into account in decision­
making. A further, implied change which it seeks is that as a result 
of the increased consideration of environmental consequences, the 
quality of decisions will improve.
There is no doubt that the Inquiry, together with public 
interest, was successful in ensuring that the decisionmakers considered 
the environmental consequences of uranium mining and export, or that 
the government's decisionmaking was improved as a result. However, 
the extent of such improvement was limited by the predominant pattern 
of policy influences which affected the policy process as a whole.
For example, as discussed, the Inquiry felt constrained to adopt 
prevailing community values; the significance of the Inquiry's 
deliberations on the principal question was lessened because it was 
virtually certain what the government's decision would be; and many 
of the Inquiry's recommendations were whittled away during implementa­
tion.
Therefore, although the Inquiry was the fullest possible 
expression of a set of procedures designed to ensure that decision­
makers took environmental consequences into account, its effect on 
decisionmaking was restricted by the realities of the surrounding 
society and its policy process. The lack of effectiveness of the EIA 
requirement in Australia often tends to be explained in terms of 
weaknesses in the legislation itself; but the experience of the 
Inquiry suggests that such weaknesses are only a manifestation of the 
underlying problems. This point will be taken up in the final chapter.
The preceding review has also shown the important policy influence 
of the 'environmental' variables, as suggested in proposition one.
The role of prevailing values in the uranium policy process in 
Australia has been discussed, and the importance of economic variables 
in the case needs no further comment. The study has shown the 
pervasive policy influence of the characteristics of nuclear power 
technology. Although nuclear power technology, because of its special
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attributes, may be an extreme example of the effect of the relevant 
technology on a policy issue, given the ubiquity of technology and 
technological change, most policy areas are affected to a degree by 
similar considerations.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC POLICY
There's always a prevailing mystique in any civilization ...
It builds itself as a barrier against change, and that always 
leaves future generations unprepared for the universe's treachery. 
All mystiques are the same in building these barriers - the 
religious mystique, the hero-leader mystique, the messiah 
mystique, the mystique of science/technology, and the mystique 
of nature itself. (Herbert, 1976, p. 377)
At the outset of this thesis it was proposed to pursue generalisa­
tions concerning the determinants of public policy. Part One put forward 
a range of such generalisations and described some major relationships 
between policy-influential variables. This chapter draws on Part One, 
on the illustrations provided by the case studies of Part Two, and on 
some additional material in order to present a more complete picture, 
and in particular to support the view that a pattern of important policy 
influences and linkages can be discerned which is central in determining 
the nature of public policy. The contribution of these conclusions to 
explaining the experience with EIA policy in Australia is then 
summarised. The final section of the chapter makes some normative 
recommendations concerning EIA policy.
#
Where material for which references have been given in previous 
chapters is merely summarised here, rather than elaborated, the 
references will generally not be repeated.
The importance of external influences
In the course of the literature review in Part One it was suggested 
that the network of external relationships of nations binds them to 
international political and economic systems and reduces their capacity 
for unilateral change.
The long period of economic prosperity in industrialised countries 
up to the early 1970's was favourable for an upsurge of interest in 
quality of life issues. Environmental and anti-nuclear movements over­
seas stimulated similar concerns in Australia. The Whitlam Labor 
government was elected in 1972 on a platform of social and environmental 
reforms. The EIA concept was adopted in modified form from the U.S. and 
embodied in Commonwealth legislation in 1974. Concern with quality of 
life in major cities led to proposed new urban developments including 
Monarto. These also had antecedents in the British new towns.
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The world recession contributed both directly, by restricting 
government finances, and indirectly, by helping the Fraser government 
into office, to that government's reductions in environmental programmes 
and EIA, and to its effective termination of the Monarto project by 
withholding Federal funding. The recession also provided a setback for 
the environmental movement as job creation took on a higher priority 
as against environmental concerns.
A combination of factors, including the anti-nuclear movement, the 
recession, the Three Mile Island incident, and rising costs of reactor 
construction, slowed the projected growth of nuclear power generation, 
particularly in the U.S., leading to marked reductions in uranium demand.
Nonetheless, the Carter non-proliferation policy and Australia’s 
'special relationship' with the U.S., its participation in relevant 
international treaties, the possible reduction in proliferation risks by 
selling Australian uranium subject to stricter safeguards than other 
suppliers, a supposed need for uranium to meet a world energy shortage, 
fears of a loss of international business confidence in Australia if 
uranium was withheld - all were external pressures and arguments of 
varying degrees of force and reality for selling Australian uranium.
Further, given the continuation of nuclear power programmes in many
f
countries, and the plentiful availability of uranium from other suppliers, 
it seemed that any decision by Australia not to supply would have a 
negligible effect on the nuclear industry. And whatever the grass-roots 
strength of the international anti-nuclear movement, at government level 
a decision not to supply would have placed Australia at odds with the 
policies of most nations, and particularly those with which it has the 
closest diplomatic and trading ties.
In all these important ways and more, the national policies in 
question were affected by external forces. It is becoming increasingly 
necessary not to conceive of national borders as significant boundaries 
for, or barriers to, influences on national policy.
The technological bias
In creating new products, technology generates new demands and 
economic growth. By providing technological responses to many human 
needs, technology promotes faith in its capacity to solve future problems. 
In this way, technology creates a bias in its favour in public attitudes.
In Part One it was argued that although new technology is to some 
extent self-generating, its development and use is largely controlled
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by the corporate sector together with some government agencies. These 
organisations benefit from their technology and become advocates of it. 
Where corporations and government agencies share a common technology 
they tend to form close links. In such cases their influence on government 
in favour of their technology is likely to be strong. Given corporate and 
government agency advocacy and favourable public attitudes, government 
policy will tend to be biased in favour of technology. Since large 
organisations favour large-scale, mainstream technology, the introduction 
of alternative technology will be made more difficult.
In Australia the CITCA Report discussed in Chapter Four exemplified 
an uncritical attitude to technology. It concluded that new technology 
and economic growth should be accepted as a whole. Technology would 
overcome any future shortage of non-renewable resources. The Report 
failed to consider selective adoption of new technology or alternative 
technologies, and recommended little in the way of technology assessment.
Despite the State government's directives concerning innovation, 
Monarto largely failed to implement alternative technologies. Attempts 
to do so within the MDC met with opposition. Government departments 
providing engineering services adhered to conventional solutions. Many 
other possible technological changes would not have been feasible
f
without parallel changes in the surrounding community.
Nuclear power generation is a paramount example of a new, complex, 
large-scale technology. These three characteristics together mean that 
it remains in the realm of large corporations, government agencies, and 
scientific and technological experts. There are inherent dangers in the 
forces which the technology harnesses - radiation, waste disposal, 
nuclear accidents. Its dangers are added to by its position on the 
frontier of technology, increasing the degree of uncertainty in its 
operations; by its potential military or terrorist uses in supplying 
material for nuclear weapons or as a target for attacks; and by its 
complexity. Both the operational complexity of nuclear power plants and 
the chain of diverse and transnational operations required to fabricate 
and supply fuel for nuclear power and dispose of its wastes, provide a 
myriad of opportunities for accident, sabotage, or diversion of materials.
A nuclear power industry brings to a nation the vision of energy 
self-sufficiency, the prestige of high-level technology, and the 
potential to produce nuclear weapons. The economic, political and 
military importance of nuclear power bring with them secrecy and
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government sympathy and subsidies for the industry. Complexity, 
uncertainty, risk and secrecy make suspension and regulation of the 
industry's many dangerous aspects extremely difficult, and public control 
over it is at best problematical. The end result is an industry run by 
corporations and governments with imperfect public knowledge and control 
and questionable public consent.
With no nuclear power industry, Australia has not had first-hand 
experience of the full range of its characteristics. But some of them 
have been in evidence. In Australia the AAEC has been both advocate and 
chief source of technical advice to government on nuclear development.
The history of the AAEC has largely been one of secrecy and non­
accountability concerning its plans and its substantial expenditures. In 
this it was aided by a complaisant government until McMahon's prime 
ministerial decision in 1971 to defer the construction by the AAEC of 
Australia's first commercial nuclear power plant. The secrecy provisions 
of the Atomic Energy Act 1953 were intended for defence matters but have 
been more widely applied within the AAEC with the effect of stifling 
disclosure and policy discussion (see generally Moyal, 1975).
As would be expected, the bulk of the scientific establishment 
associated with the nuclear industry in Australia were in favour of 
uranium mining and export, and some were untiring publicists in support 
of it. More than one such senior scientist expressed the view that 
decisions about nuclear power should be made by experts, on the grounds 
that the ordinary man is incapable of understanding the issues involved.
The Inquiry, however, found that there was a lack of objectivity in the 
evidence to it, of some distinguished scientists in favour of uranium 
mining and export, and that those involved in the nuclear industry had at 
times presented excessively optimistic pictures of its safety and 
performance.
The Inquiry's finding, of course, points to an essential problem - 
that when corporations, government agencies and experts control technology 
under conditions of secrecy and inadequate accountability, the public 
interest is open to abuse.
Materialism and conservatism
Here the terms 'materialistic' and 'materialism' are used to refer to 
a cluster of values, attitudes and beliefs generally associated with a high 
level of interest in the personal acquisition and use of goods and services,
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as compared with non-material culture and public goods. Such values 
include strongly positive attitudes towards technology, technological 
change and its products, and growth, development and 'progress', not only 
in their economic aspects but also in their physical manifestations. They 
include the expectation of an expanding range of goods and services and an 
increasing capacity to acquire them. Such attitudes are likely to be 
accompanied by a utilitarian view of the environment as a source of 
resources and a subject for development.
It is only a short step from such values to approval of a political 
and economic system which is geared to meeting materialistic wants, to 
electoral support for governments and policies which appear to most 
closely reflect such a scale of values; and a not much longer step to 
acceptance of the political and economic ideologies of the corporate 
sector and conservative governments.
In Australia since World War Two there has been a subjective 'middle- 
classing' of blue collar workers together with a drift of their votes 
towards the conservative parties. Kemp (1978, esp. p.357) attributes this 
to a decline in the importance of factors on which a distinctive class 
appeal could be made, in the face of rising real incomes, relatively 
egalitarian income distribution, reasonably adequate welfare programmes, 
and until the 1970's, full employment. He suggests also that the long 
period of prosperity could be assumed to affect class self-assessments, 
and that widespread and increasing home ownership has encouraged working 
class voters to become politically conservative.
A reasonable interpretation of Kemp's findings is that increasing 
working class real incomes have contributed to a decline in factors causing 
class divisions, allowing the influence of the materialistic attitudes 
which have always been a feature of Australian society to become more 
evident in political attitudes. At the same time, as indicated by the 
home ownership example and by the subjective middle-classing, increased 
levels of material welfare have contributed to the conservative shift.
It should be noted also that a drift towards the conservative 
parties may not be a full indicator of the shift towards conservatism, 
since the positions of conservative or Labor parties may at the same time 
be undergoing conservative shifts, either fundamentally or at least in 
the content of their campaigning. In the 1970's particularly, the ALP has 
broadened the base of its appeal beyond the traditional working class 
concerns, as illustrated by the policies of the WTiitlam, and more recently
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the Hawke, governments.
Sources of materialistic and conservative bias
In earlier chapters various factors have been suggested which 
promote and maintain a bias towards materialistic or conservative 
values or both. In discussing biogeophysical influences in Chapter Four 
it was suggested that Australia’s generally harsh environment, combined 
with the realities of pioneering settlement, encouraged utilitarian and 
exploitative attitudes to the environment. These, together with the 
country's size and small population, promoted highly favourable 
attitudes to economic development and population growth, to the point 
where these became effectively regarded as desirable ends in themselves.
Because white settlement is comparatively recent, Australia has 
in some ways not moved far from its pioneering attitudes, and is lacking 
in the moderating influences which might have derived from a longer- 
established culture. Such factors may have contributed to the strength 
of materialistic values in Australia. But because the difference 
between Australia and other Western industrial countries in relation 
to such values is only a matter of degree, it is necessary to look for 
common explanations.
f
The effect of new technology in boosting consumer demand and 
expectations by way of new products has already been noted. The 
phenomenon of positional competition discussed in Chapter 3 also 
promotes a continuing increase in consumer demands, essentially because 
much of the satisfaction derived from many goods and services, as well 
as from jobs and other social positions, is increasingly related to the 
levels of their consumption or attainment by others, due to the effects 
of status competition, crowding or absolute scarcity. Hirsch sees 
increases in the perceived shortage of time and the pressure of 
positional competition as being mutually reinforcing in creating a 
' commodity fetishism' - 'excessive creation and absorption of 
commodities and not merely an undue conceptual preoccupation with 
them' (Hirsch, 1977, p.84).
Advertising does more than give information about products. It 
generates new demands by creating product images which promise to satisfy 
psychic needs. It sells values and lifestyle - newness, possessions and 
consumption will lead to greater happiness, social acceptability and
status.
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The media may also carry unintentional bias in news and 
entertainment. As argued in Part One, television news also has an 
explanatory content which tends to neglect underlying social causes and 
reinforce the status quo. Entertainment programmes on commercial 
television seek the largest audiences, and are therefore likely to 
reflect prevalent attitudes and aspirations.
Media bias may also be deliberate. Given the concentration of 
Australian media in the hands of a few large, narrowly-owned 
corporations dominated by powerful individuals, it would be surprising 
if there were not a tendency to reflect views favourable to conservative 
governments and the corporate sector. Editorial bias is considered to 
be legitimate, but bias can also take place in the selection and 
presentation of news. Bias by sections of the media in recent Federal 
elections has been widely recognised, and in the case of the Australian 
newspaper, admitted. A number of writers have concluded that there was 
media bias in favour of mining and exporting uranium, as was also 
indicated by the review in Chapter Seven of press reaction to the 
Inquiry's First Report.
In seeking to influence public opinions, attitudes and values 
through election campaigns, conservative and non-conservative parties 
do not usually start equal. Conservative parties attract greater 
financial support from the corporate sector, a deficit not generally 
made up for the ALP by union and membership contributions. The 
corporate sector also undertakes substantial advertising aimed at 
improving corporate image and, as with uranium, may undertake campaigns 
on specific issues.
The strong materialistic and conservative values prevalent in the 
United States have a strong influence in most non-communist countries, 
and this is particularly so in Australia. The United States dominates 
imported film and television entertainment, overseas news, and foreign 
investment in Australia. Its products, or their local franchises, and 
their advertising, are part of the Australian scene. Such influences 
also promote American attitudes, values and lifestyle.
The effect of all the preceding factors is to bring about a form 
of hegemony, where a predominant scale of values, beliefs and attitudes 
is promoted and maintained by internal and external influences. Clearly, 
however, this is not the creation of any deliberate conspiracy by an
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upper class or ruling elite, although there is some deliberate 
promotion of values by the media and of course by political parties.
Nor is it suggested that there is an absence of conflicting 
values, or of conflict itself. But because of the bias in values the 
borderline between what is accepted and what is disputed is shifted in 
favour of conservatism. And much conflict is distributional: it
concerns the cutting of the cake, rather than what the ingredients are 
or how it is to be baked. The system and the products of the system 
are largely accepted; the distribution may be quarreled over.
Non-conservative political parties face difficulty because they 
are inclined towards policies which are generally not in accord with 
the prevailing materialist and conservative biases. For a Labor 
government to retain power in Australia, as examples at State as well 
as Commonwealth level have attested, it must paint itself in colours 
not too different from its Liberal predecessors.
Corporate influence on government
The materialistic bias enhances the influence of the corporate 
sector on government, both by increasing corporate sector economic 
power, and by creating a climate of ideas favourable to corporate 
sector interests. Such interests are also furthered by the extensive 
formal and informal links between the corporate sector and sections of 
the bureaucracy (see generally Loveday, 1982), and in the case of 
conservative governments by the business interests or background of 
many members of government and the party machine.
As has been noted, the nuclear industry overseas is a paramount 
example of government support based on close links between governments, 
government agencies and the industry. In Australia, the financial and 
political leverage of the mining industry as a whole has been used to 
assist uranium mining companies in obtaining approval for mining. The 
government was also closely involved with the uranium cartel and went 
to great lengths to prevent the cartel members mining uranium in 
Australia from prosecution under U.S. anti-trust legislation.
It is not necessary to demonstrate conspiratorial relationships 
between governments and the corporate sector for there to be a close 
correspondence between government policies and corporate sector
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requirements. All that is needed is a high government priority for 
corporate sector confidence and welfare and a general understanding 
of corporate needs. Such priorities were evident in the Fraser 
government's policies. Its responses to the recession showed great 
concern for the welfare of the private sector but no sympathy, and often 
denigration, for the unemployed. The attempts by the government to 
reduce the size of the public sector were made on ideological as well 
as economic grounds, to provide room for expansion for business and 
to reduce government constraints on it.
As well as pursuing such ends, the particularly heavy cuts in 
the former Departments of Environment and Urban and Regional Development 
reflected the government's belief that many of their functions, 
including most EIA, should be left to the States. But the poor 
implementation of EIA was also a response to strong lobbying, 
particularly from the mining industry. The Iwasaki case discussed 
in Chapter Five was a demonstration of the extent to which the 
government was prepared to override the spirit and the letter of the 
EIA legislation in order to approve an environmentally damaging proposal.
Although delaying its official policy announcement until after 
the Inquiry, the government consistently showed a single-minded 
determination to proceed with the mining and export of uranium, and 
was prepared to adopt almost any argument which supported this end. 
Despite its disclaimers, however, the government's central interests 
were shown by its repeated attempts to use uranium as a bargaining 
counter in international trade and the progressive dilution of its 
safeguards requirements in order to obtain sales of uranium.
In withdrawing from participation in the Ranger project through 
the AAEC, the Fraser government specifically cited its ideological 
basis for the decision in not wishing to carry out functions which 
could be undertaken by the private sector. The government's rejection 
of the Inquiry's recommendation for the sequential development of 
mining also arose in part from its desire to reduce government 
intervention (AFR, 2.4.76).
It is not surprising that a government oriented towards the values 
of private enterprise should pursue policies favourable to it. What is 
noteworthy, particularly concerning uranium, was the degvee of the 
Fraser government's commitment. It set out with missionary zeal to
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dismantle Labor's programmes, including many, such as the environmental 
and urban initiatives, which might have been expected to retain an 
appeal to the middle-class voter. The government was prepared to go to 
great lengths to get uranium out of the ground. Difficulties and 
objections were ignored, swept aside, or placated - falling uranium 
demand, Aboriginal resistance, environmental concerns, nuclear dangers.
Its stance was that of a government with a brief for big business, not 
the small * 1 * liberal, middle ground, middle class government to which 
much of its electoral appeal is directed and which many of its party 
members believe it to be. But it may also be that given the preceding 
discussion of hegemonic influences and the values and ideology 
prevailing in the community, the government's policies were not so far 
from the middle ground.
Weaknesses in government accountability
In Part One attention was drawn to some weaknesses of the 
Westminster system, and more broadly in the accountability of governments 
through parliament to the people.
Public opinion is expressed at elections, but only as a choice 
between governments and their broad policy platforms. Public support 
for specific policies is often uncertain. Between elections, public 
opinion (in aggregate, as distinct from interest group pressures) 
usually sets fairly broad and sometimes elastic and uncertain boundaries 
for public policy, within which governments have room for manoeuvre and 
which they may on occasion choose to ignore. Nevertheless, in the early 
1970's a policy of leaving uranium in the ground clearly lay outside the 
boundaries set by the attitudes of the bulk of the electorate. By 
mid-1977, however, although the polls still showed more people in favour 
of mining and export than against it, the gap had narrowed greatly over 
the preceding two years.
A policy response which might have allowed time for public opinion 
on the issue to become more settled would have been to take up the 
Inquiry's alternative suggestion of postponing a decision about mining for 
several years. Given the weak market, there was no urgency to supply 
uranium, and the delay would also have allowed time to pursue unresolved 
questions such as the disposal of high level nuclear wastes, the wishes
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of the traditional Aboriginal owners, and the carrying out of baseline 
environmental studies in the region.
Given the state of public opinion neither party stood to gain a 
great deal electorally from the uranium issue. Labor nevertheless 
featured the issue in its 1977 Federal election campaign, but despite 
pre-election polls showing that the public considered that uranium would 
be the most important election issue, the election was decided largely 
on other grounds.
Late in 1978, public opinion showed majority support by a large 
margin for the right of Aborigines to refuse mining on their traditional 
land. This did not prevent the government from limiting negotiations 
with traditional Aboriginal owners on the Ranger mine to the terms and 
conditions under which mining would proceed, and placing considerable 
pressure on them to reach agreement.
Apart from elections, public opinion may be expressed through its 
elected representatives in parliament, but with strong party discipline 
in Australian parliaments, dissent on particular policies by government 
members is extremely limited. Parliamentary debates had little influence 
on government policy on either Monarto, uranium, or on the Fraser 
government's implementation of the EIA legislation. Attacks on the 
Monarto project by the Liberal Party in the South Australian parliament 
could have been far more effective. The level of understanding of the 
issues demonstrated in the parliament was generally low. Such attacks 
had some effect on public opinion and perhaps marginally on the 
Dunstan government at a time when it was undecided whether or not to 
proceed with Monarto. But as previously noted, the decisive factors lay 
elsewhere.
The rundown in implementation of the EIA requirement by the Fraser 
government, although well understood and publicised by the environmental 
movement, was not taken up as a major issue by the Labor Opposition in 
Federal parliament.
With no possibility of the Fraser government changing its mind on 
uranium, the parliamentary debates on the subject were anticlimactic.
The issues were already being well ventilated outside parliament, and the 
anti-uranium movement as a whole, rather than the Labor Party in its 
parliamentary capacity, was making the running. Some of the ALP's
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parliamentary leadership remained personally uncommitted and publicly 
unenthusiastic about opposing uranium mining and support, even after 
this became the Party’s official platform at the July 1977 National 
Conference.
It was argued in Part One that political parties as a whole are 
not usually the major determinants of government policy, given the 
influence of prime minister and cabinet and the bureaucracy. The ALP 
has much stronger formal mechanisms than the other major parties for 
imposing policies agreed by the Party as a whole on its parliamentary 
executive. But in the uranium case, as a result of the divisions 
within the Party on the issue, there are ambiguities in the amended 
policy adopted at the 1982 National Conference. These ambiguities 
provided the Hawke government with at least a semblance of justification 
for its claim that its approval of new contracts for the Ranger mine in 
November 1983 was consistent with the Party's platform. There is little 
doubt, however, given the known views of the Prime Minister, that 
Cabinet’s approvals were made in furtherance of its belief in the 
desirability of continuing with the mining and export of uranium, 
whereas the stated minimum position of Party policy was to phase it out.
Imperfect pluralism <
It follows from the preceding discussion that the executive arm 
of government in many instances retains considerable flexibility within 
the constraints placed on it by public opinion, parliament, or party 
machinery. Pluralistic theory suggests that in such a situation the 
democratic balance is restored by the representation of public opinion 
by competing interest groups with equal access to government, with the 
role of government the essentially weak one of compromising between 
competing interests. But it has already been argued that for a number 
of reasons the corporate sector may have a disproportionate influence on 
government. Nor, as shown in the issues of both uranium mining and EIA 
policy, could the Fraser government be mistaken for a weak one pushed 
this way and that by interest group pressures.
The active anti-uranium movement included a range of anti-uranium 
groups, and considerable numbers from the union movement and the member­
ship of the Labor Party. The forces actively in favour of uranium 
mining consisted of the uranium mining companies, assisted by the 
mining industry in general and some prominent nuclear scientists. Some
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senior LNCP ministers were particularly active in public support of 
uranium mining.
The pro-mining interests had good access to government - through 
strong mining industry contacts with the bureaucracy and government 
(for example, in the powerful Department of Trade and Resources), through 
the AAEC, the pro-mining Northern Territory government, the lobbyists 
hired by the Uranium Producers Forum, and, with the LNCP in government, 
through those ministers especially supportive of uranium mining.
The anti-uranium groups had little access under the LNCP government, 
and the Department of Environment in its various forms was a weak ally.
The anti-uranium movement therefore consciously attempted to change 
government policy indirectly, by changing public opinion. The uranium 
mining companies used their financial strength to hire professional 
lobbyists, to undertake a heavy television advertising campaign, and to 
maintain legal representation throughout the Inquiry. The anti-uranium 
movement relied on low-cost publicity and largely unpaid representation.
Such relationships are typical of those generally prevalent
between government and industry and environmental interests respectively.
■<As previously noted, primary and manufacturing industry and commerce have 
extensive structures for consultation reaching into many government 
agencies. Matthews (1976, p.40) has shown the extremely heavy 
representation of business and primary producers’ associations on 
advisory committees to the Commonwealth government, as compared with 
environmental groups (127 as against 2) and of producer groups as 
compared with non-producer groups (203 as against 40). Among the producer 
groups there were 149 instances of representation of business, primary 
producers and professional associations as against 45 for trade unions.
When a non-conservative government gains office there will be some 
increase in the access and weight given to non-conservative interest 
groups. But this will be limited by the extent to which the government 
has adjusted its policies towards the middle ground. And a non­
conservative government is still faced with the pre-existing consultative 
relationships between bureaucracy and industry, the conservatism of some 
of the bureaucracy, the conservative bias of institutions, and the 
economic power of the corporate sector.
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The o v e r a l l  s i t u a t i o n  i s  one which might be c a l l e d  im per fec t  
p l u r a l i s m ,  where some i n t e r e s t s  have markedly b e t t e r  access  and a re  
given  g r e a t e r  weight  in  government d e c i s i o n s  than a re  o t h e r s .
Unequal e l i t e s
P lu ra l i s m  i s  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  competing e l i t e s ,  th e  l e a d e r s  o f  
i n t e r e s t  g roups .  Under im p e r fe c t  p l u r a l i s m ,  one o f  the  competing 
e l i t e s  w i l l  be h a b i t u a l l y  more i n f l u e n t i a l  than o t h e r s .  Th is  i s  the  
s i t u a t i o n  as between th e  broad c o a l i t i o n s  o f  pro-development  and p r o ­
envi ronment  g roup ings .  But th e  concept  o f  competing e l i t e s  can be 
ex tended  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a rena  more g e n e r a l l y .  The c o n s e r v a t i v e  e l i t e ,  
c o n s i s t i n g  c e n t r a l l y  o f  the  l e a d e r s  o f  i n d u s t r y  and commerce and 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  t e n d s  to  posse ss  g r e a t e r  p o l i t i c a l  
power than  the  c o u n t e r - e l i t e  and to  hold  o r  p r o f e s s  views which more 
c l o s e l y  r e f l e c t  th o s e  p r e v a i l i n g  in  -the community. The c o u n t e r - e l i t e ,  
c o n s i s t i n g  c e n t r a l l y  o f  l e a d e r s  o f  n o n - c o n s e rv a t iv e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
and t r a d e  u n ions ,  ho ld s  views which tend  to  be somewhat f u r t h e r  from 
th e  middle ground.
In o r d e r  to  ga in  o f f i c e  t h e  p a r l i a m e n ta r y  component o f  t h e  c o u n t e r ­
e l i t e  must r e l y  on e i t h e r  unusual  c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  such as c o n s i d e r a b l e  
p u b l i c  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w i th  th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e  p a r t y  o r  a c h a r i s m a t i c  
n o n - c o n s e r v a t iv e  l e a d e r ;  o r  as  p r e v i o u s l y  sugges ted ,  i t  must a d j u s t  
i t s  p o l i c i e s  towards th e  middle ground.  In doing so i t  runs  t h e  r i s k  
o f  a l i e n a t i n g  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  i t s  union and p a r t y  s u p p o r t .
C lass  d i v i s i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  in  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  o r g a n i s a ­
t i o n a l  bases  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  e l i t e s  and c o u n t e r - e l i t e s ,  and c o n t r o l  o f  
t h e  means o f  p ro d u c t i o n  i s  s t i l l  a major  source  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power.
But power i s  a more widespread  commodity, possessed  by l a rg e  o r g a n i s a ­
t i o n s ,  whether  b u r e a u c r a t i c ,  i n d u s t r i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  u n i o n i s t ,  or  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l ,  and c o n f e r r e d  on th e  e l i t e s  which lead  them.
In A u s t r a l i a  H ig ley  e t  a l . (1979) c a r r i e d  out  r e s e a r c h  based on 
p e r s o n a l  i n t e r v i e w s  w i th  a sample o f  370 e l i t e  members. There were 
some problems wi th  t h e i r  methodology,  but  the  fo l lowing  broad 
c o n c lu s io n s  shou ld  no t  be a f f e c t e d  by t h e s e .  The s tudy found t h a t  
p e r s o n a l  c o n t a c t s  between e l i t e  members and the  most s e n i o r  e l i t e  
p o s i t i o n  h o l d e r s ,  as  wel l  as  i s s u e - b a s e d ,  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  l i n k s  between
452
elite members, were considerably more frequent within elite sectors 
than between them, and there was a low level of personal familiarity 
across the Labor/non-Labor partisan line (pp. 237-9, 262). Neverthe­
less, Higley et at. concluded that there was more contact between 
sectors than the pluralist model would suggest.
The study showed that the 100 most central elite members or core 
was dominated by businessmen (37), Commonwealth public servants (19), 
and politicans (LNCP 13, ALP 12), with representatives of the media 
(6), voluntary associations (6), academics (4) and trade unions (4) 
making up the remainder (Higley et al.3 Table 7.10, p. 258). However, 
the core did not represent a unified power elite. Opinions for the 
elite network as a whole were organised along clear partisan lines 
extending across all issue areas and consistently separating a left 
(ALP and trade unions), centre (public servants, academics, media 
except owners) and right (business, LNCP) (p. 142). These divisions 
extended to the core elite.
The research also indicated the close linkages between business 
and LNCP elites. For example within the core elite a disproportion­
ately large percentage of the business elite's linkages were with 
members of the LNCP core elite and, to a lesser extent, with the ALP 
members (Higley et at., Table 7.11, p. 258). It is safer to assume 
that had the ALP not been then in government federally, its represen­
tation in the core and its linkages with business would have been 
considerably lower.
The study defined five main groupings of the 29 most senior 
position holders according to the extent to which they were personally 
known by the same elite respondents. For three of these groups - 
Sydney business, politics and media, Melbourne business and media, and 
LNCP leaders - there was a considerable overlap in the elite members 
who were personally familiar with the senior position holders in each 
group. This was not the case with the other two main groups, ALP 
/trade unions and Commonwealth public service leaders (pp. 237-9).
Such personal contacts between business and LNCP elites were 
undoubtedly assisted because, except for trade union, ALP and 'left 
voluntary associations' the large proportion of national leaders came 
from relatively or highly exclusive social backgrounds (p. 105).
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The importance  o f  s o c i a l  c o n t a c t s  as a b a s i s  fo r  the  l e g i t i m a t i o n  o f  
group a c t i v i t y  was no ted  by S co t t  (1980, p. 229) in rev iewing  a s e r i e s  
o f  case  s t u d i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  groups and p u b l i c  p o l i c y  in A u s t r a l i a .
Those th us  l e g i t i m i s e d  became involved  in the  p o l i c y  p r o c e s s ,  w h i le  
o t h e r s  (as i s  p redom inan t ly  the  case  f o r  envi ronmenta l  and a n t i ­
uranium groups) face  th e  more d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  o f  working th rough  th e  
p u b l i c  a ren a .
The p re c e d in g  f i n d i n g s  suppor t  th e  c o n c lu s io n s  sugges ted  e a r l i e r ;  
t h a t  the  s i t u a t i o n  in  A u s t r a l i a  l i e s  between th e  r u l i n g  e l i t e  model 
and th e  p l u r a l i s t  model in i t s  pure form, and may be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  as 
a s i t u a t i o n  o f  im p e r fe c t  p l u r a l i s m  and competing but  unequal  e l i t e s .
The i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  e l i t e  i s  too  g r e a t ,  and i t s  b i a s  too  
pronounced,  to  suppor t  th e  p l u r a l i s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  On th e  o t h e r  
hand,  the  c l e a v a g e s  in  th e  e l i t e  in te rms o f  op in io n s  and l i n k a g e s  
a long  the  c o n s e r v a t i v e / n o n - c o n s e r v a t i v e  l i n e  do no t  uphold th e  a p p l i c a ­
b i l i t y  o f  th e  power e l i t e  model.
I n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s e rv a t i s m
In P a r t  One th e  power o f  th e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  t o  i n f l u e n c e  p o l i c y  
was no ted .  Government and bureauc racy  work w i th in  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s e t t i n g .  The very  n a t u r e  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  and r u l e s  in  
a s s i s t i n g  some p a t t e r n s  o f  a c t i o n  and hampering o t h e r s  means t h a t  the y  
w i l l  c o n f l i c t  with  c e r t a i n  k inds  o f  change.  And some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  human n a t u r e  and s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  expressed  w i th i n  an o r g a n i s a ­
t i o n a l  s e t t i n g  lead  to  a tendency by members o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  t o  r e s i s t  
change,  and to  be unduly  in f l u e n c e d  in  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  and p o l i c y  
ad v ic e  by th e  i n t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  b e l i e f s  and im p e ra t i v e s  o f  t h e i r  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
Such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  were grouped in t o  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s .  Dea ling 
f i r s t  with s t r u c t u r a l  and p ro ced u ra l  f a c t o r s ,  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  laws,  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ,  r u l e s  and customary p ro ced u res  which 
p r e o r d a i n  bo th  th e  way in  which many m a t t e r s  a re  p ro c e s s e d  and o f t e n  
t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  which i s  to  be made. Such s t r u c t u r e s  p ro v id e  easy
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channels for some proposals and difficult passage for others, depending 
on the extent to which they can be routinely handled.
Fundamental examples of this kind are the Constitution itself, 
and the Westminster conventions as they have evolved in Australia. The 
effects of some of the Westminster conventions as discussed in Chapter 
Four are to detract from public access to information about the activities 
and decisionmaking processes of government. To the extent that they do 
so, governments and the bureaucracy are given latitude to conceal 
potentially embarrassing information and to pursue courses independent 
of public knowledge and opinion. There are of course good arguments 
for the continuation of some of the requirements for secrecy under the 
Westminster system, but the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act, 
with its many weaknesses, does not represent a reasonable response to 
changing views as to the merits of increased public access to 
information.
It was argued in Chapter Four that despite the fact that the 
Constitution leaves most environmental powers to the States, the 
Commonwealth, by using a range of other powers, could have played a far 
larger role in this area than it has done. Recent High Court decisions 
bear out this view. Some have therefore further asserted that the will
f
of the Commonwealth Government, not the Constitution, is the real 
obstacle to greater Commonwealth involvement in environmental matters.
But what should be recognised is that before the Commonwealth conceived 
of a greater role in this area the States had for many years carried 
out whatever land use and environmental functions were considered 
necessary within their boundaries. The real obstacle, then, was not 
so much the Constitution itself as the established way in which it had 
been implemented. Custom, as well as law, provides rigidity and 
resistance to change, in this case because custom embodies the 
historically determined distribution of power berween Commonwealth and 
States.
The Commonwealth EIA legislation, while itself a vehicle for change, 
at the same time contains provisions which limit such change, and these 
in turn reflect other pre-existing institutions. A prime example is the 
provision for Ministerial discretion in the operation of the Act, which 
combines with the limitations on legal standing in Australian law to 
ensure that the Act will not be any more thoroughly enforced than the 
government of the day wishes.
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Similarly, within organisations rules and customs can constrain 
change, or be selectively used as a rationale for either action and 
inaction, as in Treasury's refusal to answer questions by the HRSC on 
the grounds that they involved matters of government policy. Within 
the MDC, which was deliberately created as a statutory body unencumbered 
by public service administrative procedures, such procedures were 
increasingly introduced because of the familiarity of the MDC's 
administrators with them.
Naturally not all rules and structures resist change. New laws 
or organisational changes may be directed, like the Commonwealth EIA 
Act within its limitations, towards bringing about change. Nor, 
obviously, need resistance to change be undesirable. Institutions can 
defend basic freedoms, settle conflicts, define rights and obligations 
and routinise complex problems.
A second group of characteristics discussed in relation to 
institutions consisted of some aspects of personality - complacency, 
habit, primacy and selective perception - which tend to find expression 
in an organisational setting with its established routines. Such 
personality characteristics are also inclined to reinforce the effects 
of the third category, the processes of socialisation.
In the case study of the MDC several examples of the manifestation 
of professional socialisation were given. Resistance to the EIA 
requirement and to the presence of an environmental planning group 
within the MDC were worsened because these were explicitly seen as 
encroaching on the normal professional expertise and responsibilities 
of the engineering and town planning professions.
Linked with such concerns are the effects of the fourth category, 
positional costs and benefits, where individual or group attitudes to a 
proposed institutional change are affected by the losses or gains to 
those individuals or groups by reason of the change. Within the MDC 
individuals were being subjected to psychic and other costs as a result 
of intervention in their work by the environmental planning group and 
the requirements of EIA. The fifth category is that of institutional 
disposition, the collective attitudes, purposes and dogma which an 
institution develops over time and which are maintained by organisational 
socialisation.
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Hie manifestation of all these sources of resistance to change 
was apparent in the resistance to the EIA requirement within the MDC, 
by State government departments engaged in construction at Monarto, and 
by Commonwealth departments as described in Chapter Five. This is not 
to deny that in part such resistance was based on objective reasoning.
But from the documentation noted in earlier chapters it is clear that 
less objective influences, and values and imperatives peculiar to the 
organisations in question, were at work.
Bureaucratic resistance to change
Under both the Whitlam and Fraser governments, there was sustained 
resistance by some departments to the requirements of the Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act, and various degrees of non­
cooperation from some others. This was to some degree part of a more 
general resistance to the Whitlam government's policies after twenty-three 
years of conservative government. But EIA added an extra dimension by 
threatening to subject traditional departmental responsibilities to 
review by another department, to provide the public with details of the 
basis for decisions, and to require additional, unfamiliar and sometimes 
costly and complex information to be obtained and evaluated in making 
recommendations. As occurred with the Monarto EIA, such requirements 
appear almost calculated to activate the full range of sources of 
resistance to change within departments carrying out activities subject 
to the Act.
Given the content of the Act and Procedures, and their accompanying 
rhetoric, it was not uncommonly expected that EIS's would become a 
frequent adjunct to the decisionmaking processes of the Commonwealth 
government, rather than the handful of EIS's which have been produced 
each year. Resistance to the EIA requirement cannot be entirely blamed 
on the bureaucracy, however. Under the Fraser government, there were 
ministers who passively allowed, or actively connived with their 
department's avoidance of the Act's requirements. Nor was the Whitlam 
government free of such activity.
Ministerial and departmental resistance to the Act was encouraged 
under the Fraser government by its long-running review of the Act and 
the strong possibility of its amendment. To this must be added the 
demoralised state of the department administering the Act during its 
series of reorganisations, severe staff cuts, and frequent ministerial
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changes. Low-ranking or unsympathetic ministers added to an untenable 
position from which to promote an increased degree of environmental 
concern in other departments.
Some have argued that the balance of power in determining policy 
is more in favour of the department and its permanent head than the 
minister, given such factors as the wide range of pressures on the 
minister's time, his or her often short-term sojourn in any one 
portfolio, and the capacity of the department to provide its minister 
with biased or selective information. But the important point here is 
not whether the balance of power leans somewhat in favour of the 
department or its minister, but that in either case the bureaucracy has 
a great deal of influence on policy, and that such influence often 
manifests itself as resistance to change. Some degree of conservatism 
can be a beneficial stabilising force. But given the overall 
experience of the Whitlam government in attempting to implement its 
programmes, as well as its specific experience with EIA, it must be 
concluded that the capacity of the bureaucracy to frustrate and divert 
the policies of government is too large.
Decisionmaking processes as policy determinants
In Part One some well-known characterisations of decisionmaking 
were discussed - incrementalism, comprehensive-rationality, bureaucratic 
politics, and the non-decision model. It was concluded that in any 
actual decisionmaking process elements of all these models might be 
present, and any one could be the predominant mode at different times 
or in different situations. These points were confirmed in the Monarto 
case. None of these models should therefore be accepted as an a priori 
description of decisionmaking processes.
Insofar as the bureaucratic politics or incrementalist models are 
valid descriptions of reality, then they assist the preceding arguments 
about the conservatism of institutions and bureaucratic resistance to 
change. This is obvious in the case of incrementalism because it embodies 
the idea that policy change largely takes place by small increments and 
therefore changes slowly. The bureaucratic politics model sees 
decisions as the outcome of bargaining between participants whose 
organisational positions are paramount in defining their bargaining
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stances, and where bargaining takes place according to the processes 
and constraints set by the structures and operating procedures of 
organisations. Again, therefore, institutional restrictions on policy 
change are present.
There is an essential point which should be made about these 
models: that while they provide important insights into the processes
of decisionmaking, this does not mean that they provide sufficient 
explanation of the determinants of policies and decisions. But 
unfortunately, there is a tendency in the exposition of the models (with 
the exception of the non-decision model) to imply that the explanation 
of process which they give is also sufficient to explain outcomes. For 
example, as Allison attempted to show for the Cuban missile crisis, 
according to the bureaucratic politics model given a knowledge of the 
significant player's conceptions of national, organisational and 
personal goals, their organisation's policy stance and the relevant 
organisational operating procedures, it should be possible to explain 
the outcomes.
But even accepting for a moment that such factors are the most 
important immediate influences, they provide only the beginning of any 
adequate explanation. In pursuit of such an explanation it would be 
necessary to ask what influenced the player's conceptions of national, 
organisational and personal goals, what were the factors which shaped 
their organisation's policy stance in the first place, why the relevant 
organisational procedures have taken their particular shape, what support 
and attributes placed the players in their particular positions in the 
hierarchy, why some organisations and their players may have more 
influence than others, why the policy issue being addressed has arisen 
and taken its specific form, and how any alternative courses of action being 
considered were generated.
In each case, seeking answers to such questions would lead beyond 
the confines of bureaucrats and their organisational imperatives, and 
indicates the need for a broader framework for analysis. Models which 
explain outcomes centrally in terms of decisionmaking processes can be 
dangerously misleading because they de-emphasise the more fundamental 
social, economic and political circumstances which may predetermine such 
matters as the arrival of issues on the agenda, the alternatives 
available, the actors involved and their preconceptions and values.
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Mutual reinforcement and resistance to change
The predominant policy-influential variables and interrelationships 
described in this chapter tend to be mutually reinforcing. Materialism 
assists corporate sector economic and political power and influence on 
government. Materialism enhances the public importance of the 
corporate sector and the priority of its economic welfare, so that in 
government policy economic welfare tends to become identified with 
corporate sector welfare. Corporate sector prosperity provides for an 
increased weight of advertising to reinforce materialistic values. 
Advertising supports the commercial media which tend to convey 
conservative and materialistic values in news and entertainment, and 
materialism is augmented by the effects of positional competition.
Technology encourages materialism by supplying new products, at the
same time contributing to corporate sector welfare. Linkages form between
the corporate sector and government agencies concerned with industry.
Such linkages are enhanced where corporate and government staff share a
common technological or industrial expertise. Weaknesses in the public
accountability of government allow undue policy bias towards corporate
sector interests to go unchecked, and the materialist and conservative
(
biases in public values make public concern on such matters less likely. 
Institutional and bureaucratic conservatism, and processes of 
socialisation in organisations and the community, help to maintain the 
conservative bias.
Externally, the bulk of Australia's economic, political, military 
and cultural linkages are with conservative, materialistic Western or 
Westernising industrial countries, and such external linkages augment 
similar internal characteristics. International linkages are inclined to 
reinforce each other - economic interchanges may reinforce political 
linkages, or economic rewards may be provided for appropriate strategic 
cooperation.
The preceding points summarise a powerful set of relationships, which 
bias policies and resist changes which run counter to their general 
character.
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EIA and the politics of exception
Given the preceding analysis, the difficulties encountered by the 
EIA requirement can be readily explained, since it potentially conflicts 
in a variety of ways with the prevailing pattern of influences.
Given the development-oriented nature of the world industrial system, 
Australia's participation in it generates both external and internal 
pressure on its environmental protection measures such as EIA. In the 
uranium case, as has been shown, the bulk of external pressures 
favoured Australia selling its uranium. Australia is more dependent 
than most countries on its mineral exports. At the same time it has 
sought to attract resource-based industrial development such as 
aluminium refining by offering cheap power. The economic importance of 
mineral development therefore places considerable internal pressure 
on requirements such as EIA which threaten to delay or hinder such 
development. Such pressure has at times been exacerbated by competition 
for development between States, which has tended to bring about a 
lowering of environmental standards, and has led at times to government 
approval of projects before EIA has been carried out (Formby, 1984(a),1985).
EIA also potentially conflicts with prevailing values centred on
*materialism, growth and development because it provides an avenue for 
environmental values to influence the decisionmaking process, and 
carries the implication that such values tend to be underweighted in 
decisions. Such value conflicts were specifically canvassed in the 
Ranger Inquiry; and they were apparent in the disagreements within 
the MDC over EIA and in the opposition to the Act within the Common­
wealth public service.
Similarly, EIA conflicts with the technological bias by seeking 
to examine critically the implementation of technology. As in the 
case of nuclear power, large scale, complex technologies tend to 
become institutionalised and are promoted and defended by such 
institutions. In the Monarto case, government agencies such as the 
E$WS largely adhered to the high-technology solutions with which they 
were most familiar. The support of some nuclear scientists for the 
nuclear power industry extended to criticisms of the Inquiry itself, on 
the basis that decisions about the implementation of complex technol­
ogies should be left to experts.
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The EIA requirement is also potentially in conflict with the 
objectives of the corporate sector, development-oriented government 
agencies, and with the priorities of conservative governments, in that 
it threatens to increase costs by way of delays and requirements for 
environmental protection measures, or at worst to prevent proposed 
actions. The impatience of the Fraser government with the time 
required for the Inquiry was apparent; in many instances, as in the case 
of Monarto, planning and decisionmaking proceeds and commitments 
are made without waiting for the EIA to be completed.
The tendency of decisionmaking to proceed regardless of EIA 
relates to a point introduced in Chapter One, that EIA is basically 
an attempt to introduce greater rationality into decisionmaking. Given 
that, as argued above, decisionmaking is a highly variable mixture of 
rationality, bureaucratic politics, incrementalism and non­
decisionmaking, often strongly subject to extra-organisational 
influences, then such characteristics will conflict with the attempted 
imposition of greater rationality by means of EIA.
Similarly, the point was made in Chapter One that EIA, if fully 
implemented, requires considerable change within organisations
4
carrying it out. EIA, then, is likely to trigger many of the organisa­
tional sources of resistance to change discussed above and in Chapter 
Three. Earlier chapters have illustrated such resistance to change at 
work within the MDC and the Commonwealth public service.
Although environmentalism has often been said to be a middle-class 
movement, it has nevertheless found its most effective support within 
the trade union movement and the ALP, that is, through the weaker of 
the unequal elites. This is reflected in the quite different 
approaches of the Whit lam and Fraser governments to the EIA requirement. 
Even under the Whit lam government, however, support for EIA was 
ambivalent, and the implementation of EIA by Labor governments is 
likely to be weakened by any shift by the Party or its leadership 
towards more conservative policies in order to obtain or maintain 
power, and by any accompanying efforts to obtain the confidence of the 
business sector and develop closer links with it.
In Chapter One, reference was made to Dürkheim's study of the 
causes of suicide, which essentially concluded that the explanation of
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suicide is to be found not in one factor or another, but in the total 
character of the society in question. It was argued that a similar 
approach to the explanation of the determinants of public policy is 
desirable. The weakness of EIA policy and its implementation in 
Australia is due not to one, or a few contributing factors, but 
because, as has been shown, EIA policy is exceptional to the prevailing 
character of Australian society.
It may therefore be useful to describe EIA policy, and other 
policies or social movements such as the environmental or anti-uranium 
movements which conflict with the prevailing characteristics of the 
society in which they occur, as being subject to the politics of 
exception. In such cases, major aspects of the policy or even the 
need for it remain in dispute, implementation is non-routine and often 
opposed by affected parties, and policy affectiveness is low. Such 
policies may be contrasted with mainstream policies, where the need 
for a policy with certain characteristics is generally accepted, 
disputes are largely limited to the details of policy, policy changes 
are usually incremental, policy implementation has been routinised, 
and the policy is considered to be largely successful in meeting its 
objectives. (Formby, 1984(b)).
Policies such as EIA which are subject to the politics of 
exception are thus exposed to rather different policy processes from 
mainstream policies. Where this is not fully recognised, the difficul­
ties which such policies will encounter are likely to be underestimated 
and their potential effectiveness overestimated. Many of the expecta­
tions held at the time of its introduction concerning the likely rate 
of implementation and effectiveness of the Commonwealth government's 
EIA legislation have since proved to have been excessively optimistic. 
In introducing such policies, therefore, it is desirable to make 
provision as far as possible for the difficulties which they are likely 
to encounter. The final section of this chapter examines some such 
measures which might be applied to EIA policy. First, however, the 
propositions set out in Chapter One will be reviewed.
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The general propositions
As part of the aim of seeking generalisations concerning the 
extent and nature of the influence on public policy of various classes 
of policy-influential variables, it was proposed in Chapter One to 
examine several general propositions.
In terms of those propositions, it has been shown by both the 
general review of the determinants of public policy from the literature 
in Part One, and by the case studies of EIA and uranium policies in 
Part Two that the factors often described as forming the 'environment' 
of policymaking - the biogeophysical environment, technology, 
prevailing ideas and values, social and economic conditions, extra­
national influences, are important, although sometimes neglected, in 
explaining public policy (proposition one). Such influences need to 
be taken into account not just as background variables setting broad 
limits on policy, but as factors which may, either directly or through 
their multiple interactions with each other and with the more proximate 
actors and organisations, have specific consequences for particular 
policies.
Because of the wide range of factors which have been shown in 
previous chapters to influence public policy significantly, and 
because of the highly interrelated character of such influences, the 
explanation of policy is unlikely to be monocausal, and should be 
sought in terms of the patterns of interaction of many variables. It 
is therefore desirable to avoid partial analyses based on political, 
economic, decisionmaking-process, technological, institutional or 
ideological explanations. Rather, an approach should be adopted which 
at the outset attempts to comprehend the society in question as a whole 
(proposition two), in order to identify its dominant features.
The final section of Part One identified a pattern of important 
relationships between policy-influential variables which, it was 
argued, shows broad similarities in Western industrialised countries 
and is important in explaining the characteristic policies which they 
pursue (proposition three). The present chapter has endeavoured to 
describe the nature of such a pattern in the Australian case, and to 
show that it is central to the explanation of the character of 
Australian society and its policies.
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It has also been argued that this dominant pattern of relation­
ships has self-reinforcing characteristics which resist attempted 
change; and throughout this thesis attention has been drawn to various 
aspects of policy influential variables which lead to resistance to 
change (proposition four).
It has been shown that the EIA requirement has met with con­
siderable resistance, has been weak in implementation, and has achieved 
only very limited success, and it follows that other policies which 
similarly run counter to the dominant influences which have been 
described are likely to follow a similar course (proposition five).
The preceding propositions embody a broad methodology which 
crosses disciplinary boundaries, and propose a framework of influences 
and relationships which is important in determining the nature of 
public policy. These have been supported by a general review based on 
the literature and by case studies related to EIA. If the propositions 
are accepted on the basis of the argument which has been put forward, 
then given their fundamental nature it follows that the experience 
with EIA in Australia can only be fully understood with regard to these 
propositions (proposition six), and that it is desirable when seeking 
the explanation of other public policies to do so in their light 
(proposition seven).
Improving EIA policy
This thesis has not been designed with the primary purpose of 
arriving at normative recommendations concerning EIA. However, it may 
be helpful to examine the preceding analysis from a different perspec­
tive by considering how EIA policy might be made more effective. To 
be useful, any proposals to this end must offer a reasonable possibility 
of being put into effect; they must recognise the realities of the 
social and political milieu within which EIA policy must be implemented.
Procedural weaknesses or the politics of exception?
In Chapter One it was noted that the EIA requirement embodies the 
idea that changes in decisionmaking procedures can bring about more 
thorough consideration of the environmental consequences of proposals. 
This idea often appears to be based on the view that procedural
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weaknesses in decisionmaking (for example failure to require cost/ 
benefit calculations to consider externalities) are in themselves the 
reason for inadequate consideration of environmental consequences. 
Alternatively it may be considered that there are more fundamental 
influences at work (for example in determining prevailing values) 
which can nevertheless be affected to some extent by changing decision­
making procedures by means of the EIA requirement (perhaps by changing 
prevailing values by making clear the environmental consequences of 
proposals). On the other hand, it may be that the strength of the 
more fundamental influences is such that attempting to change decision­
making procedures by means of EIA will have very little effect on the 
weight given to the environmental consequences of decisions.
It should be apparent from the preceding chapters that the view 
taken here is that there are characteristics of decisionmaking 
procedures which lead to environmental consequences being neglected and 
undervalued; but at the same time there are more fundamental features 
of Western industrial society which lead to the same result. Changing 
decisionmaking procedures by means of EIA-type requirements may have 
some effect on decisions by increasing awareness of adverse environ­
mental consequences; this in turn may affect the more fundamental 
factors at work, for example by modifying prevailing values. But at 
the same time, there is a need for strategies other than EIA aimed at 
modifying some of the more basic influences which lead to a low weight­
ing being given to environmental values.
Further, because of the interrelated and persistent nature of 
some of the policy determinants which have been identified, substan­
tially modifying such influences or their effects by introducing 
stronger EIA requirements or by other means will be extremely difficult, 
as has been exemplified by the poor record of the EIA requirement in 
Australia since its introduction. The lesson here for those implement­
ing EIA and other environmental policies is that long-term resistance 
to them is not an aberration, but a reaction which should be expected. 
Consequently long-term strategies should be planned to deal with it.
Another way of looking at the causes of the problems which EIA 
is designed to meet is that either environmental consequences are being 
neglected or undervalued in terms of the values of the community as a 
whole; or environmental values are being considered to the extent that
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the community wants them to be, but that according to some standard 
externally arrived at, environmental values are being given 
insufficient weight; that is, that prevailing community values are 
thought to be in some sense wrong.
In the first case, the values of the community are not being 
implemented, perhaps because of deficiencies in decisionmaking 
procedures which cause environmental amenity to be undervalued, or 
because some groups may have an undue influence over decisionmaking 
so that decisions do not reflect community values. In the second case, 
decisionmaking processes, in giving little weight to environmental 
values, in fact reflect community values. In this case the outside 
observer may argue that his standards are in some sense ’better' than 
those of the community; or that community standards are being unduly 
biased in some way. In preceding chapters it has been argued that 
both these forms of undervaluation of environmental amenity occur - 
community values are not being fully reflected in decisions and there 
are factors which bias community values.
Environmental values are therefore likely to be undervalued at 
three levels: by weaknesses in decisionmaking procedures, by the
failure of decisions to reflect community values even where environ­
mental consequences are understood by decisionmakers, and by the 
biasing of community values for a number of reasons. In seeking to 
remedy such a situation, at the first or procedural level the aim 
would be to institute requirements which ensured as a matter of course 
that the environmental consequences of proposals are predicted and 
considered by decisionmakers as part of routine project evaluation.
Such a requirement would in turn require organisational changes. On 
the second or participatory level the aim would be to ensure that the 
public and their political representatives are informed about the 
environmental and other consequences of proposals and given the 
opportunity to state their views and provide relevant information.
On the third or political level the aim would be to counteract as far 
as possible the various technological, materialistic, and conservative 
biases and any undue influence of the corporate sector on government. 
Changes on the first level are unlikely to achieve a great deal without 
changes on the second or third levels.
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Strengthening EIA procedures
At the procedural level, neither Commonwealth nor State require­
ments in Australia (with the possible exception of New South Wales), 
are strong enough to ensure that EIA becomes a routine part of planning. 
Experience has shown that in order for this to happen, the areas of 
ministerial discretion in EIA requirements must be greatly reduced, 
and provision made for recourse to the courts by members of the public 
to enforce EIA requirements, as has been done to some extent under the 
NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act. Such legislation need 
not allow the courts to make judgements on the substantive merits of 
any proposal. In other words, the courts should not usurp the function 
of the political process to make the final decision as to whether or 
not proposals should proceed. But the courts should be able to enforce 
adherence to the procedural requirements of EIA before such a decision 
is made. That is, the courts should be able to ensure that those 
responsible have notified the relevant authority of the nature of any 
proposals likely to significantly damage the environment so that a 
decision can be made as to whether an EIS is required; that the content 
of any EIS produced conforms with requirements; that it has been made 
available to the public; and that its findings have been considered 
before a final decision is made.
Some have argued that the cost of legal recourse on EIA in terms 
of project delays would be excessive, citing the U.S. example; 
although the high initial level of litigation and project delay there 
subsequently declined. The NSW Land and Environment Court has 'in 
almost every case' disposed of matters involving major developments in 
less than three months (Cripps, 1983, p.17). If necessary the grounds 
of recourse to the courts can be made more limited than has been the 
case in the U.S. Further, if EIA takes place within an established 
framework of urban and regional land use and environmental planning, 
improved coordination between government agencies, and an adequate 
data base, then individual EIS's will not need to be so broad in scope. 
To be more effective, therefore, EIA must be accompanied by other 
legislative and organisational changes in such areas.
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Social impacts
Before moving to organisational matters, however, there are 
other aspects of the EIA requirement which warrant comment. One con­
cerns the question of whether the social, as well as the physical 
environment, should be included in EIA, and further, whether these 
should be combined with economic factors in the form of a multi­
objective planning (m.o.p.)-type document. (Here the term is used to 
mean a report which gives economic, social and biophysical consequences 
equal weight, not the strict m.o.p. format).
A difficulty here has been that the environmental movement has
tended to be concerned more with effects on the natural or built
environments than the social environment, and that environmental agencies
deal largely with the physical environment and have staff whose main
expertise lies in that area, and are therefore not well situated to
review social impacts. There is also concern that if economic and
social impacts are fully examined, either the physical environmental
concerns may be dealt with less fully or the total EIS may reach
an excessive size. In any case, it may be argued, an EIS should
contain adequate information about the economic and social impacts,
<even if concentrating on the physical. Unfortunately this is often 
not the case.
Notwithstanding these points, it seems desirable that if the 
public and decisionmakers are to form opinions about the desirability 
of a proposal, then in any public document proposed as a basis for 
decisionmaking the economic, social and physical environmental 
consequences should be given equal weight. This does not mean equal 
space, since the economic data is likely to be more readily available 
and to require less documentation.
Administering EIA
As well as the tendency not to be well equipped to review the 
social and economic aspects of EIA, environmental agencies are usually 
quite low in the departmental pecking order, with ministers correspond­
ingly low in the ministerial rankings. One alternative here is to seek 
to strengthen the standing and multi-disciplinarity of the environmental 
agency. This is unlikely to occur without sustained pressure for such
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upgrading from environmental interests. The level of protest by such 
interests during the Fraser governments rundown of EHCD was surpris­
ingly low.
Another alternative is to allocate the central responsibility for 
administration and review of EIA elsewhere. Here there are various 
options, one of which is the creation of a body with the expertise to 
carry out the tasks which are usually performed in relation to EIA in 
Australia by the main environmental agency. Such tasks include 
administration, review and recommendation, but not final responsibility 
for deciding whether the project should proceed. Such a body could be 
staffed by departmental representatives and attached to the main co­
ordinating department (e.g. Premiers or Prime Minister’s departments), 
but it would be preferable if it were to be an autonomous body with 
members from both inside and outside the public service appointed for a 
fixed term. The line departments customarily responsible for the 
relevant social, environmental, financial and economic matters would be 
responsible for reviewing these aspects of the document, with the co­
ordinating body providing an independent overview.
Implementation of a requirement for such a comprehensive document 
and its co-ordination and review by a newly created body would, of 
course, have a much greater capability than EIA of overriding existing 
decisionmaking procedures and traditional departmental responsibilities 
and autonomy and becoming a major decisionmaking tool. Because of the 
changes that would be required and the opposition which it would arouse, 
however, the likelihood of introduction of a requirement of this kind 
is low. What can be more immediately hoped for, and to some degree 
is already occurring, is EIA which gives equal weight to social as well 
as physical environmental consequences, and the acquisition of staff 
by the reviewing agency who are adequately qualified to comment on the 
documentation of social impacts.
Relating EIA to the decisionmaking process
A problem which is endemic to EIA is that, generally because of 
the length of time required to carry out environmental studies, the 
EIS document appears after some or all of the major decisions on 
whether or not the proposal should proceed have effectively been made.
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This means also that the public is informed at too late a stage as to 
the likely environmental consequences. This problem relates to the 
concept underlying EIA mentioned in Chapter One - that EIA in effect 
is an attempt to make the decisionmaking process more comprehensively 
rational by requiring review of feasible alternatives and by adding 
environmental costs and benefits to those normally considered.
Such an attempt, however, may be based on either of two dubious 
assumptions: one, that decisionmaking processes are largely rational
in any case so that it is not difficult to graft on an added element of 
rationality concerning environmental consequences; two, that although 
decisionmaking processes fall well short of comprehensive rationality 
the best approach is to attempt to push them one large step towards 
it by means of the EIA requirement.
It has been shown in preceding chapters that as well as rationality, 
decisionmaking is characterised by incrementalism, bureaucratic 
politics, and non-decision processes. Therefore, as well as attempting 
to introduce a larger element of rationality into the process by way 
of the EIA requirement, it may be fruitful to take steps which recognise 
the actual nature of decisionmaking processes and to some extent adapt 
to them.
There are many possible strategies for doing so. One is to 
encourage the production of EIA documentation in stages for large 
projects, so that, for instance, a preliminary environmental report 
based on easily available social and biophysical data is produced and 
made public much earlier in the decisionmaking process than is 
possible for a full EIS.
Such a document will activate public comment and input at stages 
when it is most likely to be considered, before planners are psychic­
ally, politically or financially committed to their plans. Comment 
from the public and other government agencies at an early stage is also 
more likely to be helpful in directing planners' attention to problems 
or providing information which has not yet been considered. It should 
not be difficult to make it clear that such a preliminary report is 
exactly that, and not a final report. The use of this tactic for the 
Monarto project defused a great deal of criticism which had been 
building up and also elicited useful information from the public.
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It is also desirable to emphasise the informal level of contact 
between the environmental agency and the proponent, and for the 
environmental agency to provide any reasonable assistance to the 
proponent. There are ultimately financial and manpower constraints 
on such activities, but at the present low level of formal EIA in 
Australia the requirements should not be large.
There should be a strong effort to minimise the amount of work 
done by external consultants, as opposed to internal staff, in 
carrying out EIA, the aim being to retain permanent in-house expertise 
which will promote environmental values from within. Government 
agencies whose work commonly involves proposals with significant 
environmental consequences should be required to appoint permanent 
staff to carry out environmental assessment.
In general, environmental agencies, as noted in previous chapters, 
are weak organisations in a strong environment, and should develop 
strategies and tactics to counter this as far as possible. Rondinelli 
(1976) suggests some interventionist strategies which may be appropriate 
in this situation.
•<Public involvement and public inquiries
The EIA/EIS process has many limitations, even when well conducted. 
As well as those already mentioned, there is the common problem that 
the decisionmakers are likely to accept public comments that they 
agree with, and ignore or rationalise those with which they disagree.
The content of such comments from the public does not become public 
unless they are set out in a revised EIS, which is not commonly the 
case.
The public inquiry form of EIA has a number of advantages. It 
provides for the debate to develop over the course of the inquiry; 
it allows third parties in the form of the commissioner(s) to assess 
the evidence, and it tends to separate the important from the trivial 
and the true from the false. Its major disadvantages are the time and 
costs involved. From a government's point of view, an inquiry's 
findings may create difficulties by conflicting with government 
intentions; for those required to give evidence, an inquiry may be an 
unpleasant experience. Only two public inquiries have been held in ten 
years under the Commonwealth EIA Act.
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Because of the advantages of the public inquiry, it may be 
desirable, while retaining the Ranger-type inquiry for major questions, 
to institute a form of inquiry of a less formal and comprehensive 
nature for matters more limited in their scope. The procedures used 
by the NSW State Pollution Control Commission noted in Chapter Five 
are of this kind. There are various means which may be used to 
prevent much of the repetition of similar evidence which occurred 
during the Ranger Inquiry, and to otherwise streamline proceedings.
The prior setting of an agenda for the SPCC inquiries following review 
of written submissions is an example of a procedure which may be 
viable for smaller inquiries.
The problems of non-routinisation
One of the main points for which those seeking improved environ­
mental assessment should strive is the routinisation of such assessment. 
Once such assessment becomes routine, many of the problems which it 
generates disappear. At present, EIA suffers from the politics of 
exception: because EIA is only required occasionally, there are no
routines and insufficient expertise to deal with it; it tends to be 
seen as an unwarranted imposition, and even when performed^it often 
remains unlinked to the real processes of organisational decision­
making. If the Australian experience with EIA shows anything, it is 
the uselessness of carrying out extensive environmental studies and 
producing reports over which the juggernaut of decisionmaking rolls 
unheeding, if it has not already disappeared over the horizon by the 
time the report appears.
Such problems can only be overcome by a more frequent and 
consistent requirement for EIA in whatever form, and the existence of 
enforceable procedures for its integration into decisionmaking. These 
things, of course, are a function of interest group and public pressure. 
Without such pressure, improvements in procedural requirements or 
public involvement will remain rare and often largely cosmetic in 
nature.
Environmental groups in Australia have not been able to form a 
sufficiently strong and persistent political alliance, other than on 
some specific issues, to bring about the routinisation of assessment 
of the environmental costs and benefits of proposals. That they have
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not done so is not really the fault of the environmental movement 
itself; it is a reflection of the strength of the influences which 
maintain the prevailing character and values of Australian society.
But there is a need for the environmental movement to recognise more 
fully that improved environmental management cannot be achieved as an 
isolated objective, but requires a much more general shift in the 
values and balance of power of society. To succeed, the environmental 
movement needs to relate its concerns with the physical environment 
to a similar concern with the social consequences of decisions, and to 
become part of a more general movement for political and social reform.
<.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR NEWSPAPERS
AFR The Australian Financial Review
Aust. The Australian
CM The Courier-Mail
CT The Canberra Times
NT The National Times (weekly)
SMH Sydney Morning Herald
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